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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-12-14 13:57:44 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-12-14 13:57:44 -0800
commit683b96f4d1d132fcefa4a0bd11916649800d7361 (patch)
tree95ba7e1c1edc15639be080773b4c32d2be60b0a4
parent0f1d6dfe03ca4e36132221b918499c6f0b0f048d (diff)
parent50523a29d900d5a403e0352d3d7aeda6a33df25c (diff)
downloadlinux-683b96f4d1d132fcefa4a0bd11916649800d7361.tar.bz2
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Generally pretty quiet for this release. Highlights: Yama: - allow ptrace access for original parent after re-parenting TPM: - add documentation - many bugfixes & cleanups - define a generic open() method for ascii & bios measurements Integrity: - Harden against malformed xattrs SELinux: - bugfixes & cleanups Smack: - Remove unnecessary smack_known_invalid label - Do not apply star label in smack_setprocattr hook - parse mnt opts after privileges check (fixes unpriv DoS vuln)" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (56 commits) Yama: allow access for the current ptrace parent tpm: adjust return value of tpm_read_log tpm: vtpm_proxy: conditionally call tpm_chip_unregister tpm: Fix handling of missing event log tpm: Check the bios_dir entry for NULL before accessing it tpm: return -ENODEV if np is not set tpm: cleanup of printk error messages tpm: replace of_find_node_by_name() with dev of_node property tpm: redefine read_log() to handle ACPI/OF at runtime tpm: fix the missing .owner in tpm_bios_measurements_ops tpm: have event log use the tpm_chip tpm: drop tpm1_chip_register(/unregister) tpm: replace dynamically allocated bios_dir with a static array tpm: replace symbolic permission with octal for securityfs files char: tpm: fix kerneldoc tpm2_unseal_trusted name typo tpm_tis: Allow tpm_tis to be bound using DT tpm, tpm_vtpm_proxy: add kdoc comments for VTPM_PROXY_IOC_NEW_DEV tpm: Only call pm_runtime_get_sync if device has a parent tpm: define a generic open() method for ascii & bios measurements Documentation: tpm: add the Physical TPM device tree binding documentation ...
-rw-r--r--Documentation/devicetree/bindings/security/tpm/ibmvtpm.txt41
-rw-r--r--Documentation/devicetree/bindings/security/tpm/tpm-i2c.txt21
-rw-r--r--Documentation/devicetree/bindings/security/tpm/tpm_tis_mmio.txt25
-rw-r--r--Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt2
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig2
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/Makefile14
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c38
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c110
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c7
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h41
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c2
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_acpi.c46
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c173
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c230
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h22
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c48
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c11
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c64
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c85
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/xen-tpmfront.c1
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/base.c23
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/fd.c6
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/internal.h2
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/namespaces.c3
-rw-r--r--include/uapi/linux/vtpm_proxy.h23
-rw-r--r--kernel/seccomp.c7
-rw-r--r--samples/seccomp/Makefile4
-rw-r--r--samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.c38
-rw-r--r--samples/seccomp/dropper.c7
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/digsig.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c13
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c3
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c120
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/classmap.h4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/objsec.h5
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c6
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack.h1
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_access.c7
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c117
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c3
-rw-r--r--security/yama/yama_lsm.c16
43 files changed, 832 insertions, 567 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/security/tpm/ibmvtpm.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/security/tpm/ibmvtpm.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d89f99971368
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/security/tpm/ibmvtpm.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+* Device Tree Bindings for IBM Virtual Trusted Platform Module(vtpm)
+
+Required properties:
+
+- compatible : property name that conveys the platform architecture
+ identifiers, as 'IBM,vtpm'
+- device_type : specifies type of virtual device
+- interrupts : property specifying the interrupt source number and
+ sense code associated with this virtual I/O Adapters
+- ibm,my-drc-index : integer index for the connector between the device
+ and its parent - present only if Dynamic
+ Reconfiguration(DR) Connector is enabled
+- ibm,#dma-address-cells: specifies the number of cells that are used to
+ encode the physical address field of dma-window
+ properties
+- ibm,#dma-size-cells : specifies the number of cells that are used to
+ encode the size field of dma-window properties
+- ibm,my-dma-window : specifies DMA window associated with this virtual
+ IOA
+- ibm,loc-code : specifies the unique and persistent location code
+ associated with this virtual I/O Adapters
+- linux,sml-base : 64-bit base address of the reserved memory allocated
+ for the firmware event log
+- linux,sml-size : size of the memory allocated for the firmware event log
+
+Example (IBM Virtual Trusted Platform Module)
+---------------------------------------------
+
+ vtpm@30000003 {
+ ibm,#dma-size-cells = <0x2>;
+ compatible = "IBM,vtpm";
+ device_type = "IBM,vtpm";
+ ibm,my-drc-index = <0x30000003>;
+ ibm,#dma-address-cells = <0x2>;
+ linux,sml-base = <0xc60e 0x0>;
+ interrupts = <0xa0003 0x0>;
+ ibm,my-dma-window = <0x10000003 0x0 0x0 0x0 0x10000000>;
+ ibm,loc-code = "U8286.41A.10082DV-V3-C3";
+ reg = <0x30000003>;
+ linux,sml-size = <0xbce10200>;
+ };
diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/security/tpm/tpm-i2c.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/security/tpm/tpm-i2c.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8cb638b7e89c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/security/tpm/tpm-i2c.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+* Device Tree Bindings for I2C based Trusted Platform Module(TPM)
+
+Required properties:
+
+- compatible : 'manufacturer,model', eg. nuvoton,npct650
+- label : human readable string describing the device, eg. "tpm"
+- linux,sml-base : 64-bit base address of the reserved memory allocated for
+ the firmware event log
+- linux,sml-size : size of the memory allocated for the firmware event log
+
+Example (for OpenPower Systems with Nuvoton TPM 2.0 on I2C)
+----------------------------------------------------------
+
+tpm@57 {
+ reg = <0x57>;
+ label = "tpm";
+ compatible = "nuvoton,npct650", "nuvoton,npct601";
+ linux,sml-base = <0x7f 0xfd450000>;
+ linux,sml-size = <0x10000>;
+ status = "okay";
+};
diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/security/tpm/tpm_tis_mmio.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/security/tpm/tpm_tis_mmio.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..41d740545189
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/security/tpm/tpm_tis_mmio.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+Trusted Computing Group MMIO Trusted Platform Module
+
+The TCG defines multi vendor standard for accessing a TPM chip, this
+is the standard protocol defined to access the TPM via MMIO. Typically
+this interface will be implemented over Intel's LPC bus.
+
+Refer to the 'TCG PC Client Specific TPM Interface Specification (TIS)' TCG
+publication for the specification.
+
+Required properties:
+
+- compatible: should contain a string below for the chip, followed by
+ "tcg,tpm-tis-mmio". Valid chip strings are:
+ * "atmel,at97sc3204"
+- reg: The location of the MMIO registers, should be at least 0x5000 bytes
+- interrupt-parent/interrupts: An optional interrupt indicating command completion.
+
+Example:
+
+ tpm_tis@90000 {
+ compatible = "atmel,at97sc3204", "tcg,tpm-tis-mmio";
+ reg = <0x90000 0x5000>;
+ interrupt-parent = <&EIC0>;
+ interrupts = <1 2>;
+ };
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt b/Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
index 324ddf5223b3..b20a993a32af 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
@@ -32,8 +32,6 @@ Usage:
(40 ascii zeros)
blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00...
(40 ascii zeros)
- blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00...
- (40 ascii zeros)
pcrinfo= ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no default)
pcrlock= pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob
migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values,
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
index 9faa0b1e7766..277186d3b668 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ config TCG_TIS_CORE
config TCG_TIS
tristate "TPM Interface Specification 1.2 Interface / TPM 2.0 FIFO Interface"
- depends on X86
+ depends on X86 || OF
select TCG_TIS_CORE
---help---
If you have a TPM security chip that is compliant with the
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
index a385fb8c17de..a05b1ebd0b26 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
@@ -2,16 +2,10 @@
# Makefile for the kernel tpm device drivers.
#
obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) += tpm.o
-tpm-y := tpm-interface.o tpm-dev.o tpm-sysfs.o tpm-chip.o tpm2-cmd.o
-tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o
-
-ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
- tpm-y += tpm_eventlog.o tpm_acpi.o
-else
-ifdef CONFIG_TCG_IBMVTPM
- tpm-y += tpm_eventlog.o tpm_of.o
-endif
-endif
+tpm-y := tpm-interface.o tpm-dev.o tpm-sysfs.o tpm-chip.o tpm2-cmd.o \
+ tpm_eventlog.o
+tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o tpm_acpi.o
+tpm-$(CONFIG_OF) += tpm_of.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_CORE) += tpm_tis_core.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS) += tpm_tis.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_SPI) += tpm_tis_spi.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
index e5950131bd90..7a4869151d3b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev)
idr_remove(&dev_nums_idr, chip->dev_num);
mutex_unlock(&idr_lock);
+ kfree(chip->log.bios_event_log);
kfree(chip);
}
@@ -276,27 +277,6 @@ static void tpm_del_char_device(struct tpm_chip *chip)
up_write(&chip->ops_sem);
}
-static int tpm1_chip_register(struct tpm_chip *chip)
-{
- if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
- return 0;
-
- tpm_sysfs_add_device(chip);
-
- chip->bios_dir = tpm_bios_log_setup(dev_name(&chip->dev));
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void tpm1_chip_unregister(struct tpm_chip *chip)
-{
- if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
- return;
-
- if (chip->bios_dir)
- tpm_bios_log_teardown(chip->bios_dir);
-}
-
static void tpm_del_legacy_sysfs(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
struct attribute **i;
@@ -363,20 +343,20 @@ int tpm_chip_register(struct tpm_chip *chip)
return rc;
}
- rc = tpm1_chip_register(chip);
- if (rc)
+ tpm_sysfs_add_device(chip);
+
+ rc = tpm_bios_log_setup(chip);
+ if (rc != 0 && rc != -ENODEV)
return rc;
tpm_add_ppi(chip);
rc = tpm_add_char_device(chip);
if (rc) {
- tpm1_chip_unregister(chip);
+ tpm_bios_log_teardown(chip);
return rc;
}
- chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_REGISTERED;
-
rc = tpm_add_legacy_sysfs(chip);
if (rc) {
tpm_chip_unregister(chip);
@@ -402,12 +382,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_chip_register);
*/
void tpm_chip_unregister(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
- if (!(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_REGISTERED))
- return;
-
tpm_del_legacy_sysfs(chip);
-
- tpm1_chip_unregister(chip);
+ tpm_bios_log_teardown(chip);
tpm_del_char_device(chip);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_chip_unregister);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
index 3a9149cf0110..a2688ac2b48f 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/freezer.h>
+#include <linux/pm_runtime.h>
#include "tpm.h"
#include "tpm_eventlog.h"
@@ -356,6 +357,9 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
if (!(flags & TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED))
mutex_lock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
+ if (chip->dev.parent)
+ pm_runtime_get_sync(chip->dev.parent);
+
rc = chip->ops->send(chip, (u8 *) buf, count);
if (rc < 0) {
dev_err(&chip->dev,
@@ -397,6 +401,9 @@ out_recv:
dev_err(&chip->dev,
"tpm_transmit: tpm_recv: error %zd\n", rc);
out:
+ if (chip->dev.parent)
+ pm_runtime_put_sync(chip->dev.parent);
+
if (!(flags & TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED))
mutex_unlock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
return rc;
@@ -437,26 +444,29 @@ static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_getcap_header = {
.ordinal = TPM_ORD_GET_CAP
};
-ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct tpm_chip *chip, __be32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap,
+ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap,
const char *desc)
{
struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
int rc;
tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
- if (subcap_id == CAP_VERSION_1_1 || subcap_id == CAP_VERSION_1_2) {
- tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = subcap_id;
+ if (subcap_id == TPM_CAP_VERSION_1_1 ||
+ subcap_id == TPM_CAP_VERSION_1_2) {
+ tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = cpu_to_be32(subcap_id);
/*subcap field not necessary */
tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(0);
tpm_cmd.header.in.length -= cpu_to_be32(sizeof(__be32));
} else {
if (subcap_id == TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM ||
subcap_id == TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL)
- tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_FLAG;
+ tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap =
+ cpu_to_be32(TPM_CAP_FLAG);
else
- tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
+ tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap =
+ cpu_to_be32(TPM_CAP_PROP);
tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
- tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = subcap_id;
+ tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = cpu_to_be32(subcap_id);
}
rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
desc);
@@ -488,12 +498,14 @@ static int tpm_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip, __be16 startup_type)
int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
- struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
+ cap_t cap;
unsigned long new_timeout[4];
unsigned long old_timeout[4];
- struct duration_t *duration_cap;
ssize_t rc;
+ if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_HAVE_TIMEOUTS)
+ return 0;
+
if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) {
/* Fixed timeouts for TPM2 */
chip->timeout_a = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_A);
@@ -506,46 +518,30 @@ int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_MEDIUM);
chip->duration[TPM_LONG] =
msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_LONG);
+
+ chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_HAVE_TIMEOUTS;
return 0;
}
- tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
- tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
- tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
- tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT;
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
- NULL);
-
+ rc = tpm_getcap(chip, TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT, &cap,
+ "attempting to determine the timeouts");
if (rc == TPM_ERR_INVALID_POSTINIT) {
/* The TPM is not started, we are the first to talk to it.
Execute a startup command. */
- dev_info(&chip->dev, "Issuing TPM_STARTUP");
+ dev_info(&chip->dev, "Issuing TPM_STARTUP\n");
if (tpm_startup(chip, TPM_ST_CLEAR))
return rc;
- tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
- tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
- tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
- tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT;
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
- 0, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_getcap(chip, TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT, &cap,
+ "attempting to determine the timeouts");
}
- if (rc) {
- dev_err(&chip->dev,
- "A TPM error (%zd) occurred attempting to determine the timeouts\n",
- rc);
- goto duration;
- }
-
- if (be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.return_code) != 0 ||
- be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.length)
- != sizeof(tpm_cmd.header.out) + sizeof(u32) + 4 * sizeof(u32))
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
- old_timeout[0] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.a);
- old_timeout[1] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.b);
- old_timeout[2] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.c);
- old_timeout[3] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.d);
+ old_timeout[0] = be32_to_cpu(cap.timeout.a);
+ old_timeout[1] = be32_to_cpu(cap.timeout.b);
+ old_timeout[2] = be32_to_cpu(cap.timeout.c);
+ old_timeout[3] = be32_to_cpu(cap.timeout.d);
memcpy(new_timeout, old_timeout, sizeof(new_timeout));
/*
@@ -583,29 +579,17 @@ int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
chip->timeout_c = usecs_to_jiffies(new_timeout[2]);
chip->timeout_d = usecs_to_jiffies(new_timeout[3]);
-duration:
- tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
- tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
- tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
- tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION;
-
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
- "attempting to determine the durations");
+ rc = tpm_getcap(chip, TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION, &cap,
+ "attempting to determine the durations");
if (rc)
return rc;
- if (be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.return_code) != 0 ||
- be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.length)
- != sizeof(tpm_cmd.header.out) + sizeof(u32) + 3 * sizeof(u32))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- duration_cap = &tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.duration;
chip->duration[TPM_SHORT] =
- usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(duration_cap->tpm_short));
+ usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(cap.duration.tpm_short));
chip->duration[TPM_MEDIUM] =
- usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(duration_cap->tpm_medium));
+ usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(cap.duration.tpm_medium));
chip->duration[TPM_LONG] =
- usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(duration_cap->tpm_long));
+ usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(cap.duration.tpm_long));
/* The Broadcom BCM0102 chipset in a Dell Latitude D820 gets the above
* value wrong and apparently reports msecs rather than usecs. So we
@@ -619,6 +603,8 @@ duration:
chip->duration_adjusted = true;
dev_info(&chip->dev, "Adjusting TPM timeout parameters.");
}
+
+ chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_HAVE_TIMEOUTS;
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_get_timeouts);
@@ -726,6 +712,14 @@ int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_read);
+#define TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND cpu_to_be32(20)
+#define EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE 34
+static const struct tpm_input_header pcrextend_header = {
+ .tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+ .length = cpu_to_be32(34),
+ .ordinal = TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND
+};
+
/**
* tpm_pcr_extend - extend pcr value with hash
* @chip_num: tpm idx # or AN&
@@ -736,14 +730,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_read);
* isn't, protect against the chip disappearing, by incrementing
* the module usage count.
*/
-#define TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND cpu_to_be32(20)
-#define EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE 34
-static const struct tpm_input_header pcrextend_header = {
- .tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
- .length = cpu_to_be32(34),
- .ordinal = TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND
-};
-
int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
{
struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
index a76ab4af9fb2..848ad6580b46 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ static ssize_t caps_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
be32_to_cpu(cap.manufacturer_id));
/* Try to get a TPM version 1.2 TPM_CAP_VERSION_INFO */
- rc = tpm_getcap(chip, CAP_VERSION_1_2, &cap,
+ rc = tpm_getcap(chip, TPM_CAP_VERSION_1_2, &cap,
"attempting to determine the 1.2 version");
if (!rc) {
str += sprintf(str,
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static ssize_t caps_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
cap.tpm_version_1_2.revMinor);
} else {
/* Otherwise just use TPM_STRUCT_VER */
- rc = tpm_getcap(chip, CAP_VERSION_1_1, &cap,
+ rc = tpm_getcap(chip, TPM_CAP_VERSION_1_1, &cap,
"attempting to determine the 1.1 version");
if (rc)
return 0;
@@ -284,6 +284,9 @@ static const struct attribute_group tpm_dev_group = {
void tpm_sysfs_add_device(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
+ if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
+ return;
+
/* The sysfs routines rely on an implicit tpm_try_get_ops, device_del
* is called before ops is null'd and the sysfs core synchronizes this
* removal so that no callbacks are running or can run again
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index 4d183c97f6a6..1ae976894257 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -35,11 +35,14 @@
#include <linux/cdev.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include "tpm_eventlog.h"
+
enum tpm_const {
TPM_MINOR = 224, /* officially assigned */
TPM_BUFSIZE = 4096,
TPM_NUM_DEVICES = 65536,
TPM_RETRY = 50, /* 5 seconds */
+ TPM_NUM_EVENT_LOG_FILES = 3,
};
enum tpm_timeout {
@@ -139,10 +142,15 @@ enum tpm2_startup_types {
#define TPM_PPI_VERSION_LEN 3
enum tpm_chip_flags {
- TPM_CHIP_FLAG_REGISTERED = BIT(0),
TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 = BIT(1),
TPM_CHIP_FLAG_IRQ = BIT(2),
TPM_CHIP_FLAG_VIRTUAL = BIT(3),
+ TPM_CHIP_FLAG_HAVE_TIMEOUTS = BIT(4),
+};
+
+struct tpm_chip_seqops {
+ struct tpm_chip *chip;
+ const struct seq_operations *seqops;
};
struct tpm_chip {
@@ -156,6 +164,10 @@ struct tpm_chip {
struct rw_semaphore ops_sem;
const struct tpm_class_ops *ops;
+ struct tpm_bios_log log;
+ struct tpm_chip_seqops bin_log_seqops;
+ struct tpm_chip_seqops ascii_log_seqops;
+
unsigned int flags;
int dev_num; /* /dev/tpm# */
@@ -171,7 +183,7 @@ struct tpm_chip {
unsigned long duration[3]; /* jiffies */
bool duration_adjusted;
- struct dentry **bios_dir;
+ struct dentry *bios_dir[TPM_NUM_EVENT_LOG_FILES];
const struct attribute_group *groups[3];
unsigned int groups_cnt;
@@ -282,21 +294,20 @@ typedef union {
} cap_t;
enum tpm_capabilities {
- TPM_CAP_FLAG = cpu_to_be32(4),
- TPM_CAP_PROP = cpu_to_be32(5),
- CAP_VERSION_1_1 = cpu_to_be32(0x06),
- CAP_VERSION_1_2 = cpu_to_be32(0x1A)
+ TPM_CAP_FLAG = 4,
+ TPM_CAP_PROP = 5,
+ TPM_CAP_VERSION_1_1 = 0x06,
+ TPM_CAP_VERSION_1_2 = 0x1A,
};
enum tpm_sub_capabilities {
- TPM_CAP_PROP_PCR = cpu_to_be32(0x101),
- TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER = cpu_to_be32(0x103),
- TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM = cpu_to_be32(0x108),
- TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL = cpu_to_be32(0x109),
- TPM_CAP_PROP_OWNER = cpu_to_be32(0x111),
- TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT = cpu_to_be32(0x115),
- TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION = cpu_to_be32(0x120),
-
+ TPM_CAP_PROP_PCR = 0x101,
+ TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER = 0x103,
+ TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM = 0x108,
+ TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL = 0x109,
+ TPM_CAP_PROP_OWNER = 0x111,
+ TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT = 0x115,
+ TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION = 0x120,
};
struct tpm_getcap_params_in {
@@ -484,7 +495,7 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
unsigned int flags);
ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, const void *cmd, int len,
unsigned int flags, const char *desc);
-ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct tpm_chip *chip, __be32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap,
+ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap,
const char *desc);
int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *);
int tpm1_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index 7df55d58c939..da5b782a9731 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
}
/**
- * tpm_unseal_trusted() - unseal the payload of a trusted key
+ * tpm2_unseal_trusted() - unseal the payload of a trusted key
* @chip_num: TPM chip to use
* @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
* @options: authentication values and other options
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_acpi.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_acpi.c
index 565a9478cb94..b7718c95fd0b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_acpi.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_acpi.c
@@ -6,10 +6,11 @@
* Stefan Berger <stefanb@us.ibm.com>
* Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
* Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
+ * Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
*
* Maintained by: <tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
*
- * Access to the eventlog extended by the TCG BIOS of PC platform
+ * Access to the event log extended by the TCG BIOS of PC platform
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -45,29 +46,28 @@ struct acpi_tcpa {
};
/* read binary bios log */
-int read_log(struct tpm_bios_log *log)
+int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
struct acpi_tcpa *buff;
acpi_status status;
void __iomem *virt;
u64 len, start;
+ struct tpm_bios_log *log;
- if (log->bios_event_log != NULL) {
- printk(KERN_ERR
- "%s: ERROR - Eventlog already initialized\n",
- __func__);
- return -EFAULT;
- }
+ log = &chip->log;
+
+ /* Unfortuntely ACPI does not associate the event log with a specific
+ * TPM, like PPI. Thus all ACPI TPMs will read the same log.
+ */
+ if (!chip->acpi_dev_handle)
+ return -ENODEV;
/* Find TCPA entry in RSDT (ACPI_LOGICAL_ADDRESSING) */
status = acpi_get_table(ACPI_SIG_TCPA, 1,
(struct acpi_table_header **)&buff);
- if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "%s: ERROR - Could not get TCPA table\n",
- __func__);
- return -EIO;
- }
+ if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
+ return -ENODEV;
switch(buff->platform_class) {
case BIOS_SERVER:
@@ -81,29 +81,29 @@ int read_log(struct tpm_bios_log *log)
break;
}
if (!len) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "%s: ERROR - TCPA log area empty\n", __func__);
+ dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: TCPA log area empty\n", __func__);
return -EIO;
}
/* malloc EventLog space */
log->bios_event_log = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!log->bios_event_log) {
- printk("%s: ERROR - Not enough Memory for BIOS measurements\n",
- __func__);
+ if (!log->bios_event_log)
return -ENOMEM;
- }
log->bios_event_log_end = log->bios_event_log + len;
virt = acpi_os_map_iomem(start, len);
- if (!virt) {
- kfree(log->bios_event_log);
- printk("%s: ERROR - Unable to map memory\n", __func__);
- return -EIO;
- }
+ if (!virt)
+ goto err;
memcpy_fromio(log->bios_event_log, virt, len);
acpi_os_unmap_iomem(virt, len);
return 0;
+
+err:
+ kfree(log->bios_event_log);
+ log->bios_event_log = NULL;
+ return -EIO;
+
}
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
index a7c870af916c..717b6b47c042 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/rculist.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/pm_runtime.h>
#include "tpm.h"
#define ACPI_SIG_TPM2 "TPM2"
@@ -83,7 +84,71 @@ struct crb_priv {
u32 cmd_size;
};
-static SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS(crb_pm, tpm_pm_suspend, tpm_pm_resume);
+/**
+ * crb_go_idle - request tpm crb device to go the idle state
+ *
+ * @dev: crb device
+ * @priv: crb private data
+ *
+ * Write CRB_CTRL_REQ_GO_IDLE to TPM_CRB_CTRL_REQ
+ * The device should respond within TIMEOUT_C by clearing the bit.
+ * Anyhow, we do not wait here as a consequent CMD_READY request
+ * will be handled correctly even if idle was not completed.
+ *
+ * The function does nothing for devices with ACPI-start method.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 always
+ */
+static int __maybe_unused crb_go_idle(struct device *dev, struct crb_priv *priv)
+{
+ if (priv->flags & CRB_FL_ACPI_START)
+ return 0;
+
+ iowrite32(CRB_CTRL_REQ_GO_IDLE, &priv->cca->req);
+ /* we don't really care when this settles */
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * crb_cmd_ready - request tpm crb device to enter ready state
+ *
+ * @dev: crb device
+ * @priv: crb private data
+ *
+ * Write CRB_CTRL_REQ_CMD_READY to TPM_CRB_CTRL_REQ
+ * and poll till the device acknowledge it by clearing the bit.
+ * The device should respond within TIMEOUT_C.
+ *
+ * The function does nothing for devices with ACPI-start method
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success -ETIME on timeout;
+ */
+static int __maybe_unused crb_cmd_ready(struct device *dev,
+ struct crb_priv *priv)
+{
+ ktime_t stop, start;
+
+ if (priv->flags & CRB_FL_ACPI_START)
+ return 0;
+
+ iowrite32(CRB_CTRL_REQ_CMD_READY, &priv->cca->req);
+
+ start = ktime_get();
+ stop = ktime_add(start, ms_to_ktime(TPM2_TIMEOUT_C));
+ do {
+ if (!(ioread32(&priv->cca->req) & CRB_CTRL_REQ_CMD_READY))
+ return 0;
+ usleep_range(50, 100);
+ } while (ktime_before(ktime_get(), stop));
+
+ if (ioread32(&priv->cca->req) & CRB_CTRL_REQ_CMD_READY) {
+ dev_warn(dev, "cmdReady timed out\n");
+ return -ETIME;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
static u8 crb_status(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
@@ -196,21 +261,6 @@ static const struct tpm_class_ops tpm_crb = {
.req_complete_val = CRB_DRV_STS_COMPLETE,
};
-static int crb_init(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv)
-{
- struct tpm_chip *chip;
-
- chip = tpmm_chip_alloc(&device->dev, &tpm_crb);
- if (IS_ERR(chip))
- return PTR_ERR(chip);
-
- dev_set_drvdata(&chip->dev, priv);
- chip->acpi_dev_handle = device->handle;
- chip->flags = TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2;
-
- return tpm_chip_register(chip);
-}
-
static int crb_check_resource(struct acpi_resource *ares, void *data)
{
struct resource *io_res = data;
@@ -249,6 +299,7 @@ static int crb_map_io(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv,
struct list_head resources;
struct resource io_res;
struct device *dev = &device->dev;
+ u32 pa_high, pa_low;
u64 cmd_pa;
u32 cmd_size;
u64 rsp_pa;
@@ -276,12 +327,27 @@ static int crb_map_io(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv,
if (IS_ERR(priv->cca))
return PTR_ERR(priv->cca);
- cmd_pa = ((u64) ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_pa_high) << 32) |
- (u64) ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_pa_low);
+ /*
+ * PTT HW bug w/a: wake up the device to access
+ * possibly not retained registers.
+ */
+ ret = crb_cmd_ready(dev, priv);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ pa_high = ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_pa_high);
+ pa_low = ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_pa_low);
+ cmd_pa = ((u64)pa_high << 32) | pa_low;
cmd_size = ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_size);
+
+ dev_dbg(dev, "cmd_hi = %X cmd_low = %X cmd_size %X\n",
+ pa_high, pa_low, cmd_size);
+
priv->cmd = crb_map_res(dev, priv, &io_res, cmd_pa, cmd_size);
- if (IS_ERR(priv->cmd))
- return PTR_ERR(priv->cmd);
+ if (IS_ERR(priv->cmd)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(priv->cmd);
+ goto out;
+ }
memcpy_fromio(&rsp_pa, &priv->cca->rsp_pa, 8);
rsp_pa = le64_to_cpu(rsp_pa);
@@ -289,7 +355,8 @@ static int crb_map_io(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv,
if (cmd_pa != rsp_pa) {
priv->rsp = crb_map_res(dev, priv, &io_res, rsp_pa, rsp_size);
- return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(priv->rsp);
+ ret = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(priv->rsp);
+ goto out;
}
/* According to the PTP specification, overlapping command and response
@@ -297,18 +364,25 @@ static int crb_map_io(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv,
*/
if (cmd_size != rsp_size) {
dev_err(dev, FW_BUG "overlapping command and response buffer sizes are not identical");
- return -EINVAL;
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
}
+
priv->cmd_size = cmd_size;
priv->rsp = priv->cmd;
- return 0;
+
+out:
+ crb_go_idle(dev, priv);
+
+ return ret;
}
static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device)
{
struct acpi_table_tpm2 *buf;
struct crb_priv *priv;
+ struct tpm_chip *chip;
struct device *dev = &device->dev;
acpi_status status;
u32 sm;
@@ -346,7 +420,33 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device)
if (rc)
return rc;
- return crb_init(device, priv);
+ chip = tpmm_chip_alloc(dev, &tpm_crb);
+ if (IS_ERR(chip))
+ return PTR_ERR(chip);
+
+ dev_set_drvdata(&chip->dev, priv);
+ chip->acpi_dev_handle = device->handle;
+ chip->flags = TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2;
+
+ rc = crb_cmd_ready(dev, priv);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ pm_runtime_get_noresume(dev);
+ pm_runtime_set_active(dev);
+ pm_runtime_enable(dev);
+
+ rc = tpm_chip_register(chip);
+ if (rc) {
+ crb_go_idle(dev, priv);
+ pm_runtime_put_noidle(dev);
+ pm_runtime_disable(dev);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ pm_runtime_put(dev);
+
+ return 0;
}
static int crb_acpi_remove(struct acpi_device *device)
@@ -356,9 +456,34 @@ static int crb_acpi_remove(struct acpi_device *device)
tpm_chip_unregister(chip);
+ pm_runtime_disable(dev);
+
return 0;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_PM
+static int crb_pm_runtime_suspend(struct device *dev)
+{
+ struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+ struct crb_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev);
+
+ return crb_go_idle(dev, priv);
+}
+
+static int crb_pm_runtime_resume(struct device *dev)
+{
+ struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+ struct crb_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev);
+
+ return crb_cmd_ready(dev, priv);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_PM */
+
+static const struct dev_pm_ops crb_pm = {
+ SET_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(tpm_pm_suspend, tpm_pm_resume)
+ SET_RUNTIME_PM_OPS(crb_pm_runtime_suspend, crb_pm_runtime_resume, NULL)
+};
+
static struct acpi_device_id crb_device_ids[] = {
{"MSFT0101", 0},
{"", 0},
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c
index e7228863290e..11bb1138a828 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c
@@ -7,10 +7,11 @@
* Stefan Berger <stefanb@us.ibm.com>
* Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
* Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
+ * Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
*
* Maintained by: <tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
*
- * Access to the eventlog created by a system's firmware / BIOS
+ * Access to the event log created by a system's firmware / BIOS
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -72,7 +73,8 @@ static const char* tcpa_pc_event_id_strings[] = {
static void *tpm_bios_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
loff_t i;
- struct tpm_bios_log *log = m->private;
+ struct tpm_chip *chip = m->private;
+ struct tpm_bios_log *log = &chip->log;
void *addr = log->bios_event_log;
void *limit = log->bios_event_log_end;
struct tcpa_event *event;
@@ -119,7 +121,8 @@ static void *tpm_bios_measurements_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v,
loff_t *pos)
{
struct tcpa_event *event = v;
- struct tpm_bios_log *log = m->private;
+ struct tpm_chip *chip = m->private;
+ struct tpm_bios_log *log = &chip->log;
void *limit = log->bios_event_log_end;
u32 converted_event_size;
u32 converted_event_type;
@@ -260,13 +263,10 @@ static int tpm_binary_bios_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
static int tpm_bios_measurements_release(struct inode *inode,
struct file *file)
{
- struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
- struct tpm_bios_log *log = seq->private;
+ struct seq_file *seq = (struct seq_file *)file->private_data;
+ struct tpm_chip *chip = (struct tpm_chip *)seq->private;
- if (log) {
- kfree(log->bios_event_log);
- kfree(log);
- }
+ put_device(&chip->dev);
return seq_release(inode, file);
}
@@ -304,151 +304,159 @@ static int tpm_ascii_bios_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
return 0;
}
-static const struct seq_operations tpm_ascii_b_measurments_seqops = {
+static const struct seq_operations tpm_ascii_b_measurements_seqops = {
.start = tpm_bios_measurements_start,
.next = tpm_bios_measurements_next,
.stop = tpm_bios_measurements_stop,
.show = tpm_ascii_bios_measurements_show,
};
-static const struct seq_operations tpm_binary_b_measurments_seqops = {
+static const struct seq_operations tpm_binary_b_measurements_seqops = {
.start = tpm_bios_measurements_start,
.next = tpm_bios_measurements_next,
.stop = tpm_bios_measurements_stop,
.show = tpm_binary_bios_measurements_show,
};
-static int tpm_ascii_bios_measurements_open(struct inode *inode,
+static int tpm_bios_measurements_open(struct inode *inode,
struct file *file)
{
int err;
- struct tpm_bios_log *log;
struct seq_file *seq;
-
- log = kzalloc(sizeof(struct tpm_bios_log), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!log)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- if ((err = read_log(log)))
- goto out_free;
+ struct tpm_chip_seqops *chip_seqops;
+ const struct seq_operations *seqops;
+ struct tpm_chip *chip;
+
+ inode_lock(inode);
+ if (!inode->i_private) {
+ inode_unlock(inode);
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+ chip_seqops = (struct tpm_chip_seqops *)inode->i_private;
+ seqops = chip_seqops->seqops;
+ chip = chip_seqops->chip;
+ get_device(&chip->dev);
+ inode_unlock(inode);
/* now register seq file */
- err = seq_open(file, &tpm_ascii_b_measurments_seqops);
+ err = seq_open(file, seqops);
if (!err) {
seq = file->private_data;
- seq->private = log;
- } else {
- goto out_free;
+ seq->private = chip;
}
-out:
return err;
-out_free:
- kfree(log->bios_event_log);
- kfree(log);
- goto out;
}
-static const struct file_operations tpm_ascii_bios_measurements_ops = {
- .open = tpm_ascii_bios_measurements_open,
+static const struct file_operations tpm_bios_measurements_ops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .open = tpm_bios_measurements_open,
.read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek,
.release = tpm_bios_measurements_release,
};
-static int tpm_binary_bios_measurements_open(struct inode *inode,
- struct file *file)
+static int tpm_read_log(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
- int err;
- struct tpm_bios_log *log;
- struct seq_file *seq;
-
- log = kzalloc(sizeof(struct tpm_bios_log), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!log)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ int rc;
- if ((err = read_log(log)))
- goto out_free;
-
- /* now register seq file */
- err = seq_open(file, &tpm_binary_b_measurments_seqops);
- if (!err) {
- seq = file->private_data;
- seq->private = log;
- } else {
- goto out_free;
+ if (chip->log.bios_event_log != NULL) {
+ dev_dbg(&chip->dev,
+ "%s: ERROR - event log already initialized\n",
+ __func__);
+ return -EFAULT;
}
-out:
- return err;
-out_free:
- kfree(log->bios_event_log);
- kfree(log);
- goto out;
-}
-
-static const struct file_operations tpm_binary_bios_measurements_ops = {
- .open = tpm_binary_bios_measurements_open,
- .read = seq_read,
- .llseek = seq_lseek,
- .release = tpm_bios_measurements_release,
-};
+ rc = tpm_read_log_acpi(chip);
+ if (rc != -ENODEV)
+ return rc;
-static int is_bad(void *p)
-{
- if (!p)
- return 1;
- if (IS_ERR(p) && (PTR_ERR(p) != -ENODEV))
- return 1;
- return 0;
+ return tpm_read_log_of(chip);
}
-struct dentry **tpm_bios_log_setup(const char *name)
+/*
+ * tpm_bios_log_setup() - Read the event log from the firmware
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use.
+ *
+ * If an event log is found then the securityfs files are setup to
+ * export it to userspace, otherwise nothing is done.
+ *
+ * Returns -ENODEV if the firmware has no event log or securityfs is not
+ * supported.
+ */
+int tpm_bios_log_setup(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
- struct dentry **ret = NULL, *tpm_dir, *bin_file, *ascii_file;
-
- tpm_dir = securityfs_create_dir(name, NULL);
- if (is_bad(tpm_dir))
- goto out;
-
- bin_file =
+ const char *name = dev_name(&chip->dev);
+ unsigned int cnt;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = tpm_read_log(chip);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ cnt = 0;
+ chip->bios_dir[cnt] = securityfs_create_dir(name, NULL);
+ /* NOTE: securityfs_create_dir can return ENODEV if securityfs is
+ * compiled out. The caller should ignore the ENODEV return code.
+ */
+ if (IS_ERR(chip->bios_dir[cnt]))
+ goto err;
+ cnt++;
+
+ chip->bin_log_seqops.chip = chip;
+ chip->bin_log_seqops.seqops = &tpm_binary_b_measurements_seqops;
+
+ chip->bios_dir[cnt] =
securityfs_create_file("binary_bios_measurements",
- S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, tpm_dir, NULL,
- &tpm_binary_bios_measurements_ops);
- if (is_bad(bin_file))
- goto out_tpm;
+ 0440, chip->bios_dir[0],
+ (void *)&chip->bin_log_seqops,
+ &tpm_bios_measurements_ops);
+ if (IS_ERR(chip->bios_dir[cnt]))
+ goto err;
+ cnt++;
+
+ chip->ascii_log_seqops.chip = chip;
+ chip->ascii_log_seqops.seqops = &tpm_ascii_b_measurements_seqops;
- ascii_file =
+ chip->bios_dir[cnt] =
securityfs_create_file("ascii_bios_measurements",
- S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, tpm_dir, NULL,
- &tpm_ascii_bios_measurements_ops);
- if (is_bad(ascii_file))
- goto out_bin;
-
- ret = kmalloc(3 * sizeof(struct dentry *), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!ret)
- goto out_ascii;
-
- ret[0] = ascii_file;
- ret[1] = bin_file;
- ret[2] = tpm_dir;
-
- return ret;
-
-out_ascii:
- securityfs_remove(ascii_file);
-out_bin:
- securityfs_remove(bin_file);
-out_tpm:
- securityfs_remove(tpm_dir);
-out:
- return NULL;
+ 0440, chip->bios_dir[0],
+ (void *)&chip->ascii_log_seqops,
+ &tpm_bios_measurements_ops);
+ if (IS_ERR(chip->bios_dir[cnt]))
+ goto err;
+ cnt++;
+
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ rc = PTR_ERR(chip->bios_dir[cnt]);
+ chip->bios_dir[cnt] = NULL;
+ tpm_bios_log_teardown(chip);
+ return rc;
}
-void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct dentry **lst)
+void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
- securityfs_remove(lst[i]);
+ struct inode *inode;
+
+ /* securityfs_remove currently doesn't take care of handling sync
+ * between removal and opening of pseudo files. To handle this, a
+ * workaround is added by making i_private = NULL here during removal
+ * and to check it during open(), both within inode_lock()/unlock().
+ * This design ensures that open() either safely gets kref or fails.
+ */
+ for (i = (TPM_NUM_EVENT_LOG_FILES - 1); i >= 0; i--) {
+ if (chip->bios_dir[i]) {
+ inode = d_inode(chip->bios_dir[i]);
+ inode_lock(inode);
+ inode->i_private = NULL;
+ inode_unlock(inode);
+ securityfs_remove(chip->bios_dir[i]);
+ }
+ }
}
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h
index 8de62b09be51..1660d74ea79a 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h
@@ -73,20 +73,24 @@ enum tcpa_pc_event_ids {
HOST_TABLE_OF_DEVICES,
};
-int read_log(struct tpm_bios_log *log);
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_TCG_IBMVTPM) || defined(CONFIG_TCG_IBMVTPM_MODULE) || \
- defined(CONFIG_ACPI)
-extern struct dentry **tpm_bios_log_setup(const char *);
-extern void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct dentry **);
+#if defined(CONFIG_ACPI)
+int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *chip);
#else
-static inline struct dentry **tpm_bios_log_setup(const char *name)
+static inline int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
- return NULL;
+ return -ENODEV;
}
-static inline void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct dentry **dir)
+#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_OF)
+int tpm_read_log_of(struct tpm_chip *chip);
+#else
+static inline int tpm_read_log_of(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
+ return -ENODEV;
}
#endif
+int tpm_bios_log_setup(struct tpm_chip *chip);
+void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct tpm_chip *chip);
+
#endif
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c
index 570f30c5c5f4..7dee42d7b5e0 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
* Copyright 2012 IBM Corporation
*
* Author: Ashley Lai <ashleydlai@gmail.com>
+ * Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
*
* Maintained by: <tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
*
@@ -20,55 +21,38 @@
#include "tpm.h"
#include "tpm_eventlog.h"
-int read_log(struct tpm_bios_log *log)
+int tpm_read_log_of(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
struct device_node *np;
const u32 *sizep;
const u64 *basep;
+ struct tpm_bios_log *log;
- if (log->bios_event_log != NULL) {
- pr_err("%s: ERROR - Eventlog already initialized\n", __func__);
- return -EFAULT;
- }
-
- np = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "vtpm");
- if (!np) {
- pr_err("%s: ERROR - IBMVTPM not supported\n", __func__);
+ log = &chip->log;
+ if (chip->dev.parent && chip->dev.parent->of_node)
+ np = chip->dev.parent->of_node;
+ else
return -ENODEV;
- }
sizep = of_get_property(np, "linux,sml-size", NULL);
- if (sizep == NULL) {
- pr_err("%s: ERROR - SML size not found\n", __func__);
- goto cleanup_eio;
- }
- if (*sizep == 0) {
- pr_err("%s: ERROR - event log area empty\n", __func__);
- goto cleanup_eio;
- }
-
basep = of_get_property(np, "linux,sml-base", NULL);
- if (basep == NULL) {
- pr_err("%s: ERROR - SML not found\n", __func__);
- goto cleanup_eio;
+ if (sizep == NULL && basep == NULL)
+ return -ENODEV;
+ if (sizep == NULL || basep == NULL)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ if (*sizep == 0) {
+ dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: Event log area empty\n", __func__);
+ return -EIO;
}
log->bios_event_log = kmalloc(*sizep, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!log->bios_event_log) {
- pr_err("%s: ERROR - Not enough memory for BIOS measurements\n",
- __func__);
- of_node_put(np);
+ if (!log->bios_event_log)
return -ENOMEM;
- }
log->bios_event_log_end = log->bios_event_log + *sizep;
memcpy(log->bios_event_log, __va(*basep), *sizep);
- of_node_put(np);
return 0;
-
-cleanup_eio:
- of_node_put(np);
- return -EIO;
}
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
index eaf5730d79eb..0127af130cb1 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
#include <linux/wait.h>
#include <linux/acpi.h>
#include <linux/freezer.h>
+#include <linux/of.h>
+#include <linux/of_device.h>
#include "tpm.h"
#include "tpm_tis_core.h"
@@ -354,12 +356,21 @@ static int tpm_tis_plat_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
return 0;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_OF
+static const struct of_device_id tis_of_platform_match[] = {
+ {.compatible = "tcg,tpm-tis-mmio"},
+ {},
+};
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, tis_of_platform_match);
+#endif
+
static struct platform_driver tis_drv = {
.probe = tpm_tis_plat_probe,
.remove = tpm_tis_plat_remove,
.driver = {
.name = "tpm_tis",
.pm = &tpm_tis_pm,
+ .of_match_table = of_match_ptr(tis_of_platform_match),
},
};
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c
index e3bf31b37138..7993678954a2 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c
@@ -180,12 +180,19 @@ static int recv_data(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
struct tpm_tis_data *priv = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev);
int size = 0, burstcnt, rc;
- while (size < count &&
- wait_for_tpm_stat(chip,
+ while (size < count) {
+ rc = wait_for_tpm_stat(chip,
TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL | TPM_STS_VALID,
chip->timeout_c,
- &priv->read_queue, true) == 0) {
- burstcnt = min_t(int, get_burstcount(chip), count - size);
+ &priv->read_queue, true);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+ burstcnt = get_burstcount(chip);
+ if (burstcnt < 0) {
+ dev_err(&chip->dev, "Unable to read burstcount\n");
+ return burstcnt;
+ }
+ burstcnt = min_t(int, burstcnt, count - size);
rc = tpm_tis_read_bytes(priv, TPM_DATA_FIFO(priv->locality),
burstcnt, buf + size);
@@ -229,8 +236,11 @@ static int tpm_tis_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
goto out;
}
- wait_for_tpm_stat(chip, TPM_STS_VALID, chip->timeout_c,
- &priv->int_queue, false);
+ if (wait_for_tpm_stat(chip, TPM_STS_VALID, chip->timeout_c,
+ &priv->int_queue, false) < 0) {
+ size = -ETIME;
+ goto out;
+ }
status = tpm_tis_status(chip);
if (status & TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL) { /* retry? */
dev_err(&chip->dev, "Error left over data\n");
@@ -271,7 +281,13 @@ static int tpm_tis_send_data(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len)
}
while (count < len - 1) {
- burstcnt = min_t(int, get_burstcount(chip), len - count - 1);
+ burstcnt = get_burstcount(chip);
+ if (burstcnt < 0) {
+ dev_err(&chip->dev, "Unable to read burstcount\n");
+ rc = burstcnt;
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ burstcnt = min_t(int, burstcnt, len - count - 1);
rc = tpm_tis_write_bytes(priv, TPM_DATA_FIFO(priv->locality),
burstcnt, buf + count);
if (rc < 0)
@@ -279,8 +295,11 @@ static int tpm_tis_send_data(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len)
count += burstcnt;
- wait_for_tpm_stat(chip, TPM_STS_VALID, chip->timeout_c,
- &priv->int_queue, false);
+ if (wait_for_tpm_stat(chip, TPM_STS_VALID, chip->timeout_c,
+ &priv->int_queue, false) < 0) {
+ rc = -ETIME;
+ goto out_err;
+ }
status = tpm_tis_status(chip);
if (!itpm && (status & TPM_STS_DATA_EXPECT) == 0) {
rc = -EIO;
@@ -293,8 +312,11 @@ static int tpm_tis_send_data(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len)
if (rc < 0)
goto out_err;
- wait_for_tpm_stat(chip, TPM_STS_VALID, chip->timeout_c,
- &priv->int_queue, false);
+ if (wait_for_tpm_stat(chip, TPM_STS_VALID, chip->timeout_c,
+ &priv->int_queue, false) < 0) {
+ rc = -ETIME;
+ goto out_err;
+ }
status = tpm_tis_status(chip);
if (!itpm && (status & TPM_STS_DATA_EXPECT) != 0) {
rc = -EIO;
@@ -755,20 +777,20 @@ int tpm_tis_core_init(struct device *dev, struct tpm_tis_data *priv, int irq,
if (intfcaps & TPM_INTF_DATA_AVAIL_INT)
dev_dbg(dev, "\tData Avail Int Support\n");
- /* Very early on issue a command to the TPM in polling mode to make
- * sure it works. May as well use that command to set the proper
- * timeouts for the driver.
- */
- if (tpm_get_timeouts(chip)) {
- dev_err(dev, "Could not get TPM timeouts and durations\n");
- rc = -ENODEV;
- goto out_err;
- }
-
/* INTERRUPT Setup */
init_waitqueue_head(&priv->read_queue);
init_waitqueue_head(&priv->int_queue);
if (irq != -1) {
+ /* Before doing irq testing issue a command to the TPM in polling mode
+ * to make sure it works. May as well use that command to set the
+ * proper timeouts for the driver.
+ */
+ if (tpm_get_timeouts(chip)) {
+ dev_err(dev, "Could not get TPM timeouts and durations\n");
+ rc = -ENODEV;
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
if (irq) {
tpm_tis_probe_irq_single(chip, intmask, IRQF_SHARED,
irq);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c
index 9a940332c157..5463b58af26e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
/*
* Copyright (C) 2015, 2016 IBM Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Intel Corporation
*
* Author: Stefan Berger <stefanb@us.ibm.com>
*
@@ -41,6 +42,7 @@ struct proxy_dev {
long state; /* internal state */
#define STATE_OPENED_FLAG BIT(0)
#define STATE_WAIT_RESPONSE_FLAG BIT(1) /* waiting for emulator response */
+#define STATE_REGISTERED_FLAG BIT(2)
size_t req_len; /* length of queued TPM request */
size_t resp_len; /* length of queued TPM response */
@@ -369,12 +371,9 @@ static void vtpm_proxy_work(struct work_struct *work)
rc = tpm_chip_register(proxy_dev->chip);
if (rc)
- goto err;
-
- return;
-
-err:
- vtpm_proxy_fops_undo_open(proxy_dev);
+ vtpm_proxy_fops_undo_open(proxy_dev);
+ else
+ proxy_dev->state |= STATE_REGISTERED_FLAG;
}
/*
@@ -515,7 +514,8 @@ static void vtpm_proxy_delete_device(struct proxy_dev *proxy_dev)
*/
vtpm_proxy_fops_undo_open(proxy_dev);
- tpm_chip_unregister(proxy_dev->chip);
+ if (proxy_dev->state & STATE_REGISTERED_FLAG)
+ tpm_chip_unregister(proxy_dev->chip);
vtpm_proxy_delete_proxy_dev(proxy_dev);
}
@@ -524,6 +524,50 @@ static void vtpm_proxy_delete_device(struct proxy_dev *proxy_dev)
* Code related to the control device /dev/vtpmx
*/
+/**
+ * vtpmx_ioc_new_dev - handler for the %VTPM_PROXY_IOC_NEW_DEV ioctl
+ * @file: /dev/vtpmx
+ * @ioctl: the ioctl number
+ * @arg: pointer to the struct vtpmx_proxy_new_dev
+ *
+ * Creates an anonymous file that is used by the process acting as a TPM to
+ * communicate with the client processes. The function will also add a new TPM
+ * device through which data is proxied to this TPM acting process. The caller
+ * will be provided with a file descriptor to communicate with the clients and
+ * major and minor numbers for the TPM device.
+ */
+static long vtpmx_ioc_new_dev(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
+ struct vtpm_proxy_new_dev __user *vtpm_new_dev_p;
+ struct vtpm_proxy_new_dev vtpm_new_dev;
+ struct file *vtpm_file;
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ vtpm_new_dev_p = argp;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&vtpm_new_dev, vtpm_new_dev_p,
+ sizeof(vtpm_new_dev)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ vtpm_file = vtpm_proxy_create_device(&vtpm_new_dev);
+ if (IS_ERR(vtpm_file))
+ return PTR_ERR(vtpm_file);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(vtpm_new_dev_p, &vtpm_new_dev,
+ sizeof(vtpm_new_dev))) {
+ put_unused_fd(vtpm_new_dev.fd);
+ fput(vtpm_file);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ fd_install(vtpm_new_dev.fd, vtpm_file);
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* vtpmx_fops_ioctl: ioctl on /dev/vtpmx
*
@@ -531,34 +575,11 @@ static void vtpm_proxy_delete_device(struct proxy_dev *proxy_dev)
* Returns 0 on success, a negative error code otherwise.
*/
static long vtpmx_fops_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int ioctl,
- unsigned long arg)
+ unsigned long arg)
{
- void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
- struct vtpm_proxy_new_dev __user *vtpm_new_dev_p;
- struct vtpm_proxy_new_dev vtpm_new_dev;
- struct file *file;
-
switch (ioctl) {
case VTPM_PROXY_IOC_NEW_DEV:
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
- vtpm_new_dev_p = argp;
- if (copy_from_user(&vtpm_new_dev, vtpm_new_dev_p,
- sizeof(vtpm_new_dev)))
- return -EFAULT;
- file = vtpm_proxy_create_device(&vtpm_new_dev);
- if (IS_ERR(file))
- return PTR_ERR(file);
- if (copy_to_user(vtpm_new_dev_p, &vtpm_new_dev,
- sizeof(vtpm_new_dev))) {
- put_unused_fd(vtpm_new_dev.fd);
- fput(file);
- return -EFAULT;
- }
-
- fd_install(vtpm_new_dev.fd, file);
- return 0;
-
+ return vtpmx_ioc_new_dev(f, ioctl, arg);
default:
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/xen-tpmfront.c b/drivers/char/tpm/xen-tpmfront.c
index 50072cc4fe5c..5aaa268f3a78 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/xen-tpmfront.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/xen-tpmfront.c
@@ -307,7 +307,6 @@ static int tpmfront_probe(struct xenbus_device *dev,
rv = setup_ring(dev, priv);
if (rv) {
chip = dev_get_drvdata(&dev->dev);
- tpm_chip_unregister(chip);
ring_free(priv);
return rv;
}
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 9b99df4893a4..2e5b2e379cdf 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -1667,7 +1667,8 @@ const struct inode_operations proc_pid_link_inode_operations = {
/* building an inode */
-struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block * sb, struct task_struct *task)
+struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block * sb,
+ struct task_struct *task, umode_t mode)
{
struct inode * inode;
struct proc_inode *ei;
@@ -1681,6 +1682,7 @@ struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block * sb, struct task_struct *t
/* Common stuff */
ei = PROC_I(inode);
+ inode->i_mode = mode;
inode->i_ino = get_next_ino();
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_atime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
inode->i_op = &proc_def_inode_operations;
@@ -2007,7 +2009,9 @@ proc_map_files_instantiate(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
struct proc_inode *ei;
struct inode *inode;
- inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task);
+ inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, S_IFLNK |
+ ((mode & FMODE_READ ) ? S_IRUSR : 0) |
+ ((mode & FMODE_WRITE) ? S_IWUSR : 0));
if (!inode)
return -ENOENT;
@@ -2016,12 +2020,6 @@ proc_map_files_instantiate(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
inode->i_op = &proc_map_files_link_inode_operations;
inode->i_size = 64;
- inode->i_mode = S_IFLNK;
-
- if (mode & FMODE_READ)
- inode->i_mode |= S_IRUSR;
- if (mode & FMODE_WRITE)
- inode->i_mode |= S_IWUSR;
d_set_d_op(dentry, &tid_map_files_dentry_operations);
d_add(dentry, inode);
@@ -2375,12 +2373,11 @@ static int proc_pident_instantiate(struct inode *dir,
struct inode *inode;
struct proc_inode *ei;
- inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task);
+ inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, p->mode);
if (!inode)
goto out;
ei = PROC_I(inode);
- inode->i_mode = p->mode;
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
set_nlink(inode, 2); /* Use getattr to fix if necessary */
if (p->iop)
@@ -3062,11 +3059,10 @@ static int proc_pid_instantiate(struct inode *dir,
{
struct inode *inode;
- inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task);
+ inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO);
if (!inode)
goto out;
- inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO;
inode->i_op = &proc_tgid_base_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &proc_tgid_base_operations;
inode->i_flags|=S_IMMUTABLE;
@@ -3354,11 +3350,10 @@ static int proc_task_instantiate(struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, struct task_struct *task, const void *ptr)
{
struct inode *inode;
- inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task);
+ inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO);
if (!inode)
goto out;
- inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO;
inode->i_op = &proc_tid_base_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &proc_tid_base_operations;
inode->i_flags|=S_IMMUTABLE;
diff --git a/fs/proc/fd.c b/fs/proc/fd.c
index d21dafef3102..4274f83bf100 100644
--- a/fs/proc/fd.c
+++ b/fs/proc/fd.c
@@ -183,14 +183,13 @@ proc_fd_instantiate(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
struct proc_inode *ei;
struct inode *inode;
- inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task);
+ inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, S_IFLNK);
if (!inode)
goto out;
ei = PROC_I(inode);
ei->fd = fd;
- inode->i_mode = S_IFLNK;
inode->i_op = &proc_pid_link_inode_operations;
inode->i_size = 64;
@@ -322,14 +321,13 @@ proc_fdinfo_instantiate(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
struct proc_inode *ei;
struct inode *inode;
- inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task);
+ inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, S_IFREG | S_IRUSR);
if (!inode)
goto out;
ei = PROC_I(inode);
ei->fd = fd;
- inode->i_mode = S_IFREG | S_IRUSR;
inode->i_fop = &proc_fdinfo_file_operations;
d_set_d_op(dentry, &tid_fd_dentry_operations);
diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h
index 109876a24d2c..2de5194ba378 100644
--- a/fs/proc/internal.h
+++ b/fs/proc/internal.h
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ extern int proc_pid_statm(struct seq_file *, struct pid_namespace *,
extern const struct dentry_operations pid_dentry_operations;
extern int pid_getattr(struct vfsmount *, struct dentry *, struct kstat *);
extern int proc_setattr(struct dentry *, struct iattr *);
-extern struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block *, struct task_struct *);
+extern struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block *, struct task_struct *, umode_t);
extern int pid_revalidate(struct dentry *, unsigned int);
extern int pid_delete_dentry(const struct dentry *);
extern int proc_pid_readdir(struct file *, struct dir_context *);
diff --git a/fs/proc/namespaces.c b/fs/proc/namespaces.c
index 51b8b0a8ad91..766f0c637ad1 100644
--- a/fs/proc/namespaces.c
+++ b/fs/proc/namespaces.c
@@ -92,12 +92,11 @@ static int proc_ns_instantiate(struct inode *dir,
struct inode *inode;
struct proc_inode *ei;
- inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task);
+ inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, S_IFLNK | S_IRWXUGO);
if (!inode)
goto out;
ei = PROC_I(inode);
- inode->i_mode = S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO;
inode->i_op = &proc_ns_link_inode_operations;
ei->ns_ops = ns_ops;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/vtpm_proxy.h b/include/uapi/linux/vtpm_proxy.h
index 41e8e2252a30..a69e991eb080 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/vtpm_proxy.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/vtpm_proxy.h
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
/*
* Definitions for the VTPM proxy driver
* Copyright (c) 2015, 2016, IBM Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Intel Corporation
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
@@ -18,8 +19,23 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/ioctl.h>
-/* ioctls */
+/**
+ * enum vtpm_proxy_flags - flags for the proxy TPM
+ * @VTPM_PROXY_FLAG_TPM2: the proxy TPM uses TPM 2.0 protocol
+ */
+enum vtpm_proxy_flags {
+ VTPM_PROXY_FLAG_TPM2 = 1,
+};
+/**
+ * struct vtpm_proxy_new_dev - parameter structure for the
+ * %VTPM_PROXY_IOC_NEW_DEV ioctl
+ * @flags: flags for the proxy TPM
+ * @tpm_num: index of the TPM device
+ * @fd: the file descriptor used by the proxy TPM
+ * @major: the major number of the TPM device
+ * @minor: the minor number of the TPM device
+ */
struct vtpm_proxy_new_dev {
__u32 flags; /* input */
__u32 tpm_num; /* output */
@@ -28,9 +44,6 @@ struct vtpm_proxy_new_dev {
__u32 minor; /* output */
};
-/* above flags */
-#define VTPM_PROXY_FLAG_TPM2 1 /* emulator is TPM 2 */
-
-#define VTPM_PROXY_IOC_NEW_DEV _IOWR(0xa1, 0x00, struct vtpm_proxy_new_dev)
+#define VTPM_PROXY_IOC_NEW_DEV _IOWR(0xa1, 0x00, struct vtpm_proxy_new_dev)
#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_VTPM_PROXY_H */
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index bff9c774987a..f7ce79a46050 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -41,8 +41,7 @@
* outside of a lifetime-guarded section. In general, this
* is only needed for handling filters shared across tasks.
* @prev: points to a previously installed, or inherited, filter
- * @len: the number of instructions in the program
- * @insnsi: the BPF program instructions to evaluate
+ * @prog: the BPF program to evaluate
*
* seccomp_filter objects are organized in a tree linked via the @prev
* pointer. For any task, it appears to be a singly-linked list starting
@@ -168,8 +167,8 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen)
}
/**
- * seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @syscall
- * @syscall: number of the current system call
+ * seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @sd
+ * @sd: optional seccomp data to be passed to filters
*
* Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes.
*/
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/Makefile b/samples/seccomp/Makefile
index ae7ff6f24f36..bf7cc6b0dc19 100644
--- a/samples/seccomp/Makefile
+++ b/samples/seccomp/Makefile
@@ -36,13 +36,13 @@ HOSTLOADLIBES_bpf-direct += $(MFLAG)
HOSTLOADLIBES_bpf-fancy += $(MFLAG)
HOSTLOADLIBES_dropper += $(MFLAG)
endif
-always := $(hostprogs-y)
+always := $(hostprogs-m)
else
# MIPS system calls are defined based on the -mabi that is passed
# to the toolchain which may or may not be a valid option
# for the host toolchain. So disable tests if target architecture
# is MIPS but the host isn't.
ifndef CONFIG_MIPS
-always := $(hostprogs-y)
+always := $(hostprogs-m)
endif
endif
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.c b/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.c
index 05cb4d5ff9f5..1ef0f4d72898 100644
--- a/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.c
+++ b/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.c
@@ -18,41 +18,41 @@
int bpf_resolve_jumps(struct bpf_labels *labels,
struct sock_filter *filter, size_t count)
{
- struct sock_filter *begin = filter;
- __u8 insn = count - 1;
+ size_t i;
- if (count < 1)
+ if (count < 1 || count > BPF_MAXINSNS)
return -1;
/*
* Walk it once, backwards, to build the label table and do fixups.
* Since backward jumps are disallowed by BPF, this is easy.
*/
- filter += insn;
- for (; filter >= begin; --insn, --filter) {
- if (filter->code != (BPF_JMP+BPF_JA))
+ for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
+ size_t offset = count - i - 1;
+ struct sock_filter *instr = &filter[offset];
+ if (instr->code != (BPF_JMP+BPF_JA))
continue;
- switch ((filter->jt<<8)|filter->jf) {
+ switch ((instr->jt<<8)|instr->jf) {
case (JUMP_JT<<8)|JUMP_JF:
- if (labels->labels[filter->k].location == 0xffffffff) {
+ if (labels->labels[instr->k].location == 0xffffffff) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unresolved label: '%s'\n",
- labels->labels[filter->k].label);
+ labels->labels[instr->k].label);
return 1;
}
- filter->k = labels->labels[filter->k].location -
- (insn + 1);
- filter->jt = 0;
- filter->jf = 0;
+ instr->k = labels->labels[instr->k].location -
+ (offset + 1);
+ instr->jt = 0;
+ instr->jf = 0;
continue;
case (LABEL_JT<<8)|LABEL_JF:
- if (labels->labels[filter->k].location != 0xffffffff) {
+ if (labels->labels[instr->k].location != 0xffffffff) {
fprintf(stderr, "Duplicate label use: '%s'\n",
- labels->labels[filter->k].label);
+ labels->labels[instr->k].label);
return 1;
}
- labels->labels[filter->k].location = insn;
- filter->k = 0; /* fall through */
- filter->jt = 0;
- filter->jf = 0;
+ labels->labels[instr->k].location = offset;
+ instr->k = 0; /* fall through */
+ instr->jt = 0;
+ instr->jf = 0;
continue;
}
}
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/dropper.c b/samples/seccomp/dropper.c
index c69c347c7011..68325ca5e71c 100644
--- a/samples/seccomp/dropper.c
+++ b/samples/seccomp/dropper.c
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@
* When run, returns the specified errno for the specified
* system call number against the given architecture.
*
- * Run this one as root as PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is not called.
*/
#include <errno.h>
@@ -42,8 +41,12 @@ static int install_filter(int nr, int arch, int error)
.len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(filter)/sizeof(filter[0])),
.filter = filter,
};
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
+ perror("prctl(NO_NEW_PRIVS)");
+ return 1;
+ }
if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2, &prog)) {
- perror("prctl");
+ perror("prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP)");
return 1;
}
return 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 4304372b323f..106e855e2d9d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static bool init_keyring __initdata;
int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
const char *digest, int digestlen)
{
- if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX)
+ if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX || siglen < 2)
return -EINVAL;
if (!keyring[id]) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index ba8615576d4d..e2ed498c0f5f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -145,6 +145,10 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
/* check value type */
switch (xattr_data->type) {
case EVM_XATTR_HMAC:
+ if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_ima_xattr_data)) {
+ evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
xattr_value_len, calc.digest);
if (rc)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 389325ac6067..1fd9539a969d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len)
{
struct signature_v2_hdr *sig;
+ enum hash_algo ret;
if (!xattr_value || xattr_len < 2)
/* return default hash algo */
@@ -143,7 +144,9 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
return sig->hash_algo;
break;
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
- return xattr_value->digest[0];
+ ret = xattr_value->digest[0];
+ if (ret < HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+ return ret;
break;
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
/* this is for backward compatibility */
@@ -384,14 +387,10 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
xattr_value_len);
if (result == 1) {
- bool digsig;
-
if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST))
return -EINVAL;
- digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG);
- if (!digsig && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
- return -EPERM;
- ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig);
+ ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry),
+ (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) ? 1 : 0);
result = 0;
}
return result;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index c07a3844ea0a..3df46906492d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
const char *cause = valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed";
if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY)
- return 0;
+ return seq_release(inode, file);
if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy() < 0) {
cause = "failed";
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 32912bd54ead..2ac1f41db5c0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -115,7 +115,8 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
ima_used_chip = 1;
if (!ima_used_chip)
- pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
+ pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass! (rc=%d)\n",
+ rc);
rc = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA);
if (rc)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 38b79d797aaf..c7c6619431d5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -231,12 +231,13 @@ static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
if (!isec)
return -ENOMEM;
- mutex_init(&isec->lock);
+ spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
isec->inode = inode;
isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
isec->task_sid = sid;
+ isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
inode->i_security = isec;
return 0;
@@ -247,7 +248,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
/*
* Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
* @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
- * allowed; when set to false, returns ERR_PTR(-ECHILD) when the label is
+ * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
* invalid. The @opt_dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode;
* when no dentry is available, set it to NULL instead.
*/
@@ -1100,11 +1101,12 @@ static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
}
rc = -ENOMEM;
- opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!opts->mnt_opts)
goto out_err;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
goto out_err;
@@ -1380,7 +1382,8 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
{
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
- u32 sid;
+ u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
+ u16 sclass;
struct dentry *dentry;
#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
char *context = NULL;
@@ -1388,12 +1391,15 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
int rc = 0;
if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
- goto out;
+ return 0;
- mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
+ spin_lock(&isec->lock);
if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
goto out_unlock;
+ if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
+ isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+
sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
@@ -1406,12 +1412,18 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
goto out_unlock;
}
+ sclass = isec->sclass;
+ task_sid = isec->task_sid;
+ sid = isec->sid;
+ isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
+ spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+
switch (sbsec->behavior) {
case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
break;
case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
- isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
+ sid = sbsec->def_sid;
break;
}
/* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
@@ -1433,7 +1445,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
* inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
* be used again by userspace.
*/
- goto out_unlock;
+ goto out;
}
len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
@@ -1441,7 +1453,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
if (!context) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
dput(dentry);
- goto out_unlock;
+ goto out;
}
context[len] = '\0';
rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
@@ -1452,14 +1464,14 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
if (rc < 0) {
dput(dentry);
- goto out_unlock;
+ goto out;
}
len = rc;
context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
if (!context) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
dput(dentry);
- goto out_unlock;
+ goto out;
}
context[len] = '\0';
rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
@@ -1471,7 +1483,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
"%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
-rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
kfree(context);
- goto out_unlock;
+ goto out;
}
/* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
sid = sbsec->def_sid;
@@ -1501,29 +1513,25 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
}
}
kfree(context);
- isec->sid = sid;
break;
case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
- isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
+ sid = task_sid;
break;
case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
/* Default to the fs SID. */
- isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
+ sid = sbsec->sid;
/* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
- isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
- rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
- isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
+ rc = security_transition_sid(task_sid, sid, sclass, NULL, &sid);
if (rc)
- goto out_unlock;
- isec->sid = sid;
+ goto out;
break;
case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
- isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
+ sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
break;
default:
/* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
- isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
+ sid = sbsec->sid;
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
/* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
@@ -1546,25 +1554,30 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
* could be used again by userspace.
*/
if (!dentry)
- goto out_unlock;
- isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
- rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass,
+ goto out;
+ rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
sbsec->flags, &sid);
dput(dentry);
if (rc)
- goto out_unlock;
- isec->sid = sid;
+ goto out;
}
break;
}
- isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+out:
+ spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+ if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
+ if (!sid || rc) {
+ isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+ isec->sid = sid;
+ }
out_unlock:
- mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
-out:
- if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
- isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+ spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
return rc;
}
@@ -3198,9 +3211,11 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
}
isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
+ spin_lock(&isec->lock);
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
isec->sid = newsid;
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+ spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
return;
}
@@ -3293,9 +3308,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
if (rc)
return rc;
+ spin_lock(&isec->lock);
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
isec->sid = newsid;
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+ spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
return 0;
}
@@ -3956,8 +3973,11 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
u32 sid = task_sid(p);
+ spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+ isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
isec->sid = sid;
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
+ spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
}
/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
@@ -4276,24 +4296,24 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+ u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
+ u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
int err = 0;
- isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
-
- if (kern)
- isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
- else {
- err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
+ if (!kern) {
+ err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
if (err)
return err;
}
+ isec->sclass = sclass;
+ isec->sid = sid;
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
if (sock->sk) {
sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
- sksec->sid = isec->sid;
- sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
+ sksec->sclass = sclass;
+ sksec->sid = sid;
err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
}
@@ -4469,16 +4489,22 @@ static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
int err;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
+ u16 sclass;
+ u32 sid;
err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
if (err)
return err;
- newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
-
isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
- newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
- newisec->sid = isec->sid;
+ spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+ sclass = isec->sclass;
+ sid = isec->sid;
+ spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+
+ newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
+ newisec->sclass = sclass;
+ newisec->sid = sid;
newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
return 0;
@@ -5981,9 +6007,9 @@ static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
- mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
+ spin_lock(&isec->lock);
isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
- mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
+ spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
}
/*
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 1f1f4b2f6018..e2d4ad3a4b4c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@
#define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
"wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read"
+#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ
+#error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
+#endif
+
/*
* Note: The name for any socket class should be suffixed by "socket",
* and doesn't contain more than one substr of "socket".
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index c21e135460a5..e8dab0f02c72 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -39,7 +39,8 @@ struct task_security_struct {
enum label_initialized {
LABEL_INVALID, /* invalid or not initialized */
- LABEL_INITIALIZED /* initialized */
+ LABEL_INITIALIZED, /* initialized */
+ LABEL_PENDING
};
struct inode_security_struct {
@@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ struct inode_security_struct {
u32 sid; /* SID of this object */
u16 sclass; /* security class of this object */
unsigned char initialized; /* initialization flag */
- struct mutex lock;
+ spinlock_t lock;
};
struct file_security_struct {
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 72c145dd799f..cf9293e01fc1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -163,6 +163,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
goto out;
+ new_value = !!new_value;
+
if (new_value != selinux_enforcing) {
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETENFORCE);
if (length)
@@ -1301,7 +1303,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
goto out;
isec->sid = sid;
- isec->initialized = 1;
+ isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
inode->i_fop = &sel_bool_ops;
inode->i_ino = i|SEL_BOOL_INO_OFFSET;
d_add(dentry, inode);
@@ -1834,7 +1836,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
isec->sid = SECINITSID_DEVNULL;
isec->sclass = SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
- isec->initialized = 1;
+ isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3));
d_add(dentry, inode);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 51fd30192c08..77abe2efacae 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -336,7 +336,6 @@ extern int smack_ptrace_rule;
extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor;
extern struct smack_known smack_known_hat;
extern struct smack_known smack_known_huh;
-extern struct smack_known smack_known_invalid;
extern struct smack_known smack_known_star;
extern struct smack_known smack_known_web;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 23e5808a0970..356e3764cad9 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -36,11 +36,6 @@ struct smack_known smack_known_floor = {
.smk_secid = 5,
};
-struct smack_known smack_known_invalid = {
- .smk_known = "",
- .smk_secid = 6,
-};
-
struct smack_known smack_known_web = {
.smk_known = "@",
.smk_secid = 7,
@@ -615,7 +610,7 @@ struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
* of a secid that is not on the list.
*/
rcu_read_unlock();
- return &smack_known_invalid;
+ return &smack_known_huh;
}
/*
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 1cb060293505..4d90257d03ad 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -692,12 +692,12 @@ static int smack_parse_opts_str(char *options,
}
}
- opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!opts->mnt_opts)
goto out_err;
opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
- GFP_ATOMIC);
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
goto out_err;
@@ -769,6 +769,31 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
if (sp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_INITIALIZED)
return 0;
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+ /*
+ * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values.
+ */
+ if (num_opts)
+ return -EPERM;
+ /*
+ * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller.
+ */
+ skp = smk_of_current();
+ sp->smk_root = skp;
+ sp->smk_default = skp;
+ /*
+ * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled
+ * backing store it's okay to trust security labels
+ * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted.
+ */
+ if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
+ sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC &&
+ sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) {
+ transmute = 1;
+ sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED;
+ }
+ }
+
sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_INITIALIZED;
for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
@@ -809,31 +834,6 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
}
}
- if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
- /*
- * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values.
- */
- if (num_opts)
- return -EPERM;
- /*
- * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller.
- */
- skp = smk_of_current();
- sp->smk_root = skp;
- sp->smk_default = skp;
- /*
- * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled
- * backing store it's okay to trust security labels
- * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted.
- */
- if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
- sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC &&
- sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) {
- transmute = 1;
- sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED;
- }
- }
-
/*
* Initialize the root inode.
*/
@@ -1384,20 +1384,14 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
if (!IS_ERR(skp))
isp->smk_inode = skp;
- else
- isp->smk_inode = &smack_known_invalid;
} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
if (!IS_ERR(skp))
isp->smk_task = skp;
- else
- isp->smk_task = &smack_known_invalid;
} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
if (!IS_ERR(skp))
isp->smk_mmap = skp;
- else
- isp->smk_mmap = &smack_known_invalid;
}
return;
@@ -2023,6 +2017,8 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
if (new_tsp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
+ new->security = new_tsp;
+
rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
@@ -2032,7 +2028,6 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- new->security = new_tsp;
return 0;
}
@@ -2067,12 +2062,8 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
{
struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
- struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
-
- if (skp == NULL)
- return -EINVAL;
- new_tsp->smk_task = skp;
+ new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid);
return 0;
}
@@ -2337,8 +2328,16 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
if (ssp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- ssp->smk_in = skp;
- ssp->smk_out = skp;
+ /*
+ * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
+ ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
+ ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
+ } else {
+ ssp->smk_in = skp;
+ ssp->smk_out = skp;
+ }
ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
sk->sk_security = ssp;
@@ -2435,17 +2434,17 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
/*
+ * If the label is NULL the entry has
+ * been renounced. Ignore it.
+ */
+ if (snp->smk_label == NULL)
+ continue;
+ /*
* we break after finding the first match because
* the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
* so we have found the most specific match
*/
for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
- /*
- * If the label is NULL the entry has
- * been renounced. Ignore it.
- */
- if (snp->smk_label == NULL)
- continue;
if ((sap->s6_addr16[i] & snp->smk_mask.s6_addr16[i]) !=
snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) {
found = 0;
@@ -3661,10 +3660,11 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
return PTR_ERR(skp);
/*
- * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label.
+ * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label
+ * and the star ("*") label.
*/
- if (skp == &smack_known_web)
- return -EPERM;
+ if (skp == &smack_known_web || skp == &smack_known_star)
+ return -EINVAL;
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
rc = -EPERM;
@@ -3884,21 +3884,11 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
return &smack_known_web;
return &smack_known_star;
}
- if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0) {
+ if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0)
/*
* Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
*/
- skp = smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
- /*
- * This has got to be a bug because it is
- * impossible to specify a fallback without
- * specifying the label, which will ensure
- * it has a secid, and the only way to get a
- * secid is from a fallback.
- */
- BUG_ON(skp == NULL);
- return skp;
- }
+ return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
/*
* Without guidance regarding the smack value
* for the packet fall back on the network
@@ -4761,7 +4751,6 @@ static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
mutex_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules_lock);
mutex_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules_lock);
mutex_init(&smack_known_star.smk_rules_lock);
- mutex_init(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules_lock);
mutex_init(&smack_known_web.smk_rules_lock);
/*
* Initialize rule lists
@@ -4770,7 +4759,6 @@ static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_star.smk_rules);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules);
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_web.smk_rules);
/*
* Create the known labels list
@@ -4779,7 +4767,6 @@ static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_hat);
smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_star);
smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_floor);
- smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_invalid);
smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_web);
}
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 6492fe96cae4..13743a01b35b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -2998,9 +2998,6 @@ static int __init init_smk_fs(void)
rc = smk_preset_netlabel(&smack_known_huh);
if (err == 0 && rc < 0)
err = rc;
- rc = smk_preset_netlabel(&smack_known_invalid);
- if (err == 0 && rc < 0)
- err = rc;
rc = smk_preset_netlabel(&smack_known_star);
if (err == 0 && rc < 0)
err = rc;
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index 0309f2111c70..968e5e0a3f81 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ static int task_is_descendant(struct task_struct *parent,
* @tracer: the task_struct of the process attempting ptrace
* @tracee: the task_struct of the process to be ptraced
*
- * Returns 1 if tracer has is ptracer exception ancestor for tracee.
+ * Returns 1 if tracer has a ptracer exception ancestor for tracee.
*/
static int ptracer_exception_found(struct task_struct *tracer,
struct task_struct *tracee)
@@ -320,6 +320,18 @@ static int ptracer_exception_found(struct task_struct *tracer,
bool found = false;
rcu_read_lock();
+
+ /*
+ * If there's already an active tracing relationship, then make an
+ * exception for the sake of other accesses, like process_vm_rw().
+ */
+ parent = ptrace_parent(tracee);
+ if (parent != NULL && same_thread_group(parent, tracer)) {
+ rc = 1;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ /* Look for a PR_SET_PTRACER relationship. */
if (!thread_group_leader(tracee))
tracee = rcu_dereference(tracee->group_leader);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) {
@@ -334,6 +346,8 @@ static int ptracer_exception_found(struct task_struct *tracer,
if (found && (parent == NULL || task_is_descendant(parent, tracer)))
rc = 1;
+
+unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
return rc;