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authorRichard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>2022-02-25 17:54:38 +0000
committerPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>2022-02-25 15:35:19 -0500
commit65881e1db4e948614d9eb195b8e1197339822949 (patch)
tree5412d30772bda69f399724371c13d53cfa4c1d96
parentb97df7c098c531010e445da88d02b7bf7bf59ef6 (diff)
downloadlinux-65881e1db4e948614d9eb195b8e1197339822949.tar.bz2
selinux: allow FIOCLEX and FIONCLEX with policy capability
These ioctls are equivalent to fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, flags), which SELinux always allows too. Furthermore, a failed FIOCLEX could result in a file descriptor being leaked to a process that should not have access to it. As this patch removes access controls, a policy capability needs to be enabled in policy to always allow these ioctls. Based-on-patch-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c6
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/policycap.h1
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h3
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/security.h7
4 files changed, 16 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1e69f88eb326..b12e14b2797b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3682,6 +3682,12 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
break;
+ case FIOCLEX:
+ case FIONCLEX:
+ if (!selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec())
+ error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
+ break;
+
/* default case assumes that the command will go
* to the file's ioctl() function.
*/
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h
index 2ec038efbb03..a9e572ca4fd9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ enum {
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL,
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION,
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS,
+ POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC,
__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX
};
#define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h
index b89289f092c9..ebd64afe1def 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h
@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ const char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = {
"always_check_network",
"cgroup_seclabel",
"nnp_nosuid_transition",
- "genfs_seclabel_symlinks"
+ "genfs_seclabel_symlinks",
+ "ioctl_skip_cloexec"
};
#endif /* _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_NAMES_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index d91a5672de99..84f42fa8012f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -219,6 +219,13 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void)
return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS]);
}
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec(void)
+{
+ struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+ return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC]);
+}
+
struct selinux_policy_convert_data;
struct selinux_load_state {