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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-04-07 11:11:41 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-04-07 11:11:41 -0700 |
commit | 3612605a5a5bc3d3ae0ec861328be8a2990f2c7a (patch) | |
tree | 6c387085155874bdf15ff9eec539c15801880734 /security | |
parent | 62f8e6c5dcb6666e7da402aea28fcf846eea144c (diff) | |
parent | df0ce17331e2501dbffc060041dfc6c5f85227b5 (diff) | |
download | linux-3612605a5a5bc3d3ae0ec861328be8a2990f2c7a.tar.bz2 |
Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull general security layer updates from James Morris:
- Convert security hooks from list to hlist, a nice cleanup, saving
about 50% of space, from Sargun Dhillon.
- Only pass the cred, not the secid, to kill_pid_info_as_cred and
security_task_kill (as the secid can be determined from the cred),
from Stephen Smalley.
- Close a potential race in kernel_read_file(), by making the file
unwritable before calling the LSM check (vs after), from Kees Cook.
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security: convert security hooks to use hlist
exec: Set file unwritable before LSM check
usb, signal, security: only pass the cred, not the secid, to kill_pid_info_as_cred and security_task_kill
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/lsm.c | 17 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 26 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 12 |
4 files changed, 35 insertions, 27 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 6134302c143c..528f59b580a8 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -716,16 +716,23 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task, } static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct siginfo *info, - int sig, u32 secid) + int sig, const struct cred *cred) { struct aa_label *cl, *tl; int error; - if (secid) - /* TODO: after secid to label mapping is done. - * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior + if (cred) { + /* + * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior */ - return 0; + cl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); + tl = aa_get_task_label(target); + error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig); + aa_put_label(cl); + aa_put_label(tl); + return error; + } + cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); tl = aa_get_task_label(target); error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index af53d2834e20..7301902a8721 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -61,11 +61,11 @@ static void __init do_security_initcalls(void) int __init security_init(void) { int i; - struct list_head *list = (struct list_head *) &security_hook_heads; + struct hlist_head *list = (struct hlist_head *) &security_hook_heads; - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(security_hook_heads) / sizeof(struct list_head); + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(security_hook_heads) / sizeof(struct hlist_head); i++) - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&list[i]); + INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&list[i]); pr_info("Security Framework initialized\n"); /* @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { hooks[i].lsm = lsm; - list_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head); + hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head); } if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0) panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__); @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_lsm_notifier); do { \ struct security_hook_list *P; \ \ - list_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \ + hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \ P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ } while (0) @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_lsm_notifier); do { \ struct security_hook_list *P; \ \ - list_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \ + hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \ RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ if (RC != 0) \ break; \ @@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) * agree that it should be set it will. If any module * thinks it should not be set it won't. */ - list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) { + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) { rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages); if (rc <= 0) { cap_sys_admin = 0; @@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buf /* * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. */ - list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) { + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) { rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc); if (rc != -EOPNOTSUPP) return rc; @@ -823,7 +823,7 @@ int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void /* * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. */ - list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) { + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) { rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size, flags); if (rc != -EOPNOTSUPP) @@ -1114,9 +1114,9 @@ int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) } int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, - int sig, u32 secid) + int sig, const struct cred *cred) { - return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, secid); + return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, cred); } int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, @@ -1126,7 +1126,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, int rc = -ENOSYS; struct security_hook_list *hp; - list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) { + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) { thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); if (thisrc != -ENOSYS) { rc = thisrc; @@ -1651,7 +1651,7 @@ int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, * For speed optimization, we explicitly break the loop rather than * using the macro */ - list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, list) { rc = hp->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, fl); break; diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 0314fc766134..2b8c55e181ae 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -4156,16 +4156,19 @@ static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) } static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, - int sig, u32 secid) + int sig, const struct cred *cred) { + u32 secid; u32 perm; if (!sig) perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */ else perm = signal_to_av(sig); - if (!secid) + if (!cred) secid = current_sid(); + else + secid = cred_sid(cred); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); } diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 0735b8db158b..57fef8e04658 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -2228,15 +2228,13 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) * @p: the task object * @info: unused * @sig: unused - * @secid: identifies the smack to use in lieu of current's + * @cred: identifies the cred to use in lieu of current's * * Return 0 if write access is permitted * - * The secid behavior is an artifact of an SELinux hack - * in the USB code. Someday it may go away. */ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, - int sig, u32 secid) + int sig, const struct cred *cred) { struct smk_audit_info ad; struct smack_known *skp; @@ -2252,17 +2250,17 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, * Sending a signal requires that the sender * can write the receiver. */ - if (secid == 0) { + if (cred == NULL) { rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad); rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_DELIVER, rc); return rc; } /* - * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO + * If the cred isn't NULL we're dealing with some USB IO * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing * we can't take privilege into account. */ - skp = smack_from_secid(secid); + skp = smk_of_task(cred->security); rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad); rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc); return rc; |