From 259e5e6c75a910f3b5e656151dc602f53f9d7548 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2012 16:47:50 -0500 Subject: Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs With this change, calling prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) disables privilege granting operations at execve-time. For example, a process will not be able to execute a setuid binary to change their uid or gid if this bit is set. The same is true for file capabilities. Additionally, LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS is defined to ensure that LSMs respect the requested behavior. To determine if the NO_NEW_PRIVS bit is set, a task may call prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0); It returns 1 if set and 0 if it is not set. If any of the arguments are non-zero, it will return -1 and set errno to -EINVAL. (PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS behaves similarly.) This functionality is desired for the proposed seccomp filter patch series. By using PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, it allows a task to modify the system call behavior for itself and its child tasks without being able to impact the behavior of a more privileged task. Another potential use is making certain privileged operations unprivileged. For example, chroot may be considered "safe" if it cannot affect privileged tasks. Note, this patch causes execve to fail when PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is set and AppArmor is in use. It is fixed in a subsequent patch. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: Will Drewry Acked-by: Eric Paris Acked-by: Kees Cook v18: updated change desc v17: using new define values as per 3.4 Signed-off-by: James Morris --- fs/exec.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'fs/exec.c') diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index b1fd2025e59a..d038968b54b4 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1245,6 +1245,13 @@ static int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE; } + /* + * This isn't strictly necessary, but it makes it harder for LSMs to + * mess up. + */ + if (current->no_new_privs) + bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS; + n_fs = 1; spin_lock(&p->fs->lock); rcu_read_lock(); @@ -1288,7 +1295,8 @@ int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) bprm->cred->euid = current_euid(); bprm->cred->egid = current_egid(); - if (!(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)) { + if (!(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) && + !current->no_new_privs) { /* Set-uid? */ if (mode & S_ISUID) { bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; -- cgit v1.2.3