From b16a87d0aef7a6be766f6618976dc5ff2c689291 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Björn Töpel Date: Mon, 25 May 2020 10:03:59 +0200 Subject: xsk: Add overflow check for u64 division, stored into u32 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The npgs member of struct xdp_umem is an u32 entity, and stores the number of pages the UMEM consumes. The calculation of npgs npgs = size / PAGE_SIZE can overflow. To avoid overflow scenarios, the division is now first stored in a u64, and the result is verified to fit into 32b. An alternative would be storing the npgs as a u64, however, this wastes memory and is an unrealisticly large packet area. Fixes: c0c77d8fb787 ("xsk: add user memory registration support sockopt") Reported-by: "Minh Bùi Quang" Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Jonathan Lemon Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CACtPs=GGvV-_Yj6rbpzTVnopgi5nhMoCcTkSkYrJHGQHJWFZMQ@mail.gmail.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200525080400.13195-1-bjorn.topel@gmail.com --- net/xdp/xdp_umem.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/xdp/xdp_umem.c b/net/xdp/xdp_umem.c index ed7a6060f73c..3889bd9aec46 100644 --- a/net/xdp/xdp_umem.c +++ b/net/xdp/xdp_umem.c @@ -341,8 +341,8 @@ static int xdp_umem_reg(struct xdp_umem *umem, struct xdp_umem_reg *mr) { bool unaligned_chunks = mr->flags & XDP_UMEM_UNALIGNED_CHUNK_FLAG; u32 chunk_size = mr->chunk_size, headroom = mr->headroom; + u64 npgs, addr = mr->addr, size = mr->len; unsigned int chunks, chunks_per_page; - u64 addr = mr->addr, size = mr->len; int err; if (chunk_size < XDP_UMEM_MIN_CHUNK_SIZE || chunk_size > PAGE_SIZE) { @@ -372,6 +372,10 @@ static int xdp_umem_reg(struct xdp_umem *umem, struct xdp_umem_reg *mr) if ((addr + size) < addr) return -EINVAL; + npgs = div_u64(size, PAGE_SIZE); + if (npgs > U32_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + chunks = (unsigned int)div_u64(size, chunk_size); if (chunks == 0) return -EINVAL; @@ -391,7 +395,7 @@ static int xdp_umem_reg(struct xdp_umem *umem, struct xdp_umem_reg *mr) umem->size = size; umem->headroom = headroom; umem->chunk_size_nohr = chunk_size - headroom; - umem->npgs = size / PAGE_SIZE; + umem->npgs = (u32)npgs; umem->pgs = NULL; umem->user = NULL; umem->flags = mr->flags; -- cgit v1.2.3 From d195b1d1d1196681ac4775e0361e9cca70f740c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Petr Mladek Date: Wed, 27 May 2020 14:28:44 +0200 Subject: powerpc/bpf: Enable bpf_probe_read{, str}() on powerpc again The commit 0ebeea8ca8a4d1d453a ("bpf: Restrict bpf_probe_read{, str}() only to archs where they work") caused that bpf_probe_read{, str}() functions were not longer available on architectures where the same logical address might have different content in kernel and user memory mapping. These architectures should use probe_read_{user,kernel}_str helpers. For backward compatibility, the problematic functions are still available on architectures where the user and kernel address spaces are not overlapping. This is defined CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE. At the moment, these backward compatible functions are enabled only on x86_64, arm, and arm64. Let's do it also on powerpc that has the non overlapping address space as well. Fixes: 0ebeea8ca8a4 ("bpf: Restrict bpf_probe_read{, str}() only to archs where they work") Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200527122844.19524-1-pmladek@suse.com --- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig index 924c541a9260..cb042a4ff19a 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig @@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ config PPC select ARCH_HAS_MMIOWB if PPC64 select ARCH_HAS_PHYS_TO_DMA select ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API + select ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE select ARCH_HAS_PTE_DEVMAP if PPC_BOOK3S_64 select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL select ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_CALLBACKS -- cgit v1.2.3 From 18644cec714aabbab173729192c7594ee57a406b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexei Starovoitov Date: Thu, 28 May 2020 21:38:36 -0700 Subject: bpf: Fix use-after-free in fmod_ret check Fix the following issue: [ 436.749342] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in bpf_trampoline_put+0x39/0x2a0 [ 436.749995] Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881ef38b8a0 by task kworker/3:5/2243 [ 436.750712] [ 436.752677] Workqueue: events bpf_prog_free_deferred [ 436.753183] Call Trace: [ 436.756483] bpf_trampoline_put+0x39/0x2a0 [ 436.756904] bpf_prog_free_deferred+0x16d/0x3d0 [ 436.757377] process_one_work+0x94a/0x15b0 [ 436.761969] [ 436.762130] Allocated by task 2529: [ 436.763323] bpf_trampoline_lookup+0x136/0x540 [ 436.763776] bpf_check+0x2872/0xa0a8 [ 436.764144] bpf_prog_load+0xb6f/0x1350 [ 436.764539] __do_sys_bpf+0x16d7/0x3720 [ 436.765825] [ 436.765988] Freed by task 2529: [ 436.767084] kfree+0xc6/0x280 [ 436.767397] bpf_trampoline_put+0x1fd/0x2a0 [ 436.767826] bpf_check+0x6832/0xa0a8 [ 436.768197] bpf_prog_load+0xb6f/0x1350 [ 436.768594] __do_sys_bpf+0x16d7/0x3720 prog->aux->trampoline = tr should be set only when prog is valid. Otherwise prog freeing will try to put trampoline via prog->aux->trampoline, but it may not point to a valid trampoline. Fixes: 6ba43b761c41 ("bpf: Attachment verification for BPF_MODIFY_RETURN") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: KP Singh Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200529043839.15824-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 24 +++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 8d7ee40e2748..bfea3f9a972f 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -10428,22 +10428,13 @@ static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) } #define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_" -static int check_attach_modify_return(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) +static int check_attach_modify_return(struct bpf_prog *prog, unsigned long addr) { - struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; - unsigned long addr = (unsigned long) prog->aux->trampoline->func.addr; - - /* This is expected to be cleaned up in the future with the KRSI effort - * introducing the LSM_HOOK macro for cleaning up lsm_hooks.h. - */ if (within_error_injection_list(addr) || !strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, prog->aux->attach_func_name, sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)) return 0; - verbose(env, "fmod_ret attach_btf_id %u (%s) is not modifiable\n", - prog->aux->attach_btf_id, prog->aux->attach_func_name); - return -EINVAL; } @@ -10654,11 +10645,18 @@ static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) goto out; } } + + if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { + ret = check_attach_modify_return(prog, addr); + if (ret) + verbose(env, "%s() is not modifiable\n", + prog->aux->attach_func_name); + } + + if (ret) + goto out; tr->func.addr = (void *)addr; prog->aux->trampoline = tr; - - if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) - ret = check_attach_modify_return(env); out: mutex_unlock(&tr->mutex); if (ret) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3a71dc366d4aa51a22f385445f2862231d3fda3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: John Fastabend Date: Fri, 29 May 2020 10:28:40 -0700 Subject: bpf: Fix a verifier issue when assigning 32bit reg states to 64bit ones With the latest trunk llvm (llvm 11), I hit a verifier issue for test_prog subtest test_verif_scale1. The following simplified example illustrate the issue: w9 = 0 /* R9_w=inv0 */ r8 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 80) /* __sk_buff->data_end */ r7 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 76) /* __sk_buff->data */ ...... w2 = w9 /* R2_w=inv0 */ r6 = r7 /* R6_w=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0,imm=0) */ r6 += r2 /* R6_w=inv(id=0) */ r3 = r6 /* R3_w=inv(id=0) */ r3 += 14 /* R3_w=inv(id=0) */ if r3 > r8 goto end r5 = *(u32 *)(r6 + 0) /* R6_w=inv(id=0) */ <== error here: R6 invalid mem access 'inv' ... end: In real test_verif_scale1 code, "w9 = 0" and "w2 = w9" are in different basic blocks. In the above, after "r6 += r2", r6 becomes a scalar, which eventually caused the memory access error. The correct register state should be a pkt pointer. The inprecise register state starts at "w2 = w9". The 32bit register w9 is 0, in __reg_assign_32_into_64(), the 64bit reg->smax_value is assigned to be U32_MAX. The 64bit reg->smin_value is 0 and the 64bit register itself remains constant based on reg->var_off. In adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), the verifier checks for a known constant, smin_val must be equal to smax_val. Since they are not equal, the verifier decides r6 is a unknown scalar, which caused later failure. The llvm10 does not have this issue as it generates different code: w9 = 0 /* R9_w=inv0 */ r8 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 80) /* __sk_buff->data_end */ r7 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 76) /* __sk_buff->data */ ...... r6 = r7 /* R6_w=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0,imm=0) */ r6 += r9 /* R6_w=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0,imm=0) */ r3 = r6 /* R3_w=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0,imm=0) */ r3 += 14 /* R3_w=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0,imm=0) */ if r3 > r8 goto end ... To fix the above issue, we can include zero in the test condition for assigning the s32_max_value and s32_min_value to their 64-bit equivalents smax_value and smin_value. Further, fix the condition to avoid doing zero extension bounds checks when s32_min_value <= 0. This could allow for the case where bounds 32-bit bounds (-1,1) get incorrectly translated to (0,1) 64-bit bounds. When in-fact the -1 min value needs to force U32_MAX bound. Fixes: 3f50f132d840 ("bpf: Verifier, do explicit ALU32 bounds tracking") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Yonghong Song Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/159077331983.6014.5758956193749002737.stgit@john-Precision-5820-Tower --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index bfea3f9a972f..efe14cf24bc6 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -1168,14 +1168,14 @@ static void __reg_assign_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) * but must be positive otherwise set to worse case bounds * and refine later from tnum. */ - if (reg->s32_min_value > 0) - reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value; - else - reg->smin_value = 0; - if (reg->s32_max_value > 0) + if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0 && reg->s32_max_value >= 0) reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value; else reg->smax_value = U32_MAX; + if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0) + reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value; + else + reg->smin_value = 0; } static void __reg_combine_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) -- cgit v1.2.3 From e3effcdfe02eb20f23d4f1833c75658ddc49e65a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: John Fastabend Date: Fri, 29 May 2020 10:28:59 -0700 Subject: bpf, selftests: Verifier bounds tests need to be updated After previous fix for zero extension test_verifier tests #65 and #66 now fail. Before the fix we can see the alu32 mov op at insn 10 10: R0_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=8,imm=0) R1_w=invP(id=0, smin_value=4294967168,smax_value=4294967423, umin_value=4294967168,umax_value=4294967423, var_off=(0x0; 0x1ffffffff), s32_min_value=-2147483648,s32_max_value=2147483647, u32_min_value=0,u32_max_value=-1) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm 10: (bc) w1 = w1 11: R0_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=8,imm=0) R1_w=invP(id=0, smin_value=0,smax_value=2147483647, umin_value=0,umax_value=4294967295, var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff), s32_min_value=-2147483648,s32_max_value=2147483647, u32_min_value=0,u32_max_value=-1) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm After the fix at insn 10 because we have 's32_min_value < 0' the following step 11 now has 'smax_value=U32_MAX' where before we pulled the s32_max_value bound into the smax_value as seen above in 11 with smax_value=2147483647. 10: R0_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=8,imm=0) R1_w=inv(id=0, smin_value=4294967168,smax_value=4294967423, umin_value=4294967168,umax_value=4294967423, var_off=(0x0; 0x1ffffffff), s32_min_value=-2147483648, s32_max_value=2147483647, u32_min_value=0,u32_max_value=-1) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm 10: (bc) w1 = w1 11: R0_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=8,imm=0) R1_w=inv(id=0, smin_value=0,smax_value=4294967295, umin_value=0,umax_value=4294967295, var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff), s32_min_value=-2147483648, s32_max_value=2147483647, u32_min_value=0, u32_max_value=-1) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm The fall out of this is by the time we get to the failing instruction at step 14 where previously we had the following: 14: R0_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=8,imm=0) R1_w=inv(id=0, smin_value=72057594021150720,smax_value=72057594029539328, umin_value=72057594021150720,umax_value=72057594029539328, var_off=(0xffffffff000000; 0xffffff), s32_min_value=-16777216,s32_max_value=-1, u32_min_value=-16777216,u32_max_value=-1) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm 14: (0f) r0 += r1 We now have, 14: R0_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=8,imm=0) R1_w=inv(id=0, smin_value=0,smax_value=72057594037927935, umin_value=0,umax_value=72057594037927935, var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffffffffff), s32_min_value=-2147483648,s32_max_value=2147483647, u32_min_value=0,u32_max_value=-1) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm 14: (0f) r0 += r1 In the original step 14 'smin_value=72057594021150720' this trips the logic in the verifier function check_reg_sane_offset(), if (smin >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || smin <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { verbose(env, "value %lld makes %s pointer be out of bounds\n", smin, reg_type_str[type]); return false; } Specifically, the 'smin <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF' check. But with the fix at step 14 we have bounds 'smin_value=0' so the above check is not tripped because BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF=1<<29. We have a smin_value=0 here because at step 10 the smaller smin_value=0 means the subtractions at steps 11 and 12 bring the smin_value negative. 11: (17) r1 -= 2147483584 12: (17) r1 -= 2147483584 13: (77) r1 >>= 8 Then the shift clears the top bit and smin_value is set to 0. Note we still have the smax_value in the fixed code so any reads will fail. An alternative would be to have reg_sane_check() do both smin and smax value tests. To fix the test we can omit the 'r1 >>=8' at line 13. This will change the err string, but keeps the intention of the test as suggseted by the title, "check after truncation of boundary-crossing range". If the verifier logic changes a different value is likely to be thrown in the error or the error will no longer be thrown forcing this test to be examined. With this change we see the new state at step 13. 13: R0_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=8,vs=8,imm=0) R1_w=invP(id=0, smin_value=-4294967168,smax_value=127, umin_value=0,umax_value=18446744073709551615, s32_min_value=-2147483648,s32_max_value=2147483647, u32_min_value=0,u32_max_value=-1) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm Giving the expected out of bounds error, "value -4294967168 makes map_value pointer be out of bounds" However, for unpriv case we see a different error now because of the mixed signed bounds pointer arithmatic. This seems OK so I've only added the unpriv_errstr for this. Another optino may have been to do addition on r1 instead of subtraction but I favor the approach above slightly. Signed-off-by: John Fastabend Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Acked-by: Yonghong Song Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/159077333942.6014.14004320043595756079.stgit@john-Precision-5820-Tower --- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds.c | 24 ++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds.c index a253a064e6e0..fafa5409bdac 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds.c @@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), - BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 9), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 8), /* r1 = [0x00, 0xff] */ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, 0), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 0xffffff80 >> 1), @@ -253,10 +253,6 @@ * [0xffff'ffff'0000'0080, 0xffff'ffff'ffff'ffff] */ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_1, 0xffffff80 >> 1), - /* r1 = 0 or - * [0x00ff'ffff'ff00'0000, 0x00ff'ffff'ffff'ffff] - */ - BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, BPF_REG_1, 8), /* error on OOB pointer computation */ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1), /* exit */ @@ -265,8 +261,10 @@ }, .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 }, /* not actually fully unbounded, but the bound is very high */ - .errstr = "value 72057594021150720 makes map_value pointer be out of bounds", - .result = REJECT + .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root", + .result_unpriv = REJECT, + .errstr = "value -4294967168 makes map_value pointer be out of bounds", + .result = REJECT, }, { "bounds check after truncation of boundary-crossing range (2)", @@ -276,7 +274,7 @@ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), - BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 9), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 8), /* r1 = [0x00, 0xff] */ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, 0), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 0xffffff80 >> 1), @@ -293,10 +291,6 @@ * [0xffff'ffff'0000'0080, 0xffff'ffff'ffff'ffff] */ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_1, 0xffffff80 >> 1), - /* r1 = 0 or - * [0x00ff'ffff'ff00'0000, 0x00ff'ffff'ffff'ffff] - */ - BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, BPF_REG_1, 8), /* error on OOB pointer computation */ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1), /* exit */ @@ -305,8 +299,10 @@ }, .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 }, /* not actually fully unbounded, but the bound is very high */ - .errstr = "value 72057594021150720 makes map_value pointer be out of bounds", - .result = REJECT + .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root", + .result_unpriv = REJECT, + .errstr = "value -4294967168 makes map_value pointer be out of bounds", + .result = REJECT, }, { "bounds check after wrapping 32-bit addition", -- cgit v1.2.3 From cf66c29bd7534813d2e1971fab71e25fe87c7e0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: John Fastabend Date: Fri, 29 May 2020 10:29:18 -0700 Subject: bpf, selftests: Add a verifier test for assigning 32bit reg states to 64bit ones Added a verifier test for assigning 32bit reg states to 64bit where 32bit reg holds a constant value of 0. Without previous kernel verifier.c fix, the test in this patch will fail. Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song Signed-off-by: John Fastabend Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/159077335867.6014.2075350327073125374.stgit@john-Precision-5820-Tower --- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds.c index fafa5409bdac..58f4aa593b1b 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds.c @@ -535,3 +535,25 @@ }, .result = ACCEPT }, +{ + "assigning 32bit bounds to 64bit for wA = 0, wB = wA", + .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)), + BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_9, 0), + BPF_MOV32_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_9), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_7), + BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_2), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_6), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_3, 8), + BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_8, 1), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_5, BPF_REG_6, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, + .result = ACCEPT, + .flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, +}, -- cgit v1.2.3