CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials

Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management.  This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.

A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().

With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:

	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
	int ret = blah(new);
	if (ret < 0) {
		abort_creds(new);
		return ret;
	}
	return commit_creds(new);

There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.

To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const.  The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers.  Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:

  (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.

  (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.

The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).

This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.

This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:

 (1) execve().

     This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
     security code rather than altering the current creds directly.

 (2) Temporary credential overrides.

     do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
     temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
     preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
     on the thread being dumped.

     This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
     credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
     the task's objective credentials.

 (3) LSM interface.

     A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:

     (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
     (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()

     	 Removed in favour of security_capset().

     (*) security_capset(), ->capset()

     	 New.  This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
     	 creds and the proposed capability sets.  It should fill in the new
     	 creds or return an error.  All pointers, barring the pointer to the
     	 new creds, are now const.

     (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()

     	 Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
     	 killed if it's an error.

     (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()

     	 Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().

     (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()

     	 New.  Free security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()

     	 New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()

     	 New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
     	 security by commit_creds().

     (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()

     	 Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().

     (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()

     	 Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid().  This is used by
     	 cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
     	 setuid() changes.  Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
     	 than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().

     (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()

     	 Removed.  Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
     	 directly to init's credentials.

	 NOTE!  This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
	 longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.

     (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
     (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()

     	 Changed.  These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
     	 refer to the security context.

 (4) sys_capset().

     This has been simplified and uses less locking.  The LSM functions it
     calls have been merged.

 (5) reparent_to_kthreadd().

     This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
     commit_thread() to point that way.

 (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()

     __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
     beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
     user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
     successful.

     switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
     folded into that.  commit_creds() should take care of protecting
     __sigqueue_alloc().

 (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.

     The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
     abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
     it.

     security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section.  This
     guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.

     The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().

     Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
     commit_creds().

     The get functions all simply access the data directly.

 (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().

     security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
     want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
     rather than through an argument.

     Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
     if it doesn't end up using it.

 (9) Keyrings.

     A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:

     (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
     	 all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
     	 They may want separating out again later.

     (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
     	 rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.

     (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
     	 thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
     	 keyring.

     (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
     	 the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.

     (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
     	 credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
     	 process or session keyrings (they're shared).

(10) Usermode helper.

     The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
     subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer.  This set
     of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
     after it has been cloned.

     call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
     call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used.  A
     special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
     specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.

     call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
     supplied keyring as the new session keyring.

(11) SELinux.

     SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
     interface changes mentioned above:

     (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
     	 current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
     	 that covers getting the ptracer's SID.  Whilst this lock ensures that
     	 the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
     	 until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
     	 lock.

(12) is_single_threaded().

     This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
     a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
     wants to use it too.

     The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
     with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough.  We really want
     to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).

(13) nfsd.

     The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
     credentials it is going to use.  It really needs to pass the credentials
     down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
     in this series have been applied.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

5 files changed, 138 insertions, 95 deletions

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index a5330e1a2216..9bd3559ddece 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1007,13 +1007,12 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 	 */
 	current->mm->task_size = TASK_SIZE;
 
-	if (bprm->e_uid != current_euid() || bprm->e_gid != current_egid()) {
-		suid_keys(current);
+	if (bprm->e_uid != current_euid() ||
+	    bprm->e_gid != current_egid()) {
 		set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
 		current->pdeath_signal = 0;
 	} else if (file_permission(bprm->file, MAY_READ) ||
 			(bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP)) {
-		suid_keys(current);
 		set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
 	}
 
@@ -1096,10 +1095,8 @@ void compute_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	int unsafe;
 
-	if (bprm->e_uid != current_uid()) {
-		suid_keys(current);
+	if (bprm->e_uid != current_uid())
 		current->pdeath_signal = 0;
-	}
 	exec_keys(current);
 
 	task_lock(current);
@@ -1709,8 +1706,9 @@ int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs * regs)
 	struct linux_binfmt * binfmt;
 	struct inode * inode;
 	struct file * file;
+	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct cred *cred;
 	int retval = 0;
-	int fsuid = current_fsuid();
 	int flag = 0;
 	int ispipe = 0;
 	unsigned long core_limit = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur;
@@ -1723,12 +1721,20 @@ int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs * regs)
 	binfmt = current->binfmt;
 	if (!binfmt || !binfmt->core_dump)
 		goto fail;
+
+	cred = prepare_creds();
+	if (!cred) {
+		retval = -ENOMEM;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
 	down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
 	/*
 	 * If another thread got here first, or we are not dumpable, bail out.
 	 */
 	if (mm->core_state || !get_dumpable(mm)) {
 		up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+		put_cred(cred);
 		goto fail;
 	}
 
@@ -1739,12 +1745,16 @@ int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs * regs)
 	 */
 	if (get_dumpable(mm) == 2) {	/* Setuid core dump mode */
 		flag = O_EXCL;		/* Stop rewrite attacks */
-		current->cred->fsuid = 0;	/* Dump root private */
+		cred->fsuid = 0;	/* Dump root private */
 	}
 
 	retval = coredump_wait(exit_code, &core_state);
-	if (retval < 0)
+	if (retval < 0) {
+		put_cred(cred);
 		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	old_cred = override_creds(cred);
 
 	/*
 	 * Clear any false indication of pending signals that might
@@ -1835,7 +1845,8 @@ fail_unlock:
 	if (helper_argv)
 		argv_free(helper_argv);
 
-	current->cred->fsuid = fsuid;
+	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	put_cred(cred);
 	coredump_finish(mm);
 fail:
 	return retval;
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/auth.c b/fs/nfsd/auth.c
index 808fc03a6fbd..836ffa1047d9 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/auth.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/auth.c
@@ -27,55 +27,67 @@ int nfsexp_flags(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp)
 
 int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp)
 {
-	struct cred *act_as = current->cred ;
-	struct svc_cred	cred = rqstp->rq_cred;
+	struct group_info *rqgi;
+	struct group_info *gi;
+	struct cred *new;
 	int i;
 	int flags = nfsexp_flags(rqstp, exp);
 	int ret;
 
+	new = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	new->fsuid = rqstp->rq_cred.cr_uid;
+	new->fsgid = rqstp->rq_cred.cr_gid;
+
+	rqgi = rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info;
+
 	if (flags & NFSEXP_ALLSQUASH) {
-		cred.cr_uid = exp->ex_anon_uid;
-		cred.cr_gid = exp->ex_anon_gid;
-		cred.cr_group_info = groups_alloc(0);
+		new->fsuid = exp->ex_anon_uid;
+		new->fsgid = exp->ex_anon_gid;
+		gi = groups_alloc(0);
 	} else if (flags & NFSEXP_ROOTSQUASH) {
-		struct group_info *gi;
-		if (!cred.cr_uid)
-			cred.cr_uid = exp->ex_anon_uid;
-		if (!cred.cr_gid)
-			cred.cr_gid = exp->ex_anon_gid;
-		gi = groups_alloc(cred.cr_group_info->ngroups);
-		if (gi)
-			for (i = 0; i < cred.cr_group_info->ngroups; i++) {
-				if (!GROUP_AT(cred.cr_group_info, i))
-					GROUP_AT(gi, i) = exp->ex_anon_gid;
-				else
-					GROUP_AT(gi, i) = GROUP_AT(cred.cr_group_info, i);
-			}
-		cred.cr_group_info = gi;
-	} else
-		get_group_info(cred.cr_group_info);
-
-	if (cred.cr_uid != (uid_t) -1)
-		act_as->fsuid = cred.cr_uid;
-	else
-		act_as->fsuid = exp->ex_anon_uid;
-	if (cred.cr_gid != (gid_t) -1)
-		act_as->fsgid = cred.cr_gid;
-	else
-		act_as->fsgid = exp->ex_anon_gid;
+		if (!new->fsuid)
+			new->fsuid = exp->ex_anon_uid;
+		if (!new->fsgid)
+			new->fsgid = exp->ex_anon_gid;
 
-	if (!cred.cr_group_info)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	ret = set_groups(act_as, cred.cr_group_info);
-	put_group_info(cred.cr_group_info);
-	if ((cred.cr_uid)) {
-		act_as->cap_effective =
-			cap_drop_nfsd_set(act_as->cap_effective);
+		gi = groups_alloc(rqgi->ngroups);
+		if (!gi)
+			goto oom;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < rqgi->ngroups; i++) {
+			if (!GROUP_AT(rqgi, i))
+				GROUP_AT(gi, i) = exp->ex_anon_gid;
+			else
+				GROUP_AT(gi, i) = GROUP_AT(rqgi, i);
+		}
 	} else {
-		act_as->cap_effective =
-			cap_raise_nfsd_set(act_as->cap_effective,
-					   act_as->cap_permitted);
+		gi = get_group_info(rqgi);
 	}
+
+	if (new->fsuid == (uid_t) -1)
+		new->fsuid = exp->ex_anon_uid;
+	if (new->fsgid == (gid_t) -1)
+		new->fsgid = exp->ex_anon_gid;
+
+	ret = set_groups(new, gi);
+	put_group_info(gi);
+	if (!ret)
+		goto error;
+
+	if (new->uid)
+		new->cap_effective = cap_drop_nfsd_set(new->cap_effective);
+	else
+		new->cap_effective = cap_raise_nfsd_set(new->cap_effective,
+							new->cap_permitted);
+	return commit_creds(new);
+
+oom:
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+error:
+	abort_creds(new);
 	return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c
index 632a50b4b371..9371ea12d7fa 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c
@@ -54,20 +54,26 @@
 static struct path rec_dir;
 static int rec_dir_init = 0;
 
-static void
-nfs4_save_user(uid_t *saveuid, gid_t *savegid)
+static int
+nfs4_save_creds(const struct cred **original_creds)
 {
-	*saveuid = current->cred->fsuid;
-	*savegid = current->cred->fsgid;
-	current->cred->fsuid = 0;
-	current->cred->fsgid = 0;
+	struct cred *new;
+
+	new = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	new->fsuid = 0;
+	new->fsgid = 0;
+	*original_creds = override_creds(new);
+	put_cred(new);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static void
-nfs4_reset_user(uid_t saveuid, gid_t savegid)
+nfs4_reset_creds(const struct cred *original)
 {
-	current->cred->fsuid = saveuid;
-	current->cred->fsgid = savegid;
+	revert_creds(original);
 }
 
 static void
@@ -129,10 +135,9 @@ nfsd4_sync_rec_dir(void)
 int
 nfsd4_create_clid_dir(struct nfs4_client *clp)
 {
+	const struct cred *original_cred;
 	char *dname = clp->cl_recdir;
 	struct dentry *dentry;
-	uid_t uid;
-	gid_t gid;
 	int status;
 
 	dprintk("NFSD: nfsd4_create_clid_dir for \"%s\"\n", dname);
@@ -140,7 +145,9 @@ nfsd4_create_clid_dir(struct nfs4_client *clp)
 	if (!rec_dir_init || clp->cl_firststate)
 		return 0;
 
-	nfs4_save_user(&uid, &gid);
+	status = nfs4_save_creds(&original_cred);
+	if (status < 0)
+		return status;
 
 	/* lock the parent */
 	mutex_lock(&rec_dir.dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
@@ -168,7 +175,7 @@ out_unlock:
 		clp->cl_firststate = 1;
 		nfsd4_sync_rec_dir();
 	}
-	nfs4_reset_user(uid, gid);
+	nfs4_reset_creds(original_cred);
 	dprintk("NFSD: nfsd4_create_clid_dir returns %d\n", status);
 	return status;
 }
@@ -211,20 +218,21 @@ nfsd4_build_dentrylist(void *arg, const char *name, int namlen,
 static int
 nfsd4_list_rec_dir(struct dentry *dir, recdir_func *f)
 {
+	const struct cred *original_cred;
 	struct file *filp;
 	struct dentry_list_arg dla = {
 		.parent = dir,
 	};
 	struct list_head *dentries = &dla.dentries;
 	struct dentry_list *child;
-	uid_t uid;
-	gid_t gid;
 	int status;
 
 	if (!rec_dir_init)
 		return 0;
 
-	nfs4_save_user(&uid, &gid);
+	status = nfs4_save_creds(&original_cred);
+	if (status < 0)
+		return status;
 
 	filp = dentry_open(dget(dir), mntget(rec_dir.mnt), O_RDONLY,
 			   current_cred());
@@ -250,7 +258,7 @@ out:
 		dput(child->dentry);
 		kfree(child);
 	}
-	nfs4_reset_user(uid, gid);
+	nfs4_reset_creds(original_cred);
 	return status;
 }
 
@@ -312,8 +320,7 @@ out:
 void
 nfsd4_remove_clid_dir(struct nfs4_client *clp)
 {
-	uid_t uid;
-	gid_t gid;
+	const struct cred *original_cred;
 	int status;
 
 	if (!rec_dir_init || !clp->cl_firststate)
@@ -323,9 +330,13 @@ nfsd4_remove_clid_dir(struct nfs4_client *clp)
 	if (status)
 		goto out;
 	clp->cl_firststate = 0;
-	nfs4_save_user(&uid, &gid);
+
+	status = nfs4_save_creds(&original_cred);
+	if (status < 0)
+		goto out;
+
 	status = nfsd4_unlink_clid_dir(clp->cl_recdir, HEXDIR_LEN-1);
-	nfs4_reset_user(uid, gid);
+	nfs4_reset_creds(original_cred);
 	if (status == 0)
 		nfsd4_sync_rec_dir();
 	mnt_drop_write(rec_dir.mnt);
@@ -402,16 +413,21 @@ nfsd4_recdir_load(void) {
 void
 nfsd4_init_recdir(char *rec_dirname)
 {
-	uid_t			uid = 0;
-	gid_t			gid = 0;
-	int 			status;
+	const struct cred *original_cred;
+	int status;
 
 	printk("NFSD: Using %s as the NFSv4 state recovery directory\n",
 			rec_dirname);
 
 	BUG_ON(rec_dir_init);
 
-	nfs4_save_user(&uid, &gid);
+	status = nfs4_save_creds(&original_cred);
+	if (status < 0) {
+		printk("NFSD: Unable to change credentials to find recovery"
+		       " directory: error %d\n",
+		       status);
+		return;
+	}
 
 	status = kern_path(rec_dirname, LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY,
 			&rec_dir);
@@ -421,7 +437,7 @@ nfsd4_init_recdir(char *rec_dirname)
 
 	if (!status)
 		rec_dir_init = 1;
-	nfs4_reset_user(uid, gid);
+	nfs4_reset_creds(original_cred);
 }
 
 void
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c b/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
index e67cfaea0865..f0da7d9c3a92 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
@@ -186,9 +186,14 @@ static __be32 nfsd_set_fh_dentry(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp)
 		 * access control settings being in effect, we cannot
 		 * fix that case easily.
 		 */
-		current->cred->cap_effective =
-			cap_raise_nfsd_set(current->cred->cap_effective,
-					   current->cred->cap_permitted);
+		struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
+		if (!new)
+			return nfserrno(-ENOMEM);
+		new->cap_effective =
+			cap_raise_nfsd_set(new->cap_effective,
+					   new->cap_permitted);
+		put_cred(override_creds(new));
+		put_cred(new);
 	} else {
 		error = nfsd_setuser_and_check_port(rqstp, exp);
 		if (error)
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index f96eaab280a3..c0a426d5766c 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -425,30 +425,33 @@ out:
  */
 asmlinkage long sys_faccessat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int mode)
 {
-	struct cred *cred = current->cred;
+	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct cred *override_cred;
 	struct path path;
 	struct inode *inode;
-	int old_fsuid, old_fsgid;
-	kernel_cap_t uninitialized_var(old_cap);  /* !SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP */
 	int res;
 
 	if (mode & ~S_IRWXO)	/* where's F_OK, X_OK, W_OK, R_OK? */
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	old_fsuid = cred->fsuid;
-	old_fsgid = cred->fsgid;
+	override_cred = prepare_creds();
+	if (!override_cred)
+		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	cred->fsuid = cred->uid;
-	cred->fsgid = cred->gid;
+	override_cred->fsuid = override_cred->uid;
+	override_cred->fsgid = override_cred->gid;
 
 	if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
 		/* Clear the capabilities if we switch to a non-root user */
-		if (current->cred->uid)
-			old_cap = cap_set_effective(__cap_empty_set);
+		if (override_cred->uid)
+			cap_clear(override_cred->cap_effective);
 		else
-			old_cap = cap_set_effective(cred->cap_permitted);
+			override_cred->cap_effective =
+				override_cred->cap_permitted;
 	}
 
+	old_cred = override_creds(override_cred);
+
 	res = user_path_at(dfd, filename, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path);
 	if (res)
 		goto out;
@@ -485,12 +488,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_faccessat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int mode)
 out_path_release:
 	path_put(&path);
 out:
-	cred->fsuid = old_fsuid;
-	cred->fsgid = old_fsgid;
-
-	if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP))
-		cap_set_effective(old_cap);
-
+	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	put_cred(override_cred);
 	return res;
 }