From 8eb613c0b8f19627ba1846dcf78bb2c85edbe8dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mimi Zohar Date: Sun, 3 May 2020 01:00:02 -0400 Subject: ima: verify mprotect change is consistent with mmap policy Files can be mmap'ed read/write and later changed to execute to circumvent IMA's mmap appraise policy rules. Due to locking issues (mmap semaphore would be taken prior to i_mutex), files can not be measured or appraised at this point. Eliminate this integrity gap, by denying the mprotect PROT_EXECUTE change, if an mmap appraise policy rule exists. On mprotect change success, return 0. On failure, return -EACESS. Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- include/linux/ima.h | 7 ++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 7 +++++- 3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index aefe758f4466..9164e1534ec9 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask); extern void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct inode *inode); extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file); extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot); +extern int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot); extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id); extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id); extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, @@ -70,6 +71,12 @@ static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) return 0; } +static inline int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, + unsigned long prot) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) { return 0; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index f96f151294e6..800fb3bba418 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -393,6 +393,57 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) return 0; } +/** + * ima_file_mprotect - based on policy, limit mprotect change + * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel. + * + * Files can be mmap'ed read/write and later changed to execute to circumvent + * IMA's mmap appraisal policy rules. Due to locking issues (mmap semaphore + * would be taken before i_mutex), files can not be measured or appraised at + * this point. Eliminate this integrity gap by denying the mprotect + * PROT_EXECUTE change, if an mmap appraise policy rule exists. + * + * On mprotect change success, return 0. On failure, return -EACESS. + */ +int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) +{ + struct ima_template_desc *template; + struct file *file = vma->vm_file; + char filename[NAME_MAX]; + char *pathbuf = NULL; + const char *pathname = NULL; + struct inode *inode; + int result = 0; + int action; + u32 secid; + int pcr; + + /* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */ + if (!vma->vm_file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) + return 0; + + security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file); + action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, + MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, 0); + + /* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */ + if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK))) + return 0; + + if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) + result = -EPERM; + + file = vma->vm_file; + pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename); + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, pathname, + "collect_data", "failed-mprotect", result, 0); + if (pathbuf) + __putname(pathbuf); + + return result; +} + /** * ima_bprm_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement. * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 7fed24b9d57e..dd0917c5bfe9 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1512,7 +1512,12 @@ int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) { - return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot); + int ret; + + ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot); + if (ret) + return ret; + return ima_file_mprotect(vma, prot); } int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) -- cgit v1.2.3