diff options
| author | Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> | 2010-11-11 14:05:18 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2010-11-12 07:55:32 -0800 |
| commit | eaf06b241b091357e72b76863ba16e89610d31bd (patch) | |
| tree | 83bc8667309050b3538630707513574c14c51f37 /include | |
| parent | 203f40a5a030ed4048cd40e3bd9ab5df6c5df589 (diff) | |
| download | linux-eaf06b241b091357e72b76863ba16e89610d31bd.tar.bz2 | |
Restrict unprivileged access to kernel syslog
The kernel syslog contains debugging information that is often useful
during exploitation of other vulnerabilities, such as kernel heap
addresses. Rather than futilely attempt to sanitize hundreds (or
thousands) of printk statements and simultaneously cripple useful
debugging functionality, it is far simpler to create an option that
prevents unprivileged users from reading the syslog.
This patch, loosely based on grsecurity's GRKERNSEC_DMESG, creates the
dmesg_restrict sysctl. When set to "0", the default, no restrictions are
enforced. When set to "1", only users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can read the
kernel syslog via dmesg(8) or other mechanisms.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: explain the config option in kernel.txt]
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Acked-by: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/kernel.h | 1 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h index b526947bdf48..fc3da9e4da19 100644 --- a/include/linux/kernel.h +++ b/include/linux/kernel.h @@ -293,6 +293,7 @@ extern bool printk_timed_ratelimit(unsigned long *caller_jiffies, unsigned int interval_msec); extern int printk_delay_msec; +extern int dmesg_restrict; /* * Print a one-time message (analogous to WARN_ONCE() et al): |