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authorDave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>2022-11-30 12:22:32 -0700
committerDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>2022-12-01 12:42:35 -0800
commit3b502e886d01c2f96b2774176be4c7bceef2516b (patch)
tree3b4543e7f3e5a772644e52e0948423a4147cae97 /drivers/cxl
parent8e80b18664934621c742f17cdac3c4fe00728612 (diff)
downloadlinux-3b502e886d01c2f96b2774176be4c7bceef2516b.tar.bz2
cxl/pmem: Add "Passphrase Secure Erase" security command support
Create callback function to support the nvdimm_security_ops() ->erase() callback. Translate the operation to send "Passphrase Secure Erase" security command for CXL memory device. When the mem device is secure erased, cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion() is called in order to invalidate all CPU caches before attempting to access the mem device again. See CXL 3.0 spec section 8.2.9.8.6.6 for reference. Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166983615293.2734609.10358657600295932156.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/cxl')
-rw-r--r--drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c1
-rw-r--r--drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h8
-rw-r--r--drivers/cxl/security.c29
3 files changed, 38 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
index 4f84d3962fb1..8747db329087 100644
--- a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
+++ b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ static struct cxl_mem_command cxl_mem_commands[CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_MAX] = {
CXL_CMD(DISABLE_PASSPHRASE, 0x40, 0, 0),
CXL_CMD(FREEZE_SECURITY, 0, 0, 0),
CXL_CMD(UNLOCK, 0x20, 0, 0),
+ CXL_CMD(PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE, 0x40, 0, 0),
};
/*
diff --git a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
index 4e6897e8eb7d..75baeb0bbe57 100644
--- a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
+++ b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
@@ -278,6 +278,7 @@ enum cxl_opcode {
CXL_MBOX_OP_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE = 0x4502,
CXL_MBOX_OP_UNLOCK = 0x4503,
CXL_MBOX_OP_FREEZE_SECURITY = 0x4504,
+ CXL_MBOX_OP_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE = 0x4505,
CXL_MBOX_OP_MAX = 0x10000
};
@@ -400,6 +401,13 @@ struct cxl_disable_pass {
u8 pass[NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN];
} __packed;
+/* passphrase secure erase payload */
+struct cxl_pass_erase {
+ u8 type;
+ u8 reserved[31];
+ u8 pass[NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN];
+} __packed;
+
enum {
CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER = 0,
CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER,
diff --git a/drivers/cxl/security.c b/drivers/cxl/security.c
index 32b9e279e74b..4a8132559a96 100644
--- a/drivers/cxl/security.c
+++ b/drivers/cxl/security.c
@@ -120,12 +120,41 @@ static int cxl_pmem_security_unlock(struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
return 0;
}
+static int cxl_pmem_security_passphrase_erase(struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
+ const struct nvdimm_key_data *key,
+ enum nvdimm_passphrase_type ptype)
+{
+ struct cxl_nvdimm *cxl_nvd = nvdimm_provider_data(nvdimm);
+ struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = cxl_nvd->cxlmd;
+ struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = cxlmd->cxlds;
+ struct cxl_pass_erase erase;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!cpu_cache_has_invalidate_memregion())
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ erase.type = ptype == NVDIMM_MASTER ?
+ CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER : CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER;
+ memcpy(erase.pass, key->data, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN);
+ /* Flush all cache before we erase mem device */
+ cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion(IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY);
+ rc = cxl_mbox_send_cmd(cxlds, CXL_MBOX_OP_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE,
+ &erase, sizeof(erase), NULL, 0);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* mem device erased, invalidate all CPU caches before data is read */
+ cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion(IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY);
+ return 0;
+}
+
static const struct nvdimm_security_ops __cxl_security_ops = {
.get_flags = cxl_pmem_get_security_flags,
.change_key = cxl_pmem_security_change_key,
.disable = cxl_pmem_security_disable,
.freeze = cxl_pmem_security_freeze,
.unlock = cxl_pmem_security_unlock,
+ .erase = cxl_pmem_security_passphrase_erase,
};
const struct nvdimm_security_ops *cxl_security_ops = &__cxl_security_ops;