bnxt_en: Add support for ndo_set_vf_trust

Trusted VFs are allowed to modify MAC address, even when PF
has assigned one.

Signed-off-by: Vasundhara Volam <vasundhara-v.volam@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

4 files changed, 37 insertions, 9 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
index 62a1443c1a2f..527ef269fed0 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
@@ -8206,6 +8206,7 @@ static const struct net_device_ops bnxt_netdev_ops = {
 	.ndo_set_vf_rate	= bnxt_set_vf_bw,
 	.ndo_set_vf_link_state	= bnxt_set_vf_link_state,
 	.ndo_set_vf_spoofchk	= bnxt_set_vf_spoofchk,
+	.ndo_set_vf_trust	= bnxt_set_vf_trust,
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_NET_POLL_CONTROLLER
 	.ndo_poll_controller	= bnxt_poll_controller,
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.h
index 9290d3cdc646..ae7c69b44472 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.h
@@ -815,6 +815,7 @@ struct bnxt_vf_info {
 #define BNXT_VF_SPOOFCHK	0x2
 #define BNXT_VF_LINK_FORCED	0x4
 #define BNXT_VF_LINK_UP		0x8
+#define BNXT_VF_TRUST		0x10
 	u32	func_flags; /* func cfg flags */
 	u32	min_tx_rate;
 	u32	max_tx_rate;
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.c
index d87faad901fe..a3d368ee3072 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /* Broadcom NetXtreme-C/E network driver.
  *
  * Copyright (c) 2014-2016 Broadcom Corporation
- * Copyright (c) 2016-2017 Broadcom Limited
+ * Copyright (c) 2016-2018 Broadcom Limited
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -121,6 +121,23 @@ int bnxt_set_vf_spoofchk(struct net_device *dev, int vf_id, bool setting)
 	return rc;
 }
 
+int bnxt_set_vf_trust(struct net_device *dev, int vf_id, bool trusted)
+{
+	struct bnxt *bp = netdev_priv(dev);
+	struct bnxt_vf_info *vf;
+
+	if (bnxt_vf_ndo_prep(bp, vf_id))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	vf = &bp->pf.vf[vf_id];
+	if (trusted)
+		vf->flags |= BNXT_VF_TRUST;
+	else
+		vf->flags &= ~BNXT_VF_TRUST;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int bnxt_get_vf_config(struct net_device *dev, int vf_id,
 		       struct ifla_vf_info *ivi)
 {
@@ -147,6 +164,7 @@ int bnxt_get_vf_config(struct net_device *dev, int vf_id,
 	else
 		ivi->qos = 0;
 	ivi->spoofchk = !!(vf->flags & BNXT_VF_SPOOFCHK);
+	ivi->trusted = !!(vf->flags & BNXT_VF_TRUST);
 	if (!(vf->flags & BNXT_VF_LINK_FORCED))
 		ivi->linkstate = IFLA_VF_LINK_STATE_AUTO;
 	else if (vf->flags & BNXT_VF_LINK_UP)
@@ -886,18 +904,19 @@ exec_fwd_resp_exit:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int bnxt_vf_store_mac(struct bnxt *bp, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf)
+static int bnxt_vf_configure_mac(struct bnxt *bp, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf)
 {
 	u32 msg_size = sizeof(struct hwrm_func_vf_cfg_input);
 	struct hwrm_func_vf_cfg_input *req =
 		(struct hwrm_func_vf_cfg_input *)vf->hwrm_cmd_req_addr;
 
-	/* Only allow VF to set a valid MAC address if the PF assigned MAC
-	 * address is zero
+	/* Allow VF to set a valid MAC address, if trust is set to on or
+	 * if the PF assigned MAC address is zero
 	 */
 	if (req->enables & cpu_to_le32(FUNC_VF_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_DFLT_MAC_ADDR)) {
 		if (is_valid_ether_addr(req->dflt_mac_addr) &&
-		    !is_valid_ether_addr(vf->mac_addr)) {
+		    ((vf->flags & BNXT_VF_TRUST) ||
+		     (!is_valid_ether_addr(vf->mac_addr)))) {
 			ether_addr_copy(vf->vf_mac_addr, req->dflt_mac_addr);
 			return bnxt_hwrm_exec_fwd_resp(bp, vf, msg_size);
 		}
@@ -913,11 +932,17 @@ static int bnxt_vf_validate_set_mac(struct bnxt *bp, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf)
 		(struct hwrm_cfa_l2_filter_alloc_input *)vf->hwrm_cmd_req_addr;
 	bool mac_ok = false;
 
-	/* VF MAC address must first match PF MAC address, if it is valid.
+	if (!is_valid_ether_addr((const u8 *)req->l2_addr))
+		return bnxt_hwrm_fwd_err_resp(bp, vf, msg_size);
+
+	/* Allow VF to set a valid MAC address, if trust is set to on.
+	 * Or VF MAC address must first match MAC address in PF's context.
 	 * Otherwise, it must match the VF MAC address if firmware spec >=
 	 * 1.2.2
 	 */
-	if (is_valid_ether_addr(vf->mac_addr)) {
+	if (vf->flags & BNXT_VF_TRUST) {
+		mac_ok = true;
+	} else if (is_valid_ether_addr(vf->mac_addr)) {
 		if (ether_addr_equal((const u8 *)req->l2_addr, vf->mac_addr))
 			mac_ok = true;
 	} else if (is_valid_ether_addr(vf->vf_mac_addr)) {
@@ -993,7 +1018,7 @@ static int bnxt_vf_req_validate_snd(struct bnxt *bp, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf)
 
 	switch (req_type) {
 	case HWRM_FUNC_VF_CFG:
-		rc = bnxt_vf_store_mac(bp, vf);
+		rc = bnxt_vf_configure_mac(bp, vf);
 		break;
 	case HWRM_CFA_L2_FILTER_ALLOC:
 		rc = bnxt_vf_validate_set_mac(bp, vf);
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.h
index dbc8d977fc5a..d10f6f6c7860 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.h
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /* Broadcom NetXtreme-C/E network driver.
  *
  * Copyright (c) 2014-2016 Broadcom Corporation
- * Copyright (c) 2016-2017 Broadcom Limited
+ * Copyright (c) 2016-2018 Broadcom Limited
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ int bnxt_set_vf_vlan(struct net_device *, int, u16, u8, __be16);
 int bnxt_set_vf_bw(struct net_device *, int, int, int);
 int bnxt_set_vf_link_state(struct net_device *, int, int);
 int bnxt_set_vf_spoofchk(struct net_device *, int, bool);
+int bnxt_set_vf_trust(struct net_device *dev, int vf_id, bool trust);
 int bnxt_sriov_configure(struct pci_dev *pdev, int num_vfs);
 void bnxt_sriov_disable(struct bnxt *);
 void bnxt_hwrm_exec_fwd_req(struct bnxt *);