From 61c581a46a9668747d355436bd4b2505594539bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2022 20:22:57 +0100 Subject: crypto: move gf128mul library into lib/crypto The gf128mul library does not depend on the crypto API at all, so it can be moved into lib/crypto. This will allow us to use it in other library code in a subsequent patch without having to depend on CONFIG_CRYPTO. While at it, change the Kconfig symbol name to align with other crypto library implementations. However, the source file name is retained, as it is reflected in the module .ko filename, and changing this might break things for users. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu --- lib/crypto/Kconfig | 3 + lib/crypto/Makefile | 2 + lib/crypto/gf128mul.c | 416 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 421 insertions(+) create mode 100644 lib/crypto/gf128mul.c (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/crypto/Kconfig b/lib/crypto/Kconfig index 7e9683e9f5c6..6767d86959de 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/lib/crypto/Kconfig @@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_AES config CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4 tristate +config CRYPTO_LIB_GF128MUL + tristate + config CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S bool help diff --git a/lib/crypto/Makefile b/lib/crypto/Makefile index c852f067ab06..7000eeb72286 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/Makefile +++ b/lib/crypto/Makefile @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ libaes-y := aes.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4) += libarc4.o libarc4-y := arc4.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_GF128MUL) += gf128mul.o + # blake2s is used by the /dev/random driver which is always builtin obj-y += libblake2s.o libblake2s-y := blake2s.o diff --git a/lib/crypto/gf128mul.c b/lib/crypto/gf128mul.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a69ae3e6c16c --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/crypto/gf128mul.c @@ -0,0 +1,416 @@ +/* gf128mul.c - GF(2^128) multiplication functions + * + * Copyright (c) 2003, Dr Brian Gladman, Worcester, UK. + * Copyright (c) 2006, Rik Snel + * + * Based on Dr Brian Gladman's (GPL'd) work published at + * http://gladman.plushost.co.uk/oldsite/cryptography_technology/index.php + * See the original copyright notice below. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it + * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free + * Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option) + * any later version. + */ + +/* + --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + Copyright (c) 2003, Dr Brian Gladman, Worcester, UK. All rights reserved. + + LICENSE TERMS + + The free distribution and use of this software in both source and binary + form is allowed (with or without changes) provided that: + + 1. distributions of this source code include the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer; + + 2. distributions in binary form include the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer + in the documentation and/or other associated materials; + + 3. the copyright holder's name is not used to endorse products + built using this software without specific written permission. + + ALTERNATIVELY, provided that this notice is retained in full, this product + may be distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License (GPL), + in which case the provisions of the GPL apply INSTEAD OF those given above. + + DISCLAIMER + + This software is provided 'as is' with no explicit or implied warranties + in respect of its properties, including, but not limited to, correctness + and/or fitness for purpose. + --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + Issue 31/01/2006 + + This file provides fast multiplication in GF(2^128) as required by several + cryptographic authentication modes +*/ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define gf128mul_dat(q) { \ + q(0x00), q(0x01), q(0x02), q(0x03), q(0x04), q(0x05), q(0x06), q(0x07),\ + q(0x08), q(0x09), q(0x0a), q(0x0b), q(0x0c), q(0x0d), q(0x0e), q(0x0f),\ + q(0x10), q(0x11), q(0x12), q(0x13), q(0x14), q(0x15), q(0x16), q(0x17),\ + q(0x18), q(0x19), q(0x1a), q(0x1b), q(0x1c), q(0x1d), q(0x1e), q(0x1f),\ + q(0x20), q(0x21), q(0x22), q(0x23), q(0x24), q(0x25), q(0x26), q(0x27),\ + q(0x28), q(0x29), q(0x2a), q(0x2b), q(0x2c), q(0x2d), q(0x2e), q(0x2f),\ + q(0x30), q(0x31), q(0x32), q(0x33), q(0x34), q(0x35), q(0x36), q(0x37),\ + q(0x38), q(0x39), q(0x3a), q(0x3b), q(0x3c), q(0x3d), q(0x3e), q(0x3f),\ + q(0x40), q(0x41), q(0x42), q(0x43), q(0x44), q(0x45), q(0x46), q(0x47),\ + q(0x48), q(0x49), q(0x4a), q(0x4b), q(0x4c), q(0x4d), q(0x4e), q(0x4f),\ + q(0x50), q(0x51), q(0x52), q(0x53), q(0x54), q(0x55), q(0x56), q(0x57),\ + q(0x58), q(0x59), q(0x5a), q(0x5b), q(0x5c), q(0x5d), q(0x5e), q(0x5f),\ + q(0x60), q(0x61), q(0x62), q(0x63), q(0x64), q(0x65), q(0x66), q(0x67),\ + q(0x68), q(0x69), q(0x6a), q(0x6b), q(0x6c), q(0x6d), q(0x6e), q(0x6f),\ + q(0x70), q(0x71), q(0x72), q(0x73), q(0x74), q(0x75), q(0x76), q(0x77),\ + q(0x78), q(0x79), q(0x7a), q(0x7b), q(0x7c), q(0x7d), q(0x7e), q(0x7f),\ + q(0x80), q(0x81), q(0x82), q(0x83), q(0x84), q(0x85), q(0x86), q(0x87),\ + q(0x88), q(0x89), q(0x8a), q(0x8b), q(0x8c), q(0x8d), q(0x8e), q(0x8f),\ + q(0x90), q(0x91), q(0x92), q(0x93), q(0x94), q(0x95), q(0x96), q(0x97),\ + q(0x98), q(0x99), q(0x9a), q(0x9b), q(0x9c), q(0x9d), q(0x9e), q(0x9f),\ + q(0xa0), q(0xa1), q(0xa2), q(0xa3), q(0xa4), q(0xa5), q(0xa6), q(0xa7),\ + q(0xa8), q(0xa9), q(0xaa), q(0xab), q(0xac), q(0xad), q(0xae), q(0xaf),\ + q(0xb0), q(0xb1), q(0xb2), q(0xb3), q(0xb4), q(0xb5), q(0xb6), q(0xb7),\ + q(0xb8), q(0xb9), q(0xba), q(0xbb), q(0xbc), q(0xbd), q(0xbe), q(0xbf),\ + q(0xc0), q(0xc1), q(0xc2), q(0xc3), q(0xc4), q(0xc5), q(0xc6), q(0xc7),\ + q(0xc8), q(0xc9), q(0xca), q(0xcb), q(0xcc), q(0xcd), q(0xce), q(0xcf),\ + q(0xd0), q(0xd1), q(0xd2), q(0xd3), q(0xd4), q(0xd5), q(0xd6), q(0xd7),\ + q(0xd8), q(0xd9), q(0xda), q(0xdb), q(0xdc), q(0xdd), q(0xde), q(0xdf),\ + q(0xe0), q(0xe1), q(0xe2), q(0xe3), q(0xe4), q(0xe5), q(0xe6), q(0xe7),\ + q(0xe8), q(0xe9), q(0xea), q(0xeb), q(0xec), q(0xed), q(0xee), q(0xef),\ + q(0xf0), q(0xf1), q(0xf2), q(0xf3), q(0xf4), q(0xf5), q(0xf6), q(0xf7),\ + q(0xf8), q(0xf9), q(0xfa), q(0xfb), q(0xfc), q(0xfd), q(0xfe), q(0xff) \ +} + +/* + * Given a value i in 0..255 as the byte overflow when a field element + * in GF(2^128) is multiplied by x^8, the following macro returns the + * 16-bit value that must be XOR-ed into the low-degree end of the + * product to reduce it modulo the polynomial x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1. + * + * There are two versions of the macro, and hence two tables: one for + * the "be" convention where the highest-order bit is the coefficient of + * the highest-degree polynomial term, and one for the "le" convention + * where the highest-order bit is the coefficient of the lowest-degree + * polynomial term. In both cases the values are stored in CPU byte + * endianness such that the coefficients are ordered consistently across + * bytes, i.e. in the "be" table bits 15..0 of the stored value + * correspond to the coefficients of x^15..x^0, and in the "le" table + * bits 15..0 correspond to the coefficients of x^0..x^15. + * + * Therefore, provided that the appropriate byte endianness conversions + * are done by the multiplication functions (and these must be in place + * anyway to support both little endian and big endian CPUs), the "be" + * table can be used for multiplications of both "bbe" and "ble" + * elements, and the "le" table can be used for multiplications of both + * "lle" and "lbe" elements. + */ + +#define xda_be(i) ( \ + (i & 0x80 ? 0x4380 : 0) ^ (i & 0x40 ? 0x21c0 : 0) ^ \ + (i & 0x20 ? 0x10e0 : 0) ^ (i & 0x10 ? 0x0870 : 0) ^ \ + (i & 0x08 ? 0x0438 : 0) ^ (i & 0x04 ? 0x021c : 0) ^ \ + (i & 0x02 ? 0x010e : 0) ^ (i & 0x01 ? 0x0087 : 0) \ +) + +#define xda_le(i) ( \ + (i & 0x80 ? 0xe100 : 0) ^ (i & 0x40 ? 0x7080 : 0) ^ \ + (i & 0x20 ? 0x3840 : 0) ^ (i & 0x10 ? 0x1c20 : 0) ^ \ + (i & 0x08 ? 0x0e10 : 0) ^ (i & 0x04 ? 0x0708 : 0) ^ \ + (i & 0x02 ? 0x0384 : 0) ^ (i & 0x01 ? 0x01c2 : 0) \ +) + +static const u16 gf128mul_table_le[256] = gf128mul_dat(xda_le); +static const u16 gf128mul_table_be[256] = gf128mul_dat(xda_be); + +/* + * The following functions multiply a field element by x^8 in + * the polynomial field representation. They use 64-bit word operations + * to gain speed but compensate for machine endianness and hence work + * correctly on both styles of machine. + */ + +static void gf128mul_x8_lle(be128 *x) +{ + u64 a = be64_to_cpu(x->a); + u64 b = be64_to_cpu(x->b); + u64 _tt = gf128mul_table_le[b & 0xff]; + + x->b = cpu_to_be64((b >> 8) | (a << 56)); + x->a = cpu_to_be64((a >> 8) ^ (_tt << 48)); +} + +static void gf128mul_x8_bbe(be128 *x) +{ + u64 a = be64_to_cpu(x->a); + u64 b = be64_to_cpu(x->b); + u64 _tt = gf128mul_table_be[a >> 56]; + + x->a = cpu_to_be64((a << 8) | (b >> 56)); + x->b = cpu_to_be64((b << 8) ^ _tt); +} + +void gf128mul_x8_ble(le128 *r, const le128 *x) +{ + u64 a = le64_to_cpu(x->a); + u64 b = le64_to_cpu(x->b); + u64 _tt = gf128mul_table_be[a >> 56]; + + r->a = cpu_to_le64((a << 8) | (b >> 56)); + r->b = cpu_to_le64((b << 8) ^ _tt); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gf128mul_x8_ble); + +void gf128mul_lle(be128 *r, const be128 *b) +{ + be128 p[8]; + int i; + + p[0] = *r; + for (i = 0; i < 7; ++i) + gf128mul_x_lle(&p[i + 1], &p[i]); + + memset(r, 0, sizeof(*r)); + for (i = 0;;) { + u8 ch = ((u8 *)b)[15 - i]; + + if (ch & 0x80) + be128_xor(r, r, &p[0]); + if (ch & 0x40) + be128_xor(r, r, &p[1]); + if (ch & 0x20) + be128_xor(r, r, &p[2]); + if (ch & 0x10) + be128_xor(r, r, &p[3]); + if (ch & 0x08) + be128_xor(r, r, &p[4]); + if (ch & 0x04) + be128_xor(r, r, &p[5]); + if (ch & 0x02) + be128_xor(r, r, &p[6]); + if (ch & 0x01) + be128_xor(r, r, &p[7]); + + if (++i >= 16) + break; + + gf128mul_x8_lle(r); + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gf128mul_lle); + +void gf128mul_bbe(be128 *r, const be128 *b) +{ + be128 p[8]; + int i; + + p[0] = *r; + for (i = 0; i < 7; ++i) + gf128mul_x_bbe(&p[i + 1], &p[i]); + + memset(r, 0, sizeof(*r)); + for (i = 0;;) { + u8 ch = ((u8 *)b)[i]; + + if (ch & 0x80) + be128_xor(r, r, &p[7]); + if (ch & 0x40) + be128_xor(r, r, &p[6]); + if (ch & 0x20) + be128_xor(r, r, &p[5]); + if (ch & 0x10) + be128_xor(r, r, &p[4]); + if (ch & 0x08) + be128_xor(r, r, &p[3]); + if (ch & 0x04) + be128_xor(r, r, &p[2]); + if (ch & 0x02) + be128_xor(r, r, &p[1]); + if (ch & 0x01) + be128_xor(r, r, &p[0]); + + if (++i >= 16) + break; + + gf128mul_x8_bbe(r); + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gf128mul_bbe); + +/* This version uses 64k bytes of table space. + A 16 byte buffer has to be multiplied by a 16 byte key + value in GF(2^128). If we consider a GF(2^128) value in + the buffer's lowest byte, we can construct a table of + the 256 16 byte values that result from the 256 values + of this byte. This requires 4096 bytes. But we also + need tables for each of the 16 higher bytes in the + buffer as well, which makes 64 kbytes in total. +*/ +/* additional explanation + * t[0][BYTE] contains g*BYTE + * t[1][BYTE] contains g*x^8*BYTE + * .. + * t[15][BYTE] contains g*x^120*BYTE */ +struct gf128mul_64k *gf128mul_init_64k_bbe(const be128 *g) +{ + struct gf128mul_64k *t; + int i, j, k; + + t = kzalloc(sizeof(*t), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!t) + goto out; + + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + t->t[i] = kzalloc(sizeof(*t->t[i]), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!t->t[i]) { + gf128mul_free_64k(t); + t = NULL; + goto out; + } + } + + t->t[0]->t[1] = *g; + for (j = 1; j <= 64; j <<= 1) + gf128mul_x_bbe(&t->t[0]->t[j + j], &t->t[0]->t[j]); + + for (i = 0;;) { + for (j = 2; j < 256; j += j) + for (k = 1; k < j; ++k) + be128_xor(&t->t[i]->t[j + k], + &t->t[i]->t[j], &t->t[i]->t[k]); + + if (++i >= 16) + break; + + for (j = 128; j > 0; j >>= 1) { + t->t[i]->t[j] = t->t[i - 1]->t[j]; + gf128mul_x8_bbe(&t->t[i]->t[j]); + } + } + +out: + return t; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gf128mul_init_64k_bbe); + +void gf128mul_free_64k(struct gf128mul_64k *t) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) + kfree_sensitive(t->t[i]); + kfree_sensitive(t); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gf128mul_free_64k); + +void gf128mul_64k_bbe(be128 *a, const struct gf128mul_64k *t) +{ + u8 *ap = (u8 *)a; + be128 r[1]; + int i; + + *r = t->t[0]->t[ap[15]]; + for (i = 1; i < 16; ++i) + be128_xor(r, r, &t->t[i]->t[ap[15 - i]]); + *a = *r; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gf128mul_64k_bbe); + +/* This version uses 4k bytes of table space. + A 16 byte buffer has to be multiplied by a 16 byte key + value in GF(2^128). If we consider a GF(2^128) value in a + single byte, we can construct a table of the 256 16 byte + values that result from the 256 values of this byte. + This requires 4096 bytes. If we take the highest byte in + the buffer and use this table to get the result, we then + have to multiply by x^120 to get the final value. For the + next highest byte the result has to be multiplied by x^112 + and so on. But we can do this by accumulating the result + in an accumulator starting with the result for the top + byte. We repeatedly multiply the accumulator value by + x^8 and then add in (i.e. xor) the 16 bytes of the next + lower byte in the buffer, stopping when we reach the + lowest byte. This requires a 4096 byte table. +*/ +struct gf128mul_4k *gf128mul_init_4k_lle(const be128 *g) +{ + struct gf128mul_4k *t; + int j, k; + + t = kzalloc(sizeof(*t), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!t) + goto out; + + t->t[128] = *g; + for (j = 64; j > 0; j >>= 1) + gf128mul_x_lle(&t->t[j], &t->t[j+j]); + + for (j = 2; j < 256; j += j) + for (k = 1; k < j; ++k) + be128_xor(&t->t[j + k], &t->t[j], &t->t[k]); + +out: + return t; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gf128mul_init_4k_lle); + +struct gf128mul_4k *gf128mul_init_4k_bbe(const be128 *g) +{ + struct gf128mul_4k *t; + int j, k; + + t = kzalloc(sizeof(*t), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!t) + goto out; + + t->t[1] = *g; + for (j = 1; j <= 64; j <<= 1) + gf128mul_x_bbe(&t->t[j + j], &t->t[j]); + + for (j = 2; j < 256; j += j) + for (k = 1; k < j; ++k) + be128_xor(&t->t[j + k], &t->t[j], &t->t[k]); + +out: + return t; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gf128mul_init_4k_bbe); + +void gf128mul_4k_lle(be128 *a, const struct gf128mul_4k *t) +{ + u8 *ap = (u8 *)a; + be128 r[1]; + int i = 15; + + *r = t->t[ap[15]]; + while (i--) { + gf128mul_x8_lle(r); + be128_xor(r, r, &t->t[ap[i]]); + } + *a = *r; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gf128mul_4k_lle); + +void gf128mul_4k_bbe(be128 *a, const struct gf128mul_4k *t) +{ + u8 *ap = (u8 *)a; + be128 r[1]; + int i = 0; + + *r = t->t[ap[0]]; + while (++i < 16) { + gf128mul_x8_bbe(r); + be128_xor(r, r, &t->t[ap[i]]); + } + *a = *r; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gf128mul_4k_bbe); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Functions for multiplying elements of GF(2^128)"); -- cgit v1.2.3 From b67ce439fef69a1a339cf2743c8198e8d90e6821 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2022 20:22:58 +0100 Subject: crypto: lib/gf128mul - make gf128mul_lle time invariant The gf128mul library has different variants with different memory/performance tradeoffs, where the faster ones use 4k or 64k lookup tables precomputed at runtime, which are based on one of the multiplication factors, which is commonly the key for keyed hash algorithms such as GHASH. The slowest variant is gf128_mul_lle() [and its bbe/ble counterparts], which does not use precomputed lookup tables, but it still relies on a single u16[256] lookup table which is input independent. The use of such a table may cause the execution time of gf128_mul_lle() to correlate with the value of the inputs, which is generally something that must be avoided for cryptographic algorithms. On top of that, the function uses a sequence of if () statements that conditionally invoke be128_xor() based on which bits are set in the second argument of the function, which is usually a pointer to the multiplication factor that represents the key. In order to remove the correlation between the execution time of gf128_mul_lle() and the value of its inputs, let's address the identified shortcomings: - add a time invariant version of gf128mul_x8_lle() that replaces the table lookup with the expression that is used at compile time to populate the lookup table; - make the invocations of be128_xor() unconditional, but pass a zero vector as the third argument if the associated bit in the key is cleared. The resulting code is likely to be significantly slower. However, given that this is the slowest version already, making it even slower in order to make it more secure is assumed to be justified. The bbe and ble counterparts could receive the same treatment, but the former is never used anywhere in the kernel, and the latter is only used in the driver for a asynchronous crypto h/w accelerator (Chelsio), where timing variances are unlikely to matter. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu --- lib/crypto/gf128mul.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/crypto/gf128mul.c b/lib/crypto/gf128mul.c index a69ae3e6c16c..8f8c45e0cdcf 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/gf128mul.c +++ b/lib/crypto/gf128mul.c @@ -146,6 +146,17 @@ static void gf128mul_x8_lle(be128 *x) x->a = cpu_to_be64((a >> 8) ^ (_tt << 48)); } +/* time invariant version of gf128mul_x8_lle */ +static void gf128mul_x8_lle_ti(be128 *x) +{ + u64 a = be64_to_cpu(x->a); + u64 b = be64_to_cpu(x->b); + u64 _tt = xda_le(b & 0xff); /* avoid table lookup */ + + x->b = cpu_to_be64((b >> 8) | (a << 56)); + x->a = cpu_to_be64((a >> 8) ^ (_tt << 48)); +} + static void gf128mul_x8_bbe(be128 *x) { u64 a = be64_to_cpu(x->a); @@ -169,38 +180,47 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(gf128mul_x8_ble); void gf128mul_lle(be128 *r, const be128 *b) { - be128 p[8]; + /* + * The p array should be aligned to twice the size of its element type, + * so that every even/odd pair is guaranteed to share a cacheline + * (assuming a cacheline size of 32 bytes or more, which is by far the + * most common). This ensures that each be128_xor() call in the loop + * takes the same amount of time regardless of the value of 'ch', which + * is derived from function parameter 'b', which is commonly used as a + * key, e.g., for GHASH. The odd array elements are all set to zero, + * making each be128_xor() a NOP if its associated bit in 'ch' is not + * set, and this is equivalent to calling be128_xor() conditionally. + * This approach aims to avoid leaking information about such keys + * through execution time variances. + * + * Unfortunately, __aligned(16) or higher does not work on x86 for + * variables on the stack so we need to perform the alignment by hand. + */ + be128 array[16 + 3] = {}; + be128 *p = PTR_ALIGN(&array[0], 2 * sizeof(be128)); int i; p[0] = *r; for (i = 0; i < 7; ++i) - gf128mul_x_lle(&p[i + 1], &p[i]); + gf128mul_x_lle(&p[2 * i + 2], &p[2 * i]); memset(r, 0, sizeof(*r)); for (i = 0;;) { u8 ch = ((u8 *)b)[15 - i]; - if (ch & 0x80) - be128_xor(r, r, &p[0]); - if (ch & 0x40) - be128_xor(r, r, &p[1]); - if (ch & 0x20) - be128_xor(r, r, &p[2]); - if (ch & 0x10) - be128_xor(r, r, &p[3]); - if (ch & 0x08) - be128_xor(r, r, &p[4]); - if (ch & 0x04) - be128_xor(r, r, &p[5]); - if (ch & 0x02) - be128_xor(r, r, &p[6]); - if (ch & 0x01) - be128_xor(r, r, &p[7]); + be128_xor(r, r, &p[ 0 + !(ch & 0x80)]); + be128_xor(r, r, &p[ 2 + !(ch & 0x40)]); + be128_xor(r, r, &p[ 4 + !(ch & 0x20)]); + be128_xor(r, r, &p[ 6 + !(ch & 0x10)]); + be128_xor(r, r, &p[ 8 + !(ch & 0x08)]); + be128_xor(r, r, &p[10 + !(ch & 0x04)]); + be128_xor(r, r, &p[12 + !(ch & 0x02)]); + be128_xor(r, r, &p[14 + !(ch & 0x01)]); if (++i >= 16) break; - gf128mul_x8_lle(r); + gf128mul_x8_lle_ti(r); /* use the time invariant version */ } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(gf128mul_lle); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 520af5da664a8edc4f4c1cd8e6e8488ecccdb7e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2022 20:22:59 +0100 Subject: crypto: lib/aesgcm - Provide minimal library implementation Implement a minimal library version of AES-GCM based on the existing library implementations of AES and multiplication in GF(2^128). Using these primitives, GCM can be implemented in a straight-forward manner. GCM has a couple of sharp edges, i.e., the amount of input data processed with the same initialization vector (IV) should be capped to protect the counter from 32-bit rollover (or carry), and the size of the authentication tag should be fixed for a given key. [0] The former concern is addressed trivially, given that the function call API uses 32-bit signed types for the input lengths. It is still up to the caller to avoid IV reuse in general, but this is not something we can police at the implementation level. As for the latter concern, let's make the authentication tag size part of the key schedule, and only permit it to be configured as part of the key expansion routine. Note that table based AES implementations are susceptible to known plaintext timing attacks on the encryption key. The AES library already attempts to mitigate this to some extent, but given that the counter mode encryption used by GCM operates exclusively on known plaintext by construction (the IV and therefore the initial counter value are known to an attacker), let's take some extra care to mitigate this, by calling the AES library with interrupts disabled. [0] https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/legacy/sp/nistspecialpublication800-38d.pdf Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/c6fb9b25-a4b6-2e4a-2dd1-63adda055a49@amd.com/ Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Tested-by: Nikunj A Dadhania Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu --- include/crypto/gcm.h | 22 ++ lib/crypto/Kconfig | 6 + lib/crypto/Makefile | 3 + lib/crypto/aesgcm.c | 727 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 758 insertions(+) create mode 100644 lib/crypto/aesgcm.c (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/include/crypto/gcm.h b/include/crypto/gcm.h index 9d7eff04f224..fd9df607a836 100644 --- a/include/crypto/gcm.h +++ b/include/crypto/gcm.h @@ -3,6 +3,9 @@ #include +#include +#include + #define GCM_AES_IV_SIZE 12 #define GCM_RFC4106_IV_SIZE 8 #define GCM_RFC4543_IV_SIZE 8 @@ -60,4 +63,23 @@ static inline int crypto_ipsec_check_assoclen(unsigned int assoclen) return 0; } + +struct aesgcm_ctx { + be128 ghash_key; + struct crypto_aes_ctx aes_ctx; + unsigned int authsize; +}; + +int aesgcm_expandkey(struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keysize, unsigned int authsize); + +void aesgcm_encrypt(const struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + int crypt_len, const u8 *assoc, int assoc_len, + const u8 iv[GCM_AES_IV_SIZE], u8 *authtag); + +bool __must_check aesgcm_decrypt(const struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, + const u8 *src, int crypt_len, const u8 *assoc, + int assoc_len, const u8 iv[GCM_AES_IV_SIZE], + const u8 *authtag); + #endif diff --git a/lib/crypto/Kconfig b/lib/crypto/Kconfig index 6767d86959de..45436bfc6dff 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/lib/crypto/Kconfig @@ -8,6 +8,12 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS config CRYPTO_LIB_AES tristate +config CRYPTO_LIB_AESGCM + tristate + select CRYPTO_LIB_AES + select CRYPTO_LIB_GF128MUL + select CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS + config CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4 tristate diff --git a/lib/crypto/Makefile b/lib/crypto/Makefile index 7000eeb72286..6ec2d4543d9c 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/Makefile +++ b/lib/crypto/Makefile @@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC) += libchacha.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES) += libaes.o libaes-y := aes.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AESGCM) += libaesgcm.o +libaesgcm-y := aesgcm.o + obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4) += libarc4.o libarc4-y := arc4.o diff --git a/lib/crypto/aesgcm.c b/lib/crypto/aesgcm.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c632d6e17af8 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/crypto/aesgcm.c @@ -0,0 +1,727 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Minimal library implementation of GCM + * + * Copyright 2022 Google LLC + */ + +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +static void aesgcm_encrypt_block(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, void *dst, + const void *src) +{ + unsigned long flags; + + /* + * In AES-GCM, both the GHASH key derivation and the CTR mode + * encryption operate on known plaintext, making them susceptible to + * timing attacks on the encryption key. The AES library already + * mitigates this risk to some extent by pulling the entire S-box into + * the caches before doing any substitutions, but this strategy is more + * effective when running with interrupts disabled. + */ + local_irq_save(flags); + aes_encrypt(ctx, dst, src); + local_irq_restore(flags); +} + +/** + * aesgcm_expandkey - Expands the AES and GHASH keys for the AES-GCM key + * schedule + * + * @ctx: The data structure that will hold the AES-GCM key schedule + * @key: The AES encryption input key + * @keysize: The length in bytes of the input key + * @authsize: The size in bytes of the GCM authentication tag + * + * Returns: 0 on success, or -EINVAL if @keysize or @authsize contain values + * that are not permitted by the GCM specification. + */ +int aesgcm_expandkey(struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keysize, unsigned int authsize) +{ + u8 kin[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = {}; + int ret; + + ret = crypto_gcm_check_authsize(authsize) ?: + aes_expandkey(&ctx->aes_ctx, key, keysize); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ctx->authsize = authsize; + aesgcm_encrypt_block(&ctx->aes_ctx, &ctx->ghash_key, kin); + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(aesgcm_expandkey); + +static void aesgcm_ghash(be128 *ghash, const be128 *key, const void *src, + int len) +{ + while (len > 0) { + crypto_xor((u8 *)ghash, src, min(len, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE)); + gf128mul_lle(ghash, key); + + src += GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE; + len -= GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE; + } +} + +static void aesgcm_mac(const struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *src, int src_len, + const u8 *assoc, int assoc_len, __be32 *ctr, u8 *authtag) +{ + be128 tail = { cpu_to_be64(assoc_len * 8), cpu_to_be64(src_len * 8) }; + u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + be128 ghash = {}; + + aesgcm_ghash(&ghash, &ctx->ghash_key, assoc, assoc_len); + aesgcm_ghash(&ghash, &ctx->ghash_key, src, src_len); + aesgcm_ghash(&ghash, &ctx->ghash_key, &tail, sizeof(tail)); + + ctr[3] = cpu_to_be32(1); + aesgcm_encrypt_block(&ctx->aes_ctx, buf, ctr); + crypto_xor_cpy(authtag, buf, (u8 *)&ghash, ctx->authsize); + + memzero_explicit(&ghash, sizeof(ghash)); + memzero_explicit(buf, sizeof(buf)); +} + +static void aesgcm_crypt(const struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + int len, __be32 *ctr) +{ + u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned int n = 2; + + while (len > 0) { + /* + * The counter increment below must not result in overflow or + * carry into the next 32-bit word, as this could result in + * inadvertent IV reuse, which must be avoided at all cost for + * stream ciphers such as AES-CTR. Given the range of 'int + * len', this cannot happen, so no explicit test is necessary. + */ + ctr[3] = cpu_to_be32(n++); + aesgcm_encrypt_block(&ctx->aes_ctx, buf, ctr); + crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, buf, min(len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)); + + dst += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + src += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + memzero_explicit(buf, sizeof(buf)); +} + +/** + * aesgcm_encrypt - Perform AES-GCM encryption on a block of data + * + * @ctx: The AES-GCM key schedule + * @dst: Pointer to the ciphertext output buffer + * @src: Pointer the plaintext (may equal @dst for encryption in place) + * @crypt_len: The size in bytes of the plaintext and ciphertext. + * @assoc: Pointer to the associated data, + * @assoc_len: The size in bytes of the associated data + * @iv: The initialization vector (IV) to use for this block of data + * (must be 12 bytes in size as per the GCM spec recommendation) + * @authtag: The address of the buffer in memory where the authentication + * tag should be stored. The buffer is assumed to have space for + * @ctx->authsize bytes. + */ +void aesgcm_encrypt(const struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + int crypt_len, const u8 *assoc, int assoc_len, + const u8 iv[GCM_AES_IV_SIZE], u8 *authtag) +{ + __be32 ctr[4]; + + memcpy(ctr, iv, GCM_AES_IV_SIZE); + + aesgcm_crypt(ctx, dst, src, crypt_len, ctr); + aesgcm_mac(ctx, dst, crypt_len, assoc, assoc_len, ctr, authtag); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(aesgcm_encrypt); + +/** + * aesgcm_decrypt - Perform AES-GCM decryption on a block of data + * + * @ctx: The AES-GCM key schedule + * @dst: Pointer to the plaintext output buffer + * @src: Pointer the ciphertext (may equal @dst for decryption in place) + * @crypt_len: The size in bytes of the plaintext and ciphertext. + * @assoc: Pointer to the associated data, + * @assoc_len: The size in bytes of the associated data + * @iv: The initialization vector (IV) to use for this block of data + * (must be 12 bytes in size as per the GCM spec recommendation) + * @authtag: The address of the buffer in memory where the authentication + * tag is stored. + * + * Returns: true on success, or false if the ciphertext failed authentication. + * On failure, no plaintext will be returned. + */ +bool __must_check aesgcm_decrypt(const struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, + const u8 *src, int crypt_len, const u8 *assoc, + int assoc_len, const u8 iv[GCM_AES_IV_SIZE], + const u8 *authtag) +{ + u8 tagbuf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + __be32 ctr[4]; + + memcpy(ctr, iv, GCM_AES_IV_SIZE); + + aesgcm_mac(ctx, src, crypt_len, assoc, assoc_len, ctr, tagbuf); + if (crypto_memneq(authtag, tagbuf, ctx->authsize)) { + memzero_explicit(tagbuf, sizeof(tagbuf)); + return false; + } + aesgcm_crypt(ctx, dst, src, crypt_len, ctr); + return true; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(aesgcm_decrypt); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Generic AES-GCM library"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel "); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); + +#ifndef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS + +/* + * Test code below. Vectors taken from crypto/testmgr.h + */ + +static const u8 __initconst ctext0[16] = + "\x58\xe2\xfc\xce\xfa\x7e\x30\x61" + "\x36\x7f\x1d\x57\xa4\xe7\x45\x5a"; + +static const u8 __initconst ptext1[16]; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext1[32] = + "\x03\x88\xda\xce\x60\xb6\xa3\x92" + "\xf3\x28\xc2\xb9\x71\xb2\xfe\x78" + "\xab\x6e\x47\xd4\x2c\xec\x13\xbd" + "\xf5\x3a\x67\xb2\x12\x57\xbd\xdf"; + +static const u8 __initconst ptext2[64] = + "\xd9\x31\x32\x25\xf8\x84\x06\xe5" + "\xa5\x59\x09\xc5\xaf\xf5\x26\x9a" + "\x86\xa7\xa9\x53\x15\x34\xf7\xda" + "\x2e\x4c\x30\x3d\x8a\x31\x8a\x72" + "\x1c\x3c\x0c\x95\x95\x68\x09\x53" + "\x2f\xcf\x0e\x24\x49\xa6\xb5\x25" + "\xb1\x6a\xed\xf5\xaa\x0d\xe6\x57" + "\xba\x63\x7b\x39\x1a\xaf\xd2\x55"; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext2[80] = + "\x42\x83\x1e\xc2\x21\x77\x74\x24" + "\x4b\x72\x21\xb7\x84\xd0\xd4\x9c" + "\xe3\xaa\x21\x2f\x2c\x02\xa4\xe0" + "\x35\xc1\x7e\x23\x29\xac\xa1\x2e" + "\x21\xd5\x14\xb2\x54\x66\x93\x1c" + "\x7d\x8f\x6a\x5a\xac\x84\xaa\x05" + "\x1b\xa3\x0b\x39\x6a\x0a\xac\x97" + "\x3d\x58\xe0\x91\x47\x3f\x59\x85" + "\x4d\x5c\x2a\xf3\x27\xcd\x64\xa6" + "\x2c\xf3\x5a\xbd\x2b\xa6\xfa\xb4"; + +static const u8 __initconst ptext3[60] = + "\xd9\x31\x32\x25\xf8\x84\x06\xe5" + "\xa5\x59\x09\xc5\xaf\xf5\x26\x9a" + "\x86\xa7\xa9\x53\x15\x34\xf7\xda" + "\x2e\x4c\x30\x3d\x8a\x31\x8a\x72" + "\x1c\x3c\x0c\x95\x95\x68\x09\x53" + "\x2f\xcf\x0e\x24\x49\xa6\xb5\x25" + "\xb1\x6a\xed\xf5\xaa\x0d\xe6\x57" + "\xba\x63\x7b\x39"; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext3[76] = + "\x42\x83\x1e\xc2\x21\x77\x74\x24" + "\x4b\x72\x21\xb7\x84\xd0\xd4\x9c" + "\xe3\xaa\x21\x2f\x2c\x02\xa4\xe0" + "\x35\xc1\x7e\x23\x29\xac\xa1\x2e" + "\x21\xd5\x14\xb2\x54\x66\x93\x1c" + "\x7d\x8f\x6a\x5a\xac\x84\xaa\x05" + "\x1b\xa3\x0b\x39\x6a\x0a\xac\x97" + "\x3d\x58\xe0\x91" + "\x5b\xc9\x4f\xbc\x32\x21\xa5\xdb" + "\x94\xfa\xe9\x5a\xe7\x12\x1a\x47"; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext4[16] = + "\xcd\x33\xb2\x8a\xc7\x73\xf7\x4b" + "\xa0\x0e\xd1\xf3\x12\x57\x24\x35"; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext5[32] = + "\x98\xe7\x24\x7c\x07\xf0\xfe\x41" + "\x1c\x26\x7e\x43\x84\xb0\xf6\x00" + "\x2f\xf5\x8d\x80\x03\x39\x27\xab" + "\x8e\xf4\xd4\x58\x75\x14\xf0\xfb"; + +static const u8 __initconst ptext6[64] = + "\xd9\x31\x32\x25\xf8\x84\x06\xe5" + "\xa5\x59\x09\xc5\xaf\xf5\x26\x9a" + "\x86\xa7\xa9\x53\x15\x34\xf7\xda" + "\x2e\x4c\x30\x3d\x8a\x31\x8a\x72" + "\x1c\x3c\x0c\x95\x95\x68\x09\x53" + "\x2f\xcf\x0e\x24\x49\xa6\xb5\x25" + "\xb1\x6a\xed\xf5\xaa\x0d\xe6\x57" + "\xba\x63\x7b\x39\x1a\xaf\xd2\x55"; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext6[80] = + "\x39\x80\xca\x0b\x3c\x00\xe8\x41" + "\xeb\x06\xfa\xc4\x87\x2a\x27\x57" + "\x85\x9e\x1c\xea\xa6\xef\xd9\x84" + "\x62\x85\x93\xb4\x0c\xa1\xe1\x9c" + "\x7d\x77\x3d\x00\xc1\x44\xc5\x25" + "\xac\x61\x9d\x18\xc8\x4a\x3f\x47" + "\x18\xe2\x44\x8b\x2f\xe3\x24\xd9" + "\xcc\xda\x27\x10\xac\xad\xe2\x56" + "\x99\x24\xa7\xc8\x58\x73\x36\xbf" + "\xb1\x18\x02\x4d\xb8\x67\x4a\x14"; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext7[16] = + "\x53\x0f\x8a\xfb\xc7\x45\x36\xb9" + "\xa9\x63\xb4\xf1\xc4\xcb\x73\x8b"; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext8[32] = + "\xce\xa7\x40\x3d\x4d\x60\x6b\x6e" + "\x07\x4e\xc5\xd3\xba\xf3\x9d\x18" + "\xd0\xd1\xc8\xa7\x99\x99\x6b\xf0" + "\x26\x5b\x98\xb5\xd4\x8a\xb9\x19"; + +static const u8 __initconst ptext9[64] = + "\xd9\x31\x32\x25\xf8\x84\x06\xe5" + "\xa5\x59\x09\xc5\xaf\xf5\x26\x9a" + "\x86\xa7\xa9\x53\x15\x34\xf7\xda" + "\x2e\x4c\x30\x3d\x8a\x31\x8a\x72" + "\x1c\x3c\x0c\x95\x95\x68\x09\x53" + "\x2f\xcf\x0e\x24\x49\xa6\xb5\x25" + "\xb1\x6a\xed\xf5\xaa\x0d\xe6\x57" + "\xba\x63\x7b\x39\x1a\xaf\xd2\x55"; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext9[80] = + "\x52\x2d\xc1\xf0\x99\x56\x7d\x07" + "\xf4\x7f\x37\xa3\x2a\x84\x42\x7d" + "\x64\x3a\x8c\xdc\xbf\xe5\xc0\xc9" + "\x75\x98\xa2\xbd\x25\x55\xd1\xaa" + "\x8c\xb0\x8e\x48\x59\x0d\xbb\x3d" + "\xa7\xb0\x8b\x10\x56\x82\x88\x38" + "\xc5\xf6\x1e\x63\x93\xba\x7a\x0a" + "\xbc\xc9\xf6\x62\x89\x80\x15\xad" + "\xb0\x94\xda\xc5\xd9\x34\x71\xbd" + "\xec\x1a\x50\x22\x70\xe3\xcc\x6c"; + +static const u8 __initconst ptext10[60] = + "\xd9\x31\x32\x25\xf8\x84\x06\xe5" + "\xa5\x59\x09\xc5\xaf\xf5\x26\x9a" + "\x86\xa7\xa9\x53\x15\x34\xf7\xda" + "\x2e\x4c\x30\x3d\x8a\x31\x8a\x72" + "\x1c\x3c\x0c\x95\x95\x68\x09\x53" + "\x2f\xcf\x0e\x24\x49\xa6\xb5\x25" + "\xb1\x6a\xed\xf5\xaa\x0d\xe6\x57" + "\xba\x63\x7b\x39"; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext10[76] = + "\x52\x2d\xc1\xf0\x99\x56\x7d\x07" + "\xf4\x7f\x37\xa3\x2a\x84\x42\x7d" + "\x64\x3a\x8c\xdc\xbf\xe5\xc0\xc9" + "\x75\x98\xa2\xbd\x25\x55\xd1\xaa" + "\x8c\xb0\x8e\x48\x59\x0d\xbb\x3d" + "\xa7\xb0\x8b\x10\x56\x82\x88\x38" + "\xc5\xf6\x1e\x63\x93\xba\x7a\x0a" + "\xbc\xc9\xf6\x62" + "\x76\xfc\x6e\xce\x0f\x4e\x17\x68" + "\xcd\xdf\x88\x53\xbb\x2d\x55\x1b"; + +static const u8 __initconst ptext11[60] = + "\xd9\x31\x32\x25\xf8\x84\x06\xe5" + "\xa5\x59\x09\xc5\xaf\xf5\x26\x9a" + "\x86\xa7\xa9\x53\x15\x34\xf7\xda" + "\x2e\x4c\x30\x3d\x8a\x31\x8a\x72" + "\x1c\x3c\x0c\x95\x95\x68\x09\x53" + "\x2f\xcf\x0e\x24\x49\xa6\xb5\x25" + "\xb1\x6a\xed\xf5\xaa\x0d\xe6\x57" + "\xba\x63\x7b\x39"; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext11[76] = + "\x39\x80\xca\x0b\x3c\x00\xe8\x41" + "\xeb\x06\xfa\xc4\x87\x2a\x27\x57" + "\x85\x9e\x1c\xea\xa6\xef\xd9\x84" + "\x62\x85\x93\xb4\x0c\xa1\xe1\x9c" + "\x7d\x77\x3d\x00\xc1\x44\xc5\x25" + "\xac\x61\x9d\x18\xc8\x4a\x3f\x47" + "\x18\xe2\x44\x8b\x2f\xe3\x24\xd9" + "\xcc\xda\x27\x10" + "\x25\x19\x49\x8e\x80\xf1\x47\x8f" + "\x37\xba\x55\xbd\x6d\x27\x61\x8c"; + +static const u8 __initconst ptext12[719] = + "\x42\xc1\xcc\x08\x48\x6f\x41\x3f" + "\x2f\x11\x66\x8b\x2a\x16\xf0\xe0" + "\x58\x83\xf0\xc3\x70\x14\xc0\x5b" + "\x3f\xec\x1d\x25\x3c\x51\xd2\x03" + "\xcf\x59\x74\x1f\xb2\x85\xb4\x07" + "\xc6\x6a\x63\x39\x8a\x5b\xde\xcb" + "\xaf\x08\x44\xbd\x6f\x91\x15\xe1" + "\xf5\x7a\x6e\x18\xbd\xdd\x61\x50" + "\x59\xa9\x97\xab\xbb\x0e\x74\x5c" + "\x00\xa4\x43\x54\x04\x54\x9b\x3b" + "\x77\xec\xfd\x5c\xa6\xe8\x7b\x08" + "\xae\xe6\x10\x3f\x32\x65\xd1\xfc" + "\xa4\x1d\x2c\x31\xfb\x33\x7a\xb3" + "\x35\x23\xf4\x20\x41\xd4\xad\x82" + "\x8b\xa4\xad\x96\x1c\x20\x53\xbe" + "\x0e\xa6\xf4\xdc\x78\x49\x3e\x72" + "\xb1\xa9\xb5\x83\xcb\x08\x54\xb7" + "\xad\x49\x3a\xae\x98\xce\xa6\x66" + "\x10\x30\x90\x8c\x55\x83\xd7\x7c" + "\x8b\xe6\x53\xde\xd2\x6e\x18\x21" + "\x01\x52\xd1\x9f\x9d\xbb\x9c\x73" + "\x57\xcc\x89\x09\x75\x9b\x78\x70" + "\xed\x26\x97\x4d\xb4\xe4\x0c\xa5" + "\xfa\x70\x04\x70\xc6\x96\x1c\x7d" + "\x54\x41\x77\xa8\xe3\xb0\x7e\x96" + "\x82\xd9\xec\xa2\x87\x68\x55\xf9" + "\x8f\x9e\x73\x43\x47\x6a\x08\x36" + "\x93\x67\xa8\x2d\xde\xac\x41\xa9" + "\x5c\x4d\x73\x97\x0f\x70\x68\xfa" + "\x56\x4d\x00\xc2\x3b\x1f\xc8\xb9" + "\x78\x1f\x51\x07\xe3\x9a\x13\x4e" + "\xed\x2b\x2e\xa3\xf7\x44\xb2\xe7" + "\xab\x19\x37\xd9\xba\x76\x5e\xd2" + "\xf2\x53\x15\x17\x4c\x6b\x16\x9f" + "\x02\x66\x49\xca\x7c\x91\x05\xf2" + "\x45\x36\x1e\xf5\x77\xad\x1f\x46" + "\xa8\x13\xfb\x63\xb6\x08\x99\x63" + "\x82\xa2\xed\xb3\xac\xdf\x43\x19" + "\x45\xea\x78\x73\xd9\xb7\x39\x11" + "\xa3\x13\x7c\xf8\x3f\xf7\xad\x81" + "\x48\x2f\xa9\x5c\x5f\xa0\xf0\x79" + "\xa4\x47\x7d\x80\x20\x26\xfd\x63" + "\x0a\xc7\x7e\x6d\x75\x47\xff\x76" + "\x66\x2e\x8a\x6c\x81\x35\xaf\x0b" + "\x2e\x6a\x49\x60\xc1\x10\xe1\xe1" + "\x54\x03\xa4\x09\x0c\x37\x7a\x15" + "\x23\x27\x5b\x8b\x4b\xa5\x64\x97" + "\xae\x4a\x50\x73\x1f\x66\x1c\x5c" + "\x03\x25\x3c\x8d\x48\x58\x71\x34" + "\x0e\xec\x4e\x55\x1a\x03\x6a\xe5" + "\xb6\x19\x2b\x84\x2a\x20\xd1\xea" + "\x80\x6f\x96\x0e\x05\x62\xc7\x78" + "\x87\x79\x60\x38\x46\xb4\x25\x57" + "\x6e\x16\x63\xf8\xad\x6e\xd7\x42" + "\x69\xe1\x88\xef\x6e\xd5\xb4\x9a" + "\x3c\x78\x6c\x3b\xe5\xa0\x1d\x22" + "\x86\x5c\x74\x3a\xeb\x24\x26\xc7" + "\x09\xfc\x91\x96\x47\x87\x4f\x1a" + "\xd6\x6b\x2c\x18\x47\xc0\xb8\x24" + "\xa8\x5a\x4a\x9e\xcb\x03\xe7\x2a" + "\x09\xe6\x4d\x9c\x6d\x86\x60\xf5" + "\x2f\x48\x69\x37\x9f\xf2\xd2\xcb" + "\x0e\x5a\xdd\x6e\x8a\xfb\x6a\xfe" + "\x0b\x63\xde\x87\x42\x79\x8a\x68" + "\x51\x28\x9b\x7a\xeb\xaf\xb8\x2f" + "\x9d\xd1\xc7\x45\x90\x08\xc9\x83" + "\xe9\x83\x84\xcb\x28\x69\x09\x69" + "\xce\x99\x46\x00\x54\xcb\xd8\x38" + "\xf9\x53\x4a\xbf\x31\xce\x57\x15" + "\x33\xfa\x96\x04\x33\x42\xe3\xc0" + "\xb7\x54\x4a\x65\x7a\x7c\x02\xe6" + "\x19\x95\xd0\x0e\x82\x07\x63\xf9" + "\xe1\x2b\x2a\xfc\x55\x92\x52\xc9" + "\xb5\x9f\x23\x28\x60\xe7\x20\x51" + "\x10\xd3\xed\x6d\x9b\xab\xb8\xe2" + "\x5d\x9a\x34\xb3\xbe\x9c\x64\xcb" + "\x78\xc6\x91\x22\x40\x91\x80\xbe" + "\xd7\x78\x5c\x0e\x0a\xdc\x08\xe9" + "\x67\x10\xa4\x83\x98\x79\x23\xe7" + "\x92\xda\xa9\x22\x16\xb1\xe7\x78" + "\xa3\x1c\x6c\x8f\x35\x7c\x4d\x37" + "\x2f\x6e\x0b\x50\x5c\x34\xb9\xf9" + "\xe6\x3d\x91\x0d\x32\x95\xaa\x3d" + "\x48\x11\x06\xbb\x2d\xf2\x63\x88" + "\x3f\x73\x09\xe2\x45\x56\x31\x51" + "\xfa\x5e\x4e\x62\xf7\x90\xf9\xa9" + "\x7d\x7b\x1b\xb1\xc8\x26\x6e\x66" + "\xf6\x90\x9a\x7f\xf2\x57\xcc\x23" + "\x59\xfa\xfa\xaa\x44\x04\x01\xa7" + "\xa4\x78\xdb\x74\x3d\x8b\xb5"; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext12[735] = + "\x84\x0b\xdb\xd5\xb7\xa8\xfe\x20" + "\xbb\xb1\x12\x7f\x41\xea\xb3\xc0" + "\xa2\xb4\x37\x19\x11\x58\xb6\x0b" + "\x4c\x1d\x38\x05\x54\xd1\x16\x73" + "\x8e\x1c\x20\x90\xa2\x9a\xb7\x74" + "\x47\xe6\xd8\xfc\x18\x3a\xb4\xea" + "\xd5\x16\x5a\x2c\x53\x01\x46\xb3" + "\x18\x33\x74\x6c\x50\xf2\xe8\xc0" + "\x73\xda\x60\x22\xeb\xe3\xe5\x9b" + "\x20\x93\x6c\x4b\x37\x99\xb8\x23" + "\x3b\x4e\xac\xe8\x5b\xe8\x0f\xb7" + "\xc3\x8f\xfb\x4a\x37\xd9\x39\x95" + "\x34\xf1\xdb\x8f\x71\xd9\xc7\x0b" + "\x02\xf1\x63\xfc\x9b\xfc\xc5\xab" + "\xb9\x14\x13\x21\xdf\xce\xaa\x88" + "\x44\x30\x1e\xce\x26\x01\x92\xf8" + "\x9f\x00\x4b\x0c\x4b\xf7\x5f\xe0" + "\x89\xca\x94\x66\x11\x21\x97\xca" + "\x3e\x83\x74\x2d\xdb\x4d\x11\xeb" + "\x97\xc2\x14\xff\x9e\x1e\xa0\x6b" + "\x08\xb4\x31\x2b\x85\xc6\x85\x6c" + "\x90\xec\x39\xc0\xec\xb3\xb5\x4e" + "\xf3\x9c\xe7\x83\x3a\x77\x0a\xf4" + "\x56\xfe\xce\x18\x33\x6d\x0b\x2d" + "\x33\xda\xc8\x05\x5c\xb4\x09\x2a" + "\xde\x6b\x52\x98\x01\xef\x36\x3d" + "\xbd\xf9\x8f\xa8\x3e\xaa\xcd\xd1" + "\x01\x2d\x42\x49\xc3\xb6\x84\xbb" + "\x48\x96\xe0\x90\x93\x6c\x48\x64" + "\xd4\xfa\x7f\x93\x2c\xa6\x21\xc8" + "\x7a\x23\x7b\xaa\x20\x56\x12\xae" + "\x16\x9d\x94\x0f\x54\xa1\xec\xca" + "\x51\x4e\xf2\x39\xf4\xf8\x5f\x04" + "\x5a\x0d\xbf\xf5\x83\xa1\x15\xe1" + "\xf5\x3c\xd8\x62\xa3\xed\x47\x89" + "\x85\x4c\xe5\xdb\xac\x9e\x17\x1d" + "\x0c\x09\xe3\x3e\x39\x5b\x4d\x74" + "\x0e\xf5\x34\xee\x70\x11\x4c\xfd" + "\xdb\x34\xb1\xb5\x10\x3f\x73\xb7" + "\xf5\xfa\xed\xb0\x1f\xa5\xcd\x3c" + "\x8d\x35\x83\xd4\x11\x44\x6e\x6c" + "\x5b\xe0\x0e\x69\xa5\x39\xe5\xbb" + "\xa9\x57\x24\x37\xe6\x1f\xdd\xcf" + "\x16\x2a\x13\xf9\x6a\x2d\x90\xa0" + "\x03\x60\x7a\xed\x69\xd5\x00\x8b" + "\x7e\x4f\xcb\xb9\xfa\x91\xb9\x37" + "\xc1\x26\xce\x90\x97\x22\x64\x64" + "\xc1\x72\x43\x1b\xf6\xac\xc1\x54" + "\x8a\x10\x9c\xdd\x8d\xd5\x8e\xb2" + "\xe4\x85\xda\xe0\x20\x5f\xf4\xb4" + "\x15\xb5\xa0\x8d\x12\x74\x49\x23" + "\x3a\xdf\x4a\xd3\xf0\x3b\x89\xeb" + "\xf8\xcc\x62\x7b\xfb\x93\x07\x41" + "\x61\x26\x94\x58\x70\xa6\x3c\xe4" + "\xff\x58\xc4\x13\x3d\xcb\x36\x6b" + "\x32\xe5\xb2\x6d\x03\x74\x6f\x76" + "\x93\x77\xde\x48\xc4\xfa\x30\x4a" + "\xda\x49\x80\x77\x0f\x1c\xbe\x11" + "\xc8\x48\xb1\xe5\xbb\xf2\x8a\xe1" + "\x96\x2f\x9f\xd1\x8e\x8a\x5c\xe2" + "\xf7\xd7\xd8\x54\xf3\x3f\xc4\x91" + "\xb8\xfb\x86\xdc\x46\x24\x91\x60" + "\x6c\x2f\xc9\x41\x37\x51\x49\x54" + "\x09\x81\x21\xf3\x03\x9f\x2b\xe3" + "\x1f\x39\x63\xaf\xf4\xd7\x53\x60" + "\xa7\xc7\x54\xf9\xee\xb1\xb1\x7d" + "\x75\x54\x65\x93\xfe\xb1\x68\x6b" + "\x57\x02\xf9\xbb\x0e\xf9\xf8\xbf" + "\x01\x12\x27\xb4\xfe\xe4\x79\x7a" + "\x40\x5b\x51\x4b\xdf\x38\xec\xb1" + "\x6a\x56\xff\x35\x4d\x42\x33\xaa" + "\x6f\x1b\xe4\xdc\xe0\xdb\x85\x35" + "\x62\x10\xd4\xec\xeb\xc5\x7e\x45" + "\x1c\x6f\x17\xca\x3b\x8e\x2d\x66" + "\x4f\x4b\x36\x56\xcd\x1b\x59\xaa" + "\xd2\x9b\x17\xb9\x58\xdf\x7b\x64" + "\x8a\xff\x3b\x9c\xa6\xb5\x48\x9e" + "\xaa\xe2\x5d\x09\x71\x32\x5f\xb6" + "\x29\xbe\xe7\xc7\x52\x7e\x91\x82" + "\x6b\x6d\x33\xe1\x34\x06\x36\x21" + "\x5e\xbe\x1e\x2f\x3e\xc1\xfb\xea" + "\x49\x2c\xb5\xca\xf7\xb0\x37\xea" + "\x1f\xed\x10\x04\xd9\x48\x0d\x1a" + "\x1c\xfb\xe7\x84\x0e\x83\x53\x74" + "\xc7\x65\xe2\x5c\xe5\xba\x73\x4c" + "\x0e\xe1\xb5\x11\x45\x61\x43\x46" + "\xaa\x25\x8f\xbd\x85\x08\xfa\x4c" + "\x15\xc1\xc0\xd8\xf5\xdc\x16\xbb" + "\x7b\x1d\xe3\x87\x57\xa7\x2a\x1d" + "\x38\x58\x9e\x8a\x43\xdc\x57" + "\xd1\x81\x7d\x2b\xe9\xff\x99\x3a" + "\x4b\x24\x52\x58\x55\xe1\x49\x14"; + +static struct { + const u8 *ptext; + const u8 *ctext; + + u8 key[AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE]; + u8 iv[GCM_AES_IV_SIZE]; + u8 assoc[20]; + + int klen; + int clen; + int plen; + int alen; +} const aesgcm_tv[] __initconst = { + { /* From McGrew & Viega - http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/656989.html */ + .klen = 16, + .ctext = ctext0, + .clen = sizeof(ctext0), + }, { + .klen = 16, + .ptext = ptext1, + .plen = sizeof(ptext1), + .ctext = ctext1, + .clen = sizeof(ctext1), + }, { + .key = "\xfe\xff\xe9\x92\x86\x65\x73\x1c" + "\x6d\x6a\x8f\x94\x67\x30\x83\x08", + .klen = 16, + .iv = "\xca\xfe\xba\xbe\xfa\xce\xdb\xad" + "\xde\xca\xf8\x88", + .ptext = ptext2, + .plen = sizeof(ptext2), + .ctext = ctext2, + .clen = sizeof(ctext2), + }, { + .key = "\xfe\xff\xe9\x92\x86\x65\x73\x1c" + "\x6d\x6a\x8f\x94\x67\x30\x83\x08", + .klen = 16, + .iv = "\xca\xfe\xba\xbe\xfa\xce\xdb\xad" + "\xde\xca\xf8\x88", + .ptext = ptext3, + .plen = sizeof(ptext3), + .assoc = "\xfe\xed\xfa\xce\xde\xad\xbe\xef" + "\xfe\xed\xfa\xce\xde\xad\xbe\xef" + "\xab\xad\xda\xd2", + .alen = 20, + .ctext = ctext3, + .clen = sizeof(ctext3), + }, { + .klen = 24, + .ctext = ctext4, + .clen = sizeof(ctext4), + }, { + .klen = 24, + .ptext = ptext1, + .plen = sizeof(ptext1), + .ctext = ctext5, + .clen = sizeof(ctext5), + }, { + .key = "\xfe\xff\xe9\x92\x86\x65\x73\x1c" + "\x6d\x6a\x8f\x94\x67\x30\x83\x08" + "\xfe\xff\xe9\x92\x86\x65\x73\x1c", + .klen = 24, + .iv = "\xca\xfe\xba\xbe\xfa\xce\xdb\xad" + "\xde\xca\xf8\x88", + .ptext = ptext6, + .plen = sizeof(ptext6), + .ctext = ctext6, + .clen = sizeof(ctext6), + }, { + .klen = 32, + .ctext = ctext7, + .clen = sizeof(ctext7), + }, { + .klen = 32, + .ptext = ptext1, + .plen = sizeof(ptext1), + .ctext = ctext8, + .clen = sizeof(ctext8), + }, { + .key = "\xfe\xff\xe9\x92\x86\x65\x73\x1c" + "\x6d\x6a\x8f\x94\x67\x30\x83\x08" + "\xfe\xff\xe9\x92\x86\x65\x73\x1c" + "\x6d\x6a\x8f\x94\x67\x30\x83\x08", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\xca\xfe\xba\xbe\xfa\xce\xdb\xad" + "\xde\xca\xf8\x88", + .ptext = ptext9, + .plen = sizeof(ptext9), + .ctext = ctext9, + .clen = sizeof(ctext9), + }, { + .key = "\xfe\xff\xe9\x92\x86\x65\x73\x1c" + "\x6d\x6a\x8f\x94\x67\x30\x83\x08" + "\xfe\xff\xe9\x92\x86\x65\x73\x1c" + "\x6d\x6a\x8f\x94\x67\x30\x83\x08", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\xca\xfe\xba\xbe\xfa\xce\xdb\xad" + "\xde\xca\xf8\x88", + .ptext = ptext10, + .plen = sizeof(ptext10), + .assoc = "\xfe\xed\xfa\xce\xde\xad\xbe\xef" + "\xfe\xed\xfa\xce\xde\xad\xbe\xef" + "\xab\xad\xda\xd2", + .alen = 20, + .ctext = ctext10, + .clen = sizeof(ctext10), + }, { + .key = "\xfe\xff\xe9\x92\x86\x65\x73\x1c" + "\x6d\x6a\x8f\x94\x67\x30\x83\x08" + "\xfe\xff\xe9\x92\x86\x65\x73\x1c", + .klen = 24, + .iv = "\xca\xfe\xba\xbe\xfa\xce\xdb\xad" + "\xde\xca\xf8\x88", + .ptext = ptext11, + .plen = sizeof(ptext11), + .assoc = "\xfe\xed\xfa\xce\xde\xad\xbe\xef" + "\xfe\xed\xfa\xce\xde\xad\xbe\xef" + "\xab\xad\xda\xd2", + .alen = 20, + .ctext = ctext11, + .clen = sizeof(ctext11), + }, { + .key = "\x62\x35\xf8\x95\xfc\xa5\xeb\xf6" + "\x0e\x92\x12\x04\xd3\xa1\x3f\x2e" + "\x8b\x32\xcf\xe7\x44\xed\x13\x59" + "\x04\x38\x77\xb0\xb9\xad\xb4\x38", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\xff" + "\xff\xff\x00\xff", + .ptext = ptext12, + .plen = sizeof(ptext12), + .ctext = ctext12, + .clen = sizeof(ctext12), + } +}; + +static int __init libaesgcm_init(void) +{ + for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(aesgcm_tv); i++) { + u8 tagbuf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + int plen = aesgcm_tv[i].plen; + struct aesgcm_ctx ctx; + u8 buf[sizeof(ptext12)]; + + if (aesgcm_expandkey(&ctx, aesgcm_tv[i].key, aesgcm_tv[i].klen, + aesgcm_tv[i].clen - plen)) { + pr_err("aesgcm_expandkey() failed on vector %d\n", i); + return -ENODEV; + } + + if (!aesgcm_decrypt(&ctx, buf, aesgcm_tv[i].ctext, plen, + aesgcm_tv[i].assoc, aesgcm_tv[i].alen, + aesgcm_tv[i].iv, aesgcm_tv[i].ctext + plen) + || memcmp(buf, aesgcm_tv[i].ptext, plen)) { + pr_err("aesgcm_decrypt() #1 failed on vector %d\n", i); + return -ENODEV; + } + + /* encrypt in place */ + aesgcm_encrypt(&ctx, buf, buf, plen, aesgcm_tv[i].assoc, + aesgcm_tv[i].alen, aesgcm_tv[i].iv, tagbuf); + if (memcmp(buf, aesgcm_tv[i].ctext, plen)) { + pr_err("aesgcm_encrypt() failed on vector %d\n", i); + return -ENODEV; + } + + /* decrypt in place */ + if (!aesgcm_decrypt(&ctx, buf, buf, plen, aesgcm_tv[i].assoc, + aesgcm_tv[i].alen, aesgcm_tv[i].iv, tagbuf) + || memcmp(buf, aesgcm_tv[i].ptext, plen)) { + pr_err("aesgcm_decrypt() #2 failed on vector %d\n", i); + return -ENODEV; + } + } + return 0; +} +module_init(libaesgcm_init); + +static void __exit libaesgcm_exit(void) +{ +} +module_exit(libaesgcm_exit); +#endif -- cgit v1.2.3