Merge tag 'efi-next-for-v5.19-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi

Pull more EFI updates from Ard Biesheuvel:
 "Follow-up tweaks for EFI changes - they mostly address issues
  introduced this merge window, except for Heinrich's patch:

   - fix new DXE service invocations for mixed mode

   - use correct Kconfig symbol when setting PE header flag

   - clean up the drivers/firmware/efi Kconfig dependencies so that
     features that depend on CONFIG_EFI are hidden from the UI when the
     symbol is not enabled.

  Also included is a RISC-V bugfix from Heinrich to avoid read-write
  mappings of read-only firmware regions in the EFI page tables"

* tag 'efi-next-for-v5.19-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi:
  efi: clean up Kconfig dependencies on CONFIG_EFI
  efi/x86: libstub: Make DXE calls mixed mode safe
  efi: x86: Fix config name for setting the NX-compatibility flag in the PE header
  riscv: read-only pages should not be writable

6 files changed, 38 insertions, 34 deletions

diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/efi.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/efi.c
index 024159298231..1aa540350abd 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/efi.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/efi.c
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static int __init set_permissions(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr, void *data)
 
 	if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO) {
 		val = pte_val(pte) & ~_PAGE_WRITE;
-		val = pte_val(pte) | _PAGE_READ;
+		val |= _PAGE_READ;
 		pte = __pte(val);
 	}
 	if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_XP) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/header.S b/arch/x86/boot/header.S
index 0352e4589efa..f912d7770130 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/header.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/header.S
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ extra_header_fields:
 	.long	0x200				# SizeOfHeaders
 	.long	0				# CheckSum
 	.word	IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION	# Subsystem (EFI application)
-#ifdef CONFIG_DXE_MEM_ATTRIBUTES
+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_DXE_MEM_ATTRIBUTES
 	.word	IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_NX_COMPAT	# DllCharacteristics
 #else
 	.word	0				# DllCharacteristics
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
index bed74a0f2932..71943dce691e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -270,6 +270,8 @@ static inline u32 efi64_convert_status(efi_status_t status)
 	return (u32)(status | (u64)status >> 32);
 }
 
+#define __efi64_split(val)		(val) & U32_MAX, (u64)(val) >> 32
+
 #define __efi64_argmap_free_pages(addr, size)				\
 	((addr), 0, (size))
 
@@ -317,6 +319,13 @@ static inline u32 efi64_convert_status(efi_status_t status)
 #define __efi64_argmap_hash_log_extend_event(prot, fl, addr, size, ev)	\
 	((prot), (fl), 0ULL, (u64)(addr), 0ULL, (u64)(size), 0ULL, ev)
 
+/* DXE services */
+#define __efi64_argmap_get_memory_space_descriptor(phys, desc) \
+	(__efi64_split(phys), (desc))
+
+#define __efi64_argmap_set_memory_space_descriptor(phys, size, flags) \
+	(__efi64_split(phys), __efi64_split(size), __efi64_split(flags))
+
 /*
  * The macros below handle the plumbing for the argument mapping. To add a
  * mapping for a specific EFI method, simply define a macro
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/Makefile
index 1be0e8295222..28fcddcd688f 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/Makefile
@@ -32,8 +32,7 @@ obj-y				+= broadcom/
 obj-y				+= cirrus/
 obj-y				+= meson/
 obj-$(CONFIG_GOOGLE_FIRMWARE)	+= google/
-obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)		+= efi/
-obj-$(CONFIG_UEFI_CPER)		+= efi/
+obj-y				+= efi/
 obj-y				+= imx/
 obj-y				+= psci/
 obj-y				+= smccc/
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig b/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig
index 4720ba98cec3..7aa4717cdcac 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig
@@ -193,6 +193,9 @@ config EFI_TEST
 	  Say Y here to enable the runtime services support via /dev/efi_test.
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+config EFI_DEV_PATH_PARSER
+	bool
+
 config APPLE_PROPERTIES
 	bool "Apple Device Properties"
 	depends on EFI_STUB && X86
@@ -255,40 +258,15 @@ config EFI_DISABLE_PCI_DMA
 	  options "efi=disable_early_pci_dma" or "efi=no_disable_early_pci_dma"
 	  may be used to override this option.
 
-endmenu
-
-config EFI_EMBEDDED_FIRMWARE
-	bool
-	depends on EFI
-	select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
-
-config UEFI_CPER
-	bool
-
-config UEFI_CPER_ARM
-	bool
-	depends on UEFI_CPER && ( ARM || ARM64 )
-	default y
-
-config UEFI_CPER_X86
-	bool
-	depends on UEFI_CPER && X86
-	default y
-
-config EFI_DEV_PATH_PARSER
-	bool
-	depends on ACPI
-	default n
-
 config EFI_EARLYCON
 	def_bool y
-	depends on EFI && SERIAL_EARLYCON && !ARM && !IA64
+	depends on SERIAL_EARLYCON && !ARM && !IA64
 	select FONT_SUPPORT
 	select ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT
 
 config EFI_CUSTOM_SSDT_OVERLAYS
 	bool "Load custom ACPI SSDT overlay from an EFI variable"
-	depends on EFI && ACPI
+	depends on ACPI
 	default ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE
 	help
 	  Allow loading of an ACPI SSDT overlay from an EFI variable specified
@@ -314,7 +292,6 @@ config EFI_DISABLE_RUNTIME
 
 config EFI_COCO_SECRET
 	bool "EFI Confidential Computing Secret Area Support"
-	depends on EFI
 	help
 	  Confidential Computing platforms (such as AMD SEV) allow the
 	  Guest Owner to securely inject secrets during guest VM launch.
@@ -327,3 +304,22 @@ config EFI_COCO_SECRET
 	  for usage inside the kernel.  This will allow the
 	  virt/coco/efi_secret module to access the secrets, which in turn
 	  allows userspace programs to access the injected secrets.
+
+config EFI_EMBEDDED_FIRMWARE
+	bool
+	select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
+
+endmenu
+
+config UEFI_CPER
+	bool
+
+config UEFI_CPER_ARM
+	bool
+	depends on UEFI_CPER && ( ARM || ARM64 )
+	default y
+
+config UEFI_CPER_X86
+	bool
+	depends on UEFI_CPER && X86
+	default y
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
index b14e88ccefca..05ae8bcc9d67 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
@@ -260,10 +260,10 @@ adjust_memory_range_protection(unsigned long start, unsigned long size)
 				      EFI_MEMORY_WB);
 
 		if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
-			efi_warn("Unable to unprotect memory range [%08lx,%08lx]: %d\n",
+			efi_warn("Unable to unprotect memory range [%08lx,%08lx]: %lx\n",
 				 unprotect_start,
 				 unprotect_start + unprotect_size,
-				 (int)status);
+				 status);
 		}
 	}
 }