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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2014-08-06 08:06:39 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2014-08-06 08:06:39 -0700
commitbb2cbf5e9367d8598fecd0c48dead69560750223 (patch)
treefb2c620451b90f41a31726bdd82077813f941e39
parente7fda6c4c3c1a7d6996dd75fd84670fa0b5d448f (diff)
parent478d085524c57cf4283699f529d5a4c22188ea69 (diff)
downloadlinux-bb2cbf5e9367d8598fecd0c48dead69560750223.tar.bz2
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "In this release: - PKCS#7 parser for the key management subsystem from David Howells - appoint Kees Cook as seccomp maintainer - bugfixes and general maintenance across the subsystem" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (94 commits) X.509: Need to export x509_request_asymmetric_key() netlabel: shorter names for the NetLabel catmap funcs/structs netlabel: fix the catmap walking functions netlabel: fix the horribly broken catmap functions netlabel: fix a problem when setting bits below the previously lowest bit PKCS#7: X.509 certificate issuer and subject are mandatory fields in the ASN.1 tpm: simplify code by using %*phN specifier tpm: Provide a generic means to override the chip returned timeouts tpm: missing tpm_chip_put in tpm_get_random() tpm: Properly clean sysfs entries in error path tpm: Add missing tpm_do_selftest to ST33 I2C driver PKCS#7: Use x509_request_asymmetric_key() Revert "selinux: fix the default socket labeling in sock_graft()" X.509: x509_request_asymmetric_keys() doesn't need string length arguments PKCS#7: fix sparse non static symbol warning KEYS: revert encrypted key change ima: add support for measuring and appraising firmware firmware_class: perform new LSM checks security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook PKCS#7: Missing inclusion of linux/err.h ...
-rw-r--r--Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy4
-rw-r--r--Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt22
-rw-r--r--Documentation/security/keys.txt14
-rw-r--r--MAINTAINERS10
-rw-r--r--arch/Kconfig1
-rw-r--r--arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/arm/kernel/calls.S1
-rw-r--r--arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h15
-rw-r--r--arch/mips/kernel/scall32-o32.S1
-rw-r--r--arch/mips/kernel/scall64-64.S1
-rw-r--r--arch/mips/kernel/scall64-n32.S1
-rw-r--r--arch/mips/kernel/scall64-o32.S1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl1
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig34
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile37
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c78
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn128
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c126
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1127
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c100
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c396
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h61
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c166
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c321
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c457
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h42
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn12
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c20
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h13
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c115
-rw-r--r--drivers/base/firmware_class.c30
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c73
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c4
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33.c1
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c31
-rw-r--r--fs/exec.c6
-rw-r--r--fs/nfs/idmap.c10
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/array.c11
-rw-r--r--include/crypto/pkcs7.h36
-rw-r--r--include/crypto/public_key.h4
-rw-r--r--include/keys/big_key-type.h3
-rw-r--r--include/keys/system_keyring.h10
-rw-r--r--include/keys/user-type.h3
-rw-r--r--include/linux/capability.h5
-rw-r--r--include/linux/ima.h6
-rw-r--r--include/linux/key-type.h5
-rw-r--r--include/linux/key.h2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/oid_registry.h8
-rw-r--r--include/linux/pe.h448
-rw-r--r--include/linux/sched.h18
-rw-r--r--include/linux/seccomp.h8
-rw-r--r--include/linux/security.h17
-rw-r--r--include/linux/syscalls.h2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/tpm.h3
-rw-r--r--include/linux/verify_pefile.h18
-rw-r--r--include/net/netlabel.h94
-rw-r--r--include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h4
-rw-r--r--include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h7
-rw-r--r--kernel/audit.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/capability.c4
-rw-r--r--kernel/fork.c49
-rw-r--r--kernel/seccomp.c412
-rw-r--r--kernel/sys.c4
-rw-r--r--kernel/sys_ni.c3
-rw-r--r--kernel/system_keyring.c1
-rw-r--r--lib/Kconfig3
-rw-r--r--net/ceph/crypto.c26
-rw-r--r--net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c43
-rw-r--r--net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c1
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c47
-rw-r--r--net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c327
-rw-r--r--net/rxrpc/ar-key.c165
-rw-r--r--scripts/selinux/genheaders/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/domain.c4
-rw-r--r--security/capability.c6
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c75
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/digsig.c28
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/Kconfig10
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h15
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c10
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c312
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c28
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c13
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/integrity.h14
-rw-r--r--security/keys/big_key.c41
-rw-r--r--security/keys/key.c49
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c21
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c34
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key_auth.c13
-rw-r--r--security/keys/user_defined.c41
-rw-r--r--security/security.c11
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c14
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/netif.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/netnode.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/netport.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/security.h3
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netif.c15
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netnode.c15
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netport.c15
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/conditional.c11
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c133
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h8
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.c141
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c41
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_access.c11
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c6
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c14
110 files changed, 4480 insertions, 834 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 4c3efe434806..d0d0c578324c 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ Description:
option: [[appraise_type=]] [permit_directio]
base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
+ [FIRMWARE_CHECK]
mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC]
fsmagic:= hex value
fsuuid:= file system UUID (e.g 8bcbe394-4f13-4144-be8e-5aa9ea2ce2f6)
@@ -57,7 +58,8 @@ Description:
measure func=BPRM_CHECK
measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
- measure func=MODULE_CHECK uid=0
+ measure func=MODULE_CHECK
+ measure func=FIRMWARE_CHECK
appraise fowner=0
The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check,
diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index 6c062a64a796..883901b9ac4f 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -566,6 +566,11 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
possible to determine what the correct size should be.
This option provides an override for these situations.
+ ca_keys= [KEYS] This parameter identifies a specific key(s) on
+ the system trusted keyring to be used for certificate
+ trust validation.
+ format: { id:<keyid> | builtin }
+
ccw_timeout_log [S390]
See Documentation/s390/CommonIO for details.
@@ -1319,6 +1324,23 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" }
Default: "ima-ng"
+ ima.ahash_minsize= [IMA] Minimum file size for asynchronous hash usage
+ Format: <min_file_size>
+ Set the minimal file size for using asynchronous hash.
+ If left unspecified, ahash usage is disabled.
+
+ ahash performance varies for different data sizes on
+ different crypto accelerators. This option can be used
+ to achieve the best performance for a particular HW.
+
+ ima.ahash_bufsize= [IMA] Asynchronous hash buffer size
+ Format: <bufsize>
+ Set hashing buffer size. Default: 4k.
+
+ ahash performance varies for different chunk sizes on
+ different crypto accelerators. This option can be used
+ to achieve best performance for particular HW.
+
init= [KNL]
Format: <full_path>
Run specified binary instead of /sbin/init as init
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
index a4c33f1a7c6d..8727c194ca16 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
@@ -1150,20 +1150,24 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory:
const void *data;
size_t datalen;
size_t quotalen;
+ time_t expiry;
};
Before calling the method, the caller will fill in data and datalen with
the payload blob parameters; quotalen will be filled in with the default
- quota size from the key type and the rest will be cleared.
+ quota size from the key type; expiry will be set to TIME_T_MAX and the
+ rest will be cleared.
If a description can be proposed from the payload contents, that should be
attached as a string to the description field. This will be used for the
key description if the caller of add_key() passes NULL or "".
The method can attach anything it likes to type_data[] and payload. These
- are merely passed along to the instantiate() or update() operations.
+ are merely passed along to the instantiate() or update() operations. If
+ set, the expiry time will be applied to the key if it is instantiated from
+ this data.
- The method should return 0 if success ful or a negative error code
+ The method should return 0 if successful or a negative error code
otherwise.
@@ -1172,7 +1176,9 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory:
This method is only required if the preparse() method is provided,
otherwise it is unused. It cleans up anything attached to the
description, type_data and payload fields of the key_preparsed_payload
- struct as filled in by the preparse() method.
+ struct as filled in by the preparse() method. It will always be called
+ after preparse() returns successfully, even if instantiate() or update()
+ succeed.
(*) int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index f77776304406..b9d02936c1df 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -8002,6 +8002,16 @@ S: Maintained
F: drivers/mmc/host/sdhci.*
F: drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pltfm.[ch]
+SECURE COMPUTING
+M: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git seccomp
+S: Supported
+F: kernel/seccomp.c
+F: include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
+F: include/linux/seccomp.h
+K: \bsecure_computing
+K: \bTIF_SECCOMP\b
+
SECURE DIGITAL HOST CONTROLLER INTERFACE, OPEN FIRMWARE BINDINGS (SDHCI-OF)
M: Anton Vorontsov <anton@enomsg.org>
L: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index 97ff872c7acc..0eae9df35b88 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -321,6 +321,7 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
- secure_computing is called from a ptrace_event()-safe context
- secure_computing return value is checked and a return value of -1
results in the system call being skipped immediately.
+ - seccomp syscall wired up
config SECCOMP_FILTER
def_bool y
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h b/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
index acd5b66ea3aa..767ea204334e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
@@ -409,6 +409,7 @@
#define __NR_sched_setattr (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+380)
#define __NR_sched_getattr (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+381)
#define __NR_renameat2 (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+382)
+#define __NR_seccomp (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+383)
/*
* The following SWIs are ARM private.
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S b/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S
index 8f51bdcdacbb..bea85f97f363 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S
@@ -392,6 +392,7 @@
/* 380 */ CALL(sys_sched_setattr)
CALL(sys_sched_getattr)
CALL(sys_renameat2)
+ CALL(sys_seccomp)
#ifndef syscalls_counted
.equ syscalls_padding, ((NR_syscalls + 3) & ~3) - NR_syscalls
#define syscalls_counted
diff --git a/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h b/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
index 5805414777e0..9bc13eaf9d67 100644
--- a/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
+++ b/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
@@ -372,16 +372,17 @@
#define __NR_sched_setattr (__NR_Linux + 349)
#define __NR_sched_getattr (__NR_Linux + 350)
#define __NR_renameat2 (__NR_Linux + 351)
+#define __NR_seccomp (__NR_Linux + 352)
/*
* Offset of the last Linux o32 flavoured syscall
*/
-#define __NR_Linux_syscalls 351
+#define __NR_Linux_syscalls 352
#endif /* _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI32 */
#define __NR_O32_Linux 4000
-#define __NR_O32_Linux_syscalls 351
+#define __NR_O32_Linux_syscalls 352
#if _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI64
@@ -701,16 +702,17 @@
#define __NR_sched_setattr (__NR_Linux + 309)
#define __NR_sched_getattr (__NR_Linux + 310)
#define __NR_renameat2 (__NR_Linux + 311)
+#define __NR_seccomp (__NR_Linux + 312)
/*
* Offset of the last Linux 64-bit flavoured syscall
*/
-#define __NR_Linux_syscalls 311
+#define __NR_Linux_syscalls 312
#endif /* _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI64 */
#define __NR_64_Linux 5000
-#define __NR_64_Linux_syscalls 311
+#define __NR_64_Linux_syscalls 312
#if _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_NABI32
@@ -1034,15 +1036,16 @@
#define __NR_sched_setattr (__NR_Linux + 313)
#define __NR_sched_getattr (__NR_Linux + 314)
#define __NR_renameat2 (__NR_Linux + 315)
+#define __NR_seccomp (__NR_Linux + 316)
/*
* Offset of the last N32 flavoured syscall
*/
-#define __NR_Linux_syscalls 315
+#define __NR_Linux_syscalls 316
#endif /* _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_NABI32 */
#define __NR_N32_Linux 6000
-#define __NR_N32_Linux_syscalls 315
+#define __NR_N32_Linux_syscalls 316
#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_UNISTD_H */
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/scall32-o32.S b/arch/mips/kernel/scall32-o32.S
index 3245474f19d5..ab02d14f1b5c 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/scall32-o32.S
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/scall32-o32.S
@@ -578,3 +578,4 @@ EXPORT(sys_call_table)
PTR sys_sched_setattr
PTR sys_sched_getattr /* 4350 */
PTR sys_renameat2
+ PTR sys_seccomp
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/scall64-64.S b/arch/mips/kernel/scall64-64.S
index be2fedd4ae33..010dccf128ec 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/scall64-64.S
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/scall64-64.S
@@ -431,4 +431,5 @@ EXPORT(sys_call_table)
PTR sys_sched_setattr
PTR sys_sched_getattr /* 5310 */
PTR sys_renameat2
+ PTR sys_seccomp
.size sys_call_table,.-sys_call_table
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/scall64-n32.S b/arch/mips/kernel/scall64-n32.S
index c1dbcda4b816..c3b3b6525df5 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/scall64-n32.S
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/scall64-n32.S
@@ -424,4 +424,5 @@ EXPORT(sysn32_call_table)
PTR sys_sched_setattr
PTR sys_sched_getattr
PTR sys_renameat2 /* 6315 */
+ PTR sys_seccomp
.size sysn32_call_table,.-sysn32_call_table
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/scall64-o32.S b/arch/mips/kernel/scall64-o32.S
index f1343ccd7ed7..bb1550b1f501 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/scall64-o32.S
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/scall64-o32.S
@@ -557,4 +557,5 @@ EXPORT(sys32_call_table)
PTR sys_sched_setattr
PTR sys_sched_getattr /* 4350 */
PTR sys_renameat2
+ PTR sys_seccomp
.size sys32_call_table,.-sys32_call_table
diff --git a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
index d6b867921612..7527eac24122 100644
--- a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
@@ -360,3 +360,4 @@
351 i386 sched_setattr sys_sched_setattr
352 i386 sched_getattr sys_sched_getattr
353 i386 renameat2 sys_renameat2
+354 i386 seccomp sys_seccomp
diff --git a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
index ec255a1646d2..16272a6c12b7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@
314 common sched_setattr sys_sched_setattr
315 common sched_getattr sys_sched_getattr
316 common renameat2 sys_renameat2
+317 common seccomp sys_seccomp
#
# x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
index 03a6eb95ab50..4870f28403f5 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ config ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
config PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
tristate "RSA public-key algorithm"
- select MPILIB_EXTRA
select MPILIB
help
This option enables support for the RSA algorithm (PKCS#1, RFC3447).
@@ -33,8 +32,39 @@ config X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
select ASN1
select OID_REGISTRY
help
- This option procides support for parsing X.509 format blobs for key
+ This option provides support for parsing X.509 format blobs for key
data and provides the ability to instantiate a crypto key from a
public key packet found inside the certificate.
+config PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
+ tristate "PKCS#7 message parser"
+ depends on X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+ select ASN1
+ select OID_REGISTRY
+ help
+ This option provides support for parsing PKCS#7 format messages for
+ signature data and provides the ability to verify the signature.
+
+config PKCS7_TEST_KEY
+ tristate "PKCS#7 testing key type"
+ depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
+ select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ help
+ This option provides a type of key that can be loaded up from a
+ PKCS#7 message - provided the message is signed by a trusted key. If
+ it is, the PKCS#7 wrapper is discarded and reading the key returns
+ just the payload. If it isn't, adding the key will fail with an
+ error.
+
+ This is intended for testing the PKCS#7 parser.
+
+config SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
+ bool "Support for PE file signature verification"
+ depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y
+ select ASN1
+ select OID_REGISTRY
+ help
+ This option provides support for verifying the signature(s) on a
+ signed PE binary.
+
endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
index 0727204aab68..e47fcd9ac5e8 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
@@ -25,3 +25,40 @@ $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.o: $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.c $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.h
clean-files += x509-asn1.c x509-asn1.h
clean-files += x509_rsakey-asn1.c x509_rsakey-asn1.h
+
+#
+# PKCS#7 message handling
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER) += pkcs7_message.o
+pkcs7_message-y := \
+ pkcs7-asn1.o \
+ pkcs7_parser.o \
+ pkcs7_trust.o \
+ pkcs7_verify.o
+
+$(obj)/pkcs7_parser.o: $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.h
+$(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.o: $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.c $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.h
+
+clean-files += pkcs7-asn1.c pkcs7-asn1.h
+
+#
+# PKCS#7 parser testing key
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_PKCS7_TEST_KEY) += pkcs7_test_key.o
+pkcs7_test_key-y := \
+ pkcs7_key_type.o
+
+#
+# Signed PE binary-wrapped key handling
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION) += verify_signed_pefile.o
+
+verify_signed_pefile-y := \
+ verify_pefile.o \
+ mscode_parser.o \
+ mscode-asn1.o
+
+$(obj)/mscode_parser.o: $(obj)/mscode-asn1.h $(obj)/mscode-asn1.h
+$(obj)/mscode-asn1.o: $(obj)/mscode-asn1.c $(obj)/mscode-asn1.h
+
+clean-files += mscode-asn1.c mscode-asn1.h
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
index 515b63430812..a63c551c6557 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
+int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id);
+
static inline const char *asymmetric_key_id(const struct key *key)
{
return key->type_data.p[1];
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
index b77eb5304788..eb8cd46961a5 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
@@ -23,6 +23,35 @@ static LIST_HEAD(asymmetric_key_parsers);
static DECLARE_RWSEM(asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
/*
+ * Match asymmetric key id with partial match
+ * @id: key id to match in a form "id:<id>"
+ */
+int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id)
+{
+ size_t idlen, kidlen;
+
+ if (!kid || !id)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* make it possible to use id as in the request: "id:<id>" */
+ if (strncmp(id, "id:", 3) == 0)
+ id += 3;
+
+ /* Anything after here requires a partial match on the ID string */
+ idlen = strlen(id);
+ kidlen = strlen(kid);
+ if (idlen > kidlen)
+ return 0;
+
+ kid += kidlen - idlen;
+ if (strcasecmp(id, kid) != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_keyid_match);
+
+/*
* Match asymmetric keys on (part of) their name
* We have some shorthand methods for matching keys. We allow:
*
@@ -34,9 +63,8 @@ static int asymmetric_key_match(const struct key *key, const void *description)
{
const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
const char *spec = description;
- const char *id, *kid;
+ const char *id;
ptrdiff_t speclen;
- size_t idlen, kidlen;
if (!subtype || !spec || !*spec)
return 0;
@@ -55,23 +83,8 @@ static int asymmetric_key_match(const struct key *key, const void *description)
speclen = id - spec;
id++;
- /* Anything after here requires a partial match on the ID string */
- kid = asymmetric_key_id(key);
- if (!kid)
- return 0;
-
- idlen = strlen(id);
- kidlen = strlen(kid);
- if (idlen > kidlen)
- return 0;
-
- kid += kidlen - idlen;
- if (strcasecmp(id, kid) != 0)
- return 0;
-
- if (speclen == 2 &&
- memcmp(spec, "id", 2) == 0)
- return 1;
+ if (speclen == 2 && memcmp(spec, "id", 2) == 0)
+ return asymmetric_keyid_match(asymmetric_key_id(key), id);
if (speclen == subtype->name_len &&
memcmp(spec, subtype->name, speclen) == 0)
@@ -156,7 +169,7 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
if (subtype) {
- subtype->destroy(prep->payload);
+ subtype->destroy(prep->payload[0]);
module_put(subtype->owner);
}
kfree(prep->type_data[1]);
@@ -164,29 +177,6 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
}
/*
- * Instantiate a asymmetric_key defined key. The key was preparsed, so we just
- * have to transfer the data here.
- */
-static int asymmetric_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
-{
- int ret;
-
- pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
-
- ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->quotalen);
- if (ret == 0) {
- key->type_data.p[0] = prep->type_data[0];
- key->type_data.p[1] = prep->type_data[1];
- key->payload.data = prep->payload;
- prep->type_data[0] = NULL;
- prep->type_data[1] = NULL;
- prep->payload = NULL;
- }
- pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
* dispose of the data dangling from the corpse of a asymmetric key
*/
static void asymmetric_key_destroy(struct key *key)
@@ -205,7 +195,7 @@ struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = {
.name = "asymmetric",
.preparse = asymmetric_key_preparse,
.free_preparse = asymmetric_key_free_preparse,
- .instantiate = asymmetric_key_instantiate,
+ .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
.match = asymmetric_key_match,
.destroy = asymmetric_key_destroy,
.describe = asymmetric_key_describe,
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6d09ba48c41c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn1
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+--- Microsoft individual code signing data blob parser
+---
+--- Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+--- Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+---
+--- This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+--- modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+--- as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+--- 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+---
+
+MSCode ::= SEQUENCE {
+ type SEQUENCE {
+ contentType ContentType,
+ parameters ANY
+ },
+ content SEQUENCE {
+ digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
+ digest OCTET STRING ({ mscode_note_digest })
+ }
+}
+
+ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ mscode_note_content_type })
+
+DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+ algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ mscode_note_digest_algo }),
+ parameters ANY OPTIONAL
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..214a992123cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+/* Parse a Microsoft Individual Code Signing blob
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MSCODE: "fmt
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include "verify_pefile.h"
+#include "mscode-asn1.h"
+
+/*
+ * Parse a Microsoft Individual Code Signing blob
+ */
+int mscode_parse(struct pefile_context *ctx)
+{
+ const void *content_data;
+ size_t data_len;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(ctx->pkcs7, &content_data, &data_len, 1);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_debug("PKCS#7 message does not contain data\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ pr_devel("Data: %zu [%*ph]\n", data_len, (unsigned)(data_len),
+ content_data);
+
+ return asn1_ber_decoder(&mscode_decoder, ctx, content_data, data_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check the content type OID
+ */
+int mscode_note_content_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ enum OID oid;
+
+ oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+ if (oid == OID__NR) {
+ char buffer[50];
+
+ sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+ pr_err("Unknown OID: %s\n", buffer);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * pesign utility had a bug where it was putting
+ * OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose instead of OID_msPeImageDataObjId
+ * So allow both OIDs.
+ */
+ if (oid != OID_msPeImageDataObjId &&
+ oid != OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose) {
+ pr_err("Unexpected content type OID %u\n", oid);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the digest algorithm OID
+ */
+int mscode_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pefile_context *ctx = context;
+ char buffer[50];
+ enum OID oid;
+
+ oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+ switch (oid) {
+ case OID_md4:
+ ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD4;
+ break;
+ case OID_md5:
+ ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+ break;
+ case OID_sha1:
+ ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+ break;
+ case OID_sha256:
+ ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA256;
+ break;
+
+ case OID__NR:
+ sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+ pr_err("Unknown OID: %s\n", buffer);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ default:
+ pr_err("Unsupported content type: %u\n", oid);
+ return -ENOPKG;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the digest we're guaranteeing with this certificate
+ */
+int mscode_note_digest(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pefile_context *ctx = context;
+
+ ctx->digest = value;
+ ctx->digest_len = vlen;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a5a14ef28c86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+PKCS7ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ contentType ContentType,
+ content [0] EXPLICIT SignedData OPTIONAL
+}
+
+ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID })
+
+SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ version INTEGER,
+ digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
+ contentInfo ContentInfo,
+ certificates CHOICE {
+ certSet [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates,
+ certSequence [2] IMPLICIT Certificates
+ } OPTIONAL ({ pkcs7_note_certificate_list }),
+ crls CHOICE {
+ crlSet [1] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists,
+ crlSequence [3] IMPLICIT CRLSequence
+ } OPTIONAL,
+ signerInfos SignerInfos
+}
+
+ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ contentType ContentType,
+ content [0] EXPLICIT Data OPTIONAL
+}
+
+Data ::= ANY ({ pkcs7_note_data })
+
+DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ::= CHOICE {
+ daSet SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
+ daSequence SEQUENCE OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier
+}
+
+DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+ algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+ parameters ANY OPTIONAL
+}
+
+--
+-- Certificates and certificate lists
+--
+ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates ::= SET OF ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate
+
+ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate ::= CHOICE {
+ certificate Certificate, -- X.509
+ extendedCertificate [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificate -- PKCS#6
+}
+
+ExtendedCertificate ::= Certificate -- cheating
+
+Certificates ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate
+
+CertificateRevocationLists ::= SET OF CertificateList
+
+CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate -- This may be defined incorrectly
+
+CRLSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
+
+Certificate ::= ANY ({ pkcs7_extract_cert }) -- X.509
+
+--
+-- Signer information
+--
+SignerInfos ::= CHOICE {
+ siSet SET OF SignerInfo,
+ siSequence SEQUENCE OF SignerInfo
+}
+
+SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ version INTEGER,
+ issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
+ digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ({ pkcs7_sig_note_digest_algo }),
+ authenticatedAttributes CHOICE {
+ aaSet [0] IMPLICIT SetOfAuthenticatedAttribute
+ ({ pkcs7_sig_note_set_of_authattrs }),
+ aaSequence [2] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF AuthenticatedAttribute
+ -- Explicit because easier to compute digest on
+ -- sequence of attributes and then reuse encoded
+ -- sequence in aaSequence.
+ } OPTIONAL,
+ digestEncryptionAlgorithm
+ DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ({ pkcs7_sig_note_pkey_algo }),
+ encryptedDigest EncryptedDigest,
+ unauthenticatedAttributes CHOICE {
+ uaSet [1] IMPLICIT SET OF UnauthenticatedAttribute,
+ uaSequence [3] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE OF UnauthenticatedAttribute
+ } OPTIONAL
+} ({ pkcs7_note_signed_info })
+
+IssuerAndSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE {
+ issuer Name ({ pkcs7_sig_note_issuer }),
+ serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber ({ pkcs7_sig_note_serial })
+}
+
+CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
+
+SetOfAuthenticatedAttribute ::= SET OF AuthenticatedAttribute
+
+AuthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
+ type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+ values SET OF ANY ({ pkcs7_sig_note_authenticated_attr })
+}
+
+UnauthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
+ type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+ values SET OF ANY
+}
+
+DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+ algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+ parameters ANY OPTIONAL
+}
+
+EncryptedDigest ::= OCTET STRING ({ pkcs7_sig_note_signature })
+
+---
+--- X.500 Name
+---
+Name ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName
+
+RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SET OF AttributeValueAssertion
+
+AttributeValueAssertion ::= SEQUENCE {
+ attributeType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+ attributeValue ANY
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3de5fb011de0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+/* Testing module to load key from trusted PKCS#7 message
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7key: "fmt
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+
+/*
+ * Preparse a PKCS#7 wrapped and validated data blob.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
+ const void *data, *saved_prep_data;
+ size_t datalen, saved_prep_datalen;
+ bool trusted;
+ int ret;
+
+ kenter("");
+
+ saved_prep_data = prep->data;
+ saved_prep_datalen = prep->datalen;
+ pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(saved_prep_data, saved_prep_datalen);
+ if (IS_ERR(pkcs7)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_free;
+
+ ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, system_trusted_keyring, &trusted);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_free;
+ if (!trusted)
+ pr_warn("PKCS#7 message doesn't chain back to a trusted key\n");
+
+ ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(pkcs7, &data, &datalen, false);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_free;
+
+ prep->data = data;
+ prep->datalen = datalen;
+ ret = user_preparse(prep);
+ prep->data = saved_prep_data;
+ prep->datalen = saved_prep_datalen;
+
+error_free:
+ pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7);
+error:
+ kleave(" = %d", ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * user defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an
+ * arbitrary blob of data as the payload
+ */
+static struct key_type key_type_pkcs7 = {
+ .name = "pkcs7_test",
+ .def_lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+ .preparse = pkcs7_preparse,
+ .free_preparse = user_free_preparse,
+ .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
+ .match = user_match,
+ .revoke = user_revoke,
+ .destroy = user_destroy,
+ .describe = user_describe,
+ .read = user_read,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Module stuff
+ */
+static int __init pkcs7_key_init(void)
+{
+ return register_key_type(&key_type_pkcs7);
+}
+
+static void __exit pkcs7_key_cleanup(void)
+{
+ unregister_key_type(&key_type_pkcs7);
+}
+
+module_init(pkcs7_key_init);
+module_exit(pkcs7_key_cleanup);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..42e56aa7d277
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
@@ -0,0 +1,396 @@
+/* PKCS#7 parser
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include "public_key.h"
+#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+#include "pkcs7-asn1.h"
+
+struct pkcs7_parse_context {
+ struct pkcs7_message *msg; /* Message being constructed */
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo; /* SignedInfo being constructed */
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info **ppsinfo;
+ struct x509_certificate *certs; /* Certificate cache */
+ struct x509_certificate **ppcerts;
+ unsigned long data; /* Start of data */
+ enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */
+ unsigned x509_index;
+ unsigned sinfo_index;
+};
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_free_message - Free a PKCS#7 message
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to free
+ */
+void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
+{
+ struct x509_certificate *cert;
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
+
+ if (pkcs7) {
+ while (pkcs7->certs) {
+ cert = pkcs7->certs;
+ pkcs7->certs = cert->next;
+ x509_free_certificate(cert);
+ }
+ while (pkcs7->crl) {
+ cert = pkcs7->crl;
+ pkcs7->crl = cert->next;
+ x509_free_certificate(cert);
+ }
+ while (pkcs7->signed_infos) {
+ sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos;
+ pkcs7->signed_infos = sinfo->next;
+ mpi_free(sinfo->sig.mpi[0]);
+ kfree(sinfo->sig.digest);
+ kfree(sinfo);
+ }
+ kfree(pkcs7);
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_free_message);
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_parse_message - Parse a PKCS#7 message
+ * @data: The raw binary ASN.1 encoded message to be parsed
+ * @datalen: The size of the encoded message
+ */
+struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_parse_message(const void *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx;
+ struct pkcs7_message *msg;
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ msg = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_message), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!msg)
+ goto error_no_sig;
+ ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto error_no_ctx;
+ ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx->sinfo)
+ goto error_no_sinfo;
+
+ ctx->msg = msg;
+ ctx->data = (unsigned long)data;
+ ctx->ppcerts = &ctx->certs;
+ ctx->ppsinfo = &ctx->msg->signed_infos;
+
+ /* Attempt to decode the signature */
+ ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&pkcs7_decoder, ctx, data, datalen);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_decode;
+
+ while (ctx->certs) {
+ struct x509_certificate *cert = ctx->certs;
+ ctx->certs = cert->next;
+ x509_free_certificate(cert);
+ }
+ mpi_free(ctx->sinfo->sig.mpi[0]);
+ kfree(ctx->sinfo->sig.digest);
+ kfree(ctx->sinfo);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ return msg;
+
+error_decode:
+ mpi_free(ctx->sinfo->sig.mpi[0]);
+ kfree(ctx->sinfo->sig.digest);
+ kfree(ctx->sinfo);
+error_no_sinfo:
+ kfree(ctx);
+error_no_ctx:
+ pkcs7_free_message(msg);
+error_no_sig:
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_parse_message);
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_get_content_data - Get access to the PKCS#7 content
+ * @pkcs7: The preparsed PKCS#7 message to access
+ * @_data: Place to return a pointer to the data
+ * @_data_len: Place to return the data length
+ * @want_wrapper: True if the ASN.1 object header should be included in the data
+ *
+ * Get access to the data content of the PKCS#7 message, including, optionally,
+ * the header of the ASN.1 object that contains it. Returns -ENODATA if the
+ * data object was missing from the message.
+ */
+int pkcs7_get_content_data(const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ const void **_data, size_t *_data_len,
+ bool want_wrapper)
+{
+ size_t wrapper;
+
+ if (!pkcs7->data)
+ return -ENODATA;
+
+ wrapper = want_wrapper ? pkcs7->data_hdrlen : 0;
+ *_data = pkcs7->data - wrapper;
+ *_data_len = pkcs7->data_len + wrapper;
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_get_content_data);
+
+/*
+ * Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how
+ * to interpret it.
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_OID(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ ctx->last_oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+ if (ctx->last_oid == OID__NR) {
+ char buffer[50];
+ sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+ printk("PKCS7: Unknown OID: [%lu] %s\n",
+ (unsigned long)value - ctx->data, buffer);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the digest algorithm for the signature.
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ switch (ctx->last_oid) {
+ case OID_md4:
+ ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD4;
+ break;
+ case OID_md5:
+ ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+ break;
+ case OID_sha1:
+ ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+ break;
+ case OID_sha256:
+ ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA256;
+ break;
+ default:
+ printk("Unsupported digest algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
+ return -ENOPKG;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the public key algorithm for the signature.
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ switch (ctx->last_oid) {
+ case OID_rsaEncryption:
+ ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+ break;
+ default:
+ printk("Unsupported pkey algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
+ return -ENOPKG;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract a certificate and store it in the context.
+ */
+int pkcs7_extract_cert(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ struct x509_certificate *x509;
+
+ if (tag != ((ASN1_UNIV << 6) | ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ)) {
+ pr_debug("Cert began with tag %02x at %lu\n",
+ tag, (unsigned long)ctx - ctx->data);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ /* We have to correct for the header so that the X.509 parser can start
+ * from the beginning. Note that since X.509 stipulates DER, there
+ * probably shouldn't be an EOC trailer - but it is in PKCS#7 (which
+ * stipulates BER).
+ */
+ value -= hdrlen;
+ vlen += hdrlen;
+
+ if (((u8*)value)[1] == 0x80)
+ vlen += 2; /* Indefinite length - there should be an EOC */
+
+ x509 = x509_cert_parse(value, vlen);
+ if (IS_ERR(x509))
+ return PTR_ERR(x509);
+
+ pr_debug("Got cert for %s\n", x509->subject);
+ pr_debug("- fingerprint %s\n", x509->fingerprint);
+
+ x509->index = ++ctx->x509_index;
+ *ctx->ppcerts = x509;
+ ctx->ppcerts = &x509->next;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Save the certificate list
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_certificate_list(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ pr_devel("Got cert list (%02x)\n", tag);
+
+ *ctx->ppcerts = ctx->msg->certs;
+ ctx->msg->certs = ctx->certs;
+ ctx->certs = NULL;
+ ctx->ppcerts = &ctx->certs;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract the data from the message and store that and its content type OID in
+ * the context.
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ pr_debug("Got data\n");
+
+ ctx->msg->data = value;
+ ctx->msg->data_len = vlen;
+ ctx->msg->data_hdrlen = hdrlen;
+ ctx->msg->data_type = ctx->last_oid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse authenticated attributes
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_authenticated_attr(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ pr_devel("AuthAttr: %02x %zu [%*ph]\n", tag, vlen, (unsigned)vlen, value);
+
+ switch (ctx->last_oid) {
+ case OID_messageDigest:
+ if (tag != ASN1_OTS)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ ctx->sinfo->msgdigest = value;
+ ctx->sinfo->msgdigest_len = vlen;
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the set of auth attributes for digestion purposes [RFC2315 9.3]
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_set_of_authattrs(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ /* We need to switch the 'CONT 0' to a 'SET OF' when we digest */
+ ctx->sinfo->authattrs = value - (hdrlen - 1);
+ ctx->sinfo->authattrs_len = vlen + (hdrlen - 1);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the issuing certificate serial number
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ ctx->sinfo->raw_serial = value;
+ ctx->sinfo->raw_serial_size = vlen;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the issuer's name
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer = value;
+ ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the signature data
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ MPI mpi;
+
+ BUG_ON(ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_algo != PKEY_ALGO_RSA);
+
+ mpi = mpi_read_raw_data(value, vlen);
+ if (!mpi)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ctx->sinfo->sig.mpi[0] = mpi;
+ ctx->sinfo->sig.nr_mpi = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note a signature information block
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_signed_info(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ ctx->sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index;
+ *ctx->ppsinfo = ctx->sinfo;
+ ctx->ppsinfo = &ctx->sinfo->next;
+ ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx->sinfo)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d25f4d15370f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/* PKCS#7 crypto data parser internal definitions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include "x509_parser.h"
+
+#define kenter(FMT, ...) \
+ pr_devel("==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define kleave(FMT, ...) \
+ pr_devel("<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+
+struct pkcs7_signed_info {
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *next;
+ struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Signing certificate (in msg->certs) */
+ unsigned index;
+ bool trusted;
+
+ /* Message digest - the digest of the Content Data (or NULL) */
+ const void *msgdigest;
+ unsigned msgdigest_len;
+
+ /* Authenticated Attribute data (or NULL) */
+ unsigned authattrs_len;
+ const void *authattrs;
+
+ /* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name */
+ const void *raw_serial;
+ unsigned raw_serial_size;
+ unsigned raw_issuer_size;
+ const void *raw_issuer;
+
+ /* Message signature.
+ *
+ * This contains the generated digest of _either_ the Content Data or
+ * the Authenticated Attributes [RFC2315 9.3]. If the latter, one of
+ * the attributes contains the digest of the the Content Data within
+ * it.
+ */
+ struct public_key_signature sig;
+};
+
+struct pkcs7_message {
+ struct x509_certificate *certs; /* Certificate list */
+ struct x509_certificate *crl; /* Revocation list */
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *signed_infos;
+
+ /* Content Data (or NULL) */
+ enum OID data_type; /* Type of Data */
+ size_t data_len; /* Length of Data */
+ size_t data_hdrlen; /* Length of Data ASN.1 header */
+ const void *data; /* Content Data (or 0) */
+};
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e666eb011a85
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+/* Validate the trust chain of a PKCS#7 message.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/asn1.h>
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include "public_key.h"
+#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+
+/**
+ * Check the trust on one PKCS#7 SignedInfo block.
+ */
+int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo,
+ struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+ struct public_key_signature *sig = &sinfo->sig;
+ struct x509_certificate *x509, *last = NULL, *p;
+ struct key *key;
+ bool trusted;
+ int ret;
+
+ kenter(",%u,", sinfo->index);
+
+ for (x509 = sinfo->signer; x509; x509 = x509->signer) {
+ if (x509->seen) {
+ if (x509->verified) {
+ trusted = x509->trusted;
+ goto verified;
+ }
+ kleave(" = -ENOKEY [cached]");
+ return -ENOKEY;
+ }
+ x509->seen = true;
+
+ /* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted
+ * keys.
+ */
+ key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->subject,
+ x509->fingerprint);
+ if (!IS_ERR(key))
+ /* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message
+ * is apparently the same as one we already trust.
+ * Verify that the trusted variant can also validate
+ * the signature on the descendant.
+ */
+ goto matched;
+ if (key == ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* Self-signed certificates form roots of their own, and if we
+ * don't know them, then we can't accept them.
+ */
+ if (x509->next == x509) {
+ kleave(" = -ENOKEY [unknown self-signed]");
+ return -ENOKEY;
+ }
+
+ might_sleep();
+ last = x509;
+ sig = &last->sig;
+ }
+
+ /* No match - see if the root certificate has a signer amongst the
+ * trusted keys.
+ */
+ if (!last || !last->issuer || !last->authority) {
+ kleave(" = -ENOKEY [no backref]");
+ return -ENOKEY;
+ }
+
+ key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->issuer,
+ last->authority);
+ if (IS_ERR(key))
+ return PTR_ERR(key) == -ENOMEM ? -ENOMEM : -ENOKEY;
+ x509 = last;
+
+matched:
+ ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
+ trusted = test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED, &key->flags);
+ key_put(key);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ if (ret == -ENOMEM)
+ return ret;
+ kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [verify %d]", ret);
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+
+verified:
+ x509->verified = true;
+ for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer) {
+ p->verified = true;
+ p->trusted = trusted;
+ }
+ sinfo->trusted = trusted;
+ kleave(" = 0");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_validate_trust - Validate PKCS#7 trust chain
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 certificate to validate
+ * @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points
+ * @_trusted: Set to true if trustworth, false otherwise
+ *
+ * Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message intersects
+ * keys we already know and trust.
+ *
+ * Returns, in order of descending priority:
+ *
+ * (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a signature failed to match for which we have a valid
+ * key, or:
+ *
+ * (*) 0 if at least one signature chain intersects with the keys in the trust
+ * keyring, or:
+ *
+ * (*) -ENOPKG if a suitable crypto module couldn't be found for a check on a
+ * chain.
+ *
+ * (*) -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a match for any of the signature chains in
+ * the message.
+ *
+ * May also return -ENOMEM.
+ */
+int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ struct key *trust_keyring,
+ bool *_trusted)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
+ struct x509_certificate *p;
+ int cached_ret = 0, ret;
+
+ for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next)
+ p->seen = false;
+
+ for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
+ ret = pkcs7_validate_trust_one(pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ if (ret == -ENOPKG) {
+ cached_ret = -ENOPKG;
+ } else if (ret == -ENOKEY) {
+ if (cached_ret == 0)
+ cached_ret = -ENOKEY;
+ } else {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+ *_trusted |= sinfo->trusted;
+ }
+
+ return cached_ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_validate_trust);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c62cf8006e1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -0,0 +1,321 @@
+/* Verify the signature on a PKCS#7 message.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/asn1.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include "public_key.h"
+#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+
+/*
+ * Digest the relevant parts of the PKCS#7 data
+ */
+static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ struct shash_desc *desc;
+ size_t digest_size, desc_size;
+ void *digest;
+ int ret;
+
+ kenter(",%u,%u", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo);
+
+ if (sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo >= PKEY_HASH__LAST ||
+ !hash_algo_name[sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo])
+ return -ENOPKG;
+
+ /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
+ * big the hash operational data will be.
+ */
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo],
+ 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+ desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
+ sinfo->sig.digest_size = digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!digest)
+ goto error_no_desc;
+
+ desc = digest + digest_size;
+ desc->tfm = tfm;
+ desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+
+ /* Digest the message [RFC2315 9.3] */
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+ ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->data_len, digest);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+ pr_devel("MsgDigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, digest);
+
+ /* However, if there are authenticated attributes, there must be a
+ * message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the
+ * digest we just calculated.
+ */
+ if (sinfo->msgdigest) {
+ u8 tag;
+
+ if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sinfo->sig.digest_size) {
+ pr_debug("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
+ sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
+ ret = -EBADMSG;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(digest, sinfo->msgdigest, sinfo->msgdigest_len) != 0) {
+ pr_debug("Sig %u: Message digest doesn't match\n",
+ sinfo->index);
+ ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /* We then calculate anew, using the authenticated attributes
+ * as the contents of the digest instead. Note that we need to
+ * convert the attributes from a CONT.0 into a SET before we
+ * hash it.
+ */
+ memset(digest, 0, sinfo->sig.digest_size);
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+ tag = ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SET;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &tag, 1);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+ ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sinfo->authattrs,
+ sinfo->authattrs_len, digest);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+ pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, digest);
+ }
+
+ sinfo->sig.digest = digest;
+ digest = NULL;
+
+error:
+ kfree(digest);
+error_no_desc:
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ kleave(" = %d", ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find the key (X.509 certificate) to use to verify a PKCS#7 message. PKCS#7
+ * uses the issuer's name and the issuing certificate serial number for
+ * matching purposes. These must match the certificate issuer's name (not
+ * subject's name) and the certificate serial number [RFC 2315 6.7].
+ */
+static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+ struct x509_certificate *x509;
+ unsigned certix = 1;
+
+ kenter("%u,%u,%u",
+ sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_issuer_size);
+
+ for (x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, certix++) {
+ /* I'm _assuming_ that the generator of the PKCS#7 message will
+ * encode the fields from the X.509 cert in the same way in the
+ * PKCS#7 message - but I can't be 100% sure of that. It's
+ * possible this will need element-by-element comparison.
+ */
+ if (x509->raw_serial_size != sinfo->raw_serial_size ||
+ memcmp(x509->raw_serial, sinfo->raw_serial,
+ sinfo->raw_serial_size) != 0)
+ continue;
+ pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n",
+ sinfo->index, certix);
+
+ if (x509->raw_issuer_size != sinfo->raw_issuer_size ||
+ memcmp(x509->raw_issuer, sinfo->raw_issuer,
+ sinfo->raw_issuer_size) != 0) {
+ pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 subject and PKCS#7 issuer don't match\n",
+ sinfo->index);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (x509->pub->pkey_algo != sinfo->sig.pkey_algo) {
+ pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n",
+ sinfo->index);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ sinfo->signer = x509;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ pr_warn("Sig %u: Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*ph)\n",
+ sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_serial);
+ return -ENOKEY;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the internal certificate chain as best we can.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+ struct x509_certificate *x509 = sinfo->signer, *p;
+ int ret;
+
+ kenter("");
+
+ for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next)
+ p->seen = false;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ pr_debug("verify %s: %s\n", x509->subject, x509->fingerprint);
+ x509->seen = true;
+ ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
+ if (x509->authority)
+ pr_debug("- authkeyid %s\n", x509->authority);
+
+ if (!x509->authority ||
+ strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0) {
+ /* If there's no authority certificate specified, then
+ * the certificate must be self-signed and is the root
+ * of the chain. Likewise if the cert is its own
+ * authority.
+ */
+ pr_debug("- no auth?\n");
+ if (x509->raw_subject_size != x509->raw_issuer_size ||
+ memcmp(x509->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer,
+ x509->raw_issuer_size) != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = x509_check_signature(x509->pub, x509);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ x509->signer = x509;
+ pr_debug("- self-signed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's
+ * list to see if the next one is there.
+ */
+ pr_debug("- want %s\n", x509->authority);
+ for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
+ pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %s\n", p->index, p->fingerprint);
+ if (p->raw_subject_size == x509->raw_issuer_size &&
+ strcmp(p->fingerprint, x509->authority) == 0 &&
+ memcmp(p->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer,
+ x509->raw_issuer_size) == 0)
+ goto found_issuer;
+ }
+
+ /* We didn't find the root of this chain */
+ pr_debug("- top\n");
+ return 0;
+
+ found_issuer:
+ pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", p->subject);
+ if (p->seen) {
+ pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains loop\n",
+ sinfo->index);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = x509_check_signature(p->pub, x509);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ x509->signer = p;
+ if (x509 == p) {
+ pr_debug("- self-signed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ x509 = p;
+ might_sleep();
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify one signed information block from a PKCS#7 message.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ kenter(",%u", sinfo->index);
+
+ /* First of all, digest the data in the PKCS#7 message and the
+ * signed information block
+ */
+ ret = pkcs7_digest(pkcs7, sinfo);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Find the key for the signature */
+ ret = pkcs7_find_key(pkcs7, sinfo);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ pr_devel("Using X.509[%u] for sig %u\n",
+ sinfo->signer->index, sinfo->index);
+
+ /* Verify the PKCS#7 binary against the key */
+ ret = public_key_verify_signature(sinfo->signer->pub, &sinfo->sig);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ pr_devel("Verified signature %u\n", sinfo->index);
+
+ /* Verify the internal certificate chain */
+ return pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(pkcs7, sinfo);
+}
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_verify - Verify a PKCS#7 message
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to be verified
+ */
+int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
+ struct x509_certificate *x509;
+ int ret, n;
+
+ kenter("");
+
+ for (n = 0, x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, n++) {
+ ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ pr_debug("X.509[%u] %s\n", n, x509->authority);
+ }
+
+ for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
+ ret = pkcs7_verify_one(pkcs7, sinfo);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ kleave(" = %d", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ kleave(" = 0");
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..79175e6ea0b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
@@ -0,0 +1,457 @@
+/* Parse a signed PE binary
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PEFILE: "fmt
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/pe.h>
+#include <linux/asn1.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include "verify_pefile.h"
+
+/*
+ * Parse a PE binary.
+ */
+static int pefile_parse_binary(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
+ struct pefile_context *ctx)
+{
+ const struct mz_hdr *mz = pebuf;
+ const struct pe_hdr *pe;
+ const struct pe32_opt_hdr *pe32;
+ const struct pe32plus_opt_hdr *pe64;
+ const struct data_directory *ddir;
+ const struct data_dirent *dde;
+ const struct section_header *secs, *sec;
+ size_t cursor, datalen = pelen;
+
+ kenter("");
+
+#define chkaddr(base, x, s) \
+ do { \
+ if ((x) < base || (s) >= datalen || (x) > datalen - (s)) \
+ return -ELIBBAD; \
+ } while (0)
+
+ chkaddr(0, 0, sizeof(*mz));
+ if (mz->magic != MZ_MAGIC)
+ return -ELIBBAD;
+ cursor = sizeof(*mz);
+
+ chkaddr(cursor, mz->peaddr, sizeof(*pe));
+ pe = pebuf + mz->peaddr;
+ if (pe->magic != PE_MAGIC)
+ return -ELIBBAD;
+ cursor = mz->peaddr + sizeof(*pe);
+
+ chkaddr(0, cursor, sizeof(pe32->magic));
+ pe32 = pebuf + cursor;
+ pe64 = pebuf + cursor;
+
+ switch (pe32->magic) {
+ case PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32:
+ chkaddr(0, cursor, sizeof(*pe32));
+ ctx->image_checksum_offset =
+ (unsigned long)&pe32->csum - (unsigned long)pebuf;
+ ctx->header_size = pe32->header_size;
+ cursor += sizeof(*pe32);
+ ctx->n_data_dirents = pe32->data_dirs;
+ break;
+
+ case PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32PLUS:
+ chkaddr(0, cursor, sizeof(*pe64));
+ ctx->image_checksum_offset =
+ (unsigned long)&pe64->csum - (unsigned long)pebuf;
+ ctx->header_size = pe64->header_size;
+ cursor += sizeof(*pe64);
+ ctx->n_data_dirents = pe64->data_dirs;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ pr_debug("Unknown PEOPT magic = %04hx\n", pe32->magic);
+ return -ELIBBAD;
+ }
+
+ pr_debug("checksum @ %x\n", ctx->image_checksum_offset);
+ pr_debug("header size = %x\n", ctx->header_size);
+
+ if (cursor >= ctx->header_size || ctx->header_size >= datalen)
+ return -ELIBBAD;
+
+ if (ctx->n_data_dirents > (ctx->header_size - cursor) / sizeof(*dde))
+ return -ELIBBAD;
+
+ ddir = pebuf + cursor;
+ cursor += sizeof(*dde) * ctx->n_data_dirents;
+
+ ctx->cert_dirent_offset =
+ (unsigned long)&ddir->certs - (unsigned long)pebuf;
+ ctx->certs_size = ddir->certs.size;
+
+ if (!ddir->certs.virtual_address || !ddir->certs.size) {
+ pr_debug("Unsigned PE binary\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+
+ chkaddr(ctx->header_size, ddir->certs.virtual_address,
+ ddir->certs.size);
+ ctx->sig_offset = ddir->certs.virtual_address;
+ ctx->sig_len = ddir->certs.size;
+ pr_debug("cert = %x @%x [%*ph]\n",
+ ctx->sig_len, ctx->sig_offset,
+ ctx->sig_len, pebuf + ctx->sig_offset);
+
+ ctx->n_sections = pe->sections;
+ if (ctx->n_sections > (ctx->header_size - cursor) / sizeof(*sec))
+ return -ELIBBAD;
+ ctx->secs = secs = pebuf + cursor;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check and strip the PE wrapper from around the signature and check that the
+ * remnant looks something like PKCS#7.
+ */
+static int pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(const void *pebuf,
+ struct pefile_context *ctx)
+{
+ struct win_certificate wrapper;
+ const u8 *pkcs7;
+
+ if (ctx->sig_len < sizeof(wrapper)) {
+ pr_debug("Signature wrapper too short\n");
+ return -ELIBBAD;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&wrapper, pebuf + ctx->sig_offset, sizeof(wrapper));
+ pr_debug("sig wrapper = { %x, %x, %x }\n",
+ wrapper.length, wrapper.revision, wrapper.cert_type);
+
+ /* Both pesign and sbsign round up the length of certificate table
+ * (in optional header data directories) to 8 byte alignment.
+ */
+ if (round_up(wrapper.length, 8) != ctx->sig_len) {
+ pr_debug("Signature wrapper len wrong\n");
+ return -ELIBBAD;
+ }
+ if (wrapper.revision != WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0) {
+ pr_debug("Signature is not revision 2.0\n");
+ return -ENOTSUPP;
+ }
+ if (wrapper.cert_type != WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {
+ pr_debug("Signature certificate type is not PKCS\n");
+ return -ENOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ /* Looks like actual pkcs signature length is in wrapper->length.
+ * size obtained from data dir entries lists the total size of
+ * certificate table which is also aligned to octawrod boundary.
+ *
+ * So set signature length field appropriately.
+ */
+ ctx->sig_len = wrapper.length;
+ ctx->sig_offset += sizeof(wrapper);
+ ctx->sig_len -= sizeof(wrapper);
+ if (ctx->sig_len == 0) {
+ pr_debug("Signature data missing\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+
+ /* What's left should a PKCS#7 cert */
+ pkcs7 = pebuf + ctx->sig_offset;
+ if (pkcs7[0] == (ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ)) {
+ if (pkcs7[1] == 0x82 &&
+ pkcs7[2] == (((ctx->sig_len - 4) >> 8) & 0xff) &&
+ pkcs7[3] == ((ctx->sig_len - 4) & 0xff))
+ return 0;
+ if (pkcs7[1] == 0x80)
+ return 0;
+ if (pkcs7[1] > 0x82)
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
+ }
+
+ pr_debug("Signature data not PKCS#7\n");
+ return -ELIBBAD;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare two sections for canonicalisation.
+ */
+static int pefile_compare_shdrs(const void *a, const void *b)
+{
+ const struct section_header *shdra = a;
+ const struct section_header *shdrb = b;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (shdra->data_addr > shdrb->data_addr)
+ return 1;
+ if (shdrb->data_addr > shdra->data_addr)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (shdra->virtual_address > shdrb->virtual_address)
+ return 1;
+ if (shdrb->virtual_address > shdra->virtual_address)
+ return -1;
+
+ rc = strcmp(shdra->name, shdrb->name);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (shdra->virtual_size > shdrb->virtual_size)
+ return 1;
+ if (shdrb->virtual_size > shdra->virtual_size)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (shdra->raw_data_size > shdrb->raw_data_size)
+ return 1;
+ if (shdrb->raw_data_size > shdra->raw_data_size)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load the contents of the PE binary into the digest, leaving out the image
+ * checksum and the certificate data block.
+ */
+static int pefile_digest_pe_contents(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
+ struct pefile_context *ctx,
+ struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+ unsigned *canon, tmp, loop, i, hashed_bytes;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Digest the header and data directory, but leave out the image
+ * checksum and the data dirent for the signature.
+ */
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, pebuf, ctx->image_checksum_offset);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ tmp = ctx->image_checksum_offset + sizeof(uint32_t);
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, pebuf + tmp,
+ ctx->cert_dirent_offset - tmp);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ tmp = ctx->cert_dirent_offset + sizeof(struct data_dirent);
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, pebuf + tmp, ctx->header_size - tmp);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ canon = kcalloc(ctx->n_sections, sizeof(unsigned), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!canon)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* We have to canonicalise the section table, so we perform an
+ * insertion sort.
+ */
+ canon[0] = 0;
+ for (loop = 1; loop < ctx->n_sections; loop++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < loop; i++) {
+ if (pefile_compare_shdrs(&ctx->secs[canon[i]],
+ &ctx->secs[loop]) > 0) {
+ memmove(&canon[i + 1], &canon[i],
+ (loop - i) * sizeof(canon[0]));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ canon[i] = loop;
+ }
+
+ hashed_bytes = ctx->header_size;
+ for (loop = 0; loop < ctx->n_sections; loop++) {
+ i = canon[loop];
+ if (ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size == 0)
+ continue;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc,
+ pebuf + ctx->secs[i].data_addr,
+ ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ kfree(canon);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ hashed_bytes += ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size;
+ }
+ kfree(canon);
+
+ if (pelen > hashed_bytes) {
+ tmp = hashed_bytes + ctx->certs_size;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc,
+ pebuf + hashed_bytes,
+ pelen - tmp);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Digest the contents of the PE binary, leaving out the image checksum and the
+ * certificate data block.
+ */
+static int pefile_digest_pe(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
+ struct pefile_context *ctx)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ struct shash_desc *desc;
+ size_t digest_size, desc_size;
+ void *digest;
+ int ret;
+
+ kenter(",%u", ctx->digest_algo);
+
+ /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
+ * big the hash operational data will be.
+ */
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[ctx->digest_algo], 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+ desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
+ digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+ if (digest_size != ctx->digest_len) {
+ pr_debug("Digest size mismatch (%zx != %x)\n",
+ digest_size, ctx->digest_len);
+ ret = -EBADMSG;
+ goto error_no_desc;
+ }
+ pr_debug("Digest: desc=%zu size=%zu\n", desc_size, digest_size);
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ desc = kzalloc(desc_size + digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!desc)
+ goto error_no_desc;
+
+ desc->tfm = tfm;
+ desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ ret = pefile_digest_pe_contents(pebuf, pelen, ctx, desc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ digest = (void *)desc + desc_size;
+ ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ pr_debug("Digest calc = [%*ph]\n", ctx->digest_len, digest);
+
+ /* Check that the PE file digest matches that in the MSCODE part of the
+ * PKCS#7 certificate.
+ */
+ if (memcmp(digest, ctx->digest, ctx->digest_len) != 0) {
+ pr_debug("Digest mismatch\n");
+ ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+ } else {
+ pr_debug("The digests match!\n");
+ }
+
+error:
+ kfree(desc);
+error_no_desc:
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ kleave(" = %d", ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_pefile_signature - Verify the signature on a PE binary image
+ * @pebuf: Buffer containing the PE binary image
+ * @pelen: Length of the binary image
+ * @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points
+ * @_trusted: Set to true if trustworth, false otherwise
+ *
+ * Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message inside the PE
+ * binary image intersects keys we already know and trust.
+ *
+ * Returns, in order of descending priority:
+ *
+ * (*) -ELIBBAD if the image cannot be parsed, or:
+ *
+ * (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a signature failed to match for which we have a valid
+ * key, or:
+ *
+ * (*) 0 if at least one signature chain intersects with the keys in the trust
+ * keyring, or:
+ *
+ * (*) -ENOPKG if a suitable crypto module couldn't be found for a check on a
+ * chain.
+ *
+ * (*) -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a match for any of the signature chains in
+ * the message.
+ *
+ * May also return -ENOMEM.
+ */
+int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
+ struct key *trusted_keyring, bool *_trusted)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
+ struct pefile_context ctx;
+ const void *data;
+ size_t datalen;
+ int ret;
+
+ kenter("");
+
+ memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+ ret = pefile_parse_binary(pebuf, pelen, &ctx);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(pebuf, &ctx);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(pebuf + ctx.sig_offset, ctx.sig_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
+ return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
+ ctx.pkcs7 = pkcs7;
+
+ ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(ctx.pkcs7, &data, &datalen, false);
+ if (ret < 0 || datalen == 0) {
+ pr_devel("PKCS#7 message does not contain data\n");
+ ret = -EBADMSG;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ ret = mscode_parse(&ctx);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ pr_debug("Digest: %u [%*ph]\n",
+ ctx.digest_len, ctx.digest_len, ctx.digest);
+
+ /* Generate the digest and check against the PKCS7 certificate
+ * contents.
+ */
+ ret = pefile_digest_pe(pebuf, pelen, &ctx);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keyring, _trusted);
+
+error:
+ pkcs7_free_message(ctx.pkcs7);
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..55d5f7ebc45a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/* PE Binary parser bits
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/verify_pefile.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+
+struct pefile_context {
+ unsigned header_size;
+ unsigned image_checksum_offset;
+ unsigned cert_dirent_offset;
+ unsigned n_data_dirents;
+ unsigned n_sections;
+ unsigned certs_size;
+ unsigned sig_offset;
+ unsigned sig_len;
+ const struct section_header *secs;
+ struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
+
+ /* PKCS#7 MS Individual Code Signing content */
+ const void *digest; /* Digest */
+ unsigned digest_len; /* Digest length */
+ enum hash_algo digest_algo; /* Digest algorithm */
+};
+
+#define kenter(FMT, ...) \
+ pr_devel("==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define kleave(FMT, ...) \
+ pr_devel("<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+
+/*
+ * mscode_parser.c
+ */
+extern int mscode_parse(struct pefile_context *ctx);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1
index bf32b3dff088..aae0cde414e2 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
version [ 0 ] Version DEFAULT,
- serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber,
+ serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber ({ x509_note_serial }),
signature AlgorithmIdentifier ({ x509_note_pkey_algo }),
issuer Name ({ x509_note_issuer }),
validity Validity,
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index 29893162497c..ac72348c186a 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "X.509: "fmt
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
@@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
kfree(cert);
}
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_free_certificate);
/*
* Parse an X.509 certificate
@@ -97,6 +99,7 @@ error_no_ctx:
error_no_cert:
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_cert_parse);
/*
* Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how
@@ -211,6 +214,19 @@ int x509_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
}
/*
+ * Note the certificate serial number
+ */
+int x509_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ ctx->cert->raw_serial = value;
+ ctx->cert->raw_serial_size = vlen;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
* Note some of the name segments from which we'll fabricate a name.
*/
int x509_extract_name_segment(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
@@ -322,6 +338,8 @@ int x509_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ ctx->cert->raw_issuer = value;
+ ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->issuer, vlen);
}
@@ -330,6 +348,8 @@ int x509_note_subject(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ ctx->cert->raw_subject = value;
+ ctx->cert->raw_subject_size = vlen;
return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->subject, vlen);
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index 87d9cc26f630..1b76f207c1f3 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -14,7 +14,9 @@
struct x509_certificate {
struct x509_certificate *next;
+ struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Certificate that signed this one */
struct public_key *pub; /* Public key details */
+ struct public_key_signature sig; /* Signature parameters */
char *issuer; /* Name of certificate issuer */
char *subject; /* Name of certificate subject */
char *fingerprint; /* Key fingerprint as hex */
@@ -25,7 +27,16 @@ struct x509_certificate {
unsigned tbs_size; /* Size of signed data */
unsigned raw_sig_size; /* Size of sigature */
const void *raw_sig; /* Signature data */
- struct public_key_signature sig; /* Signature parameters */
+ const void *raw_serial; /* Raw serial number in ASN.1 */
+ unsigned raw_serial_size;
+ unsigned raw_issuer_size;
+ const void *raw_issuer; /* Raw issuer name in ASN.1 */
+ const void *raw_subject; /* Raw subject name in ASN.1 */
+ unsigned raw_subject_size;
+ unsigned index;
+ bool seen; /* Infinite recursion prevention */
+ bool verified;
+ bool trusted;
};
/*
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 382ef0d2ff2e..f3d62307e6ee 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -18,11 +18,86 @@
#include <linux/asn1_decoder.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include "asymmetric_keys.h"
#include "public_key.h"
#include "x509_parser.h"
+static bool use_builtin_keys;
+static char *ca_keyid;
+
+#ifndef MODULE
+static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
+{
+ if (!str) /* default system keyring */
+ return 1;
+
+ if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0)
+ ca_keyid = str; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
+ else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0)
+ use_builtin_keys = true;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * x509_request_asymmetric_key - Request a key by X.509 certificate params.
+ * @keyring: The keys to search.
+ * @subject: The name of the subject to whom the key belongs.
+ * @key_id: The subject key ID as a hex string.
+ *
+ * Find a key in the given keyring by subject name and key ID. These might,
+ * for instance, be the issuer name and the authority key ID of an X.509
+ * certificate that needs to be verified.
+ */
+struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
+ const char *subject,
+ const char *key_id)
+{
+ key_ref_t key;
+ size_t subject_len = strlen(subject), key_id_len = strlen(key_id);
+ char *id;
+
+ /* Construct an identifier "<subjname>:<keyid>". */
+ id = kmalloc(subject_len + 2 + key_id_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!id)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ memcpy(id, subject, subject_len);
+ id[subject_len + 0] = ':';
+ id[subject_len + 1] = ' ';
+ memcpy(id + subject_len + 2, key_id, key_id_len);
+ id[subject_len + 2 + key_id_len] = 0;
+
+ pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
+
+ key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
+ &key_type_asymmetric, id);
+ if (IS_ERR(key))
+ pr_debug("Request for key '%s' err %ld\n", id, PTR_ERR(key));
+ kfree(id);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+ switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
+ /* Hide some search errors */
+ case -EACCES:
+ case -ENOTDIR:
+ case -EAGAIN:
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+ default:
+ return ERR_CAST(key);
+ }
+ }
+
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__,
+ key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key)));
+ return key_ref_to_ptr(key);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_request_asymmetric_key);
+
/*
* Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate. This involves
* digesting the signed data and extracting the signature.
@@ -103,6 +178,38 @@ int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_check_signature);
/*
+ * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring. If one of
+ * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the
+ * new certificate as being trusted.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if the new certificate was successfully validated, 1 if we couldn't
+ * find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list and an error if there
+ * is a matching certificate but the signature check fails.
+ */
+static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
+ struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+ struct key *key;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ if (!trust_keyring)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_keyid_match(cert->authority, ca_keyid))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+ cert->issuer, cert->authority);
+ if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
+ if (!use_builtin_keys
+ || test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags))
+ ret = x509_check_signature(key->payload.data, cert);
+ key_put(key);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
* Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate.
*/
static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
@@ -155,9 +262,13 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
/* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
if (!cert->authority ||
strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) {
- ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert);
+ ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */
if (ret < 0)
goto error_free_cert;
+ } else if (!prep->trusted) {
+ ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_system_trusted_keyring());
+ if (!ret)
+ prep->trusted = 1;
}
/* Propose a description */
@@ -177,7 +288,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
__module_get(public_key_subtype.owner);
prep->type_data[0] = &public_key_subtype;
prep->type_data[1] = cert->fingerprint;
- prep->payload = cert->pub;
+ prep->payload[0] = cert->pub;
prep->description = desc;
prep->quotalen = 100;
diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
index da77791793f1..bf424305f3dc 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/suspend.h>
#include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
#include <linux/reboot.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <generated/utsrelease.h>
@@ -303,12 +304,17 @@ static int fw_read_file_contents(struct file *file, struct firmware_buf *fw_buf)
if (rc != size) {
if (rc > 0)
rc = -EIO;
- vfree(buf);
- return rc;
+ goto fail;
}
+ rc = security_kernel_fw_from_file(file, buf, size);
+ if (rc)
+ goto fail;
fw_buf->data = buf;
fw_buf->size = size;
return 0;
+fail:
+ vfree(buf);
+ return rc;
}
static int fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device,
@@ -612,6 +618,7 @@ static ssize_t firmware_loading_store(struct device *dev,
{
struct firmware_priv *fw_priv = to_firmware_priv(dev);
struct firmware_buf *fw_buf;
+ ssize_t written = count;
int loading = simple_strtol(buf, NULL, 10);
int i;
@@ -635,6 +642,8 @@ static ssize_t firmware_loading_store(struct device *dev,
break;
case 0:
if (test_bit(FW_STATUS_LOADING, &fw_buf->status)) {
+ int rc;
+
set_bit(FW_STATUS_DONE, &fw_buf->status);
clear_bit(FW_STATUS_LOADING, &fw_buf->status);
@@ -644,10 +653,23 @@ static ssize_t firmware_loading_store(struct device *dev,
* see the mapped 'buf->data' once the loading
* is completed.
* */
- if (fw_map_pages_buf(fw_buf))
+ rc = fw_map_pages_buf(fw_buf);
+ if (rc)
dev_err(dev, "%s: map pages failed\n",
__func__);
+ else
+ rc = security_kernel_fw_from_file(NULL,
+ fw_buf->data, fw_buf->size);
+
+ /*
+ * Same logic as fw_load_abort, only the DONE bit
+ * is ignored and we set ABORT only on failure.
+ */
list_del_init(&fw_buf->pending_list);
+ if (rc) {
+ set_bit(FW_STATUS_ABORT, &fw_buf->status);
+ written = rc;
+ }
complete_all(&fw_buf->completion);
break;
}
@@ -661,7 +683,7 @@ static ssize_t firmware_loading_store(struct device *dev,
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&fw_lock);
- return count;
+ return written;
}
static DEVICE_ATTR(loading, 0644, firmware_loading_show, firmware_loading_store);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
index 62e10fd1e1cb..6af17002a115 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
@@ -491,11 +491,10 @@ static int tpm_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip, __be16 startup_type)
int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
- struct timeout_t *timeout_cap;
+ unsigned long new_timeout[4];
+ unsigned long old_timeout[4];
struct duration_t *duration_cap;
ssize_t rc;
- u32 timeout;
- unsigned int scale = 1;
tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
@@ -529,25 +528,46 @@ int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
!= sizeof(tpm_cmd.header.out) + sizeof(u32) + 4 * sizeof(u32))
return -EINVAL;
- timeout_cap = &tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout;
- /* Don't overwrite default if value is 0 */
- timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->a);
- if (timeout && timeout < 1000) {
- /* timeouts in msec rather usec */
- scale = 1000;
- chip->vendor.timeout_adjusted = true;
+ old_timeout[0] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.a);
+ old_timeout[1] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.b);
+ old_timeout[2] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.c);
+ old_timeout[3] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.d);
+ memcpy(new_timeout, old_timeout, sizeof(new_timeout));
+
+ /*
+ * Provide ability for vendor overrides of timeout values in case
+ * of misreporting.
+ */
+ if (chip->ops->update_timeouts != NULL)
+ chip->vendor.timeout_adjusted =
+ chip->ops->update_timeouts(chip, new_timeout);
+
+ if (!chip->vendor.timeout_adjusted) {
+ /* Don't overwrite default if value is 0 */
+ if (new_timeout[0] != 0 && new_timeout[0] < 1000) {
+ int i;
+
+ /* timeouts in msec rather usec */
+ for (i = 0; i != ARRAY_SIZE(new_timeout); i++)
+ new_timeout[i] *= 1000;
+ chip->vendor.timeout_adjusted = true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Report adjusted timeouts */
+ if (chip->vendor.timeout_adjusted) {
+ dev_info(chip->dev,
+ HW_ERR "Adjusting reported timeouts: A %lu->%luus B %lu->%luus C %lu->%luus D %lu->%luus\n",
+ old_timeout[0], new_timeout[0],
+ old_timeout[1], new_timeout[1],
+ old_timeout[2], new_timeout[2],
+ old_timeout[3], new_timeout[3]);
}
- if (timeout)
- chip->vendor.timeout_a = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout * scale);
- timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->b);
- if (timeout)
- chip->vendor.timeout_b = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout * scale);
- timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->c);
- if (timeout)
- chip->vendor.timeout_c = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout * scale);
- timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->d);
- if (timeout)
- chip->vendor.timeout_d = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout * scale);
+
+ chip->vendor.timeout_a = usecs_to_jiffies(new_timeout[0]);
+ chip->vendor.timeout_b = usecs_to_jiffies(new_timeout[1]);
+ chip->vendor.timeout_c = usecs_to_jiffies(new_timeout[2]);
+ chip->vendor.timeout_d = usecs_to_jiffies(new_timeout[3]);
duration:
tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
@@ -991,13 +1011,13 @@ int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *out, size_t max)
int err, total = 0, retries = 5;
u8 *dest = out;
+ if (!out || !num_bytes || max > TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
if (chip == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
- if (!out || !num_bytes || max > TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA)
- return -EINVAL;
-
do {
tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getrandom_header;
tpm_cmd.params.getrandom_in.num_bytes = cpu_to_be32(num_bytes);
@@ -1016,6 +1036,7 @@ int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *out, size_t max)
num_bytes -= recd;
} while (retries-- && total < max);
+ tpm_chip_put(chip);
return total ? total : -EIO;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_get_random);
@@ -1095,7 +1116,7 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_register_hardware(struct device *dev,
goto del_misc;
if (tpm_add_ppi(&dev->kobj))
- goto del_misc;
+ goto del_sysfs;
chip->bios_dir = tpm_bios_log_setup(chip->devname);
@@ -1106,6 +1127,8 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_register_hardware(struct device *dev,
return chip;
+del_sysfs:
+ tpm_sysfs_del_device(chip);
del_misc:
tpm_dev_del_device(chip);
put_device:
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c
index 59f7cb28260b..3a56a131586c 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c
@@ -235,7 +235,6 @@ static int tpm_bios_measurements_release(struct inode *inode,
static int tpm_ascii_bios_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
int len = 0;
- int i;
char *eventname;
struct tcpa_event *event = v;
unsigned char *event_entry =
@@ -251,8 +250,7 @@ static int tpm_ascii_bios_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
seq_printf(m, "%2d ", event->pcr_index);
/* 2nd: SHA1 */
- for (i = 0; i < 20; i++)
- seq_printf(m, "%02x", event->pcr_value[i]);
+ seq_printf(m, "%20phN", event->pcr_value);
/* 3rd: event type identifier */
seq_printf(m, " %02x", event->event_type);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33.c
index 3b7bf2162898..4669e3713428 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33.c
@@ -714,6 +714,7 @@ tpm_st33_i2c_probe(struct i2c_client *client, const struct i2c_device_id *id)
}
tpm_get_timeouts(chip);
+ tpm_do_selftest(chip);
dev_info(chip->dev, "TPM I2C Initialized\n");
return 0;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
index a9ed2270c25d..2c46734b266d 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
@@ -373,6 +373,36 @@ out_err:
return rc;
}
+struct tis_vendor_timeout_override {
+ u32 did_vid;
+ unsigned long timeout_us[4];
+};
+
+static const struct tis_vendor_timeout_override vendor_timeout_overrides[] = {
+ /* Atmel 3204 */
+ { 0x32041114, { (TIS_SHORT_TIMEOUT*1000), (TIS_LONG_TIMEOUT*1000),
+ (TIS_SHORT_TIMEOUT*1000), (TIS_SHORT_TIMEOUT*1000) } },
+};
+
+static bool tpm_tis_update_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip,
+ unsigned long *timeout_cap)
+{
+ int i;
+ u32 did_vid;
+
+ did_vid = ioread32(chip->vendor.iobase + TPM_DID_VID(0));
+
+ for (i = 0; i != ARRAY_SIZE(vendor_timeout_overrides); i++) {
+ if (vendor_timeout_overrides[i].did_vid != did_vid)
+ continue;
+ memcpy(timeout_cap, vendor_timeout_overrides[i].timeout_us,
+ sizeof(vendor_timeout_overrides[i].timeout_us));
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
/*
* Early probing for iTPM with STS_DATA_EXPECT flaw.
* Try sending command without itpm flag set and if that
@@ -437,6 +467,7 @@ static const struct tpm_class_ops tpm_tis = {
.recv = tpm_tis_recv,
.send = tpm_tis_send,
.cancel = tpm_tis_ready,
+ .update_timeouts = tpm_tis_update_timeouts,
.req_complete_mask = TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL | TPM_STS_VALID,
.req_complete_val = TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL | TPM_STS_VALID,
.req_canceled = tpm_tis_req_canceled,
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index a3d33fe592d6..ab1f1200ce5d 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1216,7 +1216,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds);
/*
* determine how safe it is to execute the proposed program
* - the caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex to protect against
- * PTRACE_ATTACH
+ * PTRACE_ATTACH or seccomp thread-sync
*/
static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
@@ -1234,7 +1234,7 @@ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* This isn't strictly necessary, but it makes it harder for LSMs to
* mess up.
*/
- if (current->no_new_privs)
+ if (task_no_new_privs(current))
bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS;
t = p;
@@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@ int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
bprm->cred->egid = current_egid();
if (!(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) &&
- !current->no_new_privs &&
+ !task_no_new_privs(current) &&
kuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_uid) &&
kgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_gid)) {
/* Set-uid? */
diff --git a/fs/nfs/idmap.c b/fs/nfs/idmap.c
index 567983d2c0eb..7dd55b745c4d 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/idmap.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/idmap.c
@@ -174,7 +174,9 @@ static int nfs_map_numeric_to_string(__u32 id, char *buf, size_t buflen)
static struct key_type key_type_id_resolver = {
.name = "id_resolver",
- .instantiate = user_instantiate,
+ .preparse = user_preparse,
+ .free_preparse = user_free_preparse,
+ .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
.match = user_match,
.revoke = user_revoke,
.destroy = user_destroy,
@@ -282,6 +284,8 @@ static struct key *nfs_idmap_request_key(const char *name, size_t namelen,
desc, "", 0, idmap);
mutex_unlock(&idmap->idmap_mutex);
}
+ if (!IS_ERR(rkey))
+ set_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL, &rkey->flags);
kfree(desc);
return rkey;
@@ -394,7 +398,9 @@ static const struct rpc_pipe_ops idmap_upcall_ops = {
static struct key_type key_type_id_resolver_legacy = {
.name = "id_legacy",
- .instantiate = user_instantiate,
+ .preparse = user_preparse,
+ .free_preparse = user_free_preparse,
+ .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
.match = user_match,
.revoke = user_revoke,
.destroy = user_destroy,
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
index d7f9199217bb..cd3653e4f35c 100644
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -297,15 +297,11 @@ static void render_cap_t(struct seq_file *m, const char *header,
seq_puts(m, header);
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
seq_printf(m, "%08x",
- a->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - __capi]);
+ a->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - __capi]);
}
seq_putc(m, '\n');
}
-/* Remove non-existent capabilities */
-#define NORM_CAPS(v) (v.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(CAP_LAST_CAP)] &= \
- CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LAST_CAP + 1) - 1)
-
static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
{
const struct cred *cred;
@@ -319,11 +315,6 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
cap_bset = cred->cap_bset;
rcu_read_unlock();
- NORM_CAPS(cap_inheritable);
- NORM_CAPS(cap_permitted);
- NORM_CAPS(cap_effective);
- NORM_CAPS(cap_bset);
-
render_cap_t(m, "CapInh:\t", &cap_inheritable);
render_cap_t(m, "CapPrm:\t", &cap_permitted);
render_cap_t(m, "CapEff:\t", &cap_effective);
diff --git a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..691c79172a26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/* PKCS#7 crypto data parser
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+struct key;
+struct pkcs7_message;
+
+/*
+ * pkcs7_parser.c
+ */
+extern struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_parse_message(const void *data,
+ size_t datalen);
+extern void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7);
+
+extern int pkcs7_get_content_data(const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ const void **_data, size_t *_datalen,
+ bool want_wrapper);
+
+/*
+ * pkcs7_trust.c
+ */
+extern int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ struct key *trust_keyring,
+ bool *_trusted);
+
+/*
+ * pkcs7_verify.c
+ */
+extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7);
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index fc09732613ad..0d164c6af539 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -98,4 +98,8 @@ struct key;
extern int verify_signature(const struct key *key,
const struct public_key_signature *sig);
+extern struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
+ const char *issuer,
+ const char *key_id);
+
#endif /* _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H */
diff --git a/include/keys/big_key-type.h b/include/keys/big_key-type.h
index d69bc8af3292..e0970a578188 100644
--- a/include/keys/big_key-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/big_key-type.h
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@
extern struct key_type key_type_big_key;
-extern int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
+extern int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
+extern void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
extern void big_key_revoke(struct key *key);
extern void big_key_destroy(struct key *key);
extern void big_key_describe(const struct key *big_key, struct seq_file *m);
diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
index 8dabc399bd1d..72665eb80692 100644
--- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
@@ -17,7 +17,15 @@
#include <linux/key.h>
extern struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
-
+static inline struct key *get_system_trusted_keyring(void)
+{
+ return system_trusted_keyring;
+}
+#else
+static inline struct key *get_system_trusted_keyring(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
#endif
#endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */
diff --git a/include/keys/user-type.h b/include/keys/user-type.h
index 5e452c84f1e6..3ab1873a4bfa 100644
--- a/include/keys/user-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/user-type.h
@@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ extern struct key_type key_type_logon;
struct key_preparsed_payload;
-extern int user_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
+extern int user_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
+extern void user_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
extern int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
extern int user_match(const struct key *key, const void *criterion);
extern void user_revoke(struct key *key);
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 84b13ad67c1c..aa93e5ef594c 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -78,8 +78,11 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
+#define CAP_LAST_U32 ((_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S) - 1)
+#define CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LAST_CAP + 1) -1)
+
# define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
-# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }})
+# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK }})
# define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 1b7f268cddce..7cf5e9b32550 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask);
extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
extern int ima_module_check(struct file *file);
+extern int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
#else
static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -46,6 +47,11 @@ static inline int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
return 0;
}
+static inline int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h
index a74c3a84dfdd..44792ee649de 100644
--- a/include/linux/key-type.h
+++ b/include/linux/key-type.h
@@ -41,10 +41,11 @@ struct key_construction {
struct key_preparsed_payload {
char *description; /* Proposed key description (or NULL) */
void *type_data[2]; /* Private key-type data */
- void *payload; /* Proposed payload */
+ void *payload[2]; /* Proposed payload */
const void *data; /* Raw data */
size_t datalen; /* Raw datalen */
size_t quotalen; /* Quota length for proposed payload */
+ time_t expiry; /* Expiry time of key */
bool trusted; /* True if key is trusted */
};
@@ -159,5 +160,7 @@ static inline int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
return key_reject_and_link(key, timeout, ENOKEY, keyring, instkey);
}
+extern int generic_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
+
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
#endif /* _LINUX_KEY_TYPE_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 017b0826642f..e1d4715f3222 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -170,6 +170,8 @@ struct key {
#define KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED 7 /* set if key has been invalidated */
#define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED 8 /* set if key is trusted */
#define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY 9 /* set if keyring only accepts links to trusted keys */
+#define KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN 10 /* set if key is builtin */
+#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL 11 /* set if key can be invalidated by root without permission */
/* the key type and key description string
* - the desc is used to match a key against search criteria
diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
index 6926db724258..c2bbf672b84e 100644
--- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h
+++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
@@ -52,9 +52,15 @@ enum OID {
OID_md4, /* 1.2.840.113549.2.4 */
OID_md5, /* 1.2.840.113549.2.5 */
- OID_certAuthInfoAccess, /* 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1 */
+ /* Microsoft Authenticode & Software Publishing */
+ OID_msIndirectData, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.4 */
+ OID_msPeImageDataObjId, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.15 */
+ OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.21 */
OID_msOutlookExpress, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.16.4 */
+
+ OID_certAuthInfoAccess, /* 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1 */
OID_sha1, /* 1.3.14.3.2.26 */
+ OID_sha256, /* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1 */
/* Distinguished Name attribute IDs [RFC 2256] */
OID_commonName, /* 2.5.4.3 */
diff --git a/include/linux/pe.h b/include/linux/pe.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e170b95e763b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/pe.h
@@ -0,0 +1,448 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011 Red Hat, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ *
+ * Author(s): Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+ */
+#ifndef __LINUX_PE_H
+#define __LINUX_PE_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#define MZ_MAGIC 0x5a4d /* "MZ" */
+
+struct mz_hdr {
+ uint16_t magic; /* MZ_MAGIC */
+ uint16_t lbsize; /* size of last used block */
+ uint16_t blocks; /* pages in file, 0x3 */
+ uint16_t relocs; /* relocations */
+ uint16_t hdrsize; /* header size in "paragraphs" */
+ uint16_t min_extra_pps; /* .bss */
+ uint16_t max_extra_pps; /* runtime limit for the arena size */
+ uint16_t ss; /* relative stack segment */
+ uint16_t sp; /* initial %sp register */
+ uint16_t checksum; /* word checksum */
+ uint16_t ip; /* initial %ip register */
+ uint16_t cs; /* initial %cs relative to load segment */
+ uint16_t reloc_table_offset; /* offset of the first relocation */
+ uint16_t overlay_num; /* overlay number. set to 0. */
+ uint16_t reserved0[4]; /* reserved */
+ uint16_t oem_id; /* oem identifier */
+ uint16_t oem_info; /* oem specific */
+ uint16_t reserved1[10]; /* reserved */
+ uint32_t peaddr; /* address of pe header */
+ char message[64]; /* message to print */
+};
+
+struct mz_reloc {
+ uint16_t offset;
+ uint16_t segment;
+};
+
+#define PE_MAGIC 0x00004550 /* "PE\0\0" */
+#define PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32 0x010b
+#define PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32_ROM 0x0107
+#define PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32PLUS 0x020b
+
+/* machine type */
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_UNKNOWN 0x0000
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_AM33 0x01d3
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_AMD64 0x8664
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_ARM 0x01c0
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_ARMV7 0x01c4
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_EBC 0x0ebc
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386 0x014c
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 0x0200
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_M32R 0x9041
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_MIPS16 0x0266
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_MIPSFPU 0x0366
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_MIPSFPU16 0x0466
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_POWERPC 0x01f0
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_POWERPCFP 0x01f1
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_R4000 0x0166
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH3 0x01a2
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH3DSP 0x01a3
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH3E 0x01a4
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH4 0x01a6
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH5 0x01a8
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_THUMB 0x01c2
+#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_WCEMIPSV2 0x0169
+
+/* flags */
+#define IMAGE_FILE_RELOCS_STRIPPED 0x0001
+#define IMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE 0x0002
+#define IMAGE_FILE_LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED 0x0004
+#define IMAGE_FILE_LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED 0x0008
+#define IMAGE_FILE_AGGRESSIVE_WS_TRIM 0x0010
+#define IMAGE_FILE_LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE 0x0020
+#define IMAGE_FILE_16BIT_MACHINE 0x0040
+#define IMAGE_FILE_BYTES_REVERSED_LO 0x0080
+#define IMAGE_FILE_32BIT_MACHINE 0x0100
+#define IMAGE_FILE_DEBUG_STRIPPED 0x0200
+#define IMAGE_FILE_REMOVABLE_RUN_FROM_SWAP 0x0400
+#define IMAGE_FILE_NET_RUN_FROM_SWAP 0x0800
+#define IMAGE_FILE_SYSTEM 0x1000
+#define IMAGE_FILE_DLL 0x2000
+#define IMAGE_FILE_UP_SYSTEM_ONLY 0x4000
+#define IMAGE_FILE_BYTES_REVERSED_HI 0x8000
+
+struct pe_hdr {
+ uint32_t magic; /* PE magic */
+ uint16_t machine; /* machine type */
+ uint16_t sections; /* number of sections */
+ uint32_t timestamp; /* time_t */
+ uint32_t symbol_table; /* symbol table offset */
+ uint32_t symbols; /* number of symbols */
+ uint16_t opt_hdr_size; /* size of optional header */
+ uint16_t flags; /* flags */
+};
+
+#define IMAGE_FILE_OPT_ROM_MAGIC 0x107
+#define IMAGE_FILE_OPT_PE32_MAGIC 0x10b
+#define IMAGE_FILE_OPT_PE32_PLUS_MAGIC 0x20b
+
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_UNKNOWN 0
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_NATIVE 1
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_GUI 2
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_CUI 3
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_POSIX_CUI 7
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_CE_GUI 9
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION 10
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_DRIVER 11
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_RUNTIME_DRIVER 12
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_ROM_IMAGE 13
+#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_XBOX 14
+
+#define IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_DYNAMIC_BASE 0x0040
+#define IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_FORCE_INTEGRITY 0x0080
+#define IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_NX_COMPAT 0x0100
+#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NO_ISOLATION 0x0200
+#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NO_SEH 0x0400
+#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NO_BIND 0x0800
+#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_WDM_DRIVER 0x2000
+#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE 0x8000
+
+/* the fact that pe32 isn't padded where pe32+ is 64-bit means union won't
+ * work right. vomit. */
+struct pe32_opt_hdr {
+ /* "standard" header */
+ uint16_t magic; /* file type */
+ uint8_t ld_major; /* linker major version */
+ uint8_t ld_minor; /* linker minor version */
+ uint32_t text_size; /* size of text section(s) */
+ uint32_t data_size; /* size of data section(s) */
+ uint32_t bss_size; /* size of bss section(s) */
+ uint32_t entry_point; /* file offset of entry point */
+ uint32_t code_base; /* relative code addr in ram */
+ uint32_t data_base; /* relative data addr in ram */
+ /* "windows" header */
+ uint32_t image_base; /* preferred load address */
+ uint32_t section_align; /* alignment in bytes */
+ uint32_t file_align; /* file alignment in bytes */
+ uint16_t os_major; /* major OS version */
+ uint16_t os_minor; /* minor OS version */
+ uint16_t image_major; /* major image version */
+ uint16_t image_minor; /* minor image version */
+ uint16_t subsys_major; /* major subsystem version */
+ uint16_t subsys_minor; /* minor subsystem version */
+ uint32_t win32_version; /* reserved, must be 0 */
+ uint32_t image_size; /* image size */
+ uint32_t header_size; /* header size rounded up to
+ file_align */
+ uint32_t csum; /* checksum */
+ uint16_t subsys; /* subsystem */
+ uint16_t dll_flags; /* more flags! */
+ uint32_t stack_size_req;/* amt of stack requested */
+ uint32_t stack_size; /* amt of stack required */
+ uint32_t heap_size_req; /* amt of heap requested */
+ uint32_t heap_size; /* amt of heap required */
+ uint32_t loader_flags; /* reserved, must be 0 */
+ uint32_t data_dirs; /* number of data dir entries */
+};
+
+struct pe32plus_opt_hdr {
+ uint16_t magic; /* file type */
+ uint8_t ld_major; /* linker major version */
+ uint8_t ld_minor; /* linker minor version */
+ uint32_t text_size; /* size of text section(s) */
+ uint32_t data_size; /* size of data section(s) */
+ uint32_t bss_size; /* size of bss section(s) */
+ uint32_t entry_point; /* file offset of entry point */
+ uint32_t code_base; /* relative code addr in ram */
+ /* "windows" header */
+ uint64_t image_base; /* preferred load address */
+ uint32_t section_align; /* alignment in bytes */
+ uint32_t file_align; /* file alignment in bytes */
+ uint16_t os_major; /* major OS version */
+ uint16_t os_minor; /* minor OS version */
+ uint16_t image_major; /* major image version */
+ uint16_t image_minor; /* minor image version */
+ uint16_t subsys_major; /* major subsystem version */
+ uint16_t subsys_minor; /* minor subsystem version */
+ uint32_t win32_version; /* reserved, must be 0 */
+ uint32_t image_size; /* image size */
+ uint32_t header_size; /* header size rounded up to
+ file_align */
+ uint32_t csum; /* checksum */
+ uint16_t subsys; /* subsystem */
+ uint16_t dll_flags; /* more flags! */
+ uint64_t stack_size_req;/* amt of stack requested */
+ uint64_t stack_size; /* amt of stack required */
+ uint64_t heap_size_req; /* amt of heap requested */
+ uint64_t heap_size; /* amt of heap required */
+ uint32_t loader_flags; /* reserved, must be 0 */
+ uint32_t data_dirs; /* number of data dir entries */
+};
+
+struct data_dirent {
+ uint32_t virtual_address; /* relative to load address */
+ uint32_t size;
+};
+
+struct data_directory {
+ struct data_dirent exports; /* .edata */
+ struct data_dirent imports; /* .idata */
+ struct data_dirent resources; /* .rsrc */
+ struct data_dirent exceptions; /* .pdata */
+ struct data_dirent certs; /* certs */
+ struct data_dirent base_relocations; /* .reloc */
+ struct data_dirent debug; /* .debug */
+ struct data_dirent arch; /* reservered */
+ struct data_dirent global_ptr; /* global pointer reg. Size=0 */
+ struct data_dirent tls; /* .tls */
+ struct data_dirent load_config; /* load configuration structure */
+ struct data_dirent bound_imports; /* no idea */
+ struct data_dirent import_addrs; /* import address table */
+ struct data_dirent delay_imports; /* delay-load import table */
+ struct data_dirent clr_runtime_hdr; /* .cor (object only) */
+ struct data_dirent reserved;
+};
+
+struct section_header {
+ char name[8]; /* name or "/12\0" string tbl offset */
+ uint32_t virtual_size; /* size of loaded section in ram */
+ uint32_t virtual_address; /* relative virtual address */
+ uint32_t raw_data_size; /* size of the section */
+ uint32_t data_addr; /* file pointer to first page of sec */
+ uint32_t relocs; /* file pointer to relocation entries */
+ uint32_t line_numbers; /* line numbers! */
+ uint16_t num_relocs; /* number of relocations */
+ uint16_t num_lin_numbers; /* srsly. */
+ uint32_t flags;
+};
+
+/* they actually defined 0x00000000 as well, but I think we'll skip that one. */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_0 0x00000001
+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_1 0x00000002
+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_2 0x00000004
+#define IMAGE_SCN_TYPE_NO_PAD 0x00000008 /* don't pad - obsolete */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_3 0x00000010
+#define IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE 0x00000020 /* .text */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA 0x00000040 /* .data */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_CNT_UNINITIALIZED_DATA 0x00000080 /* .bss */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_OTHER 0x00000100 /* reserved */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_INFO 0x00000200 /* .drectve comments */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_4 0x00000400
+#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_REMOVE 0x00000800 /* .o only - scn to be rm'd*/
+#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_COMDAT 0x00001000 /* .o only - COMDAT data */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_5 0x00002000 /* spec omits this */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_6 0x00004000 /* spec omits this */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_GPREL 0x00008000 /* global pointer referenced data */
+/* spec lists 0x20000 twice, I suspect they meant 0x10000 for one of them */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_PURGEABLE 0x00010000 /* reserved for "future" use */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_16BIT 0x00020000 /* reserved for "future" use */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_LOCKED 0x00040000 /* reserved for "future" use */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_PRELOAD 0x00080000 /* reserved for "future" use */
+/* and here they just stuck a 1-byte integer in the middle of a bitfield */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_1BYTES 0x00100000 /* it does what it says on the box */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_2BYTES 0x00200000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_4BYTES 0x00300000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_8BYTES 0x00400000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_16BYTES 0x00500000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_32BYTES 0x00600000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_64BYTES 0x00700000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_128BYTES 0x00800000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_256BYTES 0x00900000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_512BYTES 0x00a00000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_1024BYTES 0x00b00000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_2048BYTES 0x00c00000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_4096BYTES 0x00d00000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_8192BYTES 0x00e00000
+#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_NRELOC_OVFL 0x01000000 /* extended relocations */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE 0x02000000 /* scn can be discarded */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_NOT_CACHED 0x04000000 /* cannot be cached */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_NOT_PAGED 0x08000000 /* not pageable */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_SHARED 0x10000000 /* can be shared */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE 0x20000000 /* can be executed as code */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ 0x40000000 /* readable */
+#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE 0x80000000 /* writeable */
+
+enum x64_coff_reloc_type {
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_ABSOLUTE = 0,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_ADDR64,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_ADDR32,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_ADDR32N,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_1,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_2,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_3,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_4,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_5,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SECTION,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SECREL,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SECREL7,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_TOKEN,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SREL32,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_PAIR,
+ IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SSPAN32,
+};
+
+enum arm_coff_reloc_type {
+ IMAGE_REL_ARM_ABSOLUTE,
+ IMAGE_REL_ARM_ADDR32,
+ IMAGE_REL_ARM_ADDR32N,
+ IMAGE_REL_ARM_BRANCH2,
+ IMAGE_REL_ARM_BRANCH1,
+ IMAGE_REL_ARM_SECTION,
+ IMAGE_REL_ARM_SECREL,
+};
+
+enum sh_coff_reloc_type {
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_ABSOLUTE,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT16,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT32,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT8,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT8_WORD,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT8_LONG,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT4,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT4_WORD,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT4_LONG,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_PCREL8_WORD,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_PCREL8_LONG,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_PCREL12_WORD,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_STARTOF_SECTION,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_SIZEOF_SECTION,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_SECTION,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_SECREL,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT32_NB,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_GPREL4_LONG,
+ IMAGE_REL_SH3_TOKEN,
+ IMAGE_REL_SHM_PCRELPT,
+ IMAGE_REL_SHM_REFLO,
+ IMAGE_REL_SHM_REFHALF,
+ IMAGE_REL_SHM_RELLO,
+ IMAGE_REL_SHM_RELHALF,
+ IMAGE_REL_SHM_PAIR,
+ IMAGE_REL_SHM_NOMODE,
+};
+
+enum ppc_coff_reloc_type {
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_ABSOLUTE,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR64,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR32,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR24,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR16,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR14,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_REL24,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_REL14,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR32N,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_SECREL,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_SECTION,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_SECREL16,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_REFHI,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_REFLO,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_PAIR,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_SECRELLO,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_GPREL,
+ IMAGE_REL_PPC_TOKEN,
+};
+
+enum x86_coff_reloc_type {
+ IMAGE_REL_I386_ABSOLUTE,
+ IMAGE_REL_I386_DIR16,
+ IMAGE_REL_I386_REL16,
+ IMAGE_REL_I386_DIR32,
+ IMAGE_REL_I386_DIR32NB,
+ IMAGE_REL_I386_SEG12,
+ IMAGE_REL_I386_SECTION,
+ IMAGE_REL_I386_SECREL,
+ IMAGE_REL_I386_TOKEN,
+ IMAGE_REL_I386_SECREL7,
+ IMAGE_REL_I386_REL32,
+};
+
+enum ia64_coff_reloc_type {
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_ABSOLUTE,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_IMM14,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_IMM22,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_IMM64,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_DIR32,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_DIR64,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL21B,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL21M,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL21F,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_GPREL22,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_LTOFF22,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_SECTION,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_SECREL22,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_SECREL64I,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_SECREL32,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_DIR32NB,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_SREL14,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_SREL22,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_SREL32,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_UREL32,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60X,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60B,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60F,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60I,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60M,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_IMMGPREL6,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_TOKEN,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_GPREL32,
+ IMAGE_REL_IA64_ADDEND,
+};
+
+struct coff_reloc {
+ uint32_t virtual_address;
+ uint32_t symbol_table_index;
+ union {
+ enum x64_coff_reloc_type x64_type;
+ enum arm_coff_reloc_type arm_type;
+ enum sh_coff_reloc_type sh_type;
+ enum ppc_coff_reloc_type ppc_type;
+ enum x86_coff_reloc_type x86_type;
+ enum ia64_coff_reloc_type ia64_type;
+ uint16_t data;
+ };
+};
+
+/*
+ * Definitions for the contents of the certs data block
+ */
+#define WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA 0x0002
+#define WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_OKCS115 0x0EF0
+#define WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID 0x0EF1
+
+#define WIN_CERT_REVISION_1_0 0x0100
+#define WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0 0x0200
+
+struct win_certificate {
+ uint32_t length;
+ uint16_t revision;
+ uint16_t cert_type;
+};
+
+#endif /* __LINUX_PE_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 66124d63371a..7c19d552dc3f 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1304,13 +1304,12 @@ struct task_struct {
* execve */
unsigned in_iowait:1;
- /* task may not gain privileges */
- unsigned no_new_privs:1;
-
/* Revert to default priority/policy when forking */
unsigned sched_reset_on_fork:1;
unsigned sched_contributes_to_load:1;
+ unsigned long atomic_flags; /* Flags needing atomic access. */
+
pid_t pid;
pid_t tgid;
@@ -1962,6 +1961,19 @@ static inline void memalloc_noio_restore(unsigned int flags)
current->flags = (current->flags & ~PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO) | flags;
}
+/* Per-process atomic flags. */
+#define PFA_NO_NEW_PRIVS 0x00000001 /* May not gain new privileges. */
+
+static inline bool task_no_new_privs(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return test_bit(PFA_NO_NEW_PRIVS, &p->atomic_flags);
+}
+
+static inline void task_set_no_new_privs(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ set_bit(PFA_NO_NEW_PRIVS, &p->atomic_flags);
+}
+
/*
* task->jobctl flags
*/
diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
index 4054b0994071..5d586a45a319 100644
--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
#include <uapi/linux/seccomp.h>
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK (SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC)
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
#include <linux/thread_info.h>
@@ -14,11 +16,11 @@ struct seccomp_filter;
*
* @mode: indicates one of the valid values above for controlled
* system calls available to a process.
- * @filter: The metadata and ruleset for determining what system calls
- * are allowed for a task.
+ * @filter: must always point to a valid seccomp-filter or NULL as it is
+ * accessed without locking during system call entry.
*
* @filter must only be accessed from the context of current as there
- * is no locking.
+ * is no read locking.
*/
struct seccomp {
int mode;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 9c6b9722ff48..623f90e5f38d 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -702,6 +702,15 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @inode points to the inode to use as a reference.
* The current task must be the one that nominated @inode.
* Return 0 if successful.
+ * @kernel_fw_from_file:
+ * Load firmware from userspace (not called for built-in firmware).
+ * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file containing
+ * the firmware to load. This argument will be NULL if the firmware
+ * was loaded via the uevent-triggered blob-based interface exposed
+ * by CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER.
+ * @buf pointer to buffer containing firmware contents.
+ * @size length of the firmware contents.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @kernel_module_request:
* Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for
* userspace to load a kernel module with the given name.
@@ -1565,6 +1574,7 @@ struct security_operations {
void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
+ int (*kernel_fw_from_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
int (*kernel_module_from_file)(struct file *file);
int (*task_fix_setuid) (struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -1837,6 +1847,7 @@ int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
+int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file);
int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -2363,6 +2374,12 @@ static inline int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *cred,
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file,
+ char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index b0881a0ed322..1713977ee26f 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -866,4 +866,6 @@ asmlinkage long sys_process_vm_writev(pid_t pid,
asmlinkage long sys_kcmp(pid_t pid1, pid_t pid2, int type,
unsigned long idx1, unsigned long idx2);
asmlinkage long sys_finit_module(int fd, const char __user *uargs, int flags);
+asmlinkage long sys_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
+ const char __user *uargs);
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index fff1d0976f80..8350c538b486 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ struct tpm_class_ops {
int (*send) (struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len);
void (*cancel) (struct tpm_chip *chip);
u8 (*status) (struct tpm_chip *chip);
+ bool (*update_timeouts)(struct tpm_chip *chip,
+ unsigned long *timeout_cap);
+
};
#if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) || defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM_MODULE)
diff --git a/include/linux/verify_pefile.h b/include/linux/verify_pefile.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ac34819214f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/verify_pefile.h
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+/* Signed PE file verification
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H
+#define _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H
+
+extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
+ struct key *trusted_keyring, bool *_trusted);
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
index 4fe018c48ed9..a4fc39bb3e4f 100644
--- a/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_cache {
};
/**
- * struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap - NetLabel LSM secattr category bitmap
+ * struct netlbl_lsm_catmap - NetLabel LSM secattr category bitmap
* @startbit: the value of the lowest order bit in the bitmap
* @bitmap: the category bitmap
* @next: pointer to the next bitmap "node" or NULL
@@ -162,10 +162,10 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_cache {
#define NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE (NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE * \
NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPCNT)
#define NETLBL_CATMAP_BIT (NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPTYPE)0x01
-struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap {
+struct netlbl_lsm_catmap {
u32 startbit;
NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPTYPE bitmap[NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPCNT];
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *next;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *next;
};
/**
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {
struct netlbl_lsm_cache *cache;
struct {
struct {
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *cat;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cat;
u32 lvl;
} mls;
u32 secid;
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static inline void netlbl_secattr_cache_free(struct netlbl_lsm_cache *cache)
}
/**
- * netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc - Allocate a LSM secattr catmap
+ * netlbl_catmap_alloc - Allocate a LSM secattr catmap
* @flags: memory allocation flags
*
* Description:
@@ -266,30 +266,28 @@ static inline void netlbl_secattr_cache_free(struct netlbl_lsm_cache *cache)
* on failure.
*
*/
-static inline struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(
- gfp_t flags)
+static inline struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *netlbl_catmap_alloc(gfp_t flags)
{
- return kzalloc(sizeof(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap), flags);
+ return kzalloc(sizeof(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap), flags);
}
/**
- * netlbl_secattr_catmap_free - Free a LSM secattr catmap
+ * netlbl_catmap_free - Free a LSM secattr catmap
* @catmap: the category bitmap
*
* Description:
* Free a LSM secattr catmap.
*
*/
-static inline void netlbl_secattr_catmap_free(
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap)
+static inline void netlbl_catmap_free(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap)
{
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *iter;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *iter;
- do {
+ while (catmap) {
iter = catmap;
catmap = catmap->next;
kfree(iter);
- } while (catmap);
+ }
}
/**
@@ -321,7 +319,7 @@ static inline void netlbl_secattr_destroy(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
netlbl_secattr_cache_free(secattr->cache);
if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT)
- netlbl_secattr_catmap_free(secattr->attr.mls.cat);
+ netlbl_catmap_free(secattr->attr.mls.cat);
}
/**
@@ -390,17 +388,22 @@ int netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add(u32 doi,
/*
* LSM security attribute operations
*/
-int netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap,
- u32 offset);
-int netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk_rng(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap,
- u32 offset);
-int netlbl_secattr_catmap_setbit(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap,
- u32 bit,
- gfp_t flags);
-int netlbl_secattr_catmap_setrng(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap,
- u32 start,
- u32 end,
- gfp_t flags);
+int netlbl_catmap_walk(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap, u32 offset);
+int netlbl_catmap_walkrng(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap, u32 offset);
+int netlbl_catmap_getlong(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap,
+ u32 *offset,
+ unsigned long *bitmap);
+int netlbl_catmap_setbit(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap,
+ u32 bit,
+ gfp_t flags);
+int netlbl_catmap_setrng(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap,
+ u32 start,
+ u32 end,
+ gfp_t flags);
+int netlbl_catmap_setlong(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap,
+ u32 offset,
+ unsigned long bitmap,
+ gfp_t flags);
/*
* LSM protocol operations (NetLabel LSM/kernel API)
@@ -492,30 +495,39 @@ static inline int netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add(u32 doi,
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
-static inline int netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap,
- u32 offset)
+static inline int netlbl_catmap_walk(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap,
+ u32 offset)
{
return -ENOENT;
}
-static inline int netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk_rng(
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap,
- u32 offset)
+static inline int netlbl_catmap_walkrng(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap,
+ u32 offset)
{
return -ENOENT;
}
-static inline int netlbl_secattr_catmap_setbit(
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap,
- u32 bit,
- gfp_t flags)
+static inline int netlbl_catmap_getlong(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap,
+ u32 *offset,
+ unsigned long *bitmap)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline int netlbl_secattr_catmap_setrng(
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap,
- u32 start,
- u32 end,
- gfp_t flags)
+static inline int netlbl_catmap_setbit(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap,
+ u32 bit,
+ gfp_t flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline int netlbl_catmap_setrng(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap,
+ u32 start,
+ u32 end,
+ gfp_t flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static int netlbl_catmap_setlong(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap,
+ u32 offset,
+ unsigned long bitmap,
+ gfp_t flags)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
index 333640608087..65acbf0e2867 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
@@ -699,9 +699,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_sched_setattr, sys_sched_setattr)
__SYSCALL(__NR_sched_getattr, sys_sched_getattr)
#define __NR_renameat2 276
__SYSCALL(__NR_renameat2, sys_renameat2)
+#define __NR_seccomp 277
+__SYSCALL(__NR_seccomp, sys_seccomp)
#undef __NR_syscalls
-#define __NR_syscalls 277
+#define __NR_syscalls 278
/*
* All syscalls below here should go away really,
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
index ac2dc9f72973..0f238a43ff1e 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -10,6 +10,13 @@
#define SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT 1 /* uses hard-coded filter. */
#define SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER 2 /* uses user-supplied filter. */
+/* Valid operations for seccomp syscall. */
+#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT 0
+#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1
+
+/* Valid flags for SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER */
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC 1
+
/*
* All BPF programs must return a 32-bit value.
* The bottom 16-bits are for optional return data.
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 3ef2e0e797e8..ba2ff5a5c600 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1677,7 +1677,7 @@ void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
audit_log_format(ab, "%08x",
- cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]);
+ cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
}
}
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index a5cf13c018ce..989f5bfc57dc 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -258,6 +258,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data)
i++;
}
+ effective.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
+ permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
+ inheritable.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
+
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 5f1bf3bebb4f..fbd3497b221f 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -315,6 +315,15 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig)
goto free_ti;
tsk->stack = ti;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+ /*
+ * We must handle setting up seccomp filters once we're under
+ * the sighand lock in case orig has changed between now and
+ * then. Until then, filter must be NULL to avoid messing up
+ * the usage counts on the error path calling free_task.
+ */
+ tsk->seccomp.filter = NULL;
+#endif
setup_thread_stack(tsk, orig);
clear_user_return_notifier(tsk);
@@ -1081,6 +1090,39 @@ static int copy_signal(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
return 0;
}
+static void copy_seccomp(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+ /*
+ * Must be called with sighand->lock held, which is common to
+ * all threads in the group. Holding cred_guard_mutex is not
+ * needed because this new task is not yet running and cannot
+ * be racing exec.
+ */
+ BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(&current->sighand->siglock));
+
+ /* Ref-count the new filter user, and assign it. */
+ get_seccomp_filter(current);
+ p->seccomp = current->seccomp;
+
+ /*
+ * Explicitly enable no_new_privs here in case it got set
+ * between the task_struct being duplicated and holding the
+ * sighand lock. The seccomp state and nnp must be in sync.
+ */
+ if (task_no_new_privs(current))
+ task_set_no_new_privs(p);
+
+ /*
+ * If the parent gained a seccomp mode after copying thread
+ * flags and between before we held the sighand lock, we have
+ * to manually enable the seccomp thread flag here.
+ */
+ if (p->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED)
+ set_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_SECCOMP);
+#endif
+}
+
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(set_tid_address, int __user *, tidptr)
{
current->clear_child_tid = tidptr;
@@ -1195,7 +1237,6 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
goto fork_out;
ftrace_graph_init_task(p);
- get_seccomp_filter(p);
rt_mutex_init_task(p);
@@ -1435,6 +1476,12 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
spin_lock(&current->sighand->siglock);
/*
+ * Copy seccomp details explicitly here, in case they were changed
+ * before holding sighand lock.
+ */
+ copy_seccomp(p);
+
+ /*
* Process group and session signals need to be delivered to just the
* parent before the fork or both the parent and the child after the
* fork. Restart if a signal comes in before we add the new process to
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 301bbc24739c..74f460179171 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -18,15 +18,17 @@
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
/* #define SECCOMP_DEBUG 1 */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
#include <asm/syscall.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/pid.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -172,21 +174,24 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen)
*/
static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
{
- struct seccomp_filter *f;
+ struct seccomp_filter *f = ACCESS_ONCE(current->seccomp.filter);
struct seccomp_data sd;
u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
/* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
- if (WARN_ON(current->seccomp.filter == NULL))
+ if (unlikely(WARN_ON(f == NULL)))
return SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
+ /* Make sure cross-thread synced filter points somewhere sane. */
+ smp_read_barrier_depends();
+
populate_seccomp_data(&sd);
/*
* All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return
* value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA).
*/
- for (f = current->seccomp.filter; f; f = f->prev) {
+ for (; f; f = f->prev) {
u32 cur_ret = SK_RUN_FILTER(f->prog, (void *)&sd);
if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION))
@@ -194,29 +199,159 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
}
return ret;
}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
+
+static inline bool seccomp_may_assign_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode)
+{
+ BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(&current->sighand->siglock));
+
+ if (current->seccomp.mode && current->seccomp.mode != seccomp_mode)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task,
+ unsigned long seccomp_mode)
+{
+ BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(&task->sighand->siglock));
+
+ task->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode;
+ /*
+ * Make sure TIF_SECCOMP cannot be set before the mode (and
+ * filter) is set.
+ */
+ smp_mb__before_atomic();
+ set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SECCOMP);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
+/* Returns 1 if the parent is an ancestor of the child. */
+static int is_ancestor(struct seccomp_filter *parent,
+ struct seccomp_filter *child)
+{
+ /* NULL is the root ancestor. */
+ if (parent == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ for (; child; child = child->prev)
+ if (child == parent)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
/**
- * seccomp_attach_filter: Attaches a seccomp filter to current.
+ * seccomp_can_sync_threads: checks if all threads can be synchronized
+ *
+ * Expects sighand and cred_guard_mutex locks to be held.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ve on error, or the pid of a thread which was
+ * either not in the correct seccomp mode or it did not have an ancestral
+ * seccomp filter.
+ */
+static inline pid_t seccomp_can_sync_threads(void)
+{
+ struct task_struct *thread, *caller;
+
+ BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex));
+ BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(&current->sighand->siglock));
+
+ /* Validate all threads being eligible for synchronization. */
+ caller = current;
+ for_each_thread(caller, thread) {
+ pid_t failed;
+
+ /* Skip current, since it is initiating the sync. */
+ if (thread == caller)
+ continue;
+
+ if (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED ||
+ (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER &&
+ is_ancestor(thread->seccomp.filter,
+ caller->seccomp.filter)))
+ continue;
+
+ /* Return the first thread that cannot be synchronized. */
+ failed = task_pid_vnr(thread);
+ /* If the pid cannot be resolved, then return -ESRCH */
+ if (unlikely(WARN_ON(failed == 0)))
+ failed = -ESRCH;
+ return failed;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * seccomp_sync_threads: sets all threads to use current's filter
+ *
+ * Expects sighand and cred_guard_mutex locks to be held, and for
+ * seccomp_can_sync_threads() to have returned success already
+ * without dropping the locks.
+ *
+ */
+static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(void)
+{
+ struct task_struct *thread, *caller;
+
+ BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex));
+ BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(&current->sighand->siglock));
+
+ /* Synchronize all threads. */
+ caller = current;
+ for_each_thread(caller, thread) {
+ /* Skip current, since it needs no changes. */
+ if (thread == caller)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Get a task reference for the new leaf node. */
+ get_seccomp_filter(caller);
+ /*
+ * Drop the task reference to the shared ancestor since
+ * current's path will hold a reference. (This also
+ * allows a put before the assignment.)
+ */
+ put_seccomp_filter(thread);
+ smp_store_release(&thread->seccomp.filter,
+ caller->seccomp.filter);
+ /*
+ * Opt the other thread into seccomp if needed.
+ * As threads are considered to be trust-realm
+ * equivalent (see ptrace_may_access), it is safe to
+ * allow one thread to transition the other.
+ */
+ if (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED) {
+ /*
+ * Don't let an unprivileged task work around
+ * the no_new_privs restriction by creating
+ * a thread that sets it up, enters seccomp,
+ * then dies.
+ */
+ if (task_no_new_privs(caller))
+ task_set_no_new_privs(thread);
+
+ seccomp_assign_mode(thread, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * seccomp_prepare_filter: Prepares a seccomp filter for use.
* @fprog: BPF program to install
*
- * Returns 0 on success or an errno on failure.
+ * Returns filter on success or an ERR_PTR on failure.
*/
-static long seccomp_attach_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
+static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
{
struct seccomp_filter *filter;
- unsigned long fp_size = fprog->len * sizeof(struct sock_filter);
- unsigned long total_insns = fprog->len;
+ unsigned long fp_size;
struct sock_filter *fp;
int new_len;
long ret;
if (fprog->len == 0 || fprog->len > BPF_MAXINSNS)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- for (filter = current->seccomp.filter; filter; filter = filter->prev)
- total_insns += filter->prog->len + 4; /* include a 4 instr penalty */
- if (total_insns > MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ BUG_ON(INT_MAX / fprog->len < sizeof(struct sock_filter));
+ fp_size = fprog->len * sizeof(struct sock_filter);
/*
* Installing a seccomp filter requires that the task has
@@ -224,14 +359,14 @@ static long seccomp_attach_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
* This avoids scenarios where unprivileged tasks can affect the
* behavior of privileged children.
*/
- if (!current->no_new_privs &&
+ if (!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
CAP_SYS_ADMIN) != 0)
- return -EACCES;
+ return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
fp = kzalloc(fp_size, GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN);
if (!fp)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
/* Copy the instructions from fprog. */
ret = -EFAULT;
@@ -275,13 +410,7 @@ static long seccomp_attach_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
sk_filter_select_runtime(filter->prog);
- /*
- * If there is an existing filter, make it the prev and don't drop its
- * task reference.
- */
- filter->prev = current->seccomp.filter;
- current->seccomp.filter = filter;
- return 0;
+ return filter;
free_filter_prog:
kfree(filter->prog);
@@ -289,19 +418,20 @@ free_filter:
kfree(filter);
free_prog:
kfree(fp);
- return ret;
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
/**
- * seccomp_attach_user_filter - attaches a user-supplied sock_fprog
+ * seccomp_prepare_user_filter - prepares a user-supplied sock_fprog
* @user_filter: pointer to the user data containing a sock_fprog.
*
* Returns 0 on success and non-zero otherwise.
*/
-static long seccomp_attach_user_filter(char __user *user_filter)
+static struct seccomp_filter *
+seccomp_prepare_user_filter(const char __user *user_filter)
{
struct sock_fprog fprog;
- long ret = -EFAULT;
+ struct seccomp_filter *filter = ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (is_compat_task()) {
@@ -314,9 +444,56 @@ static long seccomp_attach_user_filter(char __user *user_filter)
#endif
if (copy_from_user(&fprog, user_filter, sizeof(fprog)))
goto out;
- ret = seccomp_attach_filter(&fprog);
+ filter = seccomp_prepare_filter(&fprog);
out:
- return ret;
+ return filter;
+}
+
+/**
+ * seccomp_attach_filter: validate and attach filter
+ * @flags: flags to change filter behavior
+ * @filter: seccomp filter to add to the current process
+ *
+ * Caller must be holding current->sighand->siglock lock.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ve on error.
+ */
+static long seccomp_attach_filter(unsigned int flags,
+ struct seccomp_filter *filter)
+{
+ unsigned long total_insns;
+ struct seccomp_filter *walker;
+
+ BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(&current->sighand->siglock));
+
+ /* Validate resulting filter length. */
+ total_insns = filter->prog->len;
+ for (walker = current->seccomp.filter; walker; walker = walker->prev)
+ total_insns += walker->prog->len + 4; /* 4 instr penalty */
+ if (total_insns > MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* If thread sync has been requested, check that it is possible. */
+ if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC) {
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = seccomp_can_sync_threads();
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If there is an existing filter, make it the prev and don't drop its
+ * task reference.
+ */
+ filter->prev = current->seccomp.filter;
+ current->seccomp.filter = filter;
+
+ /* Now that the new filter is in place, synchronize to all threads. */
+ if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC)
+ seccomp_sync_threads();
+
+ return 0;
}
/* get_seccomp_filter - increments the reference count of the filter on @tsk */
@@ -329,6 +506,14 @@ void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
atomic_inc(&orig->usage);
}
+static inline void seccomp_filter_free(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
+{
+ if (filter) {
+ sk_filter_free(filter->prog);
+ kfree(filter);
+ }
+}
+
/* put_seccomp_filter - decrements the ref count of tsk->seccomp.filter */
void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
@@ -337,8 +522,7 @@ void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
while (orig && atomic_dec_and_test(&orig->usage)) {
struct seccomp_filter *freeme = orig;
orig = orig->prev;
- sk_filter_free(freeme->prog);
- kfree(freeme);
+ seccomp_filter_free(freeme);
}
}
@@ -382,12 +566,17 @@ static int mode1_syscalls_32[] = {
int __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
{
- int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
int exit_sig = 0;
int *syscall;
u32 ret;
- switch (mode) {
+ /*
+ * Make sure that any changes to mode from another thread have
+ * been seen after TIF_SECCOMP was seen.
+ */
+ rmb();
+
+ switch (current->seccomp.mode) {
case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
syscall = mode1_syscalls;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
@@ -473,47 +662,152 @@ long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
}
/**
- * prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode
- * @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use
- * @filter: optional struct sock_fprog for use with SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
+ * seccomp_set_mode_strict: internal function for setting strict seccomp
*
- * This function may be called repeatedly with a @seccomp_mode of
- * SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER to install additional filters. Every filter
- * successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order) for each system
- * call the task makes.
+ * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
+ */
+static long seccomp_set_mode_strict(void)
+{
+ const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT;
+ long ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
+
+ if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode))
+ goto out;
+
+#ifdef TIF_NOTSC
+ disable_TSC();
+#endif
+ seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode);
+ ret = 0;
+
+out:
+ spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
+/**
+ * seccomp_set_mode_filter: internal function for setting seccomp filter
+ * @flags: flags to change filter behavior
+ * @filter: struct sock_fprog containing filter
+ *
+ * This function may be called repeatedly to install additional filters.
+ * Every filter successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order)
+ * for each system call the task makes.
*
* Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
*
* Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
*/
-long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)
+static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
+ const char __user *filter)
{
+ const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER;
+ struct seccomp_filter *prepared = NULL;
long ret = -EINVAL;
- if (current->seccomp.mode &&
- current->seccomp.mode != seccomp_mode)
+ /* Validate flags. */
+ if (flags & ~SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Prepare the new filter before holding any locks. */
+ prepared = seccomp_prepare_user_filter(filter);
+ if (IS_ERR(prepared))
+ return PTR_ERR(prepared);
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure we cannot change seccomp or nnp state via TSYNC
+ * while another thread is in the middle of calling exec.
+ */
+ if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC &&
+ mutex_lock_killable(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
+ goto out_free;
+
+ spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
+
+ if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode))
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = seccomp_attach_filter(flags, prepared);
+ if (ret)
goto out;
+ /* Do not free the successfully attached filter. */
+ prepared = NULL;
+
+ seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode);
+out:
+ spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
+ if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC)
+ mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+out_free:
+ seccomp_filter_free(prepared);
+ return ret;
+}
+#else
+static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
+ const char __user *filter)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Common entry point for both prctl and syscall. */
+static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
+ const char __user *uargs)
+{
+ switch (op) {
+ case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT:
+ if (flags != 0 || uargs != NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return seccomp_set_mode_strict();
+ case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER:
+ return seccomp_set_mode_filter(flags, uargs);
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+}
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(seccomp, unsigned int, op, unsigned int, flags,
+ const char __user *, uargs)
+{
+ return do_seccomp(op, flags, uargs);
+}
+
+/**
+ * prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode
+ * @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use
+ * @filter: optional struct sock_fprog for use with SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
+ */
+long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)
+{
+ unsigned int op;
+ char __user *uargs;
switch (seccomp_mode) {
case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
- ret = 0;
-#ifdef TIF_NOTSC
- disable_TSC();
-#endif
+ op = SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT;
+ /*
+ * Setting strict mode through prctl always ignored filter,
+ * so make sure it is always NULL here to pass the internal
+ * check in do_seccomp().
+ */
+ uargs = NULL;
break;
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
- ret = seccomp_attach_user_filter(filter);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
+ op = SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER;
+ uargs = filter;
break;
-#endif
default:
- goto out;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
- current->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode;
- set_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP);
-out:
- return ret;
+ /* prctl interface doesn't have flags, so they are always zero. */
+ return do_seccomp(op, 0, uargs);
}
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 66a751ebf9d9..ce8129192a26 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -1990,12 +1990,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
if (arg2 != 1 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
return -EINVAL;
- current->no_new_privs = 1;
+ task_set_no_new_privs(current);
break;
case PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS:
if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
return -EINVAL;
- return current->no_new_privs ? 1 : 0;
+ return task_no_new_privs(current) ? 1 : 0;
case PR_GET_THP_DISABLE:
if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c
index 36441b51b5df..2904a2105914 100644
--- a/kernel/sys_ni.c
+++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c
@@ -213,3 +213,6 @@ cond_syscall(compat_sys_open_by_handle_at);
/* compare kernel pointers */
cond_syscall(sys_kcmp);
+
+/* operate on Secure Computing state */
+cond_syscall(sys_seccomp);
diff --git a/kernel/system_keyring.c b/kernel/system_keyring.c
index 52ebc70263f4..875f64e8935b 100644
--- a/kernel/system_keyring.c
+++ b/kernel/system_keyring.c
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void)
pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
PTR_ERR(key));
} else {
+ set_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key_ref_to_ptr(key)->flags);
pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n",
key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
key_ref_put(key);
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig b/lib/Kconfig
index 334f7722a999..a8a775730c09 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/Kconfig
@@ -451,7 +451,8 @@ config MPILIB
config SIGNATURE
tristate
- depends on KEYS && CRYPTO
+ depends on KEYS
+ select CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_SHA1
select MPILIB
help
diff --git a/net/ceph/crypto.c b/net/ceph/crypto.c
index 6e7a236525b6..ffeba8f9dda9 100644
--- a/net/ceph/crypto.c
+++ b/net/ceph/crypto.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <keys/ceph-type.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include <linux/ceph/decode.h>
#include "crypto.h"
@@ -423,8 +424,7 @@ int ceph_encrypt2(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *dst, size_t *dst_len,
}
}
-static int ceph_key_instantiate(struct key *key,
- struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+static int ceph_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey;
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
@@ -435,10 +435,6 @@ static int ceph_key_instantiate(struct key *key,
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
goto err;
- ret = key_payload_reserve(key, datalen);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto err;
-
ret = -ENOMEM;
ckey = kmalloc(sizeof(*ckey), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ckey)
@@ -450,7 +446,8 @@ static int ceph_key_instantiate(struct key *key,
if (ret < 0)
goto err_ckey;
- key->payload.data = ckey;
+ prep->payload[0] = ckey;
+ prep->quotalen = datalen;
return 0;
err_ckey:
@@ -459,12 +456,15 @@ err:
return ret;
}
-static int ceph_key_match(const struct key *key, const void *description)
+static void ceph_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- return strcmp(key->description, description) == 0;
+ struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey = prep->payload[0];
+ ceph_crypto_key_destroy(ckey);
+ kfree(ckey);
}
-static void ceph_key_destroy(struct key *key) {
+static void ceph_key_destroy(struct key *key)
+{
struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey = key->payload.data;
ceph_crypto_key_destroy(ckey);
@@ -473,8 +473,10 @@ static void ceph_key_destroy(struct key *key) {
struct key_type key_type_ceph = {
.name = "ceph",
- .instantiate = ceph_key_instantiate,
- .match = ceph_key_match,
+ .preparse = ceph_key_preparse,
+ .free_preparse = ceph_key_free_preparse,
+ .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
+ .match = user_match,
.destroy = ceph_key_destroy,
};
diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
index bf8584339048..f380b2c58178 100644
--- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
+++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ const struct cred *dns_resolver_cache;
#define DNS_ERRORNO_OPTION "dnserror"
/*
- * Instantiate a user defined key for dns_resolver.
+ * Preparse instantiation data for a dns_resolver key.
*
* The data must be a NUL-terminated string, with the NUL char accounted in
* datalen.
@@ -58,17 +58,15 @@ const struct cred *dns_resolver_cache;
* "ip1,ip2,...#foo=bar"
*/
static int
-dns_resolver_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+dns_resolver_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct user_key_payload *upayload;
unsigned long derrno;
int ret;
- size_t datalen = prep->datalen, result_len = 0;
+ int datalen = prep->datalen, result_len = 0;
const char *data = prep->data, *end, *opt;
- kenter("%%%d,%s,'%*.*s',%zu",
- key->serial, key->description,
- (int)datalen, (int)datalen, data, datalen);
+ kenter("'%*.*s',%u", datalen, datalen, data, datalen);
if (datalen <= 1 || !data || data[datalen - 1] != '\0')
return -EINVAL;
@@ -95,8 +93,7 @@ dns_resolver_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
opt_len = next_opt - opt;
if (!opt_len) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
- "Empty option to dns_resolver key %d\n",
- key->serial);
+ "Empty option to dns_resolver key\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -125,30 +122,28 @@ dns_resolver_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
goto bad_option_value;
kdebug("dns error no. = %lu", derrno);
- key->type_data.x[0] = -derrno;
+ prep->type_data[0] = ERR_PTR(-derrno);
continue;
}
bad_option_value:
printk(KERN_WARNING
- "Option '%*.*s' to dns_resolver key %d:"
+ "Option '%*.*s' to dns_resolver key:"
" bad/missing value\n",
- opt_nlen, opt_nlen, opt, key->serial);
+ opt_nlen, opt_nlen, opt);
return -EINVAL;
} while (opt = next_opt + 1, opt < end);
}
/* don't cache the result if we're caching an error saying there's no
* result */
- if (key->type_data.x[0]) {
- kleave(" = 0 [h_error %ld]", key->type_data.x[0]);
+ if (prep->type_data[0]) {
+ kleave(" = 0 [h_error %ld]", PTR_ERR(prep->type_data[0]));
return 0;
}
kdebug("store result");
- ret = key_payload_reserve(key, result_len);
- if (ret < 0)
- return -EINVAL;
+ prep->quotalen = result_len;
upayload = kmalloc(sizeof(*upayload) + result_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!upayload) {
@@ -159,13 +154,23 @@ dns_resolver_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
upayload->datalen = result_len;
memcpy(upayload->data, data, result_len);
upayload->data[result_len] = '\0';
- rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, upayload);
+ prep->payload[0] = upayload;
kleave(" = 0");
return 0;
}
/*
+ * Clean up the preparse data
+ */
+static void dns_resolver_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+
+ kfree(prep->payload[0]);
+}
+
+/*
* The description is of the form "[<type>:]<domain_name>"
*
* The domain name may be a simple name or an absolute domain name (which
@@ -234,7 +239,9 @@ static long dns_resolver_read(const struct key *key,
struct key_type key_type_dns_resolver = {
.name = "dns_resolver",
- .instantiate = dns_resolver_instantiate,
+ .preparse = dns_resolver_preparse,
+ .free_preparse = dns_resolver_free_preparse,
+ .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
.match = dns_resolver_match,
.revoke = user_revoke,
.destroy = user_destroy,
diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c
index dd8696a3dbec..39d2c39bdf87 100644
--- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c
+++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c
@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ int dns_query(const char *type, const char *name, size_t namelen,
}
down_read(&rkey->sem);
+ set_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL, &rkey->flags);
rkey->perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;
ret = key_validate(rkey);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
index 69e77c8ff285..05b708bbdb0d 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
@@ -890,8 +890,8 @@ static int cipso_v4_map_cat_rbm_hton(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
}
for (;;) {
- host_spot = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(secattr->attr.mls.cat,
- host_spot + 1);
+ host_spot = netlbl_catmap_walk(secattr->attr.mls.cat,
+ host_spot + 1);
if (host_spot < 0)
break;
@@ -973,7 +973,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_map_cat_rbm_ntoh(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
return -EPERM;
break;
}
- ret_val = netlbl_secattr_catmap_setbit(secattr->attr.mls.cat,
+ ret_val = netlbl_catmap_setbit(&secattr->attr.mls.cat,
host_spot,
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (ret_val != 0)
@@ -1039,8 +1039,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_map_cat_enum_hton(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
u32 cat_iter = 0;
for (;;) {
- cat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(secattr->attr.mls.cat,
- cat + 1);
+ cat = netlbl_catmap_walk(secattr->attr.mls.cat, cat + 1);
if (cat < 0)
break;
if ((cat_iter + 2) > net_cat_len)
@@ -1075,9 +1074,9 @@ static int cipso_v4_map_cat_enum_ntoh(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
u32 iter;
for (iter = 0; iter < net_cat_len; iter += 2) {
- ret_val = netlbl_secattr_catmap_setbit(secattr->attr.mls.cat,
- get_unaligned_be16(&net_cat[iter]),
- GFP_ATOMIC);
+ ret_val = netlbl_catmap_setbit(&secattr->attr.mls.cat,
+ get_unaligned_be16(&net_cat[iter]),
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
}
@@ -1155,8 +1154,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_map_cat_rng_hton(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
return -ENOSPC;
for (;;) {
- iter = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(secattr->attr.mls.cat,
- iter + 1);
+ iter = netlbl_catmap_walk(secattr->attr.mls.cat, iter + 1);
if (iter < 0)
break;
cat_size += (iter == 0 ? 0 : sizeof(u16));
@@ -1164,8 +1162,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_map_cat_rng_hton(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
return -ENOSPC;
array[array_cnt++] = iter;
- iter = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk_rng(secattr->attr.mls.cat,
- iter);
+ iter = netlbl_catmap_walkrng(secattr->attr.mls.cat, iter);
if (iter < 0)
return -EFAULT;
cat_size += sizeof(u16);
@@ -1217,10 +1214,10 @@ static int cipso_v4_map_cat_rng_ntoh(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
else
cat_low = 0;
- ret_val = netlbl_secattr_catmap_setrng(secattr->attr.mls.cat,
- cat_low,
- cat_high,
- GFP_ATOMIC);
+ ret_val = netlbl_catmap_setrng(&secattr->attr.mls.cat,
+ cat_low,
+ cat_high,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
}
@@ -1335,16 +1332,12 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_rbm(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
if (tag_len > 4) {
- secattr->attr.mls.cat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (secattr->attr.mls.cat == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
ret_val = cipso_v4_map_cat_rbm_ntoh(doi_def,
&tag[4],
tag_len - 4,
secattr);
if (ret_val != 0) {
- netlbl_secattr_catmap_free(secattr->attr.mls.cat);
+ netlbl_catmap_free(secattr->attr.mls.cat);
return ret_val;
}
@@ -1430,16 +1423,12 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_enum(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
if (tag_len > 4) {
- secattr->attr.mls.cat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (secattr->attr.mls.cat == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
ret_val = cipso_v4_map_cat_enum_ntoh(doi_def,
&tag[4],
tag_len - 4,
secattr);
if (ret_val != 0) {
- netlbl_secattr_catmap_free(secattr->attr.mls.cat);
+ netlbl_catmap_free(secattr->attr.mls.cat);
return ret_val;
}
@@ -1524,16 +1513,12 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_rng(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
if (tag_len > 4) {
- secattr->attr.mls.cat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (secattr->attr.mls.cat == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
ret_val = cipso_v4_map_cat_rng_ntoh(doi_def,
&tag[4],
tag_len - 4,
secattr);
if (ret_val != 0) {
- netlbl_secattr_catmap_free(secattr->attr.mls.cat);
+ netlbl_catmap_free(secattr->attr.mls.cat);
return ret_val;
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
index 3045a964f39c..05ea4a4cc0ac 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -405,8 +405,72 @@ out_entry:
* Security Attribute Functions
*/
+#define _CM_F_NONE 0x00000000
+#define _CM_F_ALLOC 0x00000001
+#define _CM_F_WALK 0x00000002
+
/**
- * netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk - Walk a LSM secattr catmap looking for a bit
+ * _netlbl_catmap_getnode - Get a individual node from a catmap
+ * @catmap: pointer to the category bitmap
+ * @offset: the requested offset
+ * @cm_flags: catmap flags, see _CM_F_*
+ * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Iterate through the catmap looking for the node associated with @offset.
+ * If the _CM_F_ALLOC flag is set in @cm_flags and there is no associated node,
+ * one will be created and inserted into the catmap. If the _CM_F_WALK flag is
+ * set in @cm_flags and there is no associated node, the next highest node will
+ * be returned. Returns a pointer to the node on success, NULL on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *_netlbl_catmap_getnode(
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap,
+ u32 offset,
+ unsigned int cm_flags,
+ gfp_t gfp_flags)
+{
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *iter = *catmap;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *prev = NULL;
+
+ if (iter == NULL)
+ goto catmap_getnode_alloc;
+ if (offset < iter->startbit)
+ goto catmap_getnode_walk;
+ while (iter && offset >= (iter->startbit + NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE)) {
+ prev = iter;
+ iter = iter->next;
+ }
+ if (iter == NULL || offset < iter->startbit)
+ goto catmap_getnode_walk;
+
+ return iter;
+
+catmap_getnode_walk:
+ if (cm_flags & _CM_F_WALK)
+ return iter;
+catmap_getnode_alloc:
+ if (!(cm_flags & _CM_F_ALLOC))
+ return NULL;
+
+ iter = netlbl_catmap_alloc(gfp_flags);
+ if (iter == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ iter->startbit = offset & ~(NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE - 1);
+
+ if (prev == NULL) {
+ iter->next = *catmap;
+ *catmap = iter;
+ } else {
+ iter->next = prev->next;
+ prev->next = iter;
+ }
+
+ return iter;
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_catmap_walk - Walk a LSM secattr catmap looking for a bit
* @catmap: the category bitmap
* @offset: the offset to start searching at, in bits
*
@@ -415,54 +479,51 @@ out_entry:
* returns the spot of the first set bit or -ENOENT if no bits are set.
*
*/
-int netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap,
- u32 offset)
+int netlbl_catmap_walk(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap, u32 offset)
{
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *iter = catmap;
- u32 node_idx;
- u32 node_bit;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *iter = catmap;
+ u32 idx;
+ u32 bit;
NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPTYPE bitmap;
+ iter = _netlbl_catmap_getnode(&catmap, offset, _CM_F_WALK, 0);
+ if (iter == NULL)
+ return -ENOENT;
if (offset > iter->startbit) {
- while (offset >= (iter->startbit + NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE)) {
- iter = iter->next;
- if (iter == NULL)
- return -ENOENT;
- }
- node_idx = (offset - iter->startbit) / NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE;
- node_bit = offset - iter->startbit -
- (NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE * node_idx);
+ offset -= iter->startbit;
+ idx = offset / NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE;
+ bit = offset % NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE;
} else {
- node_idx = 0;
- node_bit = 0;
+ idx = 0;
+ bit = 0;
}
- bitmap = iter->bitmap[node_idx] >> node_bit;
+ bitmap = iter->bitmap[idx] >> bit;
for (;;) {
if (bitmap != 0) {
while ((bitmap & NETLBL_CATMAP_BIT) == 0) {
bitmap >>= 1;
- node_bit++;
+ bit++;
}
return iter->startbit +
- (NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE * node_idx) + node_bit;
+ (NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE * idx) + bit;
}
- if (++node_idx >= NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPCNT) {
+ if (++idx >= NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPCNT) {
if (iter->next != NULL) {
iter = iter->next;
- node_idx = 0;
+ idx = 0;
} else
return -ENOENT;
}
- bitmap = iter->bitmap[node_idx];
- node_bit = 0;
+ bitmap = iter->bitmap[idx];
+ bit = 0;
}
return -ENOENT;
}
/**
- * netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk_rng - Find the end of a string of set bits
+ * netlbl_catmap_walkrng - Find the end of a string of set bits
* @catmap: the category bitmap
* @offset: the offset to start searching at, in bits
*
@@ -472,57 +533,105 @@ int netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap,
* the end of the bitmap.
*
*/
-int netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk_rng(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap,
- u32 offset)
+int netlbl_catmap_walkrng(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap, u32 offset)
{
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *iter = catmap;
- u32 node_idx;
- u32 node_bit;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *iter;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *prev = NULL;
+ u32 idx;
+ u32 bit;
NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPTYPE bitmask;
NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPTYPE bitmap;
+ iter = _netlbl_catmap_getnode(&catmap, offset, _CM_F_WALK, 0);
+ if (iter == NULL)
+ return -ENOENT;
if (offset > iter->startbit) {
- while (offset >= (iter->startbit + NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE)) {
- iter = iter->next;
- if (iter == NULL)
- return -ENOENT;
- }
- node_idx = (offset - iter->startbit) / NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE;
- node_bit = offset - iter->startbit -
- (NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE * node_idx);
+ offset -= iter->startbit;
+ idx = offset / NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE;
+ bit = offset % NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE;
} else {
- node_idx = 0;
- node_bit = 0;
+ idx = 0;
+ bit = 0;
}
- bitmask = NETLBL_CATMAP_BIT << node_bit;
+ bitmask = NETLBL_CATMAP_BIT << bit;
for (;;) {
- bitmap = iter->bitmap[node_idx];
+ bitmap = iter->bitmap[idx];
while (bitmask != 0 && (bitmap & bitmask) != 0) {
bitmask <<= 1;
- node_bit++;
+ bit++;
}
- if (bitmask != 0)
+ if (prev && idx == 0 && bit == 0)
+ return prev->startbit + NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE - 1;
+ else if (bitmask != 0)
return iter->startbit +
- (NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE * node_idx) +
- node_bit - 1;
- else if (++node_idx >= NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPCNT) {
+ (NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE * idx) + bit - 1;
+ else if (++idx >= NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPCNT) {
if (iter->next == NULL)
- return iter->startbit + NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE - 1;
+ return iter->startbit + NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE - 1;
+ prev = iter;
iter = iter->next;
- node_idx = 0;
+ idx = 0;
}
bitmask = NETLBL_CATMAP_BIT;
- node_bit = 0;
+ bit = 0;
}
return -ENOENT;
}
/**
- * netlbl_secattr_catmap_setbit - Set a bit in a LSM secattr catmap
- * @catmap: the category bitmap
+ * netlbl_catmap_getlong - Export an unsigned long bitmap
+ * @catmap: pointer to the category bitmap
+ * @offset: pointer to the requested offset
+ * @bitmap: the exported bitmap
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Export a bitmap with an offset greater than or equal to @offset and return
+ * it in @bitmap. The @offset must be aligned to an unsigned long and will be
+ * updated on return if different from what was requested; if the catmap is
+ * empty at the requested offset and beyond, the @offset is set to (u32)-1.
+ * Returns zero on sucess, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int netlbl_catmap_getlong(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap,
+ u32 *offset,
+ unsigned long *bitmap)
+{
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *iter;
+ u32 off = *offset;
+ u32 idx;
+
+ /* only allow aligned offsets */
+ if ((off & (BITS_PER_LONG - 1)) != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (off < catmap->startbit) {
+ off = catmap->startbit;
+ *offset = off;
+ }
+ iter = _netlbl_catmap_getnode(&catmap, off, _CM_F_NONE, 0);
+ if (iter == NULL) {
+ *offset = (u32)-1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (off < iter->startbit) {
+ off = iter->startbit;
+ *offset = off;
+ } else
+ off -= iter->startbit;
+
+ idx = off / NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE;
+ *bitmap = iter->bitmap[idx] >> (off % NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_catmap_setbit - Set a bit in a LSM secattr catmap
+ * @catmap: pointer to the category bitmap
* @bit: the bit to set
* @flags: memory allocation flags
*
@@ -531,36 +640,27 @@ int netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk_rng(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap,
* negative values on failure.
*
*/
-int netlbl_secattr_catmap_setbit(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap,
- u32 bit,
- gfp_t flags)
+int netlbl_catmap_setbit(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap,
+ u32 bit,
+ gfp_t flags)
{
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *iter = catmap;
- u32 node_bit;
- u32 node_idx;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *iter;
+ u32 idx;
- while (iter->next != NULL &&
- bit >= (iter->startbit + NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE))
- iter = iter->next;
- if (bit >= (iter->startbit + NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE)) {
- iter->next = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(flags);
- if (iter->next == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
- iter = iter->next;
- iter->startbit = bit & ~(NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE - 1);
- }
+ iter = _netlbl_catmap_getnode(catmap, bit, _CM_F_ALLOC, flags);
+ if (iter == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- /* gcc always rounds to zero when doing integer division */
- node_idx = (bit - iter->startbit) / NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE;
- node_bit = bit - iter->startbit - (NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE * node_idx);
- iter->bitmap[node_idx] |= NETLBL_CATMAP_BIT << node_bit;
+ bit -= iter->startbit;
+ idx = bit / NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE;
+ iter->bitmap[idx] |= NETLBL_CATMAP_BIT << (bit % NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE);
return 0;
}
/**
- * netlbl_secattr_catmap_setrng - Set a range of bits in a LSM secattr catmap
- * @catmap: the category bitmap
+ * netlbl_catmap_setrng - Set a range of bits in a LSM secattr catmap
+ * @catmap: pointer to the category bitmap
* @start: the starting bit
* @end: the last bit in the string
* @flags: memory allocation flags
@@ -570,36 +670,63 @@ int netlbl_secattr_catmap_setbit(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap,
* on success, negative values on failure.
*
*/
-int netlbl_secattr_catmap_setrng(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap,
- u32 start,
- u32 end,
- gfp_t flags)
+int netlbl_catmap_setrng(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap,
+ u32 start,
+ u32 end,
+ gfp_t flags)
{
- int ret_val = 0;
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *iter = catmap;
- u32 iter_max_spot;
- u32 spot;
-
- /* XXX - This could probably be made a bit faster by combining writes
- * to the catmap instead of setting a single bit each time, but for
- * right now skipping to the start of the range in the catmap should
- * be a nice improvement over calling the individual setbit function
- * repeatedly from a loop. */
-
- while (iter->next != NULL &&
- start >= (iter->startbit + NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE))
- iter = iter->next;
- iter_max_spot = iter->startbit + NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE;
-
- for (spot = start; spot <= end && ret_val == 0; spot++) {
- if (spot >= iter_max_spot && iter->next != NULL) {
- iter = iter->next;
- iter_max_spot = iter->startbit + NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE;
- }
- ret_val = netlbl_secattr_catmap_setbit(iter, spot, flags);
+ int rc = 0;
+ u32 spot = start;
+
+ while (rc == 0 && spot <= end) {
+ if (((spot & (BITS_PER_LONG - 1)) != 0) &&
+ ((end - spot) > BITS_PER_LONG)) {
+ rc = netlbl_catmap_setlong(catmap,
+ spot,
+ (unsigned long)-1,
+ flags);
+ spot += BITS_PER_LONG;
+ } else
+ rc = netlbl_catmap_setbit(catmap, spot++, flags);
}
- return ret_val;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_catmap_setlong - Import an unsigned long bitmap
+ * @catmap: pointer to the category bitmap
+ * @offset: offset to the start of the imported bitmap
+ * @bitmap: the bitmap to import
+ * @flags: memory allocation flags
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Import the bitmap specified in @bitmap into @catmap, using the offset
+ * in @offset. The offset must be aligned to an unsigned long. Returns zero
+ * on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int netlbl_catmap_setlong(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap,
+ u32 offset,
+ unsigned long bitmap,
+ gfp_t flags)
+{
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *iter;
+ u32 idx;
+
+ /* only allow aligned offsets */
+ if ((offset & (BITS_PER_LONG - 1)) != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ iter = _netlbl_catmap_getnode(catmap, offset, _CM_F_ALLOC, flags);
+ if (iter == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ offset -= iter->startbit;
+ idx = offset / NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE;
+ iter->bitmap[idx] |= bitmap << (offset % NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE);
+
+ return 0;
}
/*
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c b/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c
index 0ad080790a32..3907add75932 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c
@@ -26,8 +26,10 @@
#include "ar-internal.h"
static int rxrpc_vet_description_s(const char *);
-static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *, struct key_preparsed_payload *);
-static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *, struct key_preparsed_payload *);
+static int rxrpc_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);
+static int rxrpc_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *);
+static void rxrpc_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);
+static void rxrpc_free_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *);
static void rxrpc_destroy(struct key *);
static void rxrpc_destroy_s(struct key *);
static void rxrpc_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *);
@@ -39,7 +41,9 @@ static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *, char __user *, size_t);
*/
struct key_type key_type_rxrpc = {
.name = "rxrpc",
- .instantiate = rxrpc_instantiate,
+ .preparse = rxrpc_preparse,
+ .free_preparse = rxrpc_free_preparse,
+ .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
.match = user_match,
.destroy = rxrpc_destroy,
.describe = rxrpc_describe,
@@ -54,7 +58,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_type_rxrpc);
struct key_type key_type_rxrpc_s = {
.name = "rxrpc_s",
.vet_description = rxrpc_vet_description_s,
- .instantiate = rxrpc_instantiate_s,
+ .preparse = rxrpc_preparse_s,
+ .free_preparse = rxrpc_free_preparse_s,
+ .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
.match = user_match,
.destroy = rxrpc_destroy_s,
.describe = rxrpc_describe,
@@ -81,13 +87,13 @@ static int rxrpc_vet_description_s(const char *desc)
* parse an RxKAD type XDR format token
* - the caller guarantees we have at least 4 words
*/
-static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxkad(struct key *key, const __be32 *xdr,
- unsigned int toklen)
+static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxkad(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep,
+ size_t datalen,
+ const __be32 *xdr, unsigned int toklen)
{
struct rxrpc_key_token *token, **pptoken;
size_t plen;
u32 tktlen;
- int ret;
_enter(",{%x,%x,%x,%x},%u",
ntohl(xdr[0]), ntohl(xdr[1]), ntohl(xdr[2]), ntohl(xdr[3]),
@@ -103,9 +109,7 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxkad(struct key *key, const __be32 *xdr,
return -EKEYREJECTED;
plen = sizeof(*token) + sizeof(*token->kad) + tktlen;
- ret = key_payload_reserve(key, key->datalen + plen);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
+ prep->quotalen = datalen + plen;
plen -= sizeof(*token);
token = kzalloc(sizeof(*token), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -146,16 +150,16 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxkad(struct key *key, const __be32 *xdr,
token->kad->ticket[6], token->kad->ticket[7]);
/* count the number of tokens attached */
- key->type_data.x[0]++;
+ prep->type_data[0] = (void *)((unsigned long)prep->type_data[0] + 1);
/* attach the data */
- for (pptoken = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&key->payload.data;
+ for (pptoken = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&prep->payload[0];
*pptoken;
pptoken = &(*pptoken)->next)
continue;
*pptoken = token;
- if (token->kad->expiry < key->expiry)
- key->expiry = token->kad->expiry;
+ if (token->kad->expiry < prep->expiry)
+ prep->expiry = token->kad->expiry;
_leave(" = 0");
return 0;
@@ -418,8 +422,9 @@ static int rxrpc_krb5_decode_ticket(u8 **_ticket, u16 *_tktlen,
* parse an RxK5 type XDR format token
* - the caller guarantees we have at least 4 words
*/
-static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxk5(struct key *key, const __be32 *xdr,
- unsigned int toklen)
+static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxk5(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep,
+ size_t datalen,
+ const __be32 *xdr, unsigned int toklen)
{
struct rxrpc_key_token *token, **pptoken;
struct rxk5_key *rxk5;
@@ -432,9 +437,7 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxk5(struct key *key, const __be32 *xdr,
/* reserve some payload space for this subkey - the length of the token
* is a reasonable approximation */
- ret = key_payload_reserve(key, key->datalen + toklen);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
+ prep->quotalen = datalen + toklen;
token = kzalloc(sizeof(*token), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!token)
@@ -520,14 +523,14 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxk5(struct key *key, const __be32 *xdr,
if (toklen != 0)
goto inval;
- /* attach the payload to the key */
- for (pptoken = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&key->payload.data;
+ /* attach the payload */
+ for (pptoken = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&prep->payload[0];
*pptoken;
pptoken = &(*pptoken)->next)
continue;
*pptoken = token;
- if (token->kad->expiry < key->expiry)
- key->expiry = token->kad->expiry;
+ if (token->kad->expiry < prep->expiry)
+ prep->expiry = token->kad->expiry;
_leave(" = 0");
return 0;
@@ -545,16 +548,17 @@ error:
* attempt to parse the data as the XDR format
* - the caller guarantees we have more than 7 words
*/
-static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
+static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- const __be32 *xdr = data, *token;
+ const __be32 *xdr = prep->data, *token;
const char *cp;
unsigned int len, tmp, loop, ntoken, toklen, sec_ix;
+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
int ret;
_enter(",{%x,%x,%x,%x},%zu",
ntohl(xdr[0]), ntohl(xdr[1]), ntohl(xdr[2]), ntohl(xdr[3]),
- datalen);
+ prep->datalen);
if (datalen > AFSTOKEN_LENGTH_MAX)
goto not_xdr;
@@ -635,13 +639,13 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datal
switch (sec_ix) {
case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD:
- ret = rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxkad(key, xdr, toklen);
+ ret = rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxkad(prep, datalen, xdr, toklen);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
break;
case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXK5:
- ret = rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxk5(key, xdr, toklen);
+ ret = rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxk5(prep, datalen, xdr, toklen);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
break;
@@ -665,8 +669,9 @@ error:
}
/*
- * instantiate an rxrpc defined key
- * data should be of the form:
+ * Preparse an rxrpc defined key.
+ *
+ * Data should be of the form:
* OFFSET LEN CONTENT
* 0 4 key interface version number
* 4 2 security index (type)
@@ -678,7 +683,7 @@ error:
*
* if no data is provided, then a no-security key is made
*/
-static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+static int rxrpc_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
const struct rxrpc_key_data_v1 *v1;
struct rxrpc_key_token *token, **pp;
@@ -686,7 +691,7 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep
u32 kver;
int ret;
- _enter("{%x},,%zu", key_serial(key), prep->datalen);
+ _enter("%zu", prep->datalen);
/* handle a no-security key */
if (!prep->data && prep->datalen == 0)
@@ -694,7 +699,7 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep
/* determine if the XDR payload format is being used */
if (prep->datalen > 7 * 4) {
- ret = rxrpc_instantiate_xdr(key, prep->data, prep->datalen);
+ ret = rxrpc_preparse_xdr(prep);
if (ret != -EPROTO)
return ret;
}
@@ -743,9 +748,7 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep
goto error;
plen = sizeof(*token->kad) + v1->ticket_length;
- ret = key_payload_reserve(key, plen + sizeof(*token));
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
+ prep->quotalen = plen + sizeof(*token);
ret = -ENOMEM;
token = kzalloc(sizeof(*token), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -762,15 +765,16 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep
memcpy(&token->kad->session_key, &v1->session_key, 8);
memcpy(&token->kad->ticket, v1->ticket, v1->ticket_length);
- /* attach the data */
- key->type_data.x[0]++;
+ /* count the number of tokens attached */
+ prep->type_data[0] = (void *)((unsigned long)prep->type_data[0] + 1);
- pp = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&key->payload.data;
+ /* attach the data */
+ pp = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&prep->payload[0];
while (*pp)
pp = &(*pp)->next;
*pp = token;
- if (token->kad->expiry < key->expiry)
- key->expiry = token->kad->expiry;
+ if (token->kad->expiry < prep->expiry)
+ prep->expiry = token->kad->expiry;
token = NULL;
ret = 0;
@@ -781,20 +785,55 @@ error:
}
/*
- * instantiate a server secret key
- * data should be a pointer to the 8-byte secret key
+ * Free token list.
*/
-static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *key,
- struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+static void rxrpc_free_token_list(struct rxrpc_key_token *token)
+{
+ struct rxrpc_key_token *next;
+
+ for (; token; token = next) {
+ next = token->next;
+ switch (token->security_index) {
+ case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD:
+ kfree(token->kad);
+ break;
+ case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXK5:
+ if (token->k5)
+ rxrpc_rxk5_free(token->k5);
+ break;
+ default:
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Unknown token type %x on rxrpc key\n",
+ token->security_index);
+ BUG();
+ }
+
+ kfree(token);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clean up preparse data.
+ */
+static void rxrpc_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ rxrpc_free_token_list(prep->payload[0]);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Preparse a server secret key.
+ *
+ * The data should be the 8-byte secret key.
+ */
+static int rxrpc_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct crypto_blkcipher *ci;
- _enter("{%x},,%zu", key_serial(key), prep->datalen);
+ _enter("%zu", prep->datalen);
if (prep->datalen != 8)
return -EINVAL;
- memcpy(&key->type_data, prep->data, 8);
+ memcpy(&prep->type_data, prep->data, 8);
ci = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("pcbc(des)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(ci)) {
@@ -805,36 +844,26 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *key,
if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(ci, prep->data, 8) < 0)
BUG();
- key->payload.data = ci;
+ prep->payload[0] = ci;
_leave(" = 0");
return 0;
}
/*
+ * Clean up preparse data.
+ */
+static void rxrpc_free_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ if (prep->payload[0])
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(prep->payload[0]);
+}
+
+/*
* dispose of the data dangling from the corpse of a rxrpc key
*/
static void rxrpc_destroy(struct key *key)
{
- struct rxrpc_key_token *token;
-
- while ((token = key->payload.data)) {
- key->payload.data = token->next;
- switch (token->security_index) {
- case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD:
- kfree(token->kad);
- break;
- case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXK5:
- if (token->k5)
- rxrpc_rxk5_free(token->k5);
- break;
- default:
- printk(KERN_ERR "Unknown token type %x on rxrpc key\n",
- token->security_index);
- BUG();
- }
-
- kfree(token);
- }
+ rxrpc_free_token_list(key->payload.data);
}
/*
diff --git a/scripts/selinux/genheaders/Makefile b/scripts/selinux/genheaders/Makefile
index 417b165008ee..1d1ac51359e3 100644
--- a/scripts/selinux/genheaders/Makefile
+++ b/scripts/selinux/genheaders/Makefile
@@ -2,4 +2,3 @@ hostprogs-y := genheaders
HOST_EXTRACFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux/include
always := $(hostprogs-y)
-clean-files := $(hostprogs-y)
diff --git a/scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile b/scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile
index eb365b333441..dba7eff69a00 100644
--- a/scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile
+++ b/scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile
@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@ hostprogs-y := mdp
HOST_EXTRACFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux/include
always := $(hostprogs-y)
-clean-files := $(hostprogs-y) policy.* file_contexts
+clean-files := policy.* file_contexts
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 452567d3a08e..d97cba3e3849 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest)
* There is no exception for unconfined as change_hat is not
* available.
*/
- if (current->no_new_privs)
+ if (task_no_new_privs(current))
return -EPERM;
/* released below */
@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec,
* no_new_privs is set because this aways results in a reduction
* of permissions.
*/
- if (current->no_new_privs && !unconfined(profile)) {
+ if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(profile)) {
put_cred(cred);
return -EPERM;
}
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index e76373de3129..a74fde6a7468 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -401,6 +401,11 @@ static int cap_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
return 0;
}
+static int cap_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int cap_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
{
return 0;
@@ -1015,6 +1020,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_transfer);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_fw_from_file);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_from_file);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index b9d613e0ef14..bab0611afc1e 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -421,6 +421,9 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].inheritable);
}
+ cpu_caps->permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
+ cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -822,15 +825,20 @@ int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
* Implement PR_CAPBSET_DROP. Attempt to remove the specified capability from
* the current task's bounding set. Returns 0 on success, -ve on error.
*/
-static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap)
+static int cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
{
+ struct cred *new;
+
if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
return -EPERM;
if (!cap_valid(cap))
return -EINVAL;
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
cap_lower(new->cap_bset, cap);
- return 0;
+ return commit_creds(new);
}
/**
@@ -848,26 +856,17 @@ static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap)
int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
{
+ const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new;
- long error = 0;
-
- new = prepare_creds();
- if (!new)
- return -ENOMEM;
switch (option) {
case PR_CAPBSET_READ:
- error = -EINVAL;
if (!cap_valid(arg2))
- goto error;
- error = !!cap_raised(new->cap_bset, arg2);
- goto no_change;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return !!cap_raised(old->cap_bset, arg2);
case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
- error = cap_prctl_drop(new, arg2);
- if (error < 0)
- goto error;
- goto changed;
+ return cap_prctl_drop(arg2);
/*
* The next four prctl's remain to assist with transitioning a
@@ -889,10 +888,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
* capability-based-privilege environment.
*/
case PR_SET_SECUREBITS:
- error = -EPERM;
- if ((((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
- & (new->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
- || ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
+ if ((((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
+ & (old->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
+ || ((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
|| (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
|| (cap_capable(current_cred(),
current_cred()->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
@@ -906,46 +904,39 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
*/
)
/* cannot change a locked bit */
- goto error;
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
new->securebits = arg2;
- goto changed;
+ return commit_creds(new);
case PR_GET_SECUREBITS:
- error = new->securebits;
- goto no_change;
+ return old->securebits;
case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
- if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
- error = 1;
- goto no_change;
+ return !!issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS:
- error = -EINVAL;
if (arg2 > 1) /* Note, we rely on arg2 being unsigned here */
- goto error;
- error = -EPERM;
+ return -EINVAL;
if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
- goto error;
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
if (arg2)
new->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
else
new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
- goto changed;
+ return commit_creds(new);
default:
/* No functionality available - continue with default */
- error = -ENOSYS;
- goto error;
+ return -ENOSYS;
}
-
- /* Functionality provided */
-changed:
- return commit_creds(new);
-
-no_change:
-error:
- abort_creds(new);
- return error;
}
/**
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index b4af4ebc5be2..8d4fbff8b87c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/rbtree.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <linux/digsig.h>
@@ -24,7 +26,11 @@ static struct key *keyring[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX];
static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
"_evm",
"_module",
+#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
"_ima",
+#else
+ ".ima",
+#endif
};
int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
@@ -56,3 +62,25 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
+
+int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ int err = 0;
+
+ keyring[id] = keyring_alloc(keyring_name[id], KUIDT_INIT(0),
+ KGIDT_INIT(0), cred,
+ ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
+ KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+ if (!IS_ERR(keyring[id]))
+ set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring[id]->flags);
+ else {
+ err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
+ pr_info("Can't allocate %s keyring (%d)\n",
+ keyring_name[id], err);
+ keyring[id] = NULL;
+ }
+ return err;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 81a27971d884..08758fbd496f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -123,3 +123,13 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE
For more information on integrity appraisal refer to:
<http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net>
If unsure, say N.
+
+config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed"
+ depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+ select KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
+ default y
+ help
+ This option requires that all keys added to the .ima
+ keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring.
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index f79fa8be203c..57da4bd7ba0c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_insert(struct inode *inode);
struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
/* IMA policy related functions */
-enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, MMAP_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK, POST_SETATTR };
+enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, MMAP_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK, FIRMWARE_CHECK, POST_SETATTR };
int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
int flags);
@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void);
#define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE 0x01
#define IMA_APPRAISE_FIX 0x02
#define IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES 0x04
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE 0x08
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -249,4 +250,16 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
return -EINVAL;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+static inline int ima_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
+{
+ return integrity_init_keyring(id);
+}
+#else
+static inline int ima_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING */
#endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index d3113d4aaa3c..86bfd5c5df85 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
return iint->ima_bprm_status;
case MODULE_CHECK:
return iint->ima_module_status;
+ case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
+ return iint->ima_firmware_status;
case FILE_CHECK:
default:
return iint->ima_file_status;
@@ -94,6 +96,9 @@ static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
case MODULE_CHECK:
iint->ima_module_status = status;
break;
+ case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
+ iint->ima_firmware_status = status;
+ break;
case FILE_CHECK:
default:
iint->ima_file_status = status;
@@ -113,6 +118,9 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int func)
case MODULE_CHECK:
iint->flags |= (IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
break;
+ case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
+ iint->flags |= (IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
+ break;
case FILE_CHECK:
default:
iint->flags |= (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
@@ -214,7 +222,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
hash_start = 1;
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
- cause = "IMA signature required";
+ cause = "IMA-signature-required";
status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
break;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index ccd0ac8fa9a0..0bd732843fe7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
@@ -25,7 +27,45 @@
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
#include "ima.h"
+struct ahash_completion {
+ struct completion completion;
+ int err;
+};
+
+/* minimum file size for ahash use */
+static unsigned long ima_ahash_minsize;
+module_param_named(ahash_minsize, ima_ahash_minsize, ulong, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(ahash_minsize, "Minimum file size for ahash use");
+
+/* default is 0 - 1 page. */
+static int ima_maxorder;
+static unsigned int ima_bufsize = PAGE_SIZE;
+
+static int param_set_bufsize(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+ unsigned long long size;
+ int order;
+
+ size = memparse(val, NULL);
+ order = get_order(size);
+ if (order >= MAX_ORDER)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ ima_maxorder = order;
+ ima_bufsize = PAGE_SIZE << order;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_bufsize = {
+ .set = param_set_bufsize,
+ .get = param_get_uint,
+};
+#define param_check_bufsize(name, p) __param_check(name, p, unsigned int)
+
+module_param_named(ahash_bufsize, ima_bufsize, bufsize, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(ahash_bufsize, "Maximum ahash buffer size");
+
static struct crypto_shash *ima_shash_tfm;
+static struct crypto_ahash *ima_ahash_tfm;
/**
* ima_kernel_read - read file content
@@ -93,9 +133,246 @@ static void ima_free_tfm(struct crypto_shash *tfm)
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
}
-/*
- * Calculate the MD5/SHA1 file digest
+/**
+ * ima_alloc_pages() - Allocate contiguous pages.
+ * @max_size: Maximum amount of memory to allocate.
+ * @allocated_size: Returned size of actual allocation.
+ * @last_warn: Should the min_size allocation warn or not.
+ *
+ * Tries to do opportunistic allocation for memory first trying to allocate
+ * max_size amount of memory and then splitting that until zero order is
+ * reached. Allocation is tried without generating allocation warnings unless
+ * last_warn is set. Last_warn set affects only last allocation of zero order.
+ *
+ * By default, ima_maxorder is 0 and it is equivalent to kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)
+ *
+ * Return pointer to allocated memory, or NULL on failure.
+ */
+static void *ima_alloc_pages(loff_t max_size, size_t *allocated_size,
+ int last_warn)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ int order = ima_maxorder;
+ gfp_t gfp_mask = __GFP_WAIT | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NORETRY;
+
+ if (order)
+ order = min(get_order(max_size), order);
+
+ for (; order; order--) {
+ ptr = (void *)__get_free_pages(gfp_mask, order);
+ if (ptr) {
+ *allocated_size = PAGE_SIZE << order;
+ return ptr;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* order is zero - one page */
+
+ gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
+
+ if (!last_warn)
+ gfp_mask |= __GFP_NOWARN;
+
+ ptr = (void *)__get_free_pages(gfp_mask, 0);
+ if (ptr) {
+ *allocated_size = PAGE_SIZE;
+ return ptr;
+ }
+
+ *allocated_size = 0;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_free_pages() - Free pages allocated by ima_alloc_pages().
+ * @ptr: Pointer to allocated pages.
+ * @size: Size of allocated buffer.
*/
+static void ima_free_pages(void *ptr, size_t size)
+{
+ if (!ptr)
+ return;
+ free_pages((unsigned long)ptr, get_order(size));
+}
+
+static struct crypto_ahash *ima_alloc_atfm(enum hash_algo algo)
+{
+ struct crypto_ahash *tfm = ima_ahash_tfm;
+ int rc;
+
+ if ((algo != ima_hash_algo && algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) || !tfm) {
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(hash_algo_name[algo], 0, 0);
+ if (!IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ if (algo == ima_hash_algo)
+ ima_ahash_tfm = tfm;
+ } else {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %d)\n",
+ hash_algo_name[algo], rc);
+ }
+ }
+ return tfm;
+}
+
+static void ima_free_atfm(struct crypto_ahash *tfm)
+{
+ if (tfm != ima_ahash_tfm)
+ crypto_free_ahash(tfm);
+}
+
+static void ahash_complete(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
+{
+ struct ahash_completion *res = req->data;
+
+ if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
+ return;
+ res->err = err;
+ complete(&res->completion);
+}
+
+static int ahash_wait(int err, struct ahash_completion *res)
+{
+ switch (err) {
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case -EINPROGRESS:
+ case -EBUSY:
+ wait_for_completion(&res->completion);
+ reinit_completion(&res->completion);
+ err = res->err;
+ /* fall through */
+ default:
+ pr_crit_ratelimited("ahash calculation failed: err: %d\n", err);
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file,
+ struct ima_digest_data *hash,
+ struct crypto_ahash *tfm)
+{
+ loff_t i_size, offset;
+ char *rbuf[2] = { NULL, };
+ int rc, read = 0, rbuf_len, active = 0, ahash_rc = 0;
+ struct ahash_request *req;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ struct ahash_completion res;
+ size_t rbuf_size[2];
+
+ hash->length = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+ req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!req)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ init_completion(&res.completion);
+ ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+ ahash_complete, &res);
+
+ rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_init(req), &res);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out1;
+
+ i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
+
+ if (i_size == 0)
+ goto out2;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to allocate maximum size of memory.
+ * Fail if even a single page cannot be allocated.
+ */
+ rbuf[0] = ima_alloc_pages(i_size, &rbuf_size[0], 1);
+ if (!rbuf[0]) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out1;
+ }
+
+ /* Only allocate one buffer if that is enough. */
+ if (i_size > rbuf_size[0]) {
+ /*
+ * Try to allocate secondary buffer. If that fails fallback to
+ * using single buffering. Use previous memory allocation size
+ * as baseline for possible allocation size.
+ */
+ rbuf[1] = ima_alloc_pages(i_size - rbuf_size[0],
+ &rbuf_size[1], 0);
+ }
+
+ if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
+ file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ;
+ read = 1;
+ }
+
+ for (offset = 0; offset < i_size; offset += rbuf_len) {
+ if (!rbuf[1] && offset) {
+ /* Not using two buffers, and it is not the first
+ * read/request, wait for the completion of the
+ * previous ahash_update() request.
+ */
+ rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &res);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out3;
+ }
+ /* read buffer */
+ rbuf_len = min_t(loff_t, i_size - offset, rbuf_size[active]);
+ rc = ima_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf[active], rbuf_len);
+ if (rc != rbuf_len)
+ goto out3;
+
+ if (rbuf[1] && offset) {
+ /* Using two buffers, and it is not the first
+ * read/request, wait for the completion of the
+ * previous ahash_update() request.
+ */
+ rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &res);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out3;
+ }
+
+ sg_init_one(&sg[0], rbuf[active], rbuf_len);
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, NULL, rbuf_len);
+
+ ahash_rc = crypto_ahash_update(req);
+
+ if (rbuf[1])
+ active = !active; /* swap buffers, if we use two */
+ }
+ /* wait for the last update request to complete */
+ rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &res);
+out3:
+ if (read)
+ file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
+ ima_free_pages(rbuf[0], rbuf_size[0]);
+ ima_free_pages(rbuf[1], rbuf_size[1]);
+out2:
+ if (!rc) {
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, hash->digest, 0);
+ rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_final(req), &res);
+ }
+out1:
+ ahash_request_free(req);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int ima_calc_file_ahash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+ struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
+ int rc;
+
+ tfm = ima_alloc_atfm(hash->algo);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+ rc = ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(file, hash, tfm);
+
+ ima_free_atfm(tfm);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
struct ima_digest_data *hash,
struct crypto_shash *tfm)
@@ -156,7 +433,7 @@ out:
return rc;
}
-int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+static int ima_calc_file_shash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
{
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
int rc;
@@ -173,6 +450,35 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
}
/*
+ * ima_calc_file_hash - calculate file hash
+ *
+ * Asynchronous hash (ahash) allows using HW acceleration for calculating
+ * a hash. ahash performance varies for different data sizes on different
+ * crypto accelerators. shash performance might be better for smaller files.
+ * The 'ima.ahash_minsize' module parameter allows specifying the best
+ * minimum file size for using ahash on the system.
+ *
+ * If the ima.ahash_minsize parameter is not specified, this function uses
+ * shash for the hash calculation. If ahash fails, it falls back to using
+ * shash.
+ */
+int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+ loff_t i_size;
+ int rc;
+
+ i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
+
+ if (ima_ahash_minsize && i_size >= ima_ahash_minsize) {
+ rc = ima_calc_file_ahash(file, hash);
+ if (!rc)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return ima_calc_file_shash(file, hash);
+}
+
+/*
* Calculate the hash of template data
*/
static int ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 09baa335ebc7..2917f980bf30 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -88,8 +88,6 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !ima_initialized)
return;
- mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); /* file metadata: permissions, xattr */
-
if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) {
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
@@ -104,8 +102,6 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
send_writers = true;
}
- mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
-
if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers)
return;
@@ -163,7 +159,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
- struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
+ struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
char *pathbuf = NULL;
const char *pathname = NULL;
int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise, _func;
@@ -207,6 +203,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
goto out_digsig;
}
+ template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) {
if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
@@ -322,14 +319,31 @@ int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
return process_measurement(file, NULL, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK);
}
+int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ if (!file) {
+ if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
+ (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+ return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return process_measurement(file, NULL, MAY_EXEC, FIRMWARE_CHECK);
+}
+
static int __init init_ima(void)
{
int error;
hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
error = ima_init();
- if (!error)
- ima_initialized = 1;
+ if (error)
+ goto out;
+
+ error = ima_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA);
+ if (error)
+ goto out;
+ ima_initialized = 1;
+out:
return error;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 40a7488f6721..07099a8bc283 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
{.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+ {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
};
static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
@@ -241,6 +242,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int func)
return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE;
case MODULE_CHECK:
return IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE;
+ case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
+ return IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE;
case FILE_CHECK:
default:
return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
@@ -332,7 +335,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
void ima_update_policy(void)
{
static const char op[] = "policy_update";
- const char *cause = "already exists";
+ const char *cause = "already-exists";
int result = 1;
int audit_info = 0;
@@ -486,6 +489,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MODULE_CHECK") == 0)
entry->func = MODULE_CHECK;
+ else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FIRMWARE_CHECK") == 0)
+ entry->func = FIRMWARE_CHECK;
else if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
|| (strcmp(args[0].from, "MMAP_CHECK") == 0))
entry->func = MMAP_CHECK;
@@ -636,6 +641,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
result = -EINVAL;
else if (entry->func == MODULE_CHECK)
ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES;
+ else if (entry->func == FIRMWARE_CHECK)
+ ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
audit_log_end(ab);
return result;
@@ -659,7 +666,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
/* Prevent installed policy from changing */
if (ima_rules != &ima_default_rules) {
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
- NULL, op, "already exists",
+ NULL, op, "already-exists",
-EACCES, audit_info);
return -EACCES;
}
@@ -685,7 +692,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
if (result) {
kfree(entry);
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
- NULL, op, "invalid policy", result,
+ NULL, op, "invalid-policy", result,
audit_info);
return result;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 33c0a70f6b15..19b8e314ca96 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -46,10 +46,14 @@
#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED 0x00002000
#define IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE 0x00004000
#define IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED 0x00008000
+#define IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE 0x00010000
+#define IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED 0x00020000
#define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \
- IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE)
+ IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE | \
+ IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE)
#define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \
- IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED)
+ IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED | \
+ IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED)
enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01,
@@ -104,6 +108,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4;
enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
enum integrity_status ima_module_status:4;
+ enum integrity_status ima_firmware_status:4;
enum integrity_status evm_status:4;
struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash;
};
@@ -124,6 +129,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
const char *digest, int digestlen);
+int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
#else
static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
@@ -133,6 +139,10 @@ static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
+static inline int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE */
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index 8137b27d641d..c2f91a0cf889 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -34,7 +34,9 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
struct key_type key_type_big_key = {
.name = "big_key",
.def_lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
- .instantiate = big_key_instantiate,
+ .preparse = big_key_preparse,
+ .free_preparse = big_key_free_preparse,
+ .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
.match = user_match,
.revoke = big_key_revoke,
.destroy = big_key_destroy,
@@ -43,11 +45,11 @@ struct key_type key_type_big_key = {
};
/*
- * Instantiate a big key
+ * Preparse a big key
*/
-int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2;
+ struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload;
struct file *file;
ssize_t written;
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
@@ -58,11 +60,9 @@ int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
goto error;
/* Set an arbitrary quota */
- ret = key_payload_reserve(key, 16);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
+ prep->quotalen = 16;
- key->type_data.x[1] = datalen;
+ prep->type_data[1] = (void *)(unsigned long)datalen;
if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
/* Create a shmem file to store the data in. This will permit the data
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
file = shmem_kernel_file_setup("", datalen, 0);
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(file);
- goto err_quota;
+ goto error;
}
written = kernel_write(file, prep->data, prep->datalen, 0);
@@ -93,24 +93,33 @@ int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
} else {
/* Just store the data in a buffer */
void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!data) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto err_quota;
- }
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- key->payload.data = memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen);
+ prep->payload[0] = memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen);
}
return 0;
err_fput:
fput(file);
-err_quota:
- key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
error:
return ret;
}
/*
+ * Clear preparsement.
+ */
+void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ if (prep->datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
+ struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload;
+ path_put(path);
+ } else {
+ kfree(prep->payload[0]);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
* dispose of the links from a revoked keyring
* - called with the key sem write-locked
*/
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 2048a110e7f1..b90a68c4e2c4 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -437,6 +437,11 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
/* disable the authorisation key */
if (authkey)
key_revoke(authkey);
+
+ if (prep->expiry != TIME_T_MAX) {
+ key->expiry = prep->expiry;
+ key_schedule_gc(prep->expiry + key_gc_delay);
+ }
}
}
@@ -479,6 +484,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
prep.data = data;
prep.datalen = datalen;
prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen;
+ prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX;
if (key->type->preparse) {
ret = key->type->preparse(&prep);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -488,7 +494,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
if (keyring) {
ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
if (ret < 0)
- goto error_free_preparse;
+ goto error;
}
ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, authkey, &edit);
@@ -496,10 +502,9 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
if (keyring)
__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
-error_free_preparse:
+error:
if (key->type->preparse)
key->type->free_preparse(&prep);
-error:
return ret;
}
@@ -811,11 +816,12 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
prep.datalen = plen;
prep.quotalen = index_key.type->def_datalen;
prep.trusted = flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED;
+ prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX;
if (index_key.type->preparse) {
ret = index_key.type->preparse(&prep);
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
- goto error_put_type;
+ goto error_free_prep;
}
if (!index_key.description)
index_key.description = prep.description;
@@ -941,6 +947,7 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
prep.data = payload;
prep.datalen = plen;
prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen;
+ prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX;
if (key->type->preparse) {
ret = key->type->preparse(&prep);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -956,9 +963,9 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
up_write(&key->sem);
+error:
if (key->type->preparse)
key->type->free_preparse(&prep);
-error:
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update);
@@ -1024,6 +1031,38 @@ void key_invalidate(struct key *key)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_invalidate);
/**
+ * generic_key_instantiate - Simple instantiation of a key from preparsed data
+ * @key: The key to be instantiated
+ * @prep: The preparsed data to load.
+ *
+ * Instantiate a key from preparsed data. We assume we can just copy the data
+ * in directly and clear the old pointers.
+ *
+ * This can be pointed to directly by the key type instantiate op pointer.
+ */
+int generic_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+
+ ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->quotalen);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ key->type_data.p[0] = prep->type_data[0];
+ key->type_data.p[1] = prep->type_data[1];
+ rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload[0]);
+ key->payload.data2[1] = prep->payload[1];
+ prep->type_data[0] = NULL;
+ prep->type_data[1] = NULL;
+ prep->payload[0] = NULL;
+ prep->payload[1] = NULL;
+ }
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_key_instantiate);
+
+/**
* register_key_type - Register a type of key.
* @ktype: The new key type.
*
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index cd5bd0cef25d..e26f860e5f2e 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -37,8 +37,6 @@ static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type,
return ret;
if (ret == 0 || ret >= len)
return -EINVAL;
- if (type[0] == '.')
- return -EPERM;
type[len - 1] = '\0';
return 0;
}
@@ -86,6 +84,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
if (!*description) {
kfree(description);
description = NULL;
+ } else if ((description[0] == '.') &&
+ (strncmp(type, "keyring", 7) == 0)) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ goto error2;
}
}
@@ -404,12 +406,25 @@ long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t id)
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+
+ /* Root is permitted to invalidate certain special keys */
+ if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
+ goto error;
+ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL,
+ &key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->flags))
+ goto invalidate;
+ goto error_put;
+ }
+
goto error;
}
+invalidate:
key_invalidate(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
ret = 0;
-
+error_put:
key_ref_put(key_ref);
error:
kleave(" = %ld", ret);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 9cf2575f0d97..8314a7d2104d 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ static inline unsigned keyring_hash(const char *desc)
* can be treated as ordinary keys in addition to having their own special
* operations.
*/
+static int keyring_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
+static void keyring_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring,
struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring);
@@ -84,6 +86,8 @@ static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring,
struct key_type key_type_keyring = {
.name = "keyring",
.def_datalen = 0,
+ .preparse = keyring_preparse,
+ .free_preparse = keyring_free_preparse,
.instantiate = keyring_instantiate,
.match = user_match,
.revoke = keyring_revoke,
@@ -123,6 +127,21 @@ static void keyring_publish_name(struct key *keyring)
}
/*
+ * Preparse a keyring payload
+ */
+static int keyring_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ return prep->datalen != 0 ? -EINVAL : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free a preparse of a user defined key payload
+ */
+static void keyring_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+}
+
+/*
* Initialise a keyring.
*
* Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL if given any data.
@@ -130,17 +149,10 @@ static void keyring_publish_name(struct key *keyring)
static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring,
struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- int ret;
-
- ret = -EINVAL;
- if (prep->datalen == 0) {
- assoc_array_init(&keyring->keys);
- /* make the keyring available by name if it has one */
- keyring_publish_name(keyring);
- ret = 0;
- }
-
- return ret;
+ assoc_array_init(&keyring->keys);
+ /* make the keyring available by name if it has one */
+ keyring_publish_name(keyring);
+ return 0;
}
/*
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index 7495a93b4b90..842e6f410d50 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
#include "internal.h"
#include <keys/user-type.h>
+static int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);
+static void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);
static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *,
struct key_preparsed_payload *);
static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *);
@@ -33,6 +35,8 @@ static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char __user *, size_t);
struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth = {
.name = ".request_key_auth",
.def_datalen = sizeof(struct request_key_auth),
+ .preparse = request_key_auth_preparse,
+ .free_preparse = request_key_auth_free_preparse,
.instantiate = request_key_auth_instantiate,
.describe = request_key_auth_describe,
.revoke = request_key_auth_revoke,
@@ -40,6 +44,15 @@ struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth = {
.read = request_key_auth_read,
};
+int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+}
+
/*
* Instantiate a request-key authorisation key.
*/
diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
index faa2caeb593f..eee340011f2b 100644
--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
@@ -27,7 +27,9 @@ static int logon_vet_description(const char *desc);
struct key_type key_type_user = {
.name = "user",
.def_lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
- .instantiate = user_instantiate,
+ .preparse = user_preparse,
+ .free_preparse = user_free_preparse,
+ .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
.update = user_update,
.match = user_match,
.revoke = user_revoke,
@@ -47,7 +49,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_user);
struct key_type key_type_logon = {
.name = "logon",
.def_lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
- .instantiate = user_instantiate,
+ .preparse = user_preparse,
+ .free_preparse = user_free_preparse,
+ .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
.update = user_update,
.match = user_match,
.revoke = user_revoke,
@@ -58,38 +62,37 @@ struct key_type key_type_logon = {
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_logon);
/*
- * instantiate a user defined key
+ * Preparse a user defined key payload
*/
-int user_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+int user_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct user_key_payload *upayload;
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
- int ret;
- ret = -EINVAL;
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
- goto error;
-
- ret = key_payload_reserve(key, datalen);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
+ return -EINVAL;
- ret = -ENOMEM;
upayload = kmalloc(sizeof(*upayload) + datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!upayload)
- goto error;
+ return -ENOMEM;
/* attach the data */
+ prep->quotalen = datalen;
+ prep->payload[0] = upayload;
upayload->datalen = datalen;
memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen);
- rcu_assign_keypointer(key, upayload);
- ret = 0;
-
-error:
- return ret;
+ return 0;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_preparse);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_instantiate);
+/*
+ * Free a preparse of a user defined key payload
+ */
+void user_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ kfree(prep->payload[0]);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_free_preparse);
/*
* update a user defined key
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 31614e9e96e5..e41b1a8d7644 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -845,6 +845,17 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
return security_ops->kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
}
+int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = security_ops->kernel_fw_from_file(file, buf, size);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ return ima_fw_from_file(file, buf, size);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_fw_from_file);
+
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
{
return security_ops->kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 83d06db34d03..b0e940497e23 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -161,6 +161,17 @@ static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
}
+static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
+{
+ if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
+ sel_netif_flush();
+ sel_netnode_flush();
+ sel_netport_flush();
+ synchronize_net();
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* initialise the security for the init task
*/
@@ -5993,6 +6004,9 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
+ if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
+ panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
+
if (selinux_enforcing)
printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
else
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netif.h b/security/selinux/include/netif.h
index 43d507242b42..57c6eae81eac 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netif.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netif.h
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
#ifndef _SELINUX_NETIF_H_
#define _SELINUX_NETIF_H_
+void sel_netif_flush(void);
+
int sel_netif_sid(int ifindex, u32 *sid);
#endif /* _SELINUX_NETIF_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netnode.h b/security/selinux/include/netnode.h
index df7a5ed6c694..937668dd3024 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netnode.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netnode.h
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
#ifndef _SELINUX_NETNODE_H
#define _SELINUX_NETNODE_H
+void sel_netnode_flush(void);
+
int sel_netnode_sid(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid);
#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netport.h b/security/selinux/include/netport.h
index 4d965b83d735..d1ce896b2cb0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netport.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netport.h
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
#ifndef _SELINUX_NETPORT_H
#define _SELINUX_NETPORT_H
+void sel_netport_flush(void);
+
int sel_netport_sid(u8 protocol, u16 pnum, u32 *sid);
#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index ce7852cf526b..d1e0b239b602 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#ifndef _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
#define _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/dcache.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
@@ -220,7 +221,7 @@ struct selinux_kernel_status {
/*
* The version > 0 supports above members.
*/
-} __attribute__((packed));
+} __packed;
extern void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing);
extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno);
diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c
index 694e9e43855f..3c3de4ca0ebc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netif.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netif.c
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ static void sel_netif_kill(int ifindex)
* Remove all entries from the network interface table.
*
*/
-static void sel_netif_flush(void)
+void sel_netif_flush(void)
{
int idx;
struct sel_netif *netif;
@@ -252,15 +252,6 @@ static void sel_netif_flush(void)
spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
}
-static int sel_netif_avc_callback(u32 event)
-{
- if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
- sel_netif_flush();
- synchronize_net();
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
static int sel_netif_netdev_notifier_handler(struct notifier_block *this,
unsigned long event, void *ptr)
{
@@ -291,10 +282,6 @@ static __init int sel_netif_init(void)
register_netdevice_notifier(&sel_netif_netdev_notifier);
- err = avc_add_callback(sel_netif_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
- if (err)
- panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
-
return err;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c
index 03a72c32afd7..ddf315260839 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netnode.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ int sel_netnode_sid(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid)
* Remove all entries from the network address table.
*
*/
-static void sel_netnode_flush(void)
+void sel_netnode_flush(void)
{
unsigned int idx;
struct sel_netnode *node, *node_tmp;
@@ -300,15 +300,6 @@ static void sel_netnode_flush(void)
spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
}
-static int sel_netnode_avc_callback(u32 event)
-{
- if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
- sel_netnode_flush();
- synchronize_net();
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
static __init int sel_netnode_init(void)
{
int iter;
@@ -322,10 +313,6 @@ static __init int sel_netnode_init(void)
sel_netnode_hash[iter].size = 0;
}
- ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netnode_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
- if (ret != 0)
- panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", ret);
-
return ret;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/netport.c b/security/selinux/netport.c
index d35379781c2c..73ac6784d091 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netport.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netport.c
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ int sel_netport_sid(u8 protocol, u16 pnum, u32 *sid)
* Remove all entries from the network address table.
*
*/
-static void sel_netport_flush(void)
+void sel_netport_flush(void)
{
unsigned int idx;
struct sel_netport *port, *port_tmp;
@@ -234,15 +234,6 @@ static void sel_netport_flush(void)
spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
}
-static int sel_netport_avc_callback(u32 event)
-{
- if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
- sel_netport_flush();
- synchronize_net();
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
static __init int sel_netport_init(void)
{
int iter;
@@ -256,10 +247,6 @@ static __init int sel_netport_init(void)
sel_netport_hash[iter].size = 0;
}
- ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netport_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
- if (ret != 0)
- panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", ret);
-
return ret;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index 377d148e7157..62c6773be0b7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -402,19 +402,14 @@ static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
int rc;
struct cond_expr *expr = NULL, *last = NULL;
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
if (rc)
- return rc;
+ goto err;
node->cur_state = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- len = 0;
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
/* expr */
- len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
index 820313a04d49..afe6a269ec17 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -86,51 +86,36 @@ int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src)
*
*/
int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap **catmap)
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap)
{
struct ebitmap_node *e_iter = ebmap->node;
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *c_iter;
- u32 cmap_idx, cmap_sft;
- int i;
-
- /* NetLabel's NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPTYPE is defined as an array of u64,
- * however, it is not always compatible with an array of unsigned long
- * in ebitmap_node.
- * In addition, you should pay attention the following implementation
- * assumes unsigned long has a width equal with or less than 64-bit.
- */
+ unsigned long e_map;
+ u32 offset;
+ unsigned int iter;
+ int rc;
if (e_iter == NULL) {
*catmap = NULL;
return 0;
}
- c_iter = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (c_iter == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
- *catmap = c_iter;
- c_iter->startbit = e_iter->startbit & ~(NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE - 1);
+ if (*catmap != NULL)
+ netlbl_catmap_free(*catmap);
+ *catmap = NULL;
while (e_iter) {
- for (i = 0; i < EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS; i++) {
- unsigned int delta, e_startbit, c_endbit;
-
- e_startbit = e_iter->startbit + i * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
- c_endbit = c_iter->startbit + NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE;
- if (e_startbit >= c_endbit) {
- c_iter->next
- = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (c_iter->next == NULL)
+ offset = e_iter->startbit;
+ for (iter = 0; iter < EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS; iter++) {
+ e_map = e_iter->maps[iter];
+ if (e_map != 0) {
+ rc = netlbl_catmap_setlong(catmap,
+ offset,
+ e_map,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (rc != 0)
goto netlbl_export_failure;
- c_iter = c_iter->next;
- c_iter->startbit
- = e_startbit & ~(NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE - 1);
}
- delta = e_startbit - c_iter->startbit;
- cmap_idx = delta / NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE;
- cmap_sft = delta % NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE;
- c_iter->bitmap[cmap_idx]
- |= e_iter->maps[i] << cmap_sft;
+ offset += EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
}
e_iter = e_iter->next;
}
@@ -138,7 +123,7 @@ int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
return 0;
netlbl_export_failure:
- netlbl_secattr_catmap_free(*catmap);
+ netlbl_catmap_free(*catmap);
return -ENOMEM;
}
@@ -153,58 +138,44 @@ netlbl_export_failure:
*
*/
int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap)
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap)
{
+ int rc;
struct ebitmap_node *e_iter = NULL;
- struct ebitmap_node *emap_prev = NULL;
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *c_iter = catmap;
- u32 c_idx, c_pos, e_idx, e_sft;
-
- /* NetLabel's NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPTYPE is defined as an array of u64,
- * however, it is not always compatible with an array of unsigned long
- * in ebitmap_node.
- * In addition, you should pay attention the following implementation
- * assumes unsigned long has a width equal with or less than 64-bit.
- */
-
- do {
- for (c_idx = 0; c_idx < NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPCNT; c_idx++) {
- unsigned int delta;
- u64 map = c_iter->bitmap[c_idx];
-
- if (!map)
- continue;
+ struct ebitmap_node *e_prev = NULL;
+ u32 offset = 0, idx;
+ unsigned long bitmap;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ rc = netlbl_catmap_getlong(catmap, &offset, &bitmap);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto netlbl_import_failure;
+ if (offset == (u32)-1)
+ return 0;
- c_pos = c_iter->startbit
- + c_idx * NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE;
- if (!e_iter
- || c_pos >= e_iter->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) {
- e_iter = kzalloc(sizeof(*e_iter), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!e_iter)
- goto netlbl_import_failure;
- e_iter->startbit
- = c_pos - (c_pos % EBITMAP_SIZE);
- if (emap_prev == NULL)
- ebmap->node = e_iter;
- else
- emap_prev->next = e_iter;
- emap_prev = e_iter;
- }
- delta = c_pos - e_iter->startbit;
- e_idx = delta / EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
- e_sft = delta % EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
- while (map) {
- e_iter->maps[e_idx++] |= map & (-1UL);
- map = EBITMAP_SHIFT_UNIT_SIZE(map);
- }
+ if (e_iter == NULL ||
+ offset >= e_iter->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) {
+ e_prev = e_iter;
+ e_iter = kzalloc(sizeof(*e_iter), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (e_iter == NULL)
+ goto netlbl_import_failure;
+ e_iter->startbit = offset & ~(EBITMAP_SIZE - 1);
+ if (e_prev == NULL)
+ ebmap->node = e_iter;
+ else
+ e_prev->next = e_iter;
+ ebmap->highbit = e_iter->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE;
}
- c_iter = c_iter->next;
- } while (c_iter);
- if (e_iter != NULL)
- ebmap->highbit = e_iter->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE;
- else
- ebitmap_destroy(ebmap);
+ /* offset will always be aligned to an unsigned long */
+ idx = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(e_iter, offset);
+ e_iter->maps[idx] = bitmap;
+
+ /* next */
+ offset += EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ /* NOTE: we should never reach this return */
return 0;
netlbl_import_failure:
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
index 712c8a7b8e8b..9637b8c71085 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -132,17 +132,17 @@ int ebitmap_write(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap **catmap);
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap);
int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap);
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap);
#else
static inline int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap **catmap)
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap)
{
return -ENOMEM;
}
static inline int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *catmap)
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap)
{
return -ENOMEM;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 9c5cdc2caaef..bc2a586f095c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -1080,6 +1080,26 @@ out:
* binary representation file.
*/
+static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
+{
+ int rc;
+ char *str;
+
+ str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags);
+ if (!str)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* it's expected the caller should free the str */
+ *strp = str;
+
+ rc = next_entry(str, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ str[len] = '\0';
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
{
char *key = NULL;
@@ -1100,15 +1120,9 @@ static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
perdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!key)
- goto bad;
-
- rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
- key[len] = '\0';
rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, perdatum);
if (rc)
@@ -1146,15 +1160,9 @@ static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
comdatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!key)
- goto bad;
-
- rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
- key[len] = '\0';
for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
rc = perm_read(p, comdatum->permissions.table, fp);
@@ -1321,25 +1329,14 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[5]);
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!key)
- goto bad;
-
- rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
- key[len] = '\0';
if (len2) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- cladatum->comkey = kmalloc(len2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!cladatum->comkey)
- goto bad;
- rc = next_entry(cladatum->comkey, fp, len2);
+ rc = str_read(&cladatum->comkey, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len2);
if (rc)
goto bad;
- cladatum->comkey[len2] = '\0';
rc = -EINVAL;
cladatum->comdatum = hashtab_search(p->p_commons.table, cladatum->comkey);
@@ -1422,15 +1419,9 @@ static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
role->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!key)
- goto bad;
-
- rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
- key[len] = '\0';
rc = ebitmap_read(&role->dominates, fp);
if (rc)
@@ -1495,14 +1486,9 @@ static int type_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
typdatum->primary = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
}
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!key)
- goto bad;
- rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
- key[len] = '\0';
rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, typdatum);
if (rc)
@@ -1565,14 +1551,9 @@ static int user_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
usrdatum->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!key)
- goto bad;
- rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
- key[len] = '\0';
rc = ebitmap_read(&usrdatum->roles, fp);
if (rc)
@@ -1616,14 +1597,9 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
levdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!key)
- goto bad;
- rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_ATOMIC, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
- key[len] = '\0';
rc = -ENOMEM;
levdatum->level = kmalloc(sizeof(struct mls_level), GFP_ATOMIC);
@@ -1664,14 +1640,9 @@ static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
catdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
catdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!key)
- goto bad;
- rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_ATOMIC, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto bad;
- key[len] = '\0';
rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, catdatum);
if (rc)
@@ -1968,18 +1939,12 @@ static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
goto out;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!name)
- goto out;
-
- ft->name = name;
-
/* path component string */
- rc = next_entry(name, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read(&name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto out;
- name[len] = 0;
+
+ ft->name = name;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 4);
if (rc)
@@ -2045,17 +2010,10 @@ static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
if (!newgenfs)
goto out;
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- newgenfs->fstype = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!newgenfs->fstype)
- goto out;
-
- rc = next_entry(newgenfs->fstype, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read(&newgenfs->fstype, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto out;
- newgenfs->fstype[len] = 0;
-
for (genfs_p = NULL, genfs = p->genfs; genfs;
genfs_p = genfs, genfs = genfs->next) {
rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -2091,15 +2049,9 @@ static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
if (!newc)
goto out;
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- newc->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!newc->u.name)
- goto out;
-
- rc = next_entry(newc->u.name, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read(&newc->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto out;
- newc->u.name[len] = 0;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
@@ -2189,16 +2141,10 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, struct policydb_compat_info *info,
goto out;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- c->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!c->u.name)
- goto out;
-
- rc = next_entry(c->u.name, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read(&c->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto out;
- c->u.name[len] = 0;
rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -2240,16 +2186,11 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, struct policydb_compat_info *info,
if (c->v.behavior > SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX)
goto out;
- rc = -ENOMEM;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- c->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!c->u.name)
- goto out;
-
- rc = next_entry(c->u.name, fp, len);
+ rc = str_read(&c->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
goto out;
- c->u.name[len] = 0;
+
rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -2608,7 +2549,7 @@ static int mls_write_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, void *fp)
if (!eq)
buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(r->level[1].sens);
- BUG_ON(items > (sizeof(buf)/sizeof(buf[0])));
+ BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
if (rc)
@@ -2990,7 +2931,7 @@ static int role_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(role->bounds);
- BUG_ON(items > (sizeof(buf)/sizeof(buf[0])));
+ BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
if (rc)
@@ -3040,7 +2981,7 @@ static int type_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
} else {
buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(typdatum->primary);
}
- BUG_ON(items > (sizeof(buf) / sizeof(buf[0])));
+ BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -3069,7 +3010,7 @@ static int user_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(usrdatum->value);
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(usrdatum->bounds);
- BUG_ON(items > (sizeof(buf) / sizeof(buf[0])));
+ BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 4bca49414a40..2aa9d172dc7e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2277,7 +2277,7 @@ out:
}
/**
- * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
+ * __security_genfs_sid - Helper to obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
* @fstype: filesystem type
* @path: path from root of mount
* @sclass: file security class
@@ -2286,11 +2286,13 @@ out:
* Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
* cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
* transition SIDs or task SIDs.
+ *
+ * The caller must acquire the policy_rwlock before calling this function.
*/
-int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
- char *path,
- u16 orig_sclass,
- u32 *sid)
+static inline int __security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
+ char *path,
+ u16 orig_sclass,
+ u32 *sid)
{
int len;
u16 sclass;
@@ -2301,8 +2303,6 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
path++;
- read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-
sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass);
*sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
@@ -2336,11 +2336,33 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
*sid = c->sid[0];
rc = 0;
out:
- read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
}
/**
+ * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
+ * @fstype: filesystem type
+ * @path: path from root of mount
+ * @sclass: file security class
+ * @sid: SID for path
+ *
+ * Acquire policy_rwlock before calling __security_genfs_sid() and release
+ * it afterward.
+ */
+int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
+ char *path,
+ u16 orig_sclass,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ int retval;
+
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+ retval = __security_genfs_sid(fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid);
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/**
* security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
* @sb: superblock in question
*/
@@ -2370,7 +2392,8 @@ int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
}
sbsec->sid = c->sid[0];
} else {
- rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, &sbsec->sid);
+ rc = __security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR,
+ &sbsec->sid);
if (rc) {
sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
rc = 0;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index c062e9467b62..f97d0842e621 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -457,19 +457,16 @@ int smk_netlbl_mls(int level, char *catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
sap->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
sap->attr.mls.lvl = level;
- sap->attr.mls.cat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!sap->attr.mls.cat)
- return -ENOMEM;
- sap->attr.mls.cat->startbit = 0;
+ sap->attr.mls.cat = NULL;
for (cat = 1, cp = catset, byte = 0; byte < len; cp++, byte++)
for (m = 0x80; m != 0; m >>= 1, cat++) {
if ((m & *cp) == 0)
continue;
- rc = netlbl_secattr_catmap_setbit(sap->attr.mls.cat,
- cat, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ rc = netlbl_catmap_setbit(&sap->attr.mls.cat,
+ cat, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (rc < 0) {
- netlbl_secattr_catmap_free(sap->attr.mls.cat);
+ netlbl_catmap_free(sap->attr.mls.cat);
return rc;
}
}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index f2c30801ce41..e6ab307ce86e 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3209,9 +3209,9 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
break;
}
for (acat = -1, kcat = -1; acat == kcat; ) {
- acat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(
- sap->attr.mls.cat, acat + 1);
- kcat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(
+ acat = netlbl_catmap_walk(sap->attr.mls.cat,
+ acat + 1);
+ kcat = netlbl_catmap_walk(
skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat,
kcat + 1);
if (acat < 0 || kcat < 0)
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 32b248820840..3c720ff10591 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ static int cipso_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
struct list_head *list = v;
struct smack_known *skp =
list_entry(list, struct smack_known, list);
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *cmp = skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cmp = skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat;
char sep = '/';
int i;
@@ -804,8 +804,8 @@ static int cipso_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
seq_printf(s, "%s %3d", skp->smk_known, skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl);
- for (i = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(cmp, 0); i >= 0;
- i = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(cmp, i + 1)) {
+ for (i = netlbl_catmap_walk(cmp, 0); i >= 0;
+ i = netlbl_catmap_walk(cmp, i + 1)) {
seq_printf(s, "%c%d", sep, i);
sep = ',';
}
@@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
rc = smk_netlbl_mls(maplevel, mapcatset, &ncats, SMK_CIPSOLEN);
if (rc >= 0) {
- netlbl_secattr_catmap_free(skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat);
+ netlbl_catmap_free(skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat);
skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat = ncats.attr.mls.cat;
skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl = ncats.attr.mls.lvl;
rc = count;
@@ -976,14 +976,14 @@ static int cipso2_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
struct list_head *list = v;
struct smack_known *skp =
list_entry(list, struct smack_known, list);
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *cmp = skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cmp = skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat;
char sep = '/';
int i;
seq_printf(s, "%s %3d", skp->smk_known, skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl);
- for (i = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(cmp, 0); i >= 0;
- i = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(cmp, i + 1)) {
+ for (i = netlbl_catmap_walk(cmp, 0); i >= 0;
+ i = netlbl_catmap_walk(cmp, i + 1)) {
seq_printf(s, "%c%d", sep, i);
sep = ',';
}