From 0f34a0060aebf202010b3f8fef348653a2df2346 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2014 11:05:10 +0300
Subject: ima: check ima_policy_flag in the ima_file_free() hook

This patch completes the switching to the 'ima_policy_flag' variable
in the checks at the beginning of IMA functions, starting with the
commit a756024e.

Checking 'iint_initialized' is completely unnecessary, because
S_IMA flag is unset if iint was not allocated. At the same time
the integrity cache is allocated with SLAB_PANIC and the kernel will
panic if the allocation fails during kernel initialization. So on
a running system iint_initialized is always true and can be removed.

Changes in v3:
* not limiting test to IMA_APPRAISE (spotted by Roberto Sassu)

Changes in v2:
* 'iint_initialized' removal patch merged to this patch (requested
   by Mimi)

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
---
 security/integrity/iint.c         | 3 ---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +-
 security/integrity/integrity.h    | 3 ---
 3 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index a521edf4cbd6..cc3eb4de18a1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@ static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree = RB_ROOT;
 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(integrity_iint_lock);
 static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __read_mostly;
 
-int iint_initialized;
-
 /*
  * __integrity_iint_find - return the iint associated with an inode
  */
@@ -166,7 +164,6 @@ static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void)
 	iint_cache =
 	    kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct integrity_iint_cache),
 			      0, SLAB_PANIC, init_once);
-	iint_initialized = 1;
 	return 0;
 }
 security_initcall(integrity_iintcache_init);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 62f59eca32d3..72faf0b5b05c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
 
-	if (!iint_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+	if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return;
 
 	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index c0379d13dbe1..883a5fc75449 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -169,6 +169,3 @@ static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
 {
 }
 #endif
-
-/* set during initialization */
-extern int iint_initialized;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d16a8585d3715ef161cc9858b50ea5d3c8b6079b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Oct 2014 21:43:07 +0300
Subject: integrity: add missing '__init' keyword for integrity_init_keyring()

integrity_init_keyring() is used only from kernel '__init'
functions. Add it there as well.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/digsig.c    | 2 +-
 security/integrity/integrity.h | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 8d4fbff8b87c..4f643d1b34dd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
-int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
+int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	int err = 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 883a5fc75449..f51ad65c894d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
 int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 			    const char *digest, int digestlen);
 
-int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
+int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
 #else
 
 static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From c2baec7ffaf6a2c15e03028ed9ef82a92cc49a94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Oct 2014 21:43:08 +0300
Subject: evm: skip replacing EVM signature with HMAC on read-only filesystem

If filesystem is mounted read-only or file is immutable, updating
xattr will fail. This is a usual case during early boot until
filesystem is remount read-write. This patch verifies conditions
to skip unnecessary attempt to calculate HMAC and set xattr.

Changes in v2:
* indention changed according to Lindent (requested by Mimi)

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 9685af330de5..b392fe614738 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -162,9 +162,14 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 					(const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len,
 					calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest));
 		if (!rc) {
-			/* we probably want to replace rsa with hmac here */
-			evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
-				   xattr_value_len);
+			/* Replace RSA with HMAC if not mounted readonly and
+			 * not immutable
+			 */
+			if (!IS_RDONLY(dentry->d_inode) &&
+			    !IS_IMMUTABLE(dentry->d_inode))
+				evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name,
+						    xattr_value,
+						    xattr_value_len);
 		}
 		break;
 	default:
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 456f5fd3f6017f10d04d459159ac7bd9e3815c5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Oct 2014 21:43:10 +0300
Subject: ima: use path names cache

__getname() uses slab allocation which is faster than kmalloc.
Make use of it.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c  | 4 ++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 3 ++-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 86885979918c..a99eb6d4bc09 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -325,11 +325,11 @@ const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf)
 {
 	char *pathname = NULL;
 
-	*pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
+	*pathbuf = __getname();
 	if (*pathbuf) {
 		pathname = d_absolute_path(path, *pathbuf, PATH_MAX);
 		if (IS_ERR(pathname)) {
-			kfree(*pathbuf);
+			__putname(*pathbuf);
 			*pathbuf = NULL;
 			pathname = NULL;
 		}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 72faf0b5b05c..eeee00dce729 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -246,7 +246,8 @@ out_digsig:
 		rc = -EACCES;
 	kfree(xattr_value);
 out_free:
-	kfree(pathbuf);
+	if (pathbuf)
+		__putname(pathbuf);
 out:
 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 	if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 78bb5d0b4fe1988ae1a2a0cad0776134846414bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 2014 14:40:18 +0300
Subject: ima: report policy load status

Audit messages are rate limited, often causing the policy update
info to not be visible.  Report policy loading status also using
pr_info.

Changes in v2:
* reporting moved to ima_release_policy to notice parsing errors
* reporting both completed and failed status

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index da92fcc08d15..16d85273d408 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -311,6 +311,8 @@ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
  */
 static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
+	pr_info("IMA: policy update %s\n",
+		valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed");
 	if (!valid_policy) {
 		ima_delete_rules();
 		valid_policy = 1;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 272a6e90ffee1dea39efd6fdf9592edc83a0738e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 2014 14:40:19 +0300
Subject: ima: no need to allocate entry for comment

If a rule is a comment, there is no need to allocate an entry.
Move the checking for comments before allocating the entry.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 14 ++++++--------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index cdc620b2152f..bf232b98011e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -694,6 +694,12 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 
+	p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
+	len = strlen(p) + 1;
+
+	if (*p == '#')
+		return len;
+
 	entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!entry) {
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
@@ -703,14 +709,6 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
 
-	p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
-	len = strlen(p) + 1;
-
-	if (*p == '#') {
-		kfree(entry);
-		return len;
-	}
-
 	result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
 	if (result) {
 		kfree(entry);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 7178784f0a94e2e6c668f587665fde41d405a23c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 2014 14:40:20 +0300
Subject: ima: ignore empty and with whitespaces policy lines

Empty policy lines cause parsing failures which is, especially
for new users, hard to spot. This patch prevents it.

Changes in v2:
* strip leading blanks and tabs in rules to prevent parsing failures

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index bf232b98011e..d2c47d4df7b7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -696,8 +696,9 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 
 	p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
 	len = strlen(p) + 1;
+	p += strspn(p, " \t");
 
-	if (*p == '#')
+	if (*p == '#' || *p == '\0')
 		return len;
 
 	entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 0716abbb58e3c47e04354c2502083854f49c34e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 2014 14:40:21 +0300
Subject: ima: use atomic bit operations to protect policy update interface

The current implementation uses an atomic counter to provide exclusive
access to the sysfs 'policy' entry to update the IMA policy. While it is
highly unlikely, the usage of a counter might potentially allow another
process to overflow the counter, open the interface and insert additional
rules into the policy being loaded.

This patch replaces using an atomic counter with atomic bit operations
which is more reliable and a widely used method to provide exclusive access.

As bit operation keep the interface locked after successful update, it makes
it unnecessary to verify if the default policy was set or not during parsing
and interface closing. This patch also removes that code.

Changes in v3:
* move audit log message to ima_relead_policy() to report successful and
  unsuccessful result
* unnecessary comment removed

Changes in v2:
* keep interface locked after successful policy load as in original design
* remove sysfs entry as in original design

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c     | 23 ++++++++++++++++-------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 23 ++---------------------
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 16d85273d408..973b5683a92e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -288,7 +288,12 @@ static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count;
 static struct dentry *violations;
 static struct dentry *ima_policy;
 
-static atomic_t policy_opencount = ATOMIC_INIT(1);
+enum ima_fs_flags {
+	IMA_FS_BUSY,
+};
+
+static unsigned long ima_fs_flags;
+
 /*
  * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file
  */
@@ -297,9 +302,9 @@ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 	/* No point in being allowed to open it if you aren't going to write */
 	if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY))
 		return -EACCES;
-	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&policy_opencount))
-		return 0;
-	return -EBUSY;
+	if (test_and_set_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags))
+		return -EBUSY;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -311,12 +316,16 @@ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
  */
 static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
-	pr_info("IMA: policy update %s\n",
-		valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed");
+	const char *cause = valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed";
+
+	pr_info("IMA: policy update %s\n", cause);
+	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
+			    "policy_update", cause, !valid_policy, 0);
+
 	if (!valid_policy) {
 		ima_delete_rules();
 		valid_policy = 1;
-		atomic_set(&policy_opencount, 1);
+		clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags);
 		return 0;
 	}
 	ima_update_policy();
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index d2c47d4df7b7..0d14d2591805 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -356,19 +356,8 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
  */
 void ima_update_policy(void)
 {
-	static const char op[] = "policy_update";
-	const char *cause = "already-exists";
-	int result = 1;
-	int audit_info = 0;
-
-	if (ima_rules == &ima_default_rules) {
-		ima_rules = &ima_policy_rules;
-		ima_update_policy_flag();
-		cause = "complete";
-		result = 0;
-	}
-	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
-			    NULL, op, cause, result, audit_info);
+	ima_rules = &ima_policy_rules;
+	ima_update_policy_flag();
 }
 
 enum {
@@ -686,14 +675,6 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 	ssize_t result, len;
 	int audit_info = 0;
 
-	/* Prevent installed policy from changing */
-	if (ima_rules != &ima_default_rules) {
-		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
-				    NULL, op, "already-exists",
-				    -EACCES, audit_info);
-		return -EACCES;
-	}
-
 	p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
 	len = strlen(p) + 1;
 	p += strspn(p, " \t");
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 71fed2eee0ea76b236f491006078c9d636323184 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 14:08:38 +0200
Subject: ima: added error messages to template-related functions

This patch adds some error messages to inform users about the following
events: template descriptor not found, invalid template descriptor,
template field not found and template initialization failed.

Changelog:
 - v2:
   - display an error message if the format string contains too many
     fields (Roberto Sassu)

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index e854862c9337..1310afc587f3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -52,8 +52,11 @@ static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
 	 * If not, use CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE.
 	 */
 	template_desc = lookup_template_desc(str);
-	if (!template_desc)
+	if (!template_desc) {
+		pr_err("template %s not found, using %s\n",
+		       str, CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE);
 		return 1;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Verify whether the current hash algorithm is supported
@@ -117,8 +120,11 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
 	int template_num_fields = template_fmt_size(template_fmt);
 	int i, result = 0;
 
-	if (template_num_fields > IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX)
+	if (template_num_fields > IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX) {
+		pr_err("format string '%s' contains too many fields\n",
+		       template_fmt);
 		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	/* copying is needed as strsep() modifies the original buffer */
 	template_fmt_copy = kstrdup(template_fmt, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -137,6 +143,7 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
 		struct ima_template_field *f = lookup_template_field(c);
 
 		if (!f) {
+			pr_err("field '%s' not found\n", c);
 			result = -ENOENT;
 			goto out;
 		}
@@ -163,8 +170,13 @@ struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void)
 int __init ima_init_template(void)
 {
 	struct ima_template_desc *template = ima_template_desc_current();
+	int result;
 
-	return template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt,
-					 &(template->fields),
-					 &(template->num_fields));
+	result = template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt,
+					   &(template->fields),
+					   &(template->num_fields));
+	if (result < 0)
+		pr_err("template %s init failed, result: %d\n", template->name);
+
+	return result;
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 7dbdb4206bd69bf518fd76e01f4c5c64cda96455 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 14:08:39 +0200
Subject: ima: display template format in meas. list if template name length is
 zero

With the introduction of the 'ima_template_fmt' kernel cmdline parameter,
a user can define a new template descriptor with custom format. However,
in this case, userspace tools will be unable to parse the measurements
list because the new template is unknown. For this reason, this patch
modifies the current IMA behavior to display in the list the template
format instead of the name (only if the length of the latter is zero)
so that a tool can extract needed information if it can handle listed
fields.

This patch also correctly displays the error log message in
ima_init_template() if the selected template cannot be initialized.

Changelog:
 - v3:
   - check the first byte of 'e->template_desc->name' instead of using
     strlen() in ima_fs.c (suggested by Mimi Zohar)

 - v2:
   - print the template format in ima_init_template(), if the selected
     template is custom (Roberto Sassu)

 - v1:
   - fixed patch description (Roberto Sassu, suggested by Mimi Zohar)
   - set 'template_name' variable in ima_fs.c only once
     (Roberto Sassu, suggested by Mimi Zohar)

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c       | 16 ++++++++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c |  4 +++-
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 973b5683a92e..461215e5fd31 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	/* the list never shrinks, so we don't need a lock here */
 	struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
 	struct ima_template_entry *e;
+	char *template_name;
 	int namelen;
 	u32 pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
 	bool is_ima_template = false;
@@ -128,6 +129,9 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	if (e == NULL)
 		return -1;
 
+	template_name = (e->template_desc->name[0] != '\0') ?
+	    e->template_desc->name : e->template_desc->fmt;
+
 	/*
 	 * 1st: PCRIndex
 	 * PCR used is always the same (config option) in
@@ -139,14 +143,14 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	ima_putc(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 
 	/* 3rd: template name size */
-	namelen = strlen(e->template_desc->name);
+	namelen = strlen(template_name);
 	ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof(namelen));
 
 	/* 4th:  template name */
-	ima_putc(m, e->template_desc->name, namelen);
+	ima_putc(m, template_name, namelen);
 
 	/* 5th:  template length (except for 'ima' template) */
-	if (strcmp(e->template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0)
+	if (strcmp(template_name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0)
 		is_ima_template = true;
 
 	if (!is_ima_template)
@@ -200,6 +204,7 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	/* the list never shrinks, so we don't need a lock here */
 	struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
 	struct ima_template_entry *e;
+	char *template_name;
 	int i;
 
 	/* get entry */
@@ -207,6 +212,9 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	if (e == NULL)
 		return -1;
 
+	template_name = (e->template_desc->name[0] != '\0') ?
+	    e->template_desc->name : e->template_desc->fmt;
+
 	/* 1st: PCR used (config option) */
 	seq_printf(m, "%2d ", CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
 
@@ -214,7 +222,7 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	ima_print_digest(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 
 	/* 3th:  template name */
-	seq_printf(m, " %s", e->template_desc->name);
+	seq_printf(m, " %s", template_name);
 
 	/* 4th:  template specific data */
 	for (i = 0; i < e->template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 1310afc587f3..b7b359ca39ee 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -176,7 +176,9 @@ int __init ima_init_template(void)
 					   &(template->fields),
 					   &(template->num_fields));
 	if (result < 0)
-		pr_err("template %s init failed, result: %d\n", template->name);
+		pr_err("template %s init failed, result: %d\n",
+		       (strlen(template->name) ?
+		       template->name : template->fmt), result);
 
 	return result;
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 9f3166b8ca3b89c27b9f1c9039d3662ab7812cfa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 14:08:40 +0200
Subject: ima: don't allocate a copy of template_fmt in
 template_desc_init_fields()

This patch removes the allocation of a copy of 'template_fmt', needed for
iterating over all fields in the passed template format string. The removal
was possible by replacing strcspn(), which modifies the passed string,
with strchrnul(). The currently processed template field is copied in
a temporary variable.

The purpose of this change is use template_desc_init_fields() in two ways:
for just validating a template format string (the function should work
if called by a setup function, when memory cannot be allocated), and for
actually initializing a template descriptor. The implementation of this
feature will be complete with the next patch.

Changelog:
 - v3:
   - added 'goto out' in template_desc_init_fields() to free allocated
     memory if a template field length is not valid (suggested by
     Mimi Zohar)

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index b7b359ca39ee..d93a58e603df 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -116,9 +116,9 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
 				     struct ima_template_field ***fields,
 				     int *num_fields)
 {
-	char *c, *template_fmt_copy, *template_fmt_ptr;
+	const char *template_fmt_ptr;
 	int template_num_fields = template_fmt_size(template_fmt);
-	int i, result = 0;
+	int i, len, result = 0;
 
 	if (template_num_fields > IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX) {
 		pr_err("format string '%s' contains too many fields\n",
@@ -126,24 +126,29 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	/* copying is needed as strsep() modifies the original buffer */
-	template_fmt_copy = kstrdup(template_fmt, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (template_fmt_copy == NULL)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
 	*fields = kzalloc(template_num_fields * sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (*fields == NULL) {
 		result = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	template_fmt_ptr = template_fmt_copy;
-	for (i = 0; (c = strsep(&template_fmt_ptr, "|")) != NULL &&
-	     i < template_num_fields; i++) {
-		struct ima_template_field *f = lookup_template_field(c);
+	for (i = 0, template_fmt_ptr = template_fmt; i < template_num_fields;
+	     i++, template_fmt_ptr += len + 1) {
+		char tmp_field_id[IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN + 1];
+		struct ima_template_field *f;
+
+		len = strchrnul(template_fmt_ptr, '|') - template_fmt_ptr;
+		if (len == 0 || len > IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN) {
+			pr_err("Invalid field with length %d\n", len);
+			result = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 
+		memcpy(tmp_field_id, template_fmt_ptr, len);
+		tmp_field_id[len] = '\0';
+		f = lookup_template_field(tmp_field_id);
 		if (!f) {
-			pr_err("field '%s' not found\n", c);
+			pr_err("field '%s' not found\n", tmp_field_id);
 			result = -ENOENT;
 			goto out;
 		}
@@ -155,7 +160,6 @@ out:
 		kfree(*fields);
 		*fields = NULL;
 	}
-	kfree(template_fmt_copy);
 	return result;
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 1bd7face74391ddfc568b3e638f156da1ed77aa6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 14:08:41 +0200
Subject: ima: allocate field pointers array on demand in
 template_desc_init_fields()

The allocation of a field pointers array is moved at the end of
template_desc_init_fields() and done only if the value of the 'fields'
and 'num_fields' parameters is not NULL. For just validating a template
format string, retrieved template field pointers are placed in a temporary
array.

Changelog:
 - v3:
   - do not check in this patch if 'fields' and 'num_fields' are NULL
     (suggested by Mimi Zohar)

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 34 +++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index d93a58e603df..65117ba06809 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -117,8 +117,9 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
 				     int *num_fields)
 {
 	const char *template_fmt_ptr;
+	struct ima_template_field *found_fields[IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX];
 	int template_num_fields = template_fmt_size(template_fmt);
-	int i, len, result = 0;
+	int i, len;
 
 	if (template_num_fields > IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX) {
 		pr_err("format string '%s' contains too many fields\n",
@@ -126,41 +127,32 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	*fields = kzalloc(template_num_fields * sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (*fields == NULL) {
-		result = -ENOMEM;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
 	for (i = 0, template_fmt_ptr = template_fmt; i < template_num_fields;
 	     i++, template_fmt_ptr += len + 1) {
 		char tmp_field_id[IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN + 1];
-		struct ima_template_field *f;
 
 		len = strchrnul(template_fmt_ptr, '|') - template_fmt_ptr;
 		if (len == 0 || len > IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN) {
 			pr_err("Invalid field with length %d\n", len);
-			result = -EINVAL;
-			goto out;
+			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
 		memcpy(tmp_field_id, template_fmt_ptr, len);
 		tmp_field_id[len] = '\0';
-		f = lookup_template_field(tmp_field_id);
-		if (!f) {
+		found_fields[i] = lookup_template_field(tmp_field_id);
+		if (!found_fields[i]) {
 			pr_err("field '%s' not found\n", tmp_field_id);
-			result = -ENOENT;
-			goto out;
+			return -ENOENT;
 		}
-		(*fields)[i] = f;
 	}
+
+	*fields = kmalloc_array(i, sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (*fields == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memcpy(*fields, found_fields, i * sizeof(*fields));
 	*num_fields = i;
-out:
-	if (result < 0) {
-		kfree(*fields);
-		*fields = NULL;
-	}
-	return result;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From c2426d2ad5027397342107b7ff094aa9b234acb8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 14:08:42 +0200
Subject: ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt

This patch allows users to provide a custom template format through the
new kernel command line parameter 'ima_template_fmt'. If the supplied
format is not valid, IMA uses the default template descriptor.

Changelog:
 - v3:
   - added check for 'fields' and 'num_fields' in
     template_desc_init_fields() (suggested by Mimi Zohar)

 - v2:
   - using template_desc_init_fields() to validate a format string
     (Roberto Sassu)
   - updated documentation by stating that only the chosen template
     descriptor is initialized (Roberto Sassu)

 - v1:
   - simplified code of ima_template_fmt_setup()
     (Roberto Sassu, suggested by Mimi Zohar)

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt      |  4 ++++
 Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt | 29 ++++++++++++------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c    | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index 802a3fd9e485..06b2cd5739dd 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1318,6 +1318,10 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 			Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" }
 			Default: "ima-ng"
 
+	ima_template_fmt=
+	                [IMA] Define a custom template format.
+			Format: { "field1|...|fieldN" }
+
 	ima.ahash_minsize= [IMA] Minimum file size for asynchronous hash usage
 			Format: <min_file_size>
 			Set the minimal file size for using asynchronous hash.
diff --git a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt
index a4e102dddfea..839b5dad9226 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt
@@ -27,25 +27,22 @@ Managing templates with these structures is very simple. To support
 a new data type, developers define the field identifier and implement
 two functions, init() and show(), respectively to generate and display
 measurement entries. Defining a new template descriptor requires
-specifying the template format, a string of field identifiers separated
-by the '|' character. While in the current implementation it is possible
-to define new template descriptors only by adding their definition in the
-template specific code (ima_template.c), in a future version it will be
-possible to register a new template on a running kernel by supplying to IMA
-the desired format string. In this version, IMA initializes at boot time
-all defined template descriptors by translating the format into an array
-of template fields structures taken from the set of the supported ones.
+specifying the template format (a string of field identifiers separated
+by the '|' character) through the 'ima_template_fmt' kernel command line
+parameter. At boot time, IMA initializes the chosen template descriptor
+by translating the format into an array of template fields structures taken
+from the set of the supported ones.
 
 After the initialization step, IMA will call ima_alloc_init_template()
 (new function defined within the patches for the new template management
 mechanism) to generate a new measurement entry by using the template
 descriptor chosen through the kernel configuration or through the newly
-introduced 'ima_template=' kernel command line parameter. It is during this
-phase that the advantages of the new architecture are clearly shown:
-the latter function will not contain specific code to handle a given template
-but, instead, it simply calls the init() method of the template fields
-associated to the chosen template descriptor and store the result (pointer
-to allocated data and data length) in the measurement entry structure.
+introduced 'ima_template' and 'ima_template_fmt' kernel command line parameters.
+It is during this phase that the advantages of the new architecture are
+clearly shown: the latter function will not contain specific code to handle
+a given template but, instead, it simply calls the init() method of the template
+fields associated to the chosen template descriptor and store the result
+(pointer to allocated data and data length) in the measurement entry structure.
 
 The same mechanism is employed to display measurements entries.
 The functions ima[_ascii]_measurements_show() retrieve, for each entry,
@@ -86,4 +83,6 @@ currently the following methods are supported:
  - select a template descriptor among those supported in the kernel
    configuration ('ima-ng' is the default choice);
  - specify a template descriptor name from the kernel command line through
-   the 'ima_template=' parameter.
+   the 'ima_template=' parameter;
+ - register a new template descriptor with custom format through the kernel
+   command line parameter 'ima_template_fmt='.
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 65117ba06809..0b7404ebfa80 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = {
 	{.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
 	{.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
 	{.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
+	{.name = "", .fmt = ""},	/* placeholder for a custom format */
 };
 
 static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
@@ -41,12 +42,18 @@ static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
 
 static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template;
 static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name);
+static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
+				     struct ima_template_field ***fields,
+				     int *num_fields);
 
 static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
 {
 	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
 	int template_len = strlen(str);
 
+	if (ima_template)
+		return 1;
+
 	/*
 	 * Verify that a template with the supplied name exists.
 	 * If not, use CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE.
@@ -73,6 +80,25 @@ static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
 }
 __setup("ima_template=", ima_template_setup);
 
+static int __init ima_template_fmt_setup(char *str)
+{
+	int num_templates = ARRAY_SIZE(defined_templates);
+
+	if (ima_template)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (template_desc_init_fields(str, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
+		pr_err("format string '%s' not valid, using template %s\n",
+		       str, CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	defined_templates[num_templates - 1].fmt = str;
+	ima_template = defined_templates + num_templates - 1;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_template_fmt=", ima_template_fmt_setup);
+
 static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -146,12 +172,15 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
 		}
 	}
 
-	*fields = kmalloc_array(i, sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (*fields == NULL)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (fields && num_fields) {
+		*fields = kmalloc_array(i, sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (*fields == NULL)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		memcpy(*fields, found_fields, i * sizeof(*fields));
+		*num_fields = i;
+	}
 
-	memcpy(*fields, found_fields, i * sizeof(*fields));
-	*num_fields = i;
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From e3c4abbfa97ed0b7aed36f18b32911ccf76d52c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2014 17:01:12 +0200
Subject: integrity: define a new function integrity_read_file()

This patch defines a new function called integrity_read_file()
to read file from the kernel into a buffer. Subsequent patches
will read a file containing the public keys and load them onto
the IMA keyring.

This patch moves and renames ima_kernel_read(), the non-security
checking version of kernel_read(), to integrity_kernel_read().

Changes in v3:
* Patch descriptions improved (Mimi)
* Add missing cast (kbuild test robot)

Changes in v2:
* configuration option removed
* function declared as '__init'

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/iint.c           | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 35 ++---------------
 security/integrity/integrity.h      |  4 ++
 3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index cc3eb4de18a1..dbee618526b6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/rbtree.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include "integrity.h"
 
 static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree = RB_ROOT;
@@ -167,3 +169,79 @@ static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 security_initcall(integrity_iintcache_init);
+
+
+/*
+ * integrity_kernel_read - read data from the file
+ *
+ * This is a function for reading file content instead of kernel_read().
+ * It does not perform locking checks to ensure it cannot be blocked.
+ * It does not perform security checks because it is irrelevant for IMA.
+ *
+ */
+int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
+			  char *addr, unsigned long count)
+{
+	mm_segment_t old_fs;
+	char __user *buf = (char __user *)addr;
+	ssize_t ret = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
+		return -EBADF;
+
+	old_fs = get_fs();
+	set_fs(get_ds());
+	if (file->f_op->read)
+		ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, &offset);
+	else if (file->f_op->aio_read)
+		ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
+	else if (file->f_op->read_iter)
+		ret = new_sync_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
+	set_fs(old_fs);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * integrity_read_file - read entire file content into the buffer
+ *
+ * This is function opens a file, allocates the buffer of required
+ * size, read entire file content to the buffer and closes the file
+ *
+ * It is used only by init code.
+ *
+ */
+int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data)
+{
+	struct file *file;
+	loff_t size;
+	char *buf;
+	int rc = -EINVAL;
+
+	file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(file)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(file);
+		pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
+	if (size <= 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buf) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = integrity_kernel_read(file, 0, buf, size);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		kfree(buf);
+	else if (rc != size)
+		rc = -EIO;
+	else
+		*data = buf;
+out:
+	fput(file);
+	return rc;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index d34e7dfc1118..5df4d960d4dc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -67,36 +67,6 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ahash_bufsize, "Maximum ahash buffer size");
 static struct crypto_shash *ima_shash_tfm;
 static struct crypto_ahash *ima_ahash_tfm;
 
-/**
- * ima_kernel_read - read file content
- *
- * This is a function for reading file content instead of kernel_read().
- * It does not perform locking checks to ensure it cannot be blocked.
- * It does not perform security checks because it is irrelevant for IMA.
- *
- */
-static int ima_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
-			   char *addr, unsigned long count)
-{
-	mm_segment_t old_fs;
-	char __user *buf = addr;
-	ssize_t ret = -EINVAL;
-
-	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
-		return -EBADF;
-
-	old_fs = get_fs();
-	set_fs(get_ds());
-	if (file->f_op->read)
-		ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, &offset);
-	else if (file->f_op->aio_read)
-		ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
-	else if (file->f_op->read_iter)
-		ret = new_sync_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
-	set_fs(old_fs);
-	return ret;
-}
-
 int __init ima_init_crypto(void)
 {
 	long rc;
@@ -324,7 +294,8 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file,
 		}
 		/* read buffer */
 		rbuf_len = min_t(loff_t, i_size - offset, rbuf_size[active]);
-		rc = ima_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf[active], rbuf_len);
+		rc = integrity_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf[active],
+					   rbuf_len);
 		if (rc != rbuf_len)
 			goto out3;
 
@@ -417,7 +388,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
 	while (offset < i_size) {
 		int rbuf_len;
 
-		rbuf_len = ima_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf, PAGE_SIZE);
+		rbuf_len = integrity_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf, PAGE_SIZE);
 		if (rbuf_len < 0) {
 			rc = rbuf_len;
 			break;
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index f51ad65c894d..20d220481025 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -119,6 +119,10 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
  */
 struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
 
+int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
+			  char *addr, unsigned long count);
+int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data);
+
 #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM		0
 #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MODULE	1
 #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA		2
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 65d543b2335ede80e5e66bc4f559f62db5f469bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2014 17:01:13 +0200
Subject: integrity: provide a function to load x509 certificate from the
 kernel

Provide the function to load x509 certificates from the kernel into the
integrity kernel keyring.

Changes in v2:
* configuration option removed
* function declared as '__init'

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/digsig.c    | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 security/integrity/integrity.h |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 4f643d1b34dd..5e3bd72b299a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
-#include <linux/rbtree.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/cred.h>
 #include <linux/key-type.h>
 #include <linux/digsig.h>
@@ -84,3 +84,37 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
 	}
 	return err;
 }
+
+int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, char *path)
+{
+	key_ref_t key;
+	char *data;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!keyring[id])
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	rc = integrity_read_file(path, &data);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring[id], 1),
+				   "asymmetric",
+				   NULL,
+				   data,
+				   rc,
+				   ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+				    KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
+				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED);
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(key);
+		pr_err("Problem loading X.509 certificate (%d): %s\n",
+		       rc, path);
+	} else {
+		pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s': %s\n",
+			  key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description, path);
+		key_ref_put(key);
+	}
+	kfree(data);
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 20d220481025..1057abbd31cd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 			    const char *digest, int digestlen);
 
 int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
+int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, char *path);
 #else
 
 static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
@@ -147,6 +148,7 @@ static inline int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From fd5f4e9054acbf4f22fac81a358baf3c27aa42ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2014 17:01:14 +0200
Subject: ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel

Define configuration option to load X509 certificate into the
IMA trusted kernel keyring. It implements ima_load_x509() hook
to load X509 certificate into the .ima trusted kernel keyring
from the root filesystem.

Changes in v3:
* use ima_policy_flag in ima_get_action()
  ima_load_x509 temporarily clears ima_policy_flag to disable
  appraisal to load key. Use it to skip appraisal rules.
* Key directory path changed to /etc/keys (Mimi)
* Expand IMA_LOAD_X509 Kconfig help

Changes in v2:
* added '__init'
* use ima_policy_flag to disable appraisal to load keys

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig    | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c  |  3 +--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/integrity.h    |  8 ++++++++
 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index e099875643c5..b0840f9a552f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -131,3 +131,21 @@ config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 	help
 	   This option requires that all keys added to the .ima
 	   keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring.
+
+config IMA_LOAD_X509
+	bool "Load X509 certificate onto the '.ima' trusted keyring"
+	depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	default n
+	help
+	   File signature verification is based on the public keys
+	   loaded on the .ima trusted keyring. These public keys are
+	   X509 certificates signed by a trusted key on the
+	   .system keyring.  This option enables X509 certificate
+	   loading from the kernel onto the '.ima' trusted keyring.
+
+config IMA_X509_PATH
+	string "IMA X509 certificate path"
+	depends on IMA_LOAD_X509
+	default "/etc/keys/x509_ima.der"
+	help
+	   This option defines IMA X509 certificate path.
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index a99eb6d4bc09..b0dc922d8be3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -173,8 +173,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
 {
 	int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE;
 
-	if (!ima_appraise)
-		flags &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
+	flags &= ima_policy_flag;
 
 	return ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask, flags);
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 9164fc8cac84..5e4c29d174ee 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -24,6 +24,12 @@
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 #include "ima.h"
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH
+#define IMA_X509_PATH	CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH
+#else
+#define IMA_X509_PATH	"/etc/keys/x509_ima.der"
+#endif
+
 /* name for boot aggregate entry */
 static const char *boot_aggregate_name = "boot_aggregate";
 int ima_used_chip;
@@ -91,6 +97,17 @@ err_out:
 	return result;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509
+void __init ima_load_x509(void)
+{
+	int unset_flags = ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE;
+
+	ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags;
+	integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, IMA_X509_PATH);
+	ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags;
+}
+#endif
+
 int __init ima_init(void)
 {
 	u8 pcr_i[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 1057abbd31cd..caa1f6ca72e9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -162,6 +162,14 @@ static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509
+void __init ima_load_x509(void);
+#else
+static inline void ima_load_x509(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT
 /* declarations */
 void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From c9cd2ce2bc6313aafa33f8e28d29a8690252f219 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2014 17:01:15 +0200
Subject: integrity: provide a hook to load keys when rootfs is ready

Keys can only be loaded once the rootfs is mounted. Initcalls
are not suitable for that. This patch defines a special hook
to load the x509 public keys onto the IMA keyring, before
attempting to access any file. The keys are required for
verifying the file's signature. The hook is called after the
root filesystem is mounted and before the kernel calls 'init'.

Changes in v3:
* added more explanation to the patch description (Mimi)

Changes in v2:
* Hook renamed as 'integrity_load_keys()' to handle both IMA and EVM
  keys by integrity subsystem.
* Hook patch moved after defining loading functions

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 include/linux/integrity.h |  6 ++++++
 init/main.c               |  6 +++++-
 security/integrity/iint.c | 11 +++++++++++
 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
index 83222cebd47b..c2d6082a1a4c 100644
--- a/include/linux/integrity.h
+++ b/include/linux/integrity.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ enum integrity_status {
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY
 extern struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode);
 extern void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
+extern void __init integrity_load_keys(void);
 
 #else
 static inline struct integrity_iint_cache *
@@ -36,5 +37,10 @@ static inline void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	return;
 }
+
+static inline void integrity_load_keys(void)
+{
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY */
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H */
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index e8ae1fef0908..2c1928d08b78 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
 #include <linux/context_tracking.h>
 #include <linux/random.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/integrity.h>
 
 #include <asm/io.h>
 #include <asm/bugs.h>
@@ -1026,8 +1027,11 @@ static noinline void __init kernel_init_freeable(void)
 	 * Ok, we have completed the initial bootup, and
 	 * we're essentially up and running. Get rid of the
 	 * initmem segments and start the user-mode stuff..
+	 *
+	 * rootfs is available now, try loading the public keys
+	 * and default modules
 	 */
 
-	/* rootfs is available now, try loading default modules */
+	integrity_load_keys();
 	load_default_modules();
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index dbee618526b6..df45640fbac6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -245,3 +245,14 @@ out:
 	fput(file);
 	return rc;
 }
+
+/*
+ * integrity_load_keys - load integrity keys hook
+ *
+ * Hooks is called from init/main.c:kernel_init_freeable()
+ * when rootfs is ready
+ */
+void __init integrity_load_keys(void)
+{
+	ima_load_x509();
+}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From c57782c13ecd7e7aca66cbf0139ad2a72317dc81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2014 17:01:16 +0200
Subject: ima: require signature based appraisal

This patch provides CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT kernel configuration
option to force IMA appraisal using signatures. This is useful, when EVM
key is not initialized yet and we want securely initialize integrity or
any other functionality.

It forces embedded policy to require signature. Signed initialization
script can initialize EVM key, update the IMA policy and change further
requirement of everything to be signed.

Changes in v3:
* kernel parameter fixed to configuration option in the patch description

Changes in v2:
* policy change of this patch separated from the key loading patch

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig      | 7 +++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index b0840f9a552f..b80a93ec1ccc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -149,3 +149,10 @@ config IMA_X509_PATH
 	default "/etc/keys/x509_ima.der"
 	help
 	   This option defines IMA X509 certificate path.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
+	bool "Require signed user-space initialization"
+	depends on IMA_LOAD_X509
+	default n
+	help
+	   This option requires user-space init to be signed.
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 0d14d2591805..d1eefb9d65fb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -100,7 +100,13 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
 	{.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
+#else
+	/* force signature */
+	{.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
+	 .flags = IMA_FOWNER | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+#endif
 };
 
 static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 6fb5032ebb1c5b852461d64ee33829081de8ca61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Nov 2014 17:01:17 +0200
Subject: VFS: refactor vfs_read()

integrity_kernel_read() duplicates the file read operations code
in vfs_read(). This patch refactors vfs_read() code creating a
helper function __vfs_read(). It is used by both vfs_read() and
integrity_kernel_read().

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 fs/read_write.c           | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------
 include/linux/fs.h        |  1 +
 security/integrity/iint.c | 10 +++-------
 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/fs/read_write.c b/fs/read_write.c
index 009d8542a889..f45b2ae5d5f1 100644
--- a/fs/read_write.c
+++ b/fs/read_write.c
@@ -412,6 +412,23 @@ ssize_t new_sync_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t *p
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(new_sync_read);
 
+ssize_t __vfs_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count,
+		   loff_t *pos)
+{
+	ssize_t ret;
+
+	if (file->f_op->read)
+		ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, pos);
+	else if (file->f_op->aio_read)
+		ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos);
+	else if (file->f_op->read_iter)
+		ret = new_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos);
+	else
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 ssize_t vfs_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *pos)
 {
 	ssize_t ret;
@@ -426,12 +443,7 @@ ssize_t vfs_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *pos)
 	ret = rw_verify_area(READ, file, pos, count);
 	if (ret >= 0) {
 		count = ret;
-		if (file->f_op->read)
-			ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, pos);
-		else if (file->f_op->aio_read)
-			ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos);
-		else
-			ret = new_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos);
+		ret = __vfs_read(file, buf, count, pos);
 		if (ret > 0) {
 			fsnotify_access(file);
 			add_rchar(current, ret);
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index e11d60cc867b..ac3a36e05da9 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -1527,6 +1527,7 @@ ssize_t rw_copy_check_uvector(int type, const struct iovec __user * uvector,
 			      struct iovec *fast_pointer,
 			      struct iovec **ret_pointer);
 
+extern ssize_t __vfs_read(struct file *, char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern ssize_t vfs_read(struct file *, char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern ssize_t vfs_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern ssize_t vfs_readv(struct file *, const struct iovec __user *,
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index df45640fbac6..dbb6d141c3db 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -184,20 +184,16 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
 {
 	mm_segment_t old_fs;
 	char __user *buf = (char __user *)addr;
-	ssize_t ret = -EINVAL;
+	ssize_t ret;
 
 	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
 		return -EBADF;
 
 	old_fs = get_fs();
 	set_fs(get_ds());
-	if (file->f_op->read)
-		ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, &offset);
-	else if (file->f_op->aio_read)
-		ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
-	else if (file->f_op->read_iter)
-		ret = new_sync_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
+	ret = __vfs_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
 	set_fs(old_fs);
+
 	return ret;
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3