// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later /* In-software asymmetric public-key crypto subtype * * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst * * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKEY: "fmt #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include MODULE_DESCRIPTION("In-software asymmetric public-key subtype"); MODULE_AUTHOR("Red Hat, Inc."); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); /* * Provide a part of a description of the key for /proc/keys. */ static void public_key_describe(const struct key *asymmetric_key, struct seq_file *m) { struct public_key *key = asymmetric_key->payload.data[asym_crypto]; if (key) seq_printf(m, "%s.%s", key->id_type, key->pkey_algo); } /* * Destroy a public key algorithm key. */ void public_key_free(struct public_key *key) { if (key) { kfree(key->key); kfree(key->params); kfree(key); } } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_free); /* * Destroy a public key algorithm key. */ static void public_key_destroy(void *payload0, void *payload3) { public_key_free(payload0); public_key_signature_free(payload3); } /* * Given a public_key, and an encoding and hash_algo to be used for signing * and/or verification with that key, determine the name of the corresponding * akcipher algorithm. Also check that encoding and hash_algo are allowed. */ static int software_key_determine_akcipher(const struct public_key *pkey, const char *encoding, const char *hash_algo, char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]) { int n; if (!encoding) return -EINVAL; if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "rsa") == 0) { /* * RSA signatures usually use EMSA-PKCS1-1_5 [RFC3447 sec 8.2]. */ if (strcmp(encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) { if (!hash_algo) n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "pkcs1pad(%s)", pkey->pkey_algo); else n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "pkcs1pad(%s,%s)", pkey->pkey_algo, hash_algo); return n >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ? -EINVAL : 0; } if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0) return -EINVAL; /* * Raw RSA cannot differentiate between different hash * algorithms. */ if (hash_algo) return -EINVAL; } else if (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa", 5) == 0) { if (strcmp(encoding, "x962") != 0) return -EINVAL; /* * ECDSA signatures are taken over a raw hash, so they don't * differentiate between different hash algorithms. That means * that the verifier should hard-code a specific hash algorithm. * Unfortunately, in practice ECDSA is used with multiple SHAs, * so we have to allow all of them and not just one. */ if (!hash_algo) return -EINVAL; if (strcmp(hash_algo, "sha1") != 0 && strcmp(hash_algo, "sha224") != 0 && strcmp(hash_algo, "sha256") != 0 && strcmp(hash_algo, "sha384") != 0 && strcmp(hash_algo, "sha512") != 0) return -EINVAL; } else if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0) { if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0) return -EINVAL; if (!hash_algo) return -EINVAL; if (strcmp(hash_algo, "sm3") != 0) return -EINVAL; } else if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa") == 0) { if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0) return -EINVAL; if (!hash_algo) return -EINVAL; if (strcmp(hash_algo, "streebog256") != 0 && strcmp(hash_algo, "streebog512") != 0) return -EINVAL; } else { /* Unknown public key algorithm */ return -ENOPKG; } if (strscpy(alg_name, pkey->pkey_algo, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) < 0) return -EINVAL; return 0; } static u8 *pkey_pack_u32(u8 *dst, u32 val) { memcpy(dst, &val, sizeof(val)); return dst + sizeof(val); } /* * Query information about a key. */ static int software_key_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params, struct kernel_pkey_query *info) { struct crypto_akcipher *tfm; struct public_key *pkey = params->key->payload.data[asym_crypto]; char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; u8 *key, *ptr; int ret, len; ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, params->encoding, params->hash_algo, alg_name); if (ret < 0) return ret; tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(alg_name, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) return PTR_ERR(tfm); ret = -ENOMEM; key = kmalloc(pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!key) goto error_free_tfm; memcpy(key, pkey->key, pkey->keylen); ptr = key + pkey->keylen; ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->algo); ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->paramlen); memcpy(ptr, pkey->params, pkey->paramlen); if (pkey->key_is_private) ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen); else ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen); if (ret < 0) goto error_free_key; len = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm); info->key_size = len * 8; info->max_data_size = len; info->max_sig_size = len; info->max_enc_size = len; info->max_dec_size = len; info->supported_ops = (KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT | KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_VERIFY); if (pkey->key_is_private) info->supported_ops |= (KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_DECRYPT | KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_SIGN); ret = 0; error_free_key: kfree(key); error_free_tfm: crypto_free_akcipher(tfm); pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); return ret; } /* * Do encryption, decryption and signing ops. */ static int software_key_eds_op(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *in, void *out) { const struct public_key *pkey = params->key->payload.data[asym_crypto]; struct akcipher_request *req; struct crypto_akcipher *tfm; struct crypto_wait cwait; struct scatterlist in_sg, out_sg; char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; char *key, *ptr; int ret; pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, params->encoding, params->hash_algo, alg_name); if (ret < 0) return ret; tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(alg_name, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) return PTR_ERR(tfm); ret = -ENOMEM; req = akcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL); if (!req) goto error_free_tfm; key = kmalloc(pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!key) goto error_free_req; memcpy(key, pkey->key, pkey->keylen); ptr = key + pkey->keylen; ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->algo); ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->paramlen); memcpy(ptr, pkey->params, pkey->paramlen); if (pkey->key_is_private) ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen); else ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen); if (ret) goto error_free_key; sg_init_one(&in_sg, in, params->in_len); sg_init_one(&out_sg, out, params->out_len); akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &in_sg, &out_sg, params->in_len, params->out_len); crypto_init_wait(&cwait); akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, crypto_req_done, &cwait); /* Perform the encryption calculation. */ switch (params->op) { case kernel_pkey_encrypt: ret = crypto_akcipher_encrypt(req); break; case kernel_pkey_decrypt: ret = crypto_akcipher_decrypt(req); break; case kernel_pkey_sign: ret = crypto_akcipher_sign(req); break; default: BUG(); } ret = crypto_wait_req(ret, &cwait); if (ret == 0) ret = req->dst_len; error_free_key: kfree(key); error_free_req: akcipher_request_free(req); error_free_tfm: crypto_free_akcipher(tfm); pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); return ret; } #if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM2) static int cert_sig_digest_update(const struct public_key_signature *sig, struct crypto_akcipher *tfm_pkey) { struct crypto_shash *tfm; struct shash_desc *desc; size_t desc_size; unsigned char dgst[SM3_DIGEST_SIZE]; int ret; BUG_ON(!sig->data); /* SM2 signatures always use the SM3 hash algorithm */ if (!sig->hash_algo || strcmp(sig->hash_algo, "sm3") != 0) return -EINVAL; ret = sm2_compute_z_digest(tfm_pkey, SM2_DEFAULT_USERID, SM2_DEFAULT_USERID_LEN, dgst); if (ret) return ret; tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sig->hash_algo, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) return PTR_ERR(tfm); desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc); desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!desc) { ret = -ENOMEM; goto error_free_tfm; } desc->tfm = tfm; ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); if (ret < 0) goto error_free_desc; ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, dgst, SM3_DIGEST_SIZE); if (ret < 0) goto error_free_desc; ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sig->data, sig->data_size, sig->digest); error_free_desc: kfree(desc); error_free_tfm: crypto_free_shash(tfm); return ret; } #else static inline int cert_sig_digest_update( const struct public_key_signature *sig, struct crypto_akcipher *tfm_pkey) { return -ENOTSUPP; } #endif /* ! IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM2) */ /* * Verify a signature using a public key. */ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey, const struct public_key_signature *sig) { struct crypto_wait cwait; struct crypto_akcipher *tfm; struct akcipher_request *req; struct scatterlist src_sg[2]; char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; char *key, *ptr; int ret; pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); BUG_ON(!pkey); BUG_ON(!sig); BUG_ON(!sig->s); /* * If the signature specifies a public key algorithm, it *must* match * the key's actual public key algorithm. * * Small exception: ECDSA signatures don't specify the curve, but ECDSA * keys do. So the strings can mismatch slightly in that case: * "ecdsa-nist-*" for the key, but "ecdsa" for the signature. */ if (sig->pkey_algo) { if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, sig->pkey_algo) != 0 && (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa-", 6) != 0 || strcmp(sig->pkey_algo, "ecdsa") != 0)) return -EKEYREJECTED; } ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, sig->encoding, sig->hash_algo, alg_name); if (ret < 0) return ret; tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(alg_name, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) return PTR_ERR(tfm); ret = -ENOMEM; req = akcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL); if (!req) goto error_free_tfm; key = kmalloc(pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!key) goto error_free_req; memcpy(key, pkey->key, pkey->keylen); ptr = key + pkey->keylen; ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->algo); ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->paramlen); memcpy(ptr, pkey->params, pkey->paramlen); if (pkey->key_is_private) ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen); else ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen); if (ret) goto error_free_key; if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0 && sig->data_size) { ret = cert_sig_digest_update(sig, tfm); if (ret) goto error_free_key; } sg_init_table(src_sg, 2); sg_set_buf(&src_sg[0], sig->s, sig->s_size); sg_set_buf(&src_sg[1], sig->digest, sig->digest_size); akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_sg, NULL, sig->s_size, sig->digest_size); crypto_init_wait(&cwait); akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, crypto_req_done, &cwait); ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_akcipher_verify(req), &cwait); error_free_key: kfree(key); error_free_req: akcipher_request_free(req); error_free_tfm: crypto_free_akcipher(tfm); pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret > 0)) ret = -EINVAL; return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_verify_signature); static int public_key_verify_signature_2(const struct key *key, const struct public_key_signature *sig) { const struct public_key *pk = key->payload.data[asym_crypto]; return public_key_verify_signature(pk, sig); } /* * Public key algorithm asymmetric key subtype */ struct asymmetric_key_subtype public_key_subtype = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .name = "public_key", .name_len = sizeof("public_key") - 1, .describe = public_key_describe, .destroy = public_key_destroy, .query = software_key_query, .eds_op = software_key_eds_op, .verify_signature = public_key_verify_signature_2, }; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_subtype);