From 6d92bc9d483aa1751755a66fee8fb39dffb088c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "H.J. Lu" Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2016 20:04:35 -0700 Subject: x86/build: Build compressed x86 kernels as PIE The 32-bit x86 assembler in binutils 2.26 will generate R_386_GOT32X relocation to get the symbol address in PIC. When the compressed x86 kernel isn't built as PIC, the linker optimizes R_386_GOT32X relocations to their fixed symbol addresses. However, when the compressed x86 kernel is loaded at a different address, it leads to the following load failure: Failed to allocate space for phdrs during the decompression stage. If the compressed x86 kernel is relocatable at run-time, it should be compiled with -fPIE, instead of -fPIC, if possible and should be built as Position Independent Executable (PIE) so that linker won't optimize R_386_GOT32X relocation to its fixed symbol address. Older linkers generate R_386_32 relocations against locally defined symbols, _bss, _ebss, _got and _egot, in PIE. It isn't wrong, just less optimal than R_386_RELATIVE. But the x86 kernel fails to properly handle R_386_32 relocations when relocating the kernel. To generate R_386_RELATIVE relocations, we mark _bss, _ebss, _got and _egot as hidden in both 32-bit and 64-bit x86 kernels. To build a 64-bit compressed x86 kernel as PIE, we need to disable the relocation overflow check to avoid relocation overflow errors. We do this with a new linker command-line option, -z noreloc-overflow, which got added recently: commit 4c10bbaa0912742322f10d9d5bb630ba4e15dfa7 Author: H.J. Lu Date: Tue Mar 15 11:07:06 2016 -0700 Add -z noreloc-overflow option to x86-64 ld Add -z noreloc-overflow command-line option to the x86-64 ELF linker to disable relocation overflow check. This can be used to avoid relocation overflow check if there will be no dynamic relocation overflow at run-time. The 64-bit compressed x86 kernel is built as PIE only if the linker supports -z noreloc-overflow. So far 64-bit relocatable compressed x86 kernel boots fine even when it is built as a normal executable. Signed-off-by: H.J. Lu Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Brian Gerst Cc: Denys Vlasenko Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org [ Edited the changelog and comments. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 14 +++++++++++++- arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 8 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'arch/x86') diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile index 6915ff2bd996..8774cb23064f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ targets := vmlinux vmlinux.bin vmlinux.bin.gz vmlinux.bin.bz2 vmlinux.bin.lzma \ vmlinux.bin.xz vmlinux.bin.lzo vmlinux.bin.lz4 KBUILD_CFLAGS := -m$(BITS) -D__KERNEL__ $(LINUX_INCLUDE) -O2 -KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-strict-aliasing -fPIC +KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-strict-aliasing $(call cc-option, -fPIE, -fPIC) KBUILD_CFLAGS += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING cflags-$(CONFIG_X86_32) := -march=i386 cflags-$(CONFIG_X86_64) := -mcmodel=small @@ -40,6 +40,18 @@ GCOV_PROFILE := n UBSAN_SANITIZE :=n LDFLAGS := -m elf_$(UTS_MACHINE) +ifeq ($(CONFIG_RELOCATABLE),y) +# If kernel is relocatable, build compressed kernel as PIE. +ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_32),y) +LDFLAGS += $(call ld-option, -pie) $(call ld-option, --no-dynamic-linker) +else +# To build 64-bit compressed kernel as PIE, we disable relocation +# overflow check to avoid relocation overflow error with a new linker +# command-line option, -z noreloc-overflow. +LDFLAGS += $(shell $(LD) --help 2>&1 | grep -q "\-z noreloc-overflow" \ + && echo "-z noreloc-overflow -pie --no-dynamic-linker") +endif +endif LDFLAGS_vmlinux := -T hostprogs-y := mkpiggy diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S index 8ef964ddc18e..0256064da8da 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S @@ -31,6 +31,34 @@ #include #include +/* + * The 32-bit x86 assembler in binutils 2.26 will generate R_386_GOT32X + * relocation to get the symbol address in PIC. When the compressed x86 + * kernel isn't built as PIC, the linker optimizes R_386_GOT32X + * relocations to their fixed symbol addresses. However, when the + * compressed x86 kernel is loaded at a different address, it leads + * to the following load failure: + * + * Failed to allocate space for phdrs + * + * during the decompression stage. + * + * If the compressed x86 kernel is relocatable at run-time, it should be + * compiled with -fPIE, instead of -fPIC, if possible and should be built as + * Position Independent Executable (PIE) so that linker won't optimize + * R_386_GOT32X relocation to its fixed symbol address. Older + * linkers generate R_386_32 relocations against locally defined symbols, + * _bss, _ebss, _got and _egot, in PIE. It isn't wrong, just less + * optimal than R_386_RELATIVE. But the x86 kernel fails to properly handle + * R_386_32 relocations when relocating the kernel. To generate + * R_386_RELATIVE relocations, we mark _bss, _ebss, _got and _egot as + * hidden: + */ + .hidden _bss + .hidden _ebss + .hidden _got + .hidden _egot + __HEAD ENTRY(startup_32) #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S index b0c0d16ef58d..86558a199139 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S @@ -33,6 +33,14 @@ #include #include +/* + * Locally defined symbols should be marked hidden: + */ + .hidden _bss + .hidden _ebss + .hidden _got + .hidden _egot + __HEAD .code32 ENTRY(startup_32) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7a98205deebfff9fc96f90d9e7b1a334b0bd3e2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiao Guangrong Date: Fri, 25 Mar 2016 21:19:35 +0800 Subject: KVM: MMU: fix permission_fault() kvm-unit-tests complained about the PFEC is not set properly, e.g,: test pte.rw pte.d pte.nx pde.p pde.rw pde.pse user fetch: FAIL: error code 15 expected 5 Dump mapping: address: 0x123400000000 ------L4: 3e95007 ------L3: 3e96007 ------L2: 2000083 It's caused by the reason that PFEC returned to guest is copied from the PFEC triggered by shadow page table This patch fixes it and makes the logic of updating errcode more clean Signed-off-by: Xiao Guangrong [Do not assume pfec.p=1. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini --- arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 9 ++++----- arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86') diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h index b70df72e2b33..66b33b96a31b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h @@ -173,10 +173,9 @@ static inline u8 permission_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu, int index = (pfec >> 1) + (smap >> (X86_EFLAGS_AC_BIT - PFERR_RSVD_BIT + 1)); bool fault = (mmu->permissions[index] >> pte_access) & 1; + u32 errcode = PFERR_PRESENT_MASK; WARN_ON(pfec & (PFERR_PK_MASK | PFERR_RSVD_MASK)); - pfec |= PFERR_PRESENT_MASK; - if (unlikely(mmu->pkru_mask)) { u32 pkru_bits, offset; @@ -189,15 +188,15 @@ static inline u8 permission_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu, pkru_bits = (kvm_read_pkru(vcpu) >> (pte_pkey * 2)) & 3; /* clear present bit, replace PFEC.RSVD with ACC_USER_MASK. */ - offset = pfec - 1 + + offset = (pfec & ~1) + ((pte_access & PT_USER_MASK) << (PFERR_RSVD_BIT - PT_USER_SHIFT)); pkru_bits &= mmu->pkru_mask >> offset; - pfec |= -pkru_bits & PFERR_PK_MASK; + errcode |= -pkru_bits & PFERR_PK_MASK; fault |= (pkru_bits != 0); } - return -(uint32_t)fault & pfec; + return -(u32)fault & errcode; } void kvm_mmu_invalidate_zap_all_pages(struct kvm *kvm); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h index 1d971c7553c3..bc019f70e0b6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h @@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ retry_walk: goto error; if (unlikely(is_rsvd_bits_set(mmu, pte, walker->level))) { - errcode |= PFERR_RSVD_MASK | PFERR_PRESENT_MASK; + errcode = PFERR_RSVD_MASK | PFERR_PRESENT_MASK; goto error; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From fc5b7f3bf1e1414bd4e91db6918c85ace0c873a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Matlack Date: Wed, 30 Mar 2016 12:24:47 -0700 Subject: kvm: x86: do not leak guest xcr0 into host interrupt handlers An interrupt handler that uses the fpu can kill a KVM VM, if it runs under the following conditions: - the guest's xcr0 register is loaded on the cpu - the guest's fpu context is not loaded - the host is using eagerfpu Note that the guest's xcr0 register and fpu context are not loaded as part of the atomic world switch into "guest mode". They are loaded by KVM while the cpu is still in "host mode". Usage of the fpu in interrupt context is gated by irq_fpu_usable(). The interrupt handler will look something like this: if (irq_fpu_usable()) { kernel_fpu_begin(); [... code that uses the fpu ...] kernel_fpu_end(); } As long as the guest's fpu is not loaded and the host is using eager fpu, irq_fpu_usable() returns true (interrupted_kernel_fpu_idle() returns true). The interrupt handler proceeds to use the fpu with the guest's xcr0 live. kernel_fpu_begin() saves the current fpu context. If this uses XSAVE[OPT], it may leave the xsave area in an undesirable state. According to the SDM, during XSAVE bit i of XSTATE_BV is not modified if bit i is 0 in xcr0. So it's possible that XSTATE_BV[i] == 1 and xcr0[i] == 0 following an XSAVE. kernel_fpu_end() restores the fpu context. Now if any bit i in XSTATE_BV == 1 while xcr0[i] == 0, XRSTOR generates a #GP. The fault is trapped and SIGSEGV is delivered to the current process. Only pre-4.2 kernels appear to be vulnerable to this sequence of events. Commit 653f52c ("kvm,x86: load guest FPU context more eagerly") from 4.2 forces the guest's fpu to always be loaded on eagerfpu hosts. This patch fixes the bug by keeping the host's xcr0 loaded outside of the interrupts-disabled region where KVM switches into guest mode. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: David Matlack [Move load after goto cancel_injection. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 10 ++++------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86') diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 0a2c70e43bc8..9b7798c7b210 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -700,7 +700,6 @@ static int __kvm_set_xcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 xcr) if ((xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512) != XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512) return 1; } - kvm_put_guest_xcr0(vcpu); vcpu->arch.xcr0 = xcr0; if ((xcr0 ^ old_xcr0) & XFEATURE_MASK_EXTEND) @@ -6590,8 +6589,6 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) kvm_x86_ops->prepare_guest_switch(vcpu); if (vcpu->fpu_active) kvm_load_guest_fpu(vcpu); - kvm_load_guest_xcr0(vcpu); - vcpu->mode = IN_GUEST_MODE; srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx); @@ -6618,6 +6615,8 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) goto cancel_injection; } + kvm_load_guest_xcr0(vcpu); + if (req_immediate_exit) smp_send_reschedule(vcpu->cpu); @@ -6667,6 +6666,8 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vcpu->mode = OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE; smp_wmb(); + kvm_put_guest_xcr0(vcpu); + /* Interrupt is enabled by handle_external_intr() */ kvm_x86_ops->handle_external_intr(vcpu); @@ -7314,7 +7315,6 @@ void kvm_load_guest_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * and assume host would use all available bits. * Guest xcr0 would be loaded later. */ - kvm_put_guest_xcr0(vcpu); vcpu->guest_fpu_loaded = 1; __kernel_fpu_begin(); __copy_kernel_to_fpregs(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.state); @@ -7323,8 +7323,6 @@ void kvm_load_guest_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) void kvm_put_guest_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { - kvm_put_guest_xcr0(vcpu); - if (!vcpu->guest_fpu_loaded) { vcpu->fpu_counter = 0; return; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 316314cae15fb0e3869b76b468f59a0c83ac3d4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Bonzini Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2016 12:33:00 +0100 Subject: KVM: x86: mask CPUID(0xD,0x1).EAX against host value MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit This ensures that the guest doesn't see XSAVE extensions (e.g. xgetbv1 or xsavec) that the host lacks. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Radim Krčmář Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini --- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'arch/x86') diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index 8efb839948e5..bbbaa802d13e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -534,6 +534,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, do_cpuid_1_ent(&entry[i], function, idx); if (idx == 1) { entry[i].eax &= kvm_cpuid_D_1_eax_x86_features; + cpuid_mask(&entry[i].eax, CPUID_D_1_EAX); entry[i].ebx = 0; if (entry[i].eax & (F(XSAVES)|F(XSAVEC))) entry[i].ebx = -- cgit v1.2.3 From a3125494cff084b098c80bb36fbe2061ffed9d52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tony Luck Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2016 10:05:16 +0200 Subject: x86/mce: Avoid using object after free in genpool When we loop over all queued machine check error records to pass them to the registered notifiers we use llist_for_each_entry(). But the loop calls gen_pool_free() for the entry in the body of the loop - and then the iterator looks at node->next after the free. Use llist_for_each_entry_safe() instead. Signed-off-by: Tony Luck Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Cc: Cc: Gong Chen Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: linux-edac Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0205920@agluck-desk.sc.intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1459929916-12852-4-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-genpool.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-genpool.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-genpool.c index 0a850100c594..2658e2af74ec 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-genpool.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-genpool.c @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ static char gen_pool_buf[MCE_POOLSZ]; void mce_gen_pool_process(void) { struct llist_node *head; - struct mce_evt_llist *node; + struct mce_evt_llist *node, *tmp; struct mce *mce; head = llist_del_all(&mce_event_llist); @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ void mce_gen_pool_process(void) return; head = llist_reverse_order(head); - llist_for_each_entry(node, head, llnode) { + llist_for_each_entry_safe(node, tmp, head, llnode) { mce = &node->mce; atomic_notifier_call_chain(&x86_mce_decoder_chain, 0, mce); gen_pool_free(mce_evt_pool, (unsigned long)node, sizeof(*node)); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4046d6e81f33b7ef50d6668b78076d54c5e066b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2016 11:18:57 -0700 Subject: Revert "x86: remove the kernel code/data/bss resources from /proc/iomem" This reverts commit c4004b02f8e5b9ce357a0bb1641756cc86962664. Sadly, my hope that nobody would actually use the special kernel entries in /proc/iomem were dashed by kexec. Which reads /proc/iomem explicitly to find the kernel base address. Nasty. Anyway, that means we can't do the sane and simple thing and just remove the entries, and we'll instead have to mask them out based on permissions. Reported-by: Zhengyu Zhang Reported-by: Dave Young Reported-by: Freeman Zhang Reported-by: Emrah Demir Reported-by: Baoquan He Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+) (limited to 'arch/x86') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c index 319b08a5b6ed..2367ae07eb76 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c @@ -146,6 +146,31 @@ int default_check_phys_apicid_present(int phys_apicid) struct boot_params boot_params; +/* + * Machine setup.. + */ +static struct resource data_resource = { + .name = "Kernel data", + .start = 0, + .end = 0, + .flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM +}; + +static struct resource code_resource = { + .name = "Kernel code", + .start = 0, + .end = 0, + .flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM +}; + +static struct resource bss_resource = { + .name = "Kernel bss", + .start = 0, + .end = 0, + .flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM +}; + + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 /* cpu data as detected by the assembly code in head.S */ struct cpuinfo_x86 new_cpu_data = { @@ -924,6 +949,13 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) mpx_mm_init(&init_mm); + code_resource.start = __pa_symbol(_text); + code_resource.end = __pa_symbol(_etext)-1; + data_resource.start = __pa_symbol(_etext); + data_resource.end = __pa_symbol(_edata)-1; + bss_resource.start = __pa_symbol(__bss_start); + bss_resource.end = __pa_symbol(__bss_stop)-1; + #ifdef CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL #ifdef CONFIG_CMDLINE_OVERRIDE strlcpy(boot_command_line, builtin_cmdline, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE); @@ -987,6 +1019,11 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) x86_init.resources.probe_roms(); + /* after parse_early_param, so could debug it */ + insert_resource(&iomem_resource, &code_resource); + insert_resource(&iomem_resource, &data_resource); + insert_resource(&iomem_resource, &bss_resource); + e820_add_kernel_range(); trim_bios_range(); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 -- cgit v1.2.3 From b89c173788c3a8ed571652c203bf59a0e9d700aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andi Kleen Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2016 13:25:33 -0700 Subject: perf/x86/intel: Add model number for Skylake Server to perf Everything the same as base Skylake, just a new model number. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Stephane Eranian Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Vince Weaver Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1460751933-2264-1-git-send-email-andi@firstfloor.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'arch/x86') diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c index 68fa55b4d42e..aff79884e17d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c @@ -3639,6 +3639,7 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void) case 78: /* 14nm Skylake Mobile */ case 94: /* 14nm Skylake Desktop */ + case 85: /* 14nm Skylake Server */ x86_pmu.late_ack = true; memcpy(hw_cache_event_ids, skl_hw_cache_event_ids, sizeof(hw_cache_event_ids)); memcpy(hw_cache_extra_regs, skl_hw_cache_extra_regs, sizeof(hw_cache_extra_regs)); -- cgit v1.2.3 From e1089602a3bf3efd13d0ffc575f3e22213f009da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Srinivas Pandruvada Date: Sun, 17 Apr 2016 08:43:29 -0700 Subject: perf/x86/intel/rapl: Add missing Haswell model Added one missing Haswell model. Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Stephane Eranian Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Vince Weaver Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: hpa@zytor.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1460907809-11897-1-git-send-email-srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'arch/x86') diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c index 70c93f9b03ac..1705c9d75e44 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c @@ -718,6 +718,7 @@ static int __init rapl_pmu_init(void) break; case 60: /* Haswell */ case 69: /* Haswell-Celeron */ + case 70: /* Haswell GT3e */ case 61: /* Broadwell */ case 71: /* Broadwell-H */ rapl_cntr_mask = RAPL_IDX_HSW; -- cgit v1.2.3