diff options
author | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2017-06-04 23:01:48 -0400 |
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committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2017-06-04 23:01:48 -0400 |
commit | a619cc8bedd0df6dfbc389f4c904070be87a0e5c (patch) | |
tree | 513b8ea0c8bb573013ed3ea31d0734674eee4158 | |
parent | a11227dcc345c1792945cae8a3b22882a723620f (diff) | |
parent | e2fcad58fd230f635a74e4e983c6f4ea893642d2 (diff) | |
download | linux-a619cc8bedd0df6dfbc389f4c904070be87a0e5c.tar.bz2 |
Merge branch 'skb-sgvec-overflow'
Jason A. Donenfeld says:
====================
net: Avoiding stack overflow in skb_to_sgvec
The recent bug with macsec and historical one with virtio have
indicated that letting skb_to_sgvec trounce all over an sglist
without checking the length is probably a bad idea. And it's not
necessary either: an sglist already explicitly marks its last
item, and the initialization functions are diligent in doing so.
Thus there's a clear way of avoiding future overflows.
So, this patchset, from a high level, makes skb_to_sgvec return
a potential error code, and then adjusts all callers to check
for the error code. There are two situations in which skb_to_sgvec
might return such an error:
1) When the passed in sglist is too small; and
2) When the passed in skbuff is too deeply nested.
So, the first patch in this series handles the issues with
skb_to_sgvec directly, and the remaining ones then handle the call
sites.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/macsec.c | 13 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/skbuff.h | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/core/skbuff.c | 65 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/ah4.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/esp4.c | 20 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/ah6.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/esp6.c | 20 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/rxkad.c | 19 |
9 files changed, 116 insertions, 54 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/macsec.c b/drivers/net/macsec.c index 91642fd87cd1..b79513b8322f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/macsec.c +++ b/drivers/net/macsec.c @@ -740,7 +740,12 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, macsec_fill_iv(iv, secy->sci, pn); sg_init_table(sg, ret); - skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len); + ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len); + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) { + macsec_txsa_put(tx_sa); + kfree_skb(skb); + return ERR_PTR(ret); + } if (tx_sc->encrypt) { int len = skb->len - macsec_hdr_len(sci_present) - @@ -947,7 +952,11 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, macsec_fill_iv(iv, sci, ntohl(hdr->packet_number)); sg_init_table(sg, ret); - skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len); + ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len); + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) { + kfree_skb(skb); + return ERR_PTR(ret); + } if (hdr->tci_an & MACSEC_TCI_E) { /* confidentiality: ethernet + macsec header diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c index 3e9246cc49c3..57763d30cabb 100644 --- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c +++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c @@ -1150,7 +1150,7 @@ static int xmit_skb(struct send_queue *sq, struct sk_buff *skb) struct virtio_net_hdr_mrg_rxbuf *hdr; const unsigned char *dest = ((struct ethhdr *)skb->data)->h_dest; struct virtnet_info *vi = sq->vq->vdev->priv; - unsigned num_sg; + int num_sg; unsigned hdr_len = vi->hdr_len; bool can_push; @@ -1177,11 +1177,16 @@ static int xmit_skb(struct send_queue *sq, struct sk_buff *skb) if (can_push) { __skb_push(skb, hdr_len); num_sg = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sq->sg, 0, skb->len); + if (unlikely(num_sg < 0)) + return num_sg; /* Pull header back to avoid skew in tx bytes calculations. */ __skb_pull(skb, hdr_len); } else { sg_set_buf(sq->sg, hdr, hdr_len); - num_sg = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sq->sg + 1, 0, skb->len) + 1; + num_sg = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sq->sg + 1, 0, skb->len); + if (unlikely(num_sg < 0)) + return num_sg; + num_sg++; } return virtqueue_add_outbuf(sq->vq, sq->sg, num_sg, skb, GFP_ATOMIC); } diff --git a/include/linux/skbuff.h b/include/linux/skbuff.h index 45a59c1e0cc7..d460a4cbda1c 100644 --- a/include/linux/skbuff.h +++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h @@ -953,10 +953,10 @@ struct sk_buff *skb_realloc_headroom(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int headroom); struct sk_buff *skb_copy_expand(const struct sk_buff *skb, int newheadroom, int newtailroom, gfp_t priority); -int skb_to_sgvec_nomark(struct sk_buff *skb, struct scatterlist *sg, - int offset, int len); -int skb_to_sgvec(struct sk_buff *skb, struct scatterlist *sg, int offset, - int len); +int __must_check skb_to_sgvec_nomark(struct sk_buff *skb, struct scatterlist *sg, + int offset, int len); +int __must_check skb_to_sgvec(struct sk_buff *skb, struct scatterlist *sg, + int offset, int len); int skb_cow_data(struct sk_buff *skb, int tailbits, struct sk_buff **trailer); int skb_pad(struct sk_buff *skb, int pad); #define dev_kfree_skb(a) consume_skb(a) diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c index 780b7c1563d0..bba33cf4f7cd 100644 --- a/net/core/skbuff.c +++ b/net/core/skbuff.c @@ -3508,24 +3508,18 @@ void __init skb_init(void) NULL); } -/** - * skb_to_sgvec - Fill a scatter-gather list from a socket buffer - * @skb: Socket buffer containing the buffers to be mapped - * @sg: The scatter-gather list to map into - * @offset: The offset into the buffer's contents to start mapping - * @len: Length of buffer space to be mapped - * - * Fill the specified scatter-gather list with mappings/pointers into a - * region of the buffer space attached to a socket buffer. - */ static int -__skb_to_sgvec(struct sk_buff *skb, struct scatterlist *sg, int offset, int len) +__skb_to_sgvec(struct sk_buff *skb, struct scatterlist *sg, int offset, int len, + unsigned int recursion_level) { int start = skb_headlen(skb); int i, copy = start - offset; struct sk_buff *frag_iter; int elt = 0; + if (unlikely(recursion_level >= 24)) + return -EMSGSIZE; + if (copy > 0) { if (copy > len) copy = len; @@ -3544,6 +3538,8 @@ __skb_to_sgvec(struct sk_buff *skb, struct scatterlist *sg, int offset, int len) end = start + skb_frag_size(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i]); if ((copy = end - offset) > 0) { skb_frag_t *frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i]; + if (unlikely(elt && sg_is_last(&sg[elt - 1]))) + return -EMSGSIZE; if (copy > len) copy = len; @@ -3558,16 +3554,22 @@ __skb_to_sgvec(struct sk_buff *skb, struct scatterlist *sg, int offset, int len) } skb_walk_frags(skb, frag_iter) { - int end; + int end, ret; WARN_ON(start > offset + len); end = start + frag_iter->len; if ((copy = end - offset) > 0) { + if (unlikely(elt && sg_is_last(&sg[elt - 1]))) + return -EMSGSIZE; + if (copy > len) copy = len; - elt += __skb_to_sgvec(frag_iter, sg+elt, offset - start, - copy); + ret = __skb_to_sgvec(frag_iter, sg+elt, offset - start, + copy, recursion_level + 1); + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) + return ret; + elt += ret; if ((len -= copy) == 0) return elt; offset += copy; @@ -3578,6 +3580,31 @@ __skb_to_sgvec(struct sk_buff *skb, struct scatterlist *sg, int offset, int len) return elt; } +/** + * skb_to_sgvec - Fill a scatter-gather list from a socket buffer + * @skb: Socket buffer containing the buffers to be mapped + * @sg: The scatter-gather list to map into + * @offset: The offset into the buffer's contents to start mapping + * @len: Length of buffer space to be mapped + * + * Fill the specified scatter-gather list with mappings/pointers into a + * region of the buffer space attached to a socket buffer. Returns either + * the number of scatterlist items used, or -EMSGSIZE if the contents + * could not fit. + */ +int skb_to_sgvec(struct sk_buff *skb, struct scatterlist *sg, int offset, int len) +{ + int nsg = __skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, offset, len, 0); + + if (nsg <= 0) + return nsg; + + sg_mark_end(&sg[nsg - 1]); + + return nsg; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(skb_to_sgvec); + /* As compared with skb_to_sgvec, skb_to_sgvec_nomark only map skb to given * sglist without mark the sg which contain last skb data as the end. * So the caller can mannipulate sg list as will when padding new data after @@ -3600,19 +3627,11 @@ __skb_to_sgvec(struct sk_buff *skb, struct scatterlist *sg, int offset, int len) int skb_to_sgvec_nomark(struct sk_buff *skb, struct scatterlist *sg, int offset, int len) { - return __skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, offset, len); + return __skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, offset, len, 0); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(skb_to_sgvec_nomark); -int skb_to_sgvec(struct sk_buff *skb, struct scatterlist *sg, int offset, int len) -{ - int nsg = __skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, offset, len); - sg_mark_end(&sg[nsg - 1]); - - return nsg; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(skb_to_sgvec); /** * skb_cow_data - Check that a socket buffer's data buffers are writable diff --git a/net/ipv4/ah4.c b/net/ipv4/ah4.c index 22377c8ff14b..e8f862358518 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ah4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ah4.c @@ -220,7 +220,9 @@ static int ah_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb) ah->seq_no = htonl(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.output.low); sg_init_table(sg, nfrags + sglists); - skb_to_sgvec_nomark(skb, sg, 0, skb->len); + err = skb_to_sgvec_nomark(skb, sg, 0, skb->len); + if (unlikely(err < 0)) + goto out_free; if (x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN) { /* Attach seqhi sg right after packet payload */ @@ -393,7 +395,9 @@ static int ah_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb) skb_push(skb, ihl); sg_init_table(sg, nfrags + sglists); - skb_to_sgvec_nomark(skb, sg, 0, skb->len); + err = skb_to_sgvec_nomark(skb, sg, 0, skb->len); + if (unlikely(err < 0)) + goto out_free; if (x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN) { /* Attach seqhi sg right after packet payload */ diff --git a/net/ipv4/esp4.c b/net/ipv4/esp4.c index 93322f895eab..d815d1755473 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/esp4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/esp4.c @@ -377,9 +377,11 @@ int esp_output_tail(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info * esp->esph = esph; sg_init_table(sg, esp->nfrags); - skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, - (unsigned char *)esph - skb->data, - assoclen + ivlen + esp->clen + alen); + err = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, + (unsigned char *)esph - skb->data, + assoclen + ivlen + esp->clen + alen); + if (unlikely(err < 0)) + goto error; if (!esp->inplace) { int allocsize; @@ -403,9 +405,11 @@ int esp_output_tail(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info * spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock); sg_init_table(dsg, skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags + 1); - skb_to_sgvec(skb, dsg, - (unsigned char *)esph - skb->data, - assoclen + ivlen + esp->clen + alen); + err = skb_to_sgvec(skb, dsg, + (unsigned char *)esph - skb->data, + assoclen + ivlen + esp->clen + alen); + if (unlikely(err < 0)) + goto error; } if ((x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN)) @@ -690,7 +694,9 @@ skip_cow: esp_input_set_header(skb, seqhi); sg_init_table(sg, nfrags); - skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len); + err = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len); + if (unlikely(err < 0)) + goto out; skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE; diff --git a/net/ipv6/ah6.c b/net/ipv6/ah6.c index dda6035e3b84..755f38271dd5 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ah6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ah6.c @@ -423,7 +423,9 @@ static int ah6_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb) ah->seq_no = htonl(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.output.low); sg_init_table(sg, nfrags + sglists); - skb_to_sgvec_nomark(skb, sg, 0, skb->len); + err = skb_to_sgvec_nomark(skb, sg, 0, skb->len); + if (unlikely(err < 0)) + goto out_free; if (x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN) { /* Attach seqhi sg right after packet payload */ @@ -606,7 +608,9 @@ static int ah6_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb) ip6h->hop_limit = 0; sg_init_table(sg, nfrags + sglists); - skb_to_sgvec_nomark(skb, sg, 0, skb->len); + err = skb_to_sgvec_nomark(skb, sg, 0, skb->len); + if (unlikely(err < 0)) + goto out_free; if (x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN) { /* Attach seqhi sg right after packet payload */ diff --git a/net/ipv6/esp6.c b/net/ipv6/esp6.c index 1fe99ba8066c..2ede4e459c4e 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/esp6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/esp6.c @@ -346,9 +346,11 @@ int esp6_output_tail(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info esph = esp_output_set_esn(skb, x, ip_esp_hdr(skb), seqhi); sg_init_table(sg, esp->nfrags); - skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, - (unsigned char *)esph - skb->data, - assoclen + ivlen + esp->clen + alen); + err = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, + (unsigned char *)esph - skb->data, + assoclen + ivlen + esp->clen + alen); + if (unlikely(err < 0)) + goto error; if (!esp->inplace) { int allocsize; @@ -372,9 +374,11 @@ int esp6_output_tail(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock); sg_init_table(dsg, skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags + 1); - skb_to_sgvec(skb, dsg, - (unsigned char *)esph - skb->data, - assoclen + ivlen + esp->clen + alen); + err = skb_to_sgvec(skb, dsg, + (unsigned char *)esph - skb->data, + assoclen + ivlen + esp->clen + alen); + if (unlikely(err < 0)) + goto error; } if ((x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN)) @@ -618,7 +622,9 @@ skip_cow: esp_input_set_header(skb, seqhi); sg_init_table(sg, nfrags); - skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len); + ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len); + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) + goto out; skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE; diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c index 1bb9b2ccc267..29fe20ad04aa 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c @@ -227,7 +227,9 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet_encrypt(const struct rxrpc_call *call, len &= ~(call->conn->size_align - 1); sg_init_table(sg, nsg); - skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, len); + err = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, len); + if (unlikely(err < 0)) + goto out; skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, len, iv.x); crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); @@ -324,7 +326,7 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb, bool aborted; u32 data_size, buf; u16 check; - int nsg; + int nsg, ret; _enter(""); @@ -342,7 +344,9 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb, goto nomem; sg_init_table(sg, nsg); - skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, offset, 8); + ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, offset, 8); + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) + return ret; /* start the decryption afresh */ memset(&iv, 0, sizeof(iv)); @@ -409,7 +413,7 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb, bool aborted; u32 data_size, buf; u16 check; - int nsg; + int nsg, ret; _enter(",{%d}", skb->len); @@ -434,7 +438,12 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb, } sg_init_table(sg, nsg); - skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, offset, len); + ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, offset, len); + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) { + if (sg != _sg) + kfree(sg); + return ret; + } /* decrypt from the session key */ token = call->conn->params.key->payload.data[0]; |