diff options
author | Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> | 2014-04-17 17:26:50 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2014-04-18 18:32:00 -0400 |
commit | b14878ccb7fac0242db82720b784ab62c467c0dc (patch) | |
tree | 6ffbf594320f4088c0fffa053512583e6dbd8c93 /include | |
parent | 5a292f7bc641bc16277173d1ff7cfe8cba298f00 (diff) | |
download | linux-b14878ccb7fac0242db82720b784ab62c467c0dc.tar.bz2 |
net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint
Currently, it is possible to create an SCTP socket, then switch
auth_enable via sysctl setting to 1 and crash the system on connect:
Oops[#1]:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.14.1-mipsgit-20140415 #1
task: ffffffff8056ce80 ti: ffffffff8055c000 task.ti: ffffffff8055c000
[...]
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8043c4e8>] sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac+0x68/0x80
[<ffffffff8042b300>] sctp_process_init+0x5e0/0x8a4
[<ffffffff8042188c>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x234/0x34c
[<ffffffff804228c8>] sctp_do_sm+0xb4/0x1e8
[<ffffffff80425a08>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1c4/0x214
[<ffffffff8043af68>] sctp_rcv+0x588/0x630
[<ffffffff8043e8e8>] sctp6_rcv+0x10/0x24
[<ffffffff803acb50>] ip6_input+0x2c0/0x440
[<ffffffff8030fc00>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x4a8/0x564
[<ffffffff80310650>] process_backlog+0xb4/0x18c
[<ffffffff80313cbc>] net_rx_action+0x12c/0x210
[<ffffffff80034254>] __do_softirq+0x17c/0x2ac
[<ffffffff800345e0>] irq_exit+0x54/0xb0
[<ffffffff800075a4>] ret_from_irq+0x0/0x4
[<ffffffff800090ec>] rm7k_wait_irqoff+0x24/0x48
[<ffffffff8005e388>] cpu_startup_entry+0xc0/0x148
[<ffffffff805a88b0>] start_kernel+0x37c/0x398
Code: dd0900b8 000330f8 0126302d <dcc60000> 50c0fff1 0047182a a48306a0
03e00008 00000000
---[ end trace b530b0551467f2fd ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
What happens while auth_enable=0 in that case is, that
ep->auth_hmacs is initialized to NULL in sctp_auth_init_hmacs()
when endpoint is being created.
After that point, if an admin switches over to auth_enable=1,
the machine can crash due to NULL pointer dereference during
reception of an INIT chunk. When we enter sctp_process_init()
via sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() in order to respond to an INIT chunk,
the INIT verification succeeds and while we walk and process
all INIT params via sctp_process_param() we find that
net->sctp.auth_enable is set, therefore do not fall through,
but invoke sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac() instead, and thus,
dereference what we have set to NULL during endpoint
initialization phase.
The fix is to make auth_enable immutable by caching its value
during endpoint initialization, so that its original value is
being carried along until destruction. The bug seems to originate
from the very first days.
Fix in joint work with Daniel Borkmann.
Reported-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Tested-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'include')
-rw-r--r-- | include/net/sctp/structs.h | 4 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/sctp/structs.h b/include/net/sctp/structs.h index d992ca3145fe..0dfcc92600e8 100644 --- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h +++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h @@ -1241,6 +1241,7 @@ struct sctp_endpoint { /* SCTP-AUTH: endpoint shared keys */ struct list_head endpoint_shared_keys; __u16 active_key_id; + __u8 auth_enable; }; /* Recover the outter endpoint structure. */ @@ -1269,7 +1270,8 @@ struct sctp_endpoint *sctp_endpoint_is_match(struct sctp_endpoint *, int sctp_has_association(struct net *net, const union sctp_addr *laddr, const union sctp_addr *paddr); -int sctp_verify_init(struct net *net, const struct sctp_association *asoc, +int sctp_verify_init(struct net *net, const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + const struct sctp_association *asoc, sctp_cid_t, sctp_init_chunk_t *peer_init, struct sctp_chunk *chunk, struct sctp_chunk **err_chunk); int sctp_process_init(struct sctp_association *, struct sctp_chunk *chunk, |