diff options
author | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2013-06-12 14:04:39 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2013-06-12 16:29:44 -0700 |
commit | 637241a900cbd982f744d44646b48a273d609b34 (patch) | |
tree | 0c8e84af9e6a37bd61f9fc9b7a668472df53df46 | |
parent | cf7df378aa4ff7da3a44769b7ff6e9eef1a9f3db (diff) | |
download | linux-637241a900cbd982f744d44646b48a273d609b34.tar.bz2 |
kmsg: honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on /dev/kmsg
The dmesg_restrict sysctl currently covers the syslog method for access
dmesg, however /dev/kmsg isn't covered by the same protections. Most
people haven't noticed because util-linux dmesg(1) defaults to using the
syslog method for access in older versions. With util-linux dmesg(1)
defaults to reading directly from /dev/kmsg.
To fix /dev/kmsg, let's compare the existing interfaces and what they
allow:
- /proc/kmsg allows:
- open (SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN) if CAP_SYSLOG since it uses a destructive
single-reader interface (SYSLOG_ACTION_READ).
- everything, after an open.
- syslog syscall allows:
- anything, if CAP_SYSLOG.
- SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL and SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER, if
dmesg_restrict==0.
- nothing else (EPERM).
The use-cases were:
- dmesg(1) needs to do non-destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALLs.
- sysklog(1) needs to open /proc/kmsg, drop privs, and still issue the
destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READs.
AIUI, dmesg(1) is moving to /dev/kmsg, and systemd-journald doesn't
clear the ring buffer.
Based on the comments in devkmsg_llseek, it sounds like actions besides
reading aren't going to be supported by /dev/kmsg (i.e.
SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR), so we have a strict subset of the non-destructive
syslog syscall actions.
To this end, move the check as Josh had done, but also rename the
constants to reflect their new uses (SYSLOG_FROM_CALL becomes
SYSLOG_FROM_READER, and SYSLOG_FROM_FILE becomes SYSLOG_FROM_PROC).
SYSLOG_FROM_READER allows non-destructive actions, and SYSLOG_FROM_PROC
allows destructive actions after a capabilities-constrained
SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN check.
- /dev/kmsg allows:
- open if CAP_SYSLOG or dmesg_restrict==0
- reading/polling, after open
Addresses https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=903192
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use pr_warn_once()]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Christian Kujau <lists@nerdbynature.de>
Tested-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/kmsg.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/syslog.h | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/printk.c | 91 |
3 files changed, 57 insertions, 48 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/kmsg.c b/fs/proc/kmsg.c index bd4b5a740ff1..bdfabdaefdce 100644 --- a/fs/proc/kmsg.c +++ b/fs/proc/kmsg.c @@ -21,12 +21,12 @@ extern wait_queue_head_t log_wait; static int kmsg_open(struct inode * inode, struct file * file) { - return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE); + return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC); } static int kmsg_release(struct inode * inode, struct file * file) { - (void) do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE); + (void) do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC); return 0; } @@ -34,15 +34,15 @@ static ssize_t kmsg_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) && - !do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE)) + !do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC)) return -EAGAIN; - return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ, buf, count, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE); + return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ, buf, count, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC); } static unsigned int kmsg_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) { poll_wait(file, &log_wait, wait); - if (do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE)) + if (do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC)) return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; return 0; } diff --git a/include/linux/syslog.h b/include/linux/syslog.h index 38911391a139..98a3153c0f96 100644 --- a/include/linux/syslog.h +++ b/include/linux/syslog.h @@ -44,8 +44,8 @@ /* Return size of the log buffer */ #define SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER 10 -#define SYSLOG_FROM_CALL 0 -#define SYSLOG_FROM_FILE 1 +#define SYSLOG_FROM_READER 0 +#define SYSLOG_FROM_PROC 1 int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int count, bool from_file); diff --git a/kernel/printk.c b/kernel/printk.c index fa36e1494420..8212c1aef125 100644 --- a/kernel/printk.c +++ b/kernel/printk.c @@ -363,6 +363,53 @@ static void log_store(int facility, int level, log_next_seq++; } +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT +int dmesg_restrict = 1; +#else +int dmesg_restrict; +#endif + +static int syslog_action_restricted(int type) +{ + if (dmesg_restrict) + return 1; + /* + * Unless restricted, we allow "read all" and "get buffer size" + * for everybody. + */ + return type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL && + type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER; +} + +static int check_syslog_permissions(int type, bool from_file) +{ + /* + * If this is from /proc/kmsg and we've already opened it, then we've + * already done the capabilities checks at open time. + */ + if (from_file && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN) + return 0; + + if (syslog_action_restricted(type)) { + if (capable(CAP_SYSLOG)) + return 0; + /* + * For historical reasons, accept CAP_SYS_ADMIN too, with + * a warning. + */ + if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + pr_warn_once("%s (%d): Attempt to access syslog with " + "CAP_SYS_ADMIN but no CAP_SYSLOG " + "(deprecated).\n", + current->comm, task_pid_nr(current)); + return 0; + } + return -EPERM; + } + return security_syslog(type); +} + + /* /dev/kmsg - userspace message inject/listen interface */ struct devkmsg_user { u64 seq; @@ -620,7 +667,8 @@ static int devkmsg_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY) return 0; - err = security_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL); + err = check_syslog_permissions(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL, + SYSLOG_FROM_READER); if (err) return err; @@ -813,45 +861,6 @@ static inline void boot_delay_msec(int level) } #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT -int dmesg_restrict = 1; -#else -int dmesg_restrict; -#endif - -static int syslog_action_restricted(int type) -{ - if (dmesg_restrict) - return 1; - /* Unless restricted, we allow "read all" and "get buffer size" for everybody */ - return type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER; -} - -static int check_syslog_permissions(int type, bool from_file) -{ - /* - * If this is from /proc/kmsg and we've already opened it, then we've - * already done the capabilities checks at open time. - */ - if (from_file && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN) - return 0; - - if (syslog_action_restricted(type)) { - if (capable(CAP_SYSLOG)) - return 0; - /* For historical reasons, accept CAP_SYS_ADMIN too, with a warning */ - if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { - printk_once(KERN_WARNING "%s (%d): " - "Attempt to access syslog with CAP_SYS_ADMIN " - "but no CAP_SYSLOG (deprecated).\n", - current->comm, task_pid_nr(current)); - return 0; - } - return -EPERM; - } - return 0; -} - #if defined(CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME) static bool printk_time = 1; #else @@ -1249,7 +1258,7 @@ out: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(syslog, int, type, char __user *, buf, int, len) { - return do_syslog(type, buf, len, SYSLOG_FROM_CALL); + return do_syslog(type, buf, len, SYSLOG_FROM_READER); } /* |