From 596cf3fe5854fe2b1703b0466ed6bf9cfb83c91e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vishwanath Pai Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2016 21:49:00 +0100 Subject: netfilter: ipset: fix race condition in ipset save, swap and delete This fix adds a new reference counter (ref_netlink) for the struct ip_set. The other reference counter (ref) can be swapped out by ip_set_swap and we need a separate counter to keep track of references for netlink events like dump. Using the same ref counter for dump causes a race condition which can be demonstrated by the following script: ipset create hash_ip1 hash:ip family inet hashsize 1024 maxelem 500000 \ counters ipset create hash_ip2 hash:ip family inet hashsize 300000 maxelem 500000 \ counters ipset create hash_ip3 hash:ip family inet hashsize 1024 maxelem 500000 \ counters ipset save & ipset swap hash_ip3 hash_ip2 ipset destroy hash_ip3 /* will crash the machine */ Swap will exchange the values of ref so destroy will see ref = 0 instead of ref = 1. With this fix in place swap will not succeed because ipset save still has ref_netlink on the set (ip_set_swap doesn't swap ref_netlink). Both delete and swap will error out if ref_netlink != 0 on the set. Note: The changes to *_head functions is because previously we would increment ref whenever we called these functions, we don't do that anymore. Reviewed-by: Joshua Hunt Signed-off-by: Vishwanath Pai Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_gen.h | 2 +- net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_gen.h | 2 +- net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_list_set.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_gen.h b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_gen.h index b0bc475f641e..2e8e7e5fb4a6 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_gen.h +++ b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_gen.h @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ mtype_head(struct ip_set *set, struct sk_buff *skb) if (!nested) goto nla_put_failure; if (mtype_do_head(skb, map) || - nla_put_net32(skb, IPSET_ATTR_REFERENCES, htonl(set->ref - 1)) || + nla_put_net32(skb, IPSET_ATTR_REFERENCES, htonl(set->ref)) || nla_put_net32(skb, IPSET_ATTR_MEMSIZE, htonl(memsize))) goto nla_put_failure; if (unlikely(ip_set_put_flags(skb, set))) diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c index 7e6568cad494..a748b0c2c981 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c @@ -497,6 +497,26 @@ __ip_set_put(struct ip_set *set) write_unlock_bh(&ip_set_ref_lock); } +/* set->ref can be swapped out by ip_set_swap, netlink events (like dump) need + * a separate reference counter + */ +static inline void +__ip_set_get_netlink(struct ip_set *set) +{ + write_lock_bh(&ip_set_ref_lock); + set->ref_netlink++; + write_unlock_bh(&ip_set_ref_lock); +} + +static inline void +__ip_set_put_netlink(struct ip_set *set) +{ + write_lock_bh(&ip_set_ref_lock); + BUG_ON(set->ref_netlink == 0); + set->ref_netlink--; + write_unlock_bh(&ip_set_ref_lock); +} + /* Add, del and test set entries from kernel. * * The set behind the index must exist and must be referenced @@ -1002,7 +1022,7 @@ static int ip_set_destroy(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl, if (!attr[IPSET_ATTR_SETNAME]) { for (i = 0; i < inst->ip_set_max; i++) { s = ip_set(inst, i); - if (s && s->ref) { + if (s && (s->ref || s->ref_netlink)) { ret = -IPSET_ERR_BUSY; goto out; } @@ -1024,7 +1044,7 @@ static int ip_set_destroy(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl, if (!s) { ret = -ENOENT; goto out; - } else if (s->ref) { + } else if (s->ref || s->ref_netlink) { ret = -IPSET_ERR_BUSY; goto out; } @@ -1171,6 +1191,9 @@ static int ip_set_swap(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl, struct sk_buff *skb, from->family == to->family)) return -IPSET_ERR_TYPE_MISMATCH; + if (from->ref_netlink || to->ref_netlink) + return -EBUSY; + strncpy(from_name, from->name, IPSET_MAXNAMELEN); strncpy(from->name, to->name, IPSET_MAXNAMELEN); strncpy(to->name, from_name, IPSET_MAXNAMELEN); @@ -1206,7 +1229,7 @@ ip_set_dump_done(struct netlink_callback *cb) if (set->variant->uref) set->variant->uref(set, cb, false); pr_debug("release set %s\n", set->name); - __ip_set_put_byindex(inst, index); + __ip_set_put_netlink(set); } return 0; } @@ -1328,7 +1351,7 @@ dump_last: if (!cb->args[IPSET_CB_ARG0]) { /* Start listing: make sure set won't be destroyed */ pr_debug("reference set\n"); - set->ref++; + set->ref_netlink++; } write_unlock_bh(&ip_set_ref_lock); nlh = start_msg(skb, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid, @@ -1396,7 +1419,7 @@ release_refcount: if (set->variant->uref) set->variant->uref(set, cb, false); pr_debug("release set %s\n", set->name); - __ip_set_put_byindex(inst, index); + __ip_set_put_netlink(set); cb->args[IPSET_CB_ARG0] = 0; } out: diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_gen.h b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_gen.h index e5336ab36d67..d32fd6b036bf 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_gen.h +++ b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_gen.h @@ -1082,7 +1082,7 @@ mtype_head(struct ip_set *set, struct sk_buff *skb) if (nla_put_u32(skb, IPSET_ATTR_MARKMASK, h->markmask)) goto nla_put_failure; #endif - if (nla_put_net32(skb, IPSET_ATTR_REFERENCES, htonl(set->ref - 1)) || + if (nla_put_net32(skb, IPSET_ATTR_REFERENCES, htonl(set->ref)) || nla_put_net32(skb, IPSET_ATTR_MEMSIZE, htonl(memsize))) goto nla_put_failure; if (unlikely(ip_set_put_flags(skb, set))) diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_list_set.c b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_list_set.c index 24c6c1962aea..a2a89e4e0a14 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_list_set.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_list_set.c @@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ list_set_head(struct ip_set *set, struct sk_buff *skb) if (!nested) goto nla_put_failure; if (nla_put_net32(skb, IPSET_ATTR_SIZE, htonl(map->size)) || - nla_put_net32(skb, IPSET_ATTR_REFERENCES, htonl(set->ref - 1)) || + nla_put_net32(skb, IPSET_ATTR_REFERENCES, htonl(set->ref)) || nla_put_net32(skb, IPSET_ATTR_MEMSIZE, htonl(sizeof(*map) + n * set->dsize))) goto nla_put_failure; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5745b0be05a0f8ccbc92a36b69f3a6bc58e91954 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarno Rajahalme Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2016 11:15:19 -0700 Subject: openvswitch: Fix checking for new expected connections. OVS should call into CT NAT for packets of new expected connections only when the conntrack state is persisted with the 'commit' option to the OVS CT action. The test for this condition is doubly wrong, as the CT status field is ANDed with the bit number (IPS_EXPECTED_BIT) rather than the mask (IPS_EXPECTED), and due to the wrong assumption that the expected bit would apply only for the first (i.e., 'new') packet of a connection, while in fact the expected bit remains on for the lifetime of an expected connection. The 'ctinfo' value IP_CT_RELATED derived from the ct status can be used instead, as it is only ever applicable to the 'new' packets of the expected connection. Fixes: 05752523e565 ('openvswitch: Interface with NAT.') Reported-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Jarno Rajahalme Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/openvswitch/conntrack.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c index dc5eb29fe7d6..47f7c62761d2 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c @@ -664,11 +664,12 @@ static int ovs_ct_nat(struct net *net, struct sw_flow_key *key, /* Determine NAT type. * Check if the NAT type can be deduced from the tracked connection. - * Make sure expected traffic is NATted only when committing. + * Make sure new expected connections (IP_CT_RELATED) are NATted only + * when committing. */ if (info->nat & OVS_CT_NAT && ctinfo != IP_CT_NEW && ct->status & IPS_NAT_MASK && - (!(ct->status & IPS_EXPECTED_BIT) || info->commit)) { + (ctinfo != IP_CT_RELATED || info->commit)) { /* NAT an established or related connection like before. */ if (CTINFO2DIR(ctinfo) == IP_CT_DIR_REPLY) /* This is the REPLY direction for a connection -- cgit v1.2.3 From 99b7248e2ad57ca93ada10c6598affb267ffc99a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2016 14:33:45 +0100 Subject: openvswitch: call only into reachable nf-nat code The openvswitch code has gained support for calling into the nf-nat-ipv4/ipv6 modules, however those can be loadable modules in a configuration in which openvswitch is built-in, leading to link errors: net/built-in.o: In function `__ovs_ct_lookup': :(.text+0x2cc2c8): undefined reference to `nf_nat_icmp_reply_translation' :(.text+0x2cc66c): undefined reference to `nf_nat_icmpv6_reply_translation' The dependency on (!NF_NAT || NF_NAT) prevents similar issues, but NF_NAT is set to 'y' if any of the symbols selecting it are built-in, but the link error happens when any of them are modular. A second issue is that even if CONFIG_NF_NAT_IPV6 is built-in, CONFIG_NF_NAT_IPV4 might be completely disabled. This is unlikely to be useful in practice, but the driver currently only handles IPv6 being optional. This patch improves the Kconfig dependency so that openvswitch cannot be built-in if either of the two other symbols are set to 'm', and it replaces the incorrect #ifdef in ovs_ct_nat_execute() with two "if (IS_ENABLED())" checks that should catch all corner cases also make the code more readable. The same #ifdef exists ovs_ct_nat_to_attr(), where it does not cause a link error, but for consistency I'm changing it the same way. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Fixes: 05752523e565 ("openvswitch: Interface with NAT.") Acked-by: Joe Stringer Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/openvswitch/Kconfig | 4 +++- net/openvswitch/conntrack.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/openvswitch/Kconfig b/net/openvswitch/Kconfig index 234a73344c6e..ce947292ae77 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/Kconfig +++ b/net/openvswitch/Kconfig @@ -7,7 +7,9 @@ config OPENVSWITCH depends on INET depends on !NF_CONNTRACK || \ (NF_CONNTRACK && ((!NF_DEFRAG_IPV6 || NF_DEFRAG_IPV6) && \ - (!NF_NAT || NF_NAT))) + (!NF_NAT || NF_NAT) && \ + (!NF_NAT_IPV4 || NF_NAT_IPV4) && \ + (!NF_NAT_IPV6 || NF_NAT_IPV6))) select LIBCRC32C select MPLS select NET_MPLS_GSO diff --git a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c index 47f7c62761d2..3797879b0bf8 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c @@ -535,14 +535,15 @@ static int ovs_ct_nat_execute(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nf_conn *ct, switch (ctinfo) { case IP_CT_RELATED: case IP_CT_RELATED_REPLY: - if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP) && + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT_IPV4) && + skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP) && ip_hdr(skb)->protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP) { if (!nf_nat_icmp_reply_translation(skb, ct, ctinfo, hooknum)) err = NF_DROP; goto push; -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT_IPV6) - } else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { + } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT_IPV6) && + skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { __be16 frag_off; u8 nexthdr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->nexthdr; int hdrlen = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, @@ -557,7 +558,6 @@ static int ovs_ct_nat_execute(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nf_conn *ct, err = NF_DROP; goto push; } -#endif } /* Non-ICMP, fall thru to initialize if needed. */ case IP_CT_NEW: @@ -1239,7 +1239,8 @@ static bool ovs_ct_nat_to_attr(const struct ovs_conntrack_info *info, } if (info->range.flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_MAP_IPS) { - if (info->family == NFPROTO_IPV4) { + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT_IPV4) && + info->family == NFPROTO_IPV4) { if (nla_put_in_addr(skb, OVS_NAT_ATTR_IP_MIN, info->range.min_addr.ip) || (info->range.max_addr.ip @@ -1247,8 +1248,8 @@ static bool ovs_ct_nat_to_attr(const struct ovs_conntrack_info *info, (nla_put_in_addr(skb, OVS_NAT_ATTR_IP_MAX, info->range.max_addr.ip)))) return false; -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT_IPV6) - } else if (info->family == NFPROTO_IPV6) { + } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT_IPV6) && + info->family == NFPROTO_IPV6) { if (nla_put_in6_addr(skb, OVS_NAT_ATTR_IP_MIN, &info->range.min_addr.in6) || (memcmp(&info->range.max_addr.in6, @@ -1257,7 +1258,6 @@ static bool ovs_ct_nat_to_attr(const struct ovs_conntrack_info *info, (nla_put_in6_addr(skb, OVS_NAT_ATTR_IP_MAX, &info->range.max_addr.in6)))) return false; -#endif } else { return false; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From bdf533de6968e9686df777dc178486f600c6e617 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2016 18:02:49 +0100 Subject: netfilter: x_tables: validate e->target_offset early We should check that e->target_offset is sane before mark_source_chains gets called since it will fetch the target entry for loop detection. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 17 ++++++++--------- net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 17 ++++++++--------- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 17 ++++++++--------- 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c index bf081927e06b..830bbe8ec13d 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c @@ -474,14 +474,12 @@ next: return 1; } -static inline int check_entry(const struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name) +static inline int check_entry(const struct arpt_entry *e) { const struct xt_entry_target *t; - if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp)) { - duprintf("arp_tables: arp check failed %p %s.\n", e, name); + if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp)) return -EINVAL; - } if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) > e->next_offset) return -EINVAL; @@ -522,10 +520,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name, unsigned int size) struct xt_target *target; int ret; - ret = check_entry(e, name); - if (ret) - return ret; - e->counters.pcnt = xt_percpu_counter_alloc(); if (IS_ERR_VALUE(e->counters.pcnt)) return -ENOMEM; @@ -576,6 +570,7 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e, unsigned int valid_hooks) { unsigned int h; + int err; if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 || (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit) { @@ -590,6 +585,10 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e, return -EINVAL; } + err = check_entry(e); + if (err) + return err; + /* Check hooks & underflows */ for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) { if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h))) @@ -1246,7 +1245,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e, } /* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */ - ret = check_entry((struct arpt_entry *)e, name); + ret = check_entry((struct arpt_entry *)e); if (ret) return ret; diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c index e53f8d6f326d..1d72a3c4a7e7 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c @@ -569,14 +569,12 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net) } static int -check_entry(const struct ipt_entry *e, const char *name) +check_entry(const struct ipt_entry *e) { const struct xt_entry_target *t; - if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip)) { - duprintf("ip check failed %p %s.\n", e, name); + if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip)) return -EINVAL; - } if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) > e->next_offset) @@ -666,10 +664,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct ipt_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name, struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar; struct xt_entry_match *ematch; - ret = check_entry(e, name); - if (ret) - return ret; - e->counters.pcnt = xt_percpu_counter_alloc(); if (IS_ERR_VALUE(e->counters.pcnt)) return -ENOMEM; @@ -741,6 +735,7 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e, unsigned int valid_hooks) { unsigned int h; + int err; if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 || (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit) { @@ -755,6 +750,10 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e, return -EINVAL; } + err = check_entry(e); + if (err) + return err; + /* Check hooks & underflows */ for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) { if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h))) @@ -1506,7 +1505,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e, } /* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */ - ret = check_entry((struct ipt_entry *)e, name); + ret = check_entry((struct ipt_entry *)e); if (ret) return ret; diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c index 84f9baf7aee8..26a5ad1cc4fd 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c @@ -581,14 +581,12 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net) } static int -check_entry(const struct ip6t_entry *e, const char *name) +check_entry(const struct ip6t_entry *e) { const struct xt_entry_target *t; - if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6)) { - duprintf("ip_tables: ip check failed %p %s.\n", e, name); + if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6)) return -EINVAL; - } if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) > e->next_offset) @@ -679,10 +677,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct ip6t_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name, struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar; struct xt_entry_match *ematch; - ret = check_entry(e, name); - if (ret) - return ret; - e->counters.pcnt = xt_percpu_counter_alloc(); if (IS_ERR_VALUE(e->counters.pcnt)) return -ENOMEM; @@ -753,6 +747,7 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e, unsigned int valid_hooks) { unsigned int h; + int err; if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ip6t_entry) != 0 || (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit) { @@ -767,6 +762,10 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e, return -EINVAL; } + err = check_entry(e); + if (err) + return err; + /* Check hooks & underflows */ for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) { if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h))) @@ -1518,7 +1517,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e, } /* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */ - ret = check_entry((struct ip6t_entry *)e, name); + ret = check_entry((struct ip6t_entry *)e); if (ret) return ret; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6e94e0cfb0887e4013b3b930fa6ab1fe6bb6ba91 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2016 18:02:50 +0100 Subject: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 6 ++++-- net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 6 ++++-- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 6 ++++-- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c index 830bbe8ec13d..51d4fe56b807 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c @@ -573,7 +573,8 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e, int err; if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 || - (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit) { + (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit || + (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) { duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e); return -EINVAL; } @@ -1232,7 +1233,8 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e, duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e); if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_arpt_entry) != 0 || - (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) >= limit) { + (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) >= limit || + (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) { duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit); return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c index 1d72a3c4a7e7..fb7694e6663e 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c @@ -738,7 +738,8 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e, int err; if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 || - (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit) { + (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit || + (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) { duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e); return -EINVAL; } @@ -1492,7 +1493,8 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e, duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e); if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ipt_entry) != 0 || - (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) >= limit) { + (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) >= limit || + (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) { duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit); return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c index 26a5ad1cc4fd..b248528f2a17 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c @@ -750,7 +750,8 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e, int err; if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ip6t_entry) != 0 || - (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit) { + (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit || + (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) { duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e); return -EINVAL; } @@ -1504,7 +1505,8 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e, duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e); if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ip6t_entry) != 0 || - (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) >= limit) { + (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) >= limit || + (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) { duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit); return -EINVAL; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 54d83fc74aa9ec72794373cb47432c5f7fb1a309 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2016 18:02:52 +0100 Subject: netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper Ben Hawkes says: In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a counter value at the supplied offset. Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called -- the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP. However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies. It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching. However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches (no -m args). The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule. Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'. Reported-by: Ben Hawkes Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 18 +++++++++--------- net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 23 +++++++++++------------ net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 23 +++++++++++------------ 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c index 51d4fe56b807..a1bb5e7129a2 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c @@ -359,11 +359,12 @@ unsigned int arpt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb, } /* All zeroes == unconditional rule. */ -static inline bool unconditional(const struct arpt_arp *arp) +static inline bool unconditional(const struct arpt_entry *e) { static const struct arpt_arp uncond; - return memcmp(arp, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0; + return e->target_offset == sizeof(struct arpt_entry) && + memcmp(&e->arp, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0; } /* Figures out from what hook each rule can be called: returns 0 if @@ -402,11 +403,10 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo, |= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS)); /* Unconditional return/END. */ - if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct arpt_entry) && + if ((unconditional(e) && (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) && - t->verdict < 0 && unconditional(&e->arp)) || - visited) { + t->verdict < 0) || visited) { unsigned int oldpos, size; if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, @@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ static bool check_underflow(const struct arpt_entry *e) const struct xt_entry_target *t; unsigned int verdict; - if (!unconditional(&e->arp)) + if (!unconditional(e)) return false; t = arpt_get_target_c(e); if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0) @@ -598,9 +598,9 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e, newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h]; if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) { if (!check_underflow(e)) { - pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and " - "use the STANDARD target with " - "ACCEPT/DROP\n"); + pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and " + "use the STANDARD target with " + "ACCEPT/DROP\n"); return -EINVAL; } newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h]; diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c index fb7694e6663e..89b5d959eda3 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c @@ -168,11 +168,12 @@ get_entry(const void *base, unsigned int offset) /* All zeroes == unconditional rule. */ /* Mildly perf critical (only if packet tracing is on) */ -static inline bool unconditional(const struct ipt_ip *ip) +static inline bool unconditional(const struct ipt_entry *e) { static const struct ipt_ip uncond; - return memcmp(ip, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0; + return e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) && + memcmp(&e->ip, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0; #undef FWINV } @@ -229,11 +230,10 @@ get_chainname_rulenum(const struct ipt_entry *s, const struct ipt_entry *e, } else if (s == e) { (*rulenum)++; - if (s->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) && + if (unconditional(s) && strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 && - t->verdict < 0 && - unconditional(&s->ip)) { + t->verdict < 0) { /* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */ *comment = *chainname == hookname ? comments[NF_IP_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY] @@ -476,11 +476,10 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo, e->comefrom |= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS)); /* Unconditional return/END. */ - if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) && + if ((unconditional(e) && (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) && - t->verdict < 0 && unconditional(&e->ip)) || - visited) { + t->verdict < 0) || visited) { unsigned int oldpos, size; if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, @@ -715,7 +714,7 @@ static bool check_underflow(const struct ipt_entry *e) const struct xt_entry_target *t; unsigned int verdict; - if (!unconditional(&e->ip)) + if (!unconditional(e)) return false; t = ipt_get_target_c(e); if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0) @@ -763,9 +762,9 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e, newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h]; if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) { if (!check_underflow(e)) { - pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and " - "use the STANDARD target with " - "ACCEPT/DROP\n"); + pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and " + "use the STANDARD target with " + "ACCEPT/DROP\n"); return -EINVAL; } newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h]; diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c index b248528f2a17..541b59f83595 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c @@ -198,11 +198,12 @@ get_entry(const void *base, unsigned int offset) /* All zeroes == unconditional rule. */ /* Mildly perf critical (only if packet tracing is on) */ -static inline bool unconditional(const struct ip6t_ip6 *ipv6) +static inline bool unconditional(const struct ip6t_entry *e) { static const struct ip6t_ip6 uncond; - return memcmp(ipv6, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0; + return e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) && + memcmp(&e->ipv6, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0; } static inline const struct xt_entry_target * @@ -258,11 +259,10 @@ get_chainname_rulenum(const struct ip6t_entry *s, const struct ip6t_entry *e, } else if (s == e) { (*rulenum)++; - if (s->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) && + if (unconditional(s) && strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 && - t->verdict < 0 && - unconditional(&s->ipv6)) { + t->verdict < 0) { /* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */ *comment = *chainname == hookname ? comments[NF_IP6_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY] @@ -488,11 +488,10 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo, e->comefrom |= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS)); /* Unconditional return/END. */ - if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) && + if ((unconditional(e) && (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) && - t->verdict < 0 && - unconditional(&e->ipv6)) || visited) { + t->verdict < 0) || visited) { unsigned int oldpos, size; if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, @@ -727,7 +726,7 @@ static bool check_underflow(const struct ip6t_entry *e) const struct xt_entry_target *t; unsigned int verdict; - if (!unconditional(&e->ipv6)) + if (!unconditional(e)) return false; t = ip6t_get_target_c(e); if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0) @@ -775,9 +774,9 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e, newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h]; if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) { if (!check_underflow(e)) { - pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and " - "use the STANDARD target with " - "ACCEPT/DROP\n"); + pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and " + "use the STANDARD target with " + "ACCEPT/DROP\n"); return -EINVAL; } newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h]; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 931401137f60fc299256bbc221c0b756be31c32c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2016 12:58:01 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: honor NFQA_CFG_F_FAIL_OPEN when netlink unicast fails When netlink unicast fails to deliver the message to userspace, we should also check if the NFQA_CFG_F_FAIL_OPEN flag is set so we reinject the packet back to the stack. I think the user expects no packet drops when this flag is set due to queueing to userspace errors, no matter if related to the internal queue or when sending the netlink message to userspace. The userspace application will still get the ENOBUFS error via recvmsg() so the user still knows that, with the current configuration that is in place, the userspace application is not consuming the messages at the pace that the kernel needs. Reported-by: "Yigal Reiss (yreiss)" Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Tested-by: "Yigal Reiss (yreiss)" --- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c index 75429997ed41..cb5b630a645b 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c @@ -582,7 +582,12 @@ __nfqnl_enqueue_packet(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, /* nfnetlink_unicast will either free the nskb or add it to a socket */ err = nfnetlink_unicast(nskb, net, queue->peer_portid, MSG_DONTWAIT); if (err < 0) { - queue->queue_user_dropped++; + if (queue->flags & NFQA_CFG_F_FAIL_OPEN) { + failopen = 1; + err = 0; + } else { + queue->queue_user_dropped++; + } goto err_out_unlock; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From b301f2538759933cf9ff1f7c4f968da72e3f0757 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2016 21:29:53 +0100 Subject: netfilter: x_tables: enforce nul-terminated table name from getsockopt GET_ENTRIES Make sure the table names via getsockopt GET_ENTRIES is nul-terminated in ebtables and all the x_tables variants and their respective compat code. Uncovered by KASAN. Reported-by: Baozeng Ding Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 4 ++++ net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 2 ++ net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 2 ++ net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c index 67b2e27999aa..8570bc7744c2 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c @@ -1521,6 +1521,8 @@ static int do_ebt_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len) if (copy_from_user(&tmp, user, sizeof(tmp))) return -EFAULT; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name) - 1] = '\0'; + t = find_table_lock(net, tmp.name, &ret, &ebt_mutex); if (!t) return ret; @@ -2332,6 +2334,8 @@ static int compat_do_ebt_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, if (copy_from_user(&tmp, user, sizeof(tmp))) return -EFAULT; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name) - 1] = '\0'; + t = find_table_lock(net, tmp.name, &ret, &ebt_mutex); if (!t) return ret; diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c index a1bb5e7129a2..4133b0f513af 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c @@ -969,6 +969,7 @@ static int get_entries(struct net *net, struct arpt_get_entries __user *uptr, sizeof(struct arpt_get_entries) + get.size); return -EINVAL; } + get.name[sizeof(get.name) - 1] = '\0'; t = xt_find_table_lock(net, NFPROTO_ARP, get.name); if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(t)) { @@ -1663,6 +1664,7 @@ static int compat_get_entries(struct net *net, *len, sizeof(get) + get.size); return -EINVAL; } + get.name[sizeof(get.name) - 1] = '\0'; xt_compat_lock(NFPROTO_ARP); t = xt_find_table_lock(net, NFPROTO_ARP, get.name); diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c index 89b5d959eda3..631c100a1338 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c @@ -1156,6 +1156,7 @@ get_entries(struct net *net, struct ipt_get_entries __user *uptr, *len, sizeof(get) + get.size); return -EINVAL; } + get.name[sizeof(get.name) - 1] = '\0'; t = xt_find_table_lock(net, AF_INET, get.name); if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(t)) { @@ -1935,6 +1936,7 @@ compat_get_entries(struct net *net, struct compat_ipt_get_entries __user *uptr, *len, sizeof(get) + get.size); return -EINVAL; } + get.name[sizeof(get.name) - 1] = '\0'; xt_compat_lock(AF_INET); t = xt_find_table_lock(net, AF_INET, get.name); diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c index 541b59f83595..86b67b70b626 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c @@ -1168,6 +1168,7 @@ get_entries(struct net *net, struct ip6t_get_entries __user *uptr, *len, sizeof(get) + get.size); return -EINVAL; } + get.name[sizeof(get.name) - 1] = '\0'; t = xt_find_table_lock(net, AF_INET6, get.name); if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(t)) { @@ -1944,6 +1945,7 @@ compat_get_entries(struct net *net, struct compat_ip6t_get_entries __user *uptr, *len, sizeof(get) + get.size); return -EINVAL; } + get.name[sizeof(get.name) - 1] = '\0'; xt_compat_lock(AF_INET6); t = xt_find_table_lock(net, AF_INET6, get.name); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 29421198c3a860092e27c2ad8499dfe603398817 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liping Zhang Date: Sat, 26 Mar 2016 16:32:57 +0800 Subject: netfilter: ipv4: fix NULL dereference Commit fa50d974d104 ("ipv4: Namespaceify ip_default_ttl sysctl knob") use sock_net(skb->sk) to get the net namespace, but we can't assume that sk_buff->sk is always exist, so when it is NULL, oops will happen. Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/bridge/netfilter/nft_reject_bridge.c | 20 ++++++------ net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_SYNPROXY.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++--------------- 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/nft_reject_bridge.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/nft_reject_bridge.c index adc8d7221dbb..77f7e7a9ebe1 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/nft_reject_bridge.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/nft_reject_bridge.c @@ -40,7 +40,8 @@ static void nft_reject_br_push_etherhdr(struct sk_buff *oldskb, /* We cannot use oldskb->dev, it can be either bridge device (NF_BRIDGE INPUT) * or the bridge port (NF_BRIDGE PREROUTING). */ -static void nft_reject_br_send_v4_tcp_reset(struct sk_buff *oldskb, +static void nft_reject_br_send_v4_tcp_reset(struct net *net, + struct sk_buff *oldskb, const struct net_device *dev, int hook) { @@ -48,7 +49,6 @@ static void nft_reject_br_send_v4_tcp_reset(struct sk_buff *oldskb, struct iphdr *niph; const struct tcphdr *oth; struct tcphdr _oth; - struct net *net = sock_net(oldskb->sk); if (!nft_bridge_iphdr_validate(oldskb)) return; @@ -75,7 +75,8 @@ static void nft_reject_br_send_v4_tcp_reset(struct sk_buff *oldskb, br_deliver(br_port_get_rcu(dev), nskb); } -static void nft_reject_br_send_v4_unreach(struct sk_buff *oldskb, +static void nft_reject_br_send_v4_unreach(struct net *net, + struct sk_buff *oldskb, const struct net_device *dev, int hook, u8 code) { @@ -86,7 +87,6 @@ static void nft_reject_br_send_v4_unreach(struct sk_buff *oldskb, void *payload; __wsum csum; u8 proto; - struct net *net = sock_net(oldskb->sk); if (oldskb->csum_bad || !nft_bridge_iphdr_validate(oldskb)) return; @@ -273,17 +273,17 @@ static void nft_reject_bridge_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, case htons(ETH_P_IP): switch (priv->type) { case NFT_REJECT_ICMP_UNREACH: - nft_reject_br_send_v4_unreach(pkt->skb, pkt->in, - pkt->hook, + nft_reject_br_send_v4_unreach(pkt->net, pkt->skb, + pkt->in, pkt->hook, priv->icmp_code); break; case NFT_REJECT_TCP_RST: - nft_reject_br_send_v4_tcp_reset(pkt->skb, pkt->in, - pkt->hook); + nft_reject_br_send_v4_tcp_reset(pkt->net, pkt->skb, + pkt->in, pkt->hook); break; case NFT_REJECT_ICMPX_UNREACH: - nft_reject_br_send_v4_unreach(pkt->skb, pkt->in, - pkt->hook, + nft_reject_br_send_v4_unreach(pkt->net, pkt->skb, + pkt->in, pkt->hook, nft_reject_icmp_code(priv->icmp_code)); break; } diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_SYNPROXY.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_SYNPROXY.c index 7b8fbb352877..db5b87509446 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_SYNPROXY.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_SYNPROXY.c @@ -18,10 +18,10 @@ #include static struct iphdr * -synproxy_build_ip(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 saddr, __be32 daddr) +synproxy_build_ip(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 saddr, + __be32 daddr) { struct iphdr *iph; - struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk); skb_reset_network_header(skb); iph = (struct iphdr *)skb_put(skb, sizeof(*iph)); @@ -40,14 +40,12 @@ synproxy_build_ip(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 saddr, __be32 daddr) } static void -synproxy_send_tcp(const struct synproxy_net *snet, +synproxy_send_tcp(struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff *nskb, struct nf_conntrack *nfct, enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo, struct iphdr *niph, struct tcphdr *nth, unsigned int tcp_hdr_size) { - struct net *net = nf_ct_net(snet->tmpl); - nth->check = ~tcp_v4_check(tcp_hdr_size, niph->saddr, niph->daddr, 0); nskb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL; nskb->csum_start = (unsigned char *)nth - nskb->head; @@ -72,7 +70,7 @@ free_nskb: } static void -synproxy_send_client_synack(const struct synproxy_net *snet, +synproxy_send_client_synack(struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tcphdr *th, const struct synproxy_options *opts) { @@ -91,7 +89,7 @@ synproxy_send_client_synack(const struct synproxy_net *snet, return; skb_reserve(nskb, MAX_TCP_HEADER); - niph = synproxy_build_ip(nskb, iph->daddr, iph->saddr); + niph = synproxy_build_ip(net, nskb, iph->daddr, iph->saddr); skb_reset_transport_header(nskb); nth = (struct tcphdr *)skb_put(nskb, tcp_hdr_size); @@ -109,15 +107,16 @@ synproxy_send_client_synack(const struct synproxy_net *snet, synproxy_build_options(nth, opts); - synproxy_send_tcp(snet, skb, nskb, skb->nfct, IP_CT_ESTABLISHED_REPLY, + synproxy_send_tcp(net, skb, nskb, skb->nfct, IP_CT_ESTABLISHED_REPLY, niph, nth, tcp_hdr_size); } static void -synproxy_send_server_syn(const struct synproxy_net *snet, +synproxy_send_server_syn(struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tcphdr *th, const struct synproxy_options *opts, u32 recv_seq) { + struct synproxy_net *snet = synproxy_pernet(net); struct sk_buff *nskb; struct iphdr *iph, *niph; struct tcphdr *nth; @@ -132,7 +131,7 @@ synproxy_send_server_syn(const struct synproxy_net *snet, return; skb_reserve(nskb, MAX_TCP_HEADER); - niph = synproxy_build_ip(nskb, iph->saddr, iph->daddr); + niph = synproxy_build_ip(net, nskb, iph->saddr, iph->daddr); skb_reset_transport_header(nskb); nth = (struct tcphdr *)skb_put(nskb, tcp_hdr_size); @@ -153,12 +152,12 @@ synproxy_send_server_syn(const struct synproxy_net *snet, synproxy_build_options(nth, opts); - synproxy_send_tcp(snet, skb, nskb, &snet->tmpl->ct_general, IP_CT_NEW, + synproxy_send_tcp(net, skb, nskb, &snet->tmpl->ct_general, IP_CT_NEW, niph, nth, tcp_hdr_size); } static void -synproxy_send_server_ack(const struct synproxy_net *snet, +synproxy_send_server_ack(struct net *net, const struct ip_ct_tcp *state, const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tcphdr *th, const struct synproxy_options *opts) @@ -177,7 +176,7 @@ synproxy_send_server_ack(const struct synproxy_net *snet, return; skb_reserve(nskb, MAX_TCP_HEADER); - niph = synproxy_build_ip(nskb, iph->daddr, iph->saddr); + niph = synproxy_build_ip(net, nskb, iph->daddr, iph->saddr); skb_reset_transport_header(nskb); nth = (struct tcphdr *)skb_put(nskb, tcp_hdr_size); @@ -193,11 +192,11 @@ synproxy_send_server_ack(const struct synproxy_net *snet, synproxy_build_options(nth, opts); - synproxy_send_tcp(snet, skb, nskb, NULL, 0, niph, nth, tcp_hdr_size); + synproxy_send_tcp(net, skb, nskb, NULL, 0, niph, nth, tcp_hdr_size); } static void -synproxy_send_client_ack(const struct synproxy_net *snet, +synproxy_send_client_ack(struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tcphdr *th, const struct synproxy_options *opts) { @@ -215,7 +214,7 @@ synproxy_send_client_ack(const struct synproxy_net *snet, return; skb_reserve(nskb, MAX_TCP_HEADER); - niph = synproxy_build_ip(nskb, iph->saddr, iph->daddr); + niph = synproxy_build_ip(net, nskb, iph->saddr, iph->daddr); skb_reset_transport_header(nskb); nth = (struct tcphdr *)skb_put(nskb, tcp_hdr_size); @@ -231,15 +230,16 @@ synproxy_send_client_ack(const struct synproxy_net *snet, synproxy_build_options(nth, opts); - synproxy_send_tcp(snet, skb, nskb, skb->nfct, IP_CT_ESTABLISHED_REPLY, + synproxy_send_tcp(net, skb, nskb, skb->nfct, IP_CT_ESTABLISHED_REPLY, niph, nth, tcp_hdr_size); } static bool -synproxy_recv_client_ack(const struct synproxy_net *snet, +synproxy_recv_client_ack(struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tcphdr *th, struct synproxy_options *opts, u32 recv_seq) { + struct synproxy_net *snet = synproxy_pernet(net); int mss; mss = __cookie_v4_check(ip_hdr(skb), th, ntohl(th->ack_seq) - 1); @@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ synproxy_recv_client_ack(const struct synproxy_net *snet, if (opts->options & XT_SYNPROXY_OPT_TIMESTAMP) synproxy_check_timestamp_cookie(opts); - synproxy_send_server_syn(snet, skb, th, opts, recv_seq); + synproxy_send_server_syn(net, skb, th, opts, recv_seq); return true; } @@ -263,7 +263,8 @@ static unsigned int synproxy_tg4(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) { const struct xt_synproxy_info *info = par->targinfo; - struct synproxy_net *snet = synproxy_pernet(par->net); + struct net *net = par->net; + struct synproxy_net *snet = synproxy_pernet(net); struct synproxy_options opts = {}; struct tcphdr *th, _th; @@ -292,12 +293,12 @@ synproxy_tg4(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) XT_SYNPROXY_OPT_SACK_PERM | XT_SYNPROXY_OPT_ECN); - synproxy_send_client_synack(snet, skb, th, &opts); + synproxy_send_client_synack(net, skb, th, &opts); return NF_DROP; } else if (th->ack && !(th->fin || th->rst || th->syn)) { /* ACK from client */ - synproxy_recv_client_ack(snet, skb, th, &opts, ntohl(th->seq)); + synproxy_recv_client_ack(net, skb, th, &opts, ntohl(th->seq)); return NF_DROP; } @@ -308,7 +309,8 @@ static unsigned int ipv4_synproxy_hook(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *nhs) { - struct synproxy_net *snet = synproxy_pernet(nhs->net); + struct net *net = nhs->net; + struct synproxy_net *snet = synproxy_pernet(net); enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; struct nf_conn *ct; struct nf_conn_synproxy *synproxy; @@ -365,7 +367,7 @@ static unsigned int ipv4_synproxy_hook(void *priv, * therefore we need to add 1 to make the SYN sequence * number match the one of first SYN. */ - if (synproxy_recv_client_ack(snet, skb, th, &opts, + if (synproxy_recv_client_ack(net, skb, th, &opts, ntohl(th->seq) + 1)) this_cpu_inc(snet->stats->cookie_retrans); @@ -391,12 +393,12 @@ static unsigned int ipv4_synproxy_hook(void *priv, XT_SYNPROXY_OPT_SACK_PERM); swap(opts.tsval, opts.tsecr); - synproxy_send_server_ack(snet, state, skb, th, &opts); + synproxy_send_server_ack(net, state, skb, th, &opts); nf_ct_seqadj_init(ct, ctinfo, synproxy->isn - ntohl(th->seq)); swap(opts.tsval, opts.tsecr); - synproxy_send_client_ack(snet, skb, th, &opts); + synproxy_send_client_ack(net, skb, th, &opts); consume_skb(skb); return NF_STOLEN; -- cgit v1.2.3