Merge branch 'master' into next

Conflicts:
	fs/namei.c

Manually merged per:

diff --cc fs/namei.c
index 734f2b5,bbc15c2..0000000
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@@ -860,9 -848,8 +849,10 @@@ static int __link_path_walk(const char
  		nd->flags |= LOOKUP_CONTINUE;
  		err = exec_permission_lite(inode);
  		if (err == -EAGAIN)
- 			err = vfs_permission(nd, MAY_EXEC);
+ 			err = inode_permission(nd->path.dentry->d_inode,
+ 					       MAY_EXEC);
 +		if (!err)
 +			err = ima_path_check(&nd->path, MAY_EXEC);
   		if (err)
  			break;

@@@ -1525,14 -1506,9 +1509,14 @@@ int may_open(struct path *path, int acc
  		flag &= ~O_TRUNC;
  	}

- 	error = vfs_permission(nd, acc_mode);
+ 	error = inode_permission(inode, acc_mode);
  	if (error)
  		return error;
 +
- 	error = ima_path_check(&nd->path,
++	error = ima_path_check(path,
 +			       acc_mode & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));
 +	if (error)
 +		return error;
  	/*
  	 * An append-only file must be opened in append mode for writing.
  	 */

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

11 files changed, 170 insertions, 39 deletions

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index a79b23f73d03..bf129f87de7e 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -82,6 +82,15 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 	  IPSec.
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
+config SECURITY_PATH
+	bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
+	depends on SECURITY
+	help
+	  This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
+	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
+	  implement pathname based access controls.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
 config SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 	bool "File POSIX Capabilities"
 	default n
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 2dce66fcb992..c545bd1300b5 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -263,6 +263,53 @@ static void cap_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
 	*secid = 0;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+static int cap_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+			  unsigned int dev)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			    const char *old_name)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
+			 struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_rename(struct path *old_path, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			   struct path *new_path, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
+			     unsigned int time_attrs)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 static int cap_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -883,6 +930,16 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getsecid);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_mknod);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_mkdir);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_rmdir);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_unlink);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_symlink);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_link);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_rename);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_truncate);
+#endif
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_permission);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_free_security);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index f0e671dcfff0..7cd61a5f5205 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	int error;
 
-	if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
+	if (!inode->i_op->getxattr)
 	       return 0;
 
 	error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0);
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 
-	if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->removexattr)
+	if (!inode->i_op->removexattr)
 	       return 0;
 
 	return inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
 
 	memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data));
 
-	if (!inode || !inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
+	if (!inode || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
 		return -ENODATA;
 
 	size = inode->i_op->getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &caps,
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
index 5ba78701adc3..3aacd0fe7179 100644
--- a/security/device_cgroup.c
+++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
@@ -513,11 +513,14 @@ int devcgroup_inode_mknod(int mode, dev_t dev)
 	struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup;
 	struct dev_whitelist_item *wh;
 
+	if (!S_ISBLK(mode) && !S_ISCHR(mode))
+		return 0;
+
 	rcu_read_lock();
 
 	dev_cgroup = task_devcgroup(current);
 
-	list_for_each_entry(wh, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) {
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(wh, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) {
 		if (wh->type & DEV_ALL)
 			goto acc_check;
 		if ((wh->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !S_ISBLK(mode))
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index b41e708147ae..f3b91bfbe4cb 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -61,9 +61,6 @@ static struct inode *get_inode(struct super_block *sb, int mode, dev_t dev)
 
 	if (inode) {
 		inode->i_mode = mode;
-		inode->i_uid = 0;
-		inode->i_gid = 0;
-		inode->i_blocks = 0;
 		inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
 		switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
 		default:
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 09796797d122..b1ec3b4ee17d 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -54,11 +54,11 @@ static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type,
  * - returns the new key's serial number
  * - implements add_key()
  */
-asmlinkage long sys_add_key(const char __user *_type,
-			    const char __user *_description,
-			    const void __user *_payload,
-			    size_t plen,
-			    key_serial_t ringid)
+SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
+		const char __user *, _description,
+		const void __user *, _payload,
+		size_t, plen,
+		key_serial_t, ringid)
 {
 	key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
 	char type[32], *description;
@@ -146,10 +146,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_add_key(const char __user *_type,
  *   - if the _callout_info string is empty, it will be rendered as "-"
  * - implements request_key()
  */
-asmlinkage long sys_request_key(const char __user *_type,
-				const char __user *_description,
-				const char __user *_callout_info,
-				key_serial_t destringid)
+SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
+		const char __user *, _description,
+		const char __user *, _callout_info,
+		key_serial_t, destringid)
 {
 	struct key_type *ktype;
 	struct key *key;
@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ long keyctl_join_session_keyring(const char __user *_name)
 
 	/* join the session */
 	ret = join_session_keyring(name);
+	kfree(name);
 
  error:
 	return ret;
@@ -1216,8 +1217,8 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
 /*
  * the key control system call
  */
-asmlinkage long sys_keyctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
-			   unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
+SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
+		unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5)
 {
 	switch (option) {
 	case KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID:
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index a02f243f09c0..c3586c0d97e2 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -373,6 +373,72 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+int security_path_mknod(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+			unsigned int dev)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+		return 0;
+	return security_ops->path_mknod(path, dentry, mode, dev);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod);
+
+int security_path_mkdir(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+		return 0;
+	return security_ops->path_mkdir(path, dentry, mode);
+}
+
+int security_path_rmdir(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+		return 0;
+	return security_ops->path_rmdir(path, dentry);
+}
+
+int security_path_unlink(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+		return 0;
+	return security_ops->path_unlink(path, dentry);
+}
+
+int security_path_symlink(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry,
+			  const char *old_name)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+		return 0;
+	return security_ops->path_symlink(path, dentry, old_name);
+}
+
+int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
+		       struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(old_dentry->d_inode)))
+		return 0;
+	return security_ops->path_link(old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
+}
+
+int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			 struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(old_dentry->d_inode) ||
+		     (new_dentry->d_inode && IS_PRIVATE(new_dentry->d_inode))))
+		return 0;
+	return security_ops->path_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
+					 new_dentry);
+}
+
+int security_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
+			   unsigned int time_attrs)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+		return 0;
+	return security_ops->path_truncate(path, length, time_attrs);
+}
+#endif
+
 int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 77fb3c8d9267..01ec6d2c6b97 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -847,8 +847,6 @@ static struct inode *sel_make_inode(struct super_block *sb, int mode)
 
 	if (ret) {
 		ret->i_mode = mode;
-		ret->i_uid = ret->i_gid = 0;
-		ret->i_blocks = 0;
 		ret->i_atime = ret->i_mtime = ret->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
 	}
 	return ret;
@@ -1211,7 +1209,7 @@ static struct avc_cache_stats *sel_avc_get_stat_idx(loff_t *idx)
 {
 	int cpu;
 
-	for (cpu = *idx; cpu < NR_CPUS; ++cpu) {
+	for (cpu = *idx; cpu < nr_cpu_ids; ++cpu) {
 		if (!cpu_possible(cpu))
 			continue;
 		*idx = cpu + 1;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 343c8ab14af0..c65e4fe4a0f1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2602,7 +2602,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
 		/* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
-		if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL && op != AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
+		if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
@@ -2736,10 +2736,10 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
 		switch (op) {
-		case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+		case Audit_equal:
 			match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
 			break;
-		case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
+		case Audit_not_equal:
 			match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user);
 			break;
 		}
@@ -2747,10 +2747,10 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
 		switch (op) {
-		case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+		case Audit_equal:
 			match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
 			break;
-		case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
+		case Audit_not_equal:
 			match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role);
 			break;
 		}
@@ -2758,10 +2758,10 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
 		switch (op) {
-		case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+		case Audit_equal:
 			match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
 			break;
-		case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
+		case Audit_not_equal:
 			match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type);
 			break;
 		}
@@ -2774,31 +2774,31 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 			  field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
 			 &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
 		switch (op) {
-		case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+		case Audit_equal:
 			match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
 					     level);
 			break;
-		case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
+		case Audit_not_equal:
 			match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
 					      level);
 			break;
-		case AUDIT_LESS_THAN:
+		case Audit_lt:
 			match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
 					       level) &&
 				 !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
 					       level));
 			break;
-		case AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
+		case Audit_le:
 			match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
 					      level);
 			break;
-		case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN:
+		case Audit_gt:
 			match = (mls_level_dom(level,
 					      &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
 				 !mls_level_eq(level,
 					       &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
 			break;
-		case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
+		case Audit_ge:
 			match = mls_level_dom(level,
 					      &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
 			break;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 6bfaba6177c2..0278bc083044 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2691,7 +2691,7 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 	if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL && op != AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
+	if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	*rule = smk_import(rulestr, 0);
@@ -2755,9 +2755,9 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 	 * both pointers will point to the same smack_known
 	 * label.
 	 */
-	if (op == AUDIT_EQUAL)
+	if (op == Audit_equal)
 		return (rule == smack);
-	if (op == AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
+	if (op == Audit_not_equal)
 		return (rule != smack);
 
 	return 0;
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index bf107a389ac1..8e42800878f4 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		break;
 	case 'a':
 	case 'A':
-		rule.smk_access |= MAY_READ;
+		rule.smk_access |= MAY_APPEND;
 		break;
 	default:
 		goto out;
@@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (skp == NULL)
 		goto out;
 
-	rule += SMK_LABELLEN;;
+	rule += SMK_LABELLEN;
 	ret = sscanf(rule, "%d", &maplevel);
 	if (ret != 1 || maplevel > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL)
 		goto out;