From d9452e9f81e997cbd0c9bface8d2c2a4b064cc3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "David S. Miller" Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2008 12:28:49 -0800 Subject: [NETPOLL]: Revert two bogus cleanups that broke netconsole. Based upon a report by Andrew Morton and code analysis done by Jarek Poplawski. This reverts 33f807ba0d9259e7c75c7a2ce8bd2787e5b540c7 ("[NETPOLL]: Kill NETPOLL_RX_DROP, set but never tested.") and c7b6ea24b43afb5749cb704e143df19d70e23dea ("[NETPOLL]: Don't need rx_flags."). The rx_flags did get tested for zero vs. non-zero and therefore we do need those tests and that code which sets NETPOLL_RX_DROP et al. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/linux/netpoll.h | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/linux/netpoll.h b/include/linux/netpoll.h index a0525a1f4715..e3d79593fb3a 100644 --- a/include/linux/netpoll.h +++ b/include/linux/netpoll.h @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ struct netpoll { struct netpoll_info { atomic_t refcnt; + int rx_flags; spinlock_t rx_lock; struct netpoll *rx_np; /* netpoll that registered an rx_hook */ struct sk_buff_head arp_tx; /* list of arp requests to reply to */ @@ -50,12 +51,12 @@ static inline int netpoll_rx(struct sk_buff *skb) unsigned long flags; int ret = 0; - if (!npinfo || !npinfo->rx_np) + if (!npinfo || (!npinfo->rx_np && !npinfo->rx_flags)) return 0; spin_lock_irqsave(&npinfo->rx_lock, flags); - /* check rx_np again with the lock held */ - if (npinfo->rx_np && __netpoll_rx(skb)) + /* check rx_flags again with the lock held */ + if (npinfo->rx_flags && __netpoll_rx(skb)) ret = 1; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&npinfo->rx_lock, flags); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7adc3830f90df04a13366914d80a3ed407db5381 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "David S. Miller" Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2008 14:28:41 -0800 Subject: [TCP]: Improve ipv4 established hash function. If all of the entropy is in the local and foreign addresses, but xor'ing together would cancel out that entropy, the current hash performs poorly. Suggested by Cosmin Ratiu: Basically, the situation is as follows: There is a client machine and a server machine. Both create 15000 virtual interfaces, open up a socket for each pair of interfaces and do SIP traffic. By profiling I noticed that there is a lot of time spent walking the established hash chains with this particular setup. The addresses were distributed like this: client interfaces were 198.18.0.1/16 with increments of 1 and server interfaces were 198.18.128.1/16 with increments of 1. As I said, there were 15000 interfaces. Source and destination ports were 5060 for each connection. So in this case, ports don't matter for hashing purposes, and the bits from the address pairs used cancel each other, meaning there are no differences in the whole lot of pairs, so they all end up in the same hash chain. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/net/inet_sock.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'include') diff --git a/include/net/inet_sock.h b/include/net/inet_sock.h index 70013c5f4e59..89cd011edb99 100644 --- a/include/net/inet_sock.h +++ b/include/net/inet_sock.h @@ -175,7 +175,8 @@ extern void build_ehash_secret(void); static inline unsigned int inet_ehashfn(const __be32 laddr, const __u16 lport, const __be32 faddr, const __be16 fport) { - return jhash_2words((__force __u32) laddr ^ (__force __u32) faddr, + return jhash_3words((__force __u32) laddr, + (__force __u32) faddr, ((__u32) lport) << 16 | (__force __u32)fport, inet_ehash_secret); } -- cgit v1.2.3