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authorPavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>2021-11-01 10:12:12 +0300
committerMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>2021-11-16 13:59:20 +0100
commit3a56ef719f0b9682afb8a86d64b2399e36faa4e6 (patch)
treec3e6b7d83ea115d0fad007d36fdf3691aec1e071
parentdd2ac1d6d4954522c67279e42e7069b91f67f151 (diff)
downloadlinux-3a56ef719f0b9682afb8a86d64b2399e36faa4e6.tar.bz2
Bluetooth: stop proccessing malicious adv data
Syzbot reported slab-out-of-bounds read in hci_le_adv_report_evt(). The problem was in missing validaion check. We should check if data is not malicious and we can read next data block. If we won't check ptr validness, code can read a way beyond skb->end and it can cause problems, of course. Fixes: e95beb414168 ("Bluetooth: hci_le_adv_report_evt code refactoring") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e3fcb9c4f3c2a931dc40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/hci_event.c8
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index d4b75a6cfeee..5471fbf38873 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -5906,7 +5906,8 @@ static void hci_le_adv_report_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct hci_ev_le_advertising_info *ev = ptr;
s8 rssi;
- if (ev->length <= HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH) {
+ if (ev->length <= HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH &&
+ ev->data + ev->length <= skb_tail_pointer(skb)) {
rssi = ev->data[ev->length];
process_adv_report(hdev, ev->evt_type, &ev->bdaddr,
ev->bdaddr_type, NULL, 0, rssi,
@@ -5916,6 +5917,11 @@ static void hci_le_adv_report_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
}
ptr += sizeof(*ev) + ev->length + 1;
+
+ if (ptr > (void *) skb_tail_pointer(skb) - sizeof(*ev)) {
+ bt_dev_err(hdev, "Malicious advertising data. Stopping processing");
+ break;
+ }
}
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);