Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 PTI updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "Fix reporting bugs of the MDS and TAA mitigation status, if one or
  both are set via a boot option.

  No change to mitigation behavior intended"

* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/speculation: Fix redundant MDS mitigation message
  x86/speculation: Fix incorrect MDS/TAA mitigation status

4 files changed, 48 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
index e3a796c0d3a2..2d19c9f4c1fe 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
@@ -265,8 +265,11 @@ time with the option "mds=". The valid arguments for this option are:
 
   ============  =============================================================
 
-Not specifying this option is equivalent to "mds=full".
-
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "mds=full". For processors
+that are affected by both TAA (TSX Asynchronous Abort) and MDS,
+specifying just "mds=off" without an accompanying "tsx_async_abort=off"
+will have no effect as the same mitigation is used for both
+vulnerabilities.
 
 Mitigation selection guide
 --------------------------
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
index fddbd7579c53..af6865b822d2 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
@@ -174,7 +174,10 @@ the option "tsx_async_abort=". The valid arguments for this option are:
                 CPU is not vulnerable to cross-thread TAA attacks.
   ============  =============================================================
 
-Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx_async_abort=full".
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx_async_abort=full". For
+processors that are affected by both TAA and MDS, specifying just
+"tsx_async_abort=off" without an accompanying "mds=off" will have no
+effect as the same mitigation is used for both vulnerabilities.
 
 The kernel command line also allows to control the TSX feature using the
 parameter "tsx=" on CPUs which support TSX control. MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL is used
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 9b847f06cb19..a0a4732eedbb 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2473,6 +2473,12 @@
 				     SMT on vulnerable CPUs
 			off        - Unconditionally disable MDS mitigation
 
+			On TAA-affected machines, mds=off can be prevented by
+			an active TAA mitigation as both vulnerabilities are
+			mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to disable
+			this mitigation, you need to specify tsx_async_abort=off
+			too.
+
 			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
 			mds=full.
 
@@ -4931,6 +4937,11 @@
 				     vulnerable to cross-thread TAA attacks.
 			off        - Unconditionally disable TAA mitigation
 
+			On MDS-affected machines, tsx_async_abort=off can be
+			prevented by an active MDS mitigation as both vulnerabilities
+			are mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to disable
+			this mitigation, you need to specify mds=off too.
+
 			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
 			tsx_async_abort=full.  On CPUs which are MDS affected
 			and deploy MDS mitigation, TAA mitigation is not
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 4c7b0fa15a19..8bf64899f56a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void);
 static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
 
 /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
@@ -108,6 +109,12 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 	mds_select_mitigation();
 	taa_select_mitigation();
 
+	/*
+	 * As MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related, print MDS
+	 * mitigation until after TAA mitigation selection is done.
+	 */
+	mds_print_mitigation();
+
 	arch_smt_update();
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
@@ -245,6 +252,12 @@ static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
 		    (mds_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
 			cpu_smt_disable(false);
 	}
+}
+
+static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off())
+		return;
 
 	pr_info("%s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
 }
@@ -304,8 +317,12 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
 		return;
 	}
 
-	/* TAA mitigation is turned off on the cmdline (tsx_async_abort=off) */
-	if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF)
+	/*
+	 * TAA mitigation via VERW is turned off if both
+	 * tsx_async_abort=off and mds=off are specified.
+	 */
+	if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+	    mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
 		goto out;
 
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
@@ -339,6 +356,15 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
 	if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
 		cpu_smt_disable(false);
 
+	/*
+	 * Update MDS mitigation, if necessary, as the mds_user_clear is
+	 * now enabled for TAA mitigation.
+	 */
+	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+	    boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
+		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+		mds_select_mitigation();
+	}
 out:
 	pr_info("%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
 }